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  The	   thesis	   in	  hand	  will	   attempt	   to	  define	   fairness	   in	   the	   light	  of	   the	  ECHR	  and	  examine	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  this	  concept	  applies	  to	  EU	  law.	  What	  is	   fairness	  in	  criminal	  proceedings?	  How	  can	  it	  be	  appropriated	  in	  a	  European	  Union	  context?	  Which	   are	   the	   characteristics	   of	   a	   concept	   on	   evidential	   fairness	   in	   Europe?	  Which	  are	  the	  applications	  of	  this	  concept	  in	  EU	  Criminal	  Law?	  	  The	  core	  question	  of	  the	  thesis	  in	  hand	  is	  summarised	  on	  how	  a	  concept	  of	  fair	  criminal	   evidence	   in	   Europe	   can	   be	   utilised	   by	   the	   EU	   in	   its	   further	   steps	   of	  integration	  in	  the	  area	  of	  European	  Criminal	  Law.	  The	  first	  part	  of	  it	  deals	  with	  the	  characteristics	  of	  such	  a	  concept,	  namely	  its	  origin,	  environment	  and	  content,	  whereas	   the	   second	   part	   researches	   the	   applications	   of	   this	   concept	   in	   EU	  Criminal	   Law	   and	   especially	   in	   mutual	   recognition	   as	   a	   principle	   and	   as	   it	   is	  incorporated	   in	   legal	   instruments	   such	  as	   the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  and	  the	  new	  draft	  for	  a	  European	  Investigation	  Order.	  	  In	  terms	  of	  methodology,	  the	  essential	  sources	  for	  this	  thesis	  are	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (plus	  relevant	  reports	  and	  decisions	  of	  the	  Commission)	   and	   European	   Court	   of	   Justice	   (only	   those	   with	   reference	   to	  criminal	  proceedings);	  furthermore,	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  European	  Union	  texts	  (treaties,	   legislation,	  preparatory	  acts,	  parliamentary	  questions,	  proposals,	  comments,	  etc.).	  Jurisprudentially,	  the	  thesis	  is	  inspired	  in	  principle	   by	   natural	   law	   theories	   (e.g.	   new	   natural	   law	   theory,	   practical	  reasonableness)	   and	   also	   influenced	   to	   a	   certain	   extent	   by	   systems	   and	   social	  contract	  theories.	  These	  are	  mentioned	  here	  more	  as	  the	  underlining	  premises	  of	  thought	  used	  rather	  than	  as	  concepts	  that	  are	  part	  of	  the	  analysis	  or	  directly	  in	  dialogue	  with	  what	  is	  proposed.	  	  In	  part	  (A)	  of	  the	  thesis	  the	  first	  leg	  of	  the	  research	  question	  is	  discussed,	  namely	  the	  characteristics	  of	  a	  concept	  on	  evidential	  fairness	  in	  Europe.	  In	  Chapter	  2,	  the	  starting	   point	   is	   the	   origin	   of	   evidential	   fairness.	   It	   is	   argued	   that	   fairness	   in	  evidential	  matters	   in	  a	  European	   level	  comes	   into	  existence	   in	   the	  realm	  of	   the	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Council	   of	   Europe.	   The	   fact	   that	   the	   Treaty	   on	   European	   Union	   (Maastricht	  Treaty)	  proclaims	  the	  respect	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  as	  guaranteed	  in	  the	  ECHR,	  provides	   the	   grounds	   that	   there	   is	   also	   a	   legislative	   thread	   of	   inheritance	  between	  the	  two	  organisations.	  The	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  with	  its	  Article	  6	   is	   presented	   as	   evidence-­‐relevant,	   while	   it	   is	   also	   argued	   that	   criminal	  evidence,	   criminal	   procedure	   and	   fairness,	   as	   conceptions	   of	   law,	   are	  interdependent	  and	  all	  accommodated	  in	  Article	  6.	  Before	  its	  legal	  construction	  in	  the	  text	  of	  Article	  6,	  the	  autonomy	  of	  fairness	  as	  a	  concept	  of	  evidence	  law	  is	  discussed.	  It	  is	  emphasised	  that	  fairness	  consists	  a	  principle	  of	  the	  same	  order	  as	  relevance	  and	  admissibility.	  Its	  relationship	  with	  procedure	  and	  evidence	  is	  also	  pointed	  out	  both	  conceptually	  and	  with	  relation	  to	  the	  text	  of	  Article	  6.	  	  In	  Chapter	  3,	  the	  focus	  is	  on	  the	  environment	  of	  the	  evidential	   fairness,	   formed	  by	   Article	   6	   of	   ECHR	   and	   shaped	   in	   detail	   by	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Human	  Rights.	  What	  follows,	  is	  an	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  law	  of	  ECtHR	  on	  Article	  6	  (‘right	  to	  a	   fair	   trial’)	   in	   terms	   of	   fairness.	   In	   other	   words,	   the	   Article	   6	   of	   the	   ECHR	   is	  interpreted	  in	  terms	  of	  evidence	  law.	  The	  goal	  is	  to	  observe	  the	  Court’s	  standing	  on	   evidence	   matters	   with	   which	   Article	   6	   is	   directly	   (Ch.	   4)	   or	   indirectly	  constellated.	   Only	   within	   the	   context	   of	   Strasbourg’s	   case	   law	   can	   be	   rightly	  found	   the	   material	   needed	   for	   the	   distillation	   of	   the	   principles	   of	   evidential	  fairness.	  	  	  It	   is	   also	   believed	   that	   there	   are	   elements	   that	   are	   more	   closely	   related	   to	  evidence	   matters,	   such	   as	   adversarial	   proceedings,	   the	   right	   to	   a	   reasoned	  judgment,	   the	   presumption	   of	   innocence	   and	   safeguards	   against	   the	   use	   of	  illegally	  obtained	  evidence.	  The	  first	  part	  of	  the	  thesis	  closes	  with	  the	  content	  of	  evidential	  fairness	  (Ch.	  4).	  That	  consists	  of	  propositions	  on	  principles	  emanating	  from	  within	  the	  environment	  created	  by	  Strasbourg’s	  case	  law.	  It	  includes	  values	  that	  speak	  in	  favour	  of	  evidence	  confronted	  in	  a	  ‘vis-­‐à-­‐vis’	  manner,	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  serving	  as	  modus	  judicandi,	  judicial	  decisions	  open,	  transparent	  and	  examinable	   and	   finally	   an	   overarching	   liberal	   maxim.	   These	   principles	   are	  further	   supported	   by	   the	   application	   of	   a	   holistic	   approach	   to	   Article	   6	   that	  proves	  the	  necessity	  and	  key	  role	  of	  the	  environment	  in	  the	  shaping	  and	  function	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of	  their	  content	  and	  a	  theoretical	  construct	  that	  qualifies	  them	  as	  axiomatic	  tools	  ready	  to	  be	  tested	  in	  EU	  level.	  	  	  	  In	   the	   second	   part,	   the	   interest	   moves	   into	   the	   European	   Union	   and	   the	  evidential	  matters	  within	   its	   Area	   of	   Freedom,	   Security	   and	   Justice.	   Here,	   it	   is	  discussed	  the	  next	  leg	  of	  the	  research	  question,	  i.e.	  how	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  first	  part	  about	  a	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept	  apply	  to	  the	  judicial	  cooperation	  on	  evidence	  matters	   in	   EU	   level.	   Here	   by	   ‘applying’	   it	   is	  meant	   the	   testing	   of	   two	  different	  conditions;	  firstly,	  if	  the	  principles	  adopted	  in	  the	  first	  part	  are	  already	  –subconsciously	  or	  not–	  followed	  in	  practice,	  and	  to	  what	  extent,	  and	  secondly,	  how	   they	   can	   improve	   and	   adjust	   the	   existing	   system.	   Applying	   evidential	  fairness	  to	  the	  European	  Union	  realm	  of	  criminal	  matters	  necessarily	  has	  to	  start	  with	  mutual	  recognition.	  Mutual	  recognition	  is	  the	  main	  means	  and	  rationale	  of	  the	  EU	  legislation	  in	  the	  area	  of	  European	  Criminal	  Law.	  It	  is	  argued	  though	  that	  the	  mutual	  recognition	  principle	  is	  not	  only	  a	  principle	  unknown	  to	  the	  criminal	  law	   traditions	   of	   Europe	   but	   also	   a	   concept	   that	   does	   not	   correspond	   to	   the	  general	  principles	  of	  EU	  Law.	  	  	  Since	   the	   purpose	   of	   this	   thesis	   is	   the	   illustration	   of	   the	   idea	   of	   fairness	   in	  criminal	  evidence,	  the	  related	  discussion	  cannot	  be	  avoided,	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  the	  fairest	  possible	  way	  of	  managing	  evidence	   in	  united	  Europe.	   In	  the	  5th	  chapter	  and	   first	   of	   the	   second	   part,	   the	   fair	   character	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   will	   be	  discovered	  in	  its	  placement	  within	  the	  EU	  Law	  structure	  and	  in	  particular	  in	  the	  area	   of	   judicial	   cooperation	   in	   criminal	   matters.	   The	   specialness	   of	   mutual	  recognition	   as	   a	   mechanism	   of	   cooperation	   will	   be	   discovered	   as	   well	   as	   its	  accordance	  to	  fairness.	  However,	  it	  is	  a	  fact	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  in	   criminal	  matters	  within	   the	  EU	   is	  not	  absolute.	   It	  will	  be	  argued	   that	  by	   the	  particular	   adjustments	   that	   a	   fair	   criminal	   evidence	   concept	   can	   bring	   to	   it,	   a	  more	  sensitive	  cooperation	  can	  be	   forwarded	  in	   favour	  of	   the	  protection	  of	   the	  European	  citizens.	  	  	  Mutual	  recognition	  will	  be	  the	  starting	  point,	  firstly	  as	  it	  is	  set	  within	  the	  EU	  Law	  area	   and	   secondly	   as	   it	   has	   become	   part	   and	   parcel	   of	   judicial	   cooperation	   in	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criminal	   matters.	   The	   related	   objections	   and	   arguments	   to	   it	   will	   be	   also	  examined.	   Before	   its	   interplay	  with	   fairness	  will	   be	   proposed,	   it	   is	   crucial	   that	  mutual	   recognition	   can	  be	  presented	  as	   a	   sophisticated	  administrative	   concept	  that	   has	   its	   own	   distinctive	   characteristics.	   It	   is	   this	   very	   nature	   of	   mutual	  recognition	   that	  makes	   fairness	   a	   conception	   that	   can	   elevate	   qualitatively	   the	  proper	   function	  of	   the	   former	   in	   the	   sphere	  of	  European	  Criminal	  Law.	  This	   is	  also	  supported	  by	  the	  evolution	  of	  instruments	  in	  criminal	  matters	  (from	  mutual	  legal	   assistance	   to	   mutual	   recognition)	   and	   the	   aftermath	   of	   their	   negotiation	  and	  practice.	  	  After	  introducing	  the	  idea	  of	  interaction	  of	  fairness	  and	  mutual	  recognition,	  the	  following	  chapter	  (Ch.	  6)	  will	  focus	  on	  this	  proposition	  in	  a	  more	  practical	  level,	  namely	   the	   application	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   fair	   criminal	   evidence	   in	   the	   most	  forwarded	  initiatives	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  in	  criminal	  evidence.	  Therefore,	  the	  sixth	   and	   seventh	   chapter	   will	   analyse	   respectively	   the	   European	   Evidence	  Warrant	  Framework	  Decision	  and	   the	  draft	   for	  a	  new	  Directive	  on	  a	  European	  Investigation	  Order.1	  	  	  The	  sixth	  chapter	  will	  begin	  with	  some	  of	   the	   latest	   issues	   in	  European	   judicial	  cooperation	  in	  criminal	  matters	  that	  shed	  light	  to	  the	  discussion,	  such	  as	  the	  EU	  accession	  in	  the	  ECHR,	  the	  transnational	  element	  of	  the	  traditional	  trial	  and	  the	  gathering	  and	  admissibility	  of	  evidence	  landscape	  after	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty.	  It	  will	  continue	  in	  particular	  with	  the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant,	  its	  content,	  its	  main	  issues	  and	  the	  procedural	  safeguards	  provisioned	  in	  its	  text.	  Parallel	  to	  that	  the	  principles	  of	  evidential	  fairness	  as	  derived	  from	  ECHR	  and	  ECtHR’s	  case	  law	  will	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  instrument	  pointing	  in	  a	  critical	  way	  its	  strengths	  and	  flaws.	  In	  the	  last	  chapter	  (Ch.	  7)	  of	  this	  part	  the	  same	  will	  apply	  to	  the	  new	  initiative	  for	  a	  European	  Investigation	  Order.	  	  	  The	  conception	  of	  a	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept	  in	  Europe	  with	  the	  ambition	  to	   be	   applied	   in	   the	   area	   of	   judicial	   cooperation	   in	   criminal	   matters	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  analysis	  is	  based	  upon	  the	  text	  agreed	  as	  general	  approach	  by	  the	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	   This	   is	   the	   Council’s	   agreed	   position	   before	   entering	   first	   reading	   ‘trilogue’	   with	   the	  European	  Parliament.	  See	  more	  below	  under	  7.	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European	   Union	   cannot	   offer	   a	   definitive	   solution	   to	   the	   issues	   related	   to	   the	  transnational	   law	   enforcement	   under	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   in	   the	   European	   Union.	  Nevertheless,	   this	   way,	   although	   thorny,	   is	   worth	   following	   as	   it	   can	   ensure	   a	  substantive	  concept	  of	  freedom	  in	  a	  border-­‐less	  Europe.	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Conceiving	  evidential	  fairness	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Introduction	  	  
	  In	  this	  first	  chapter	  of	  the	  first	  part,	  the	  origin	  of	  a	  concept	  on	  evidential	  fairness	  will	  be	  constructed.	  The	  starting	  point	  of	  the	  whole	  effort	  is	  the	  practical	  need	  for	  common	   ground	   on	   evidence	   matters	   in	   the	   united	   Europe.	   The	   threat	   of	  transnational	   crime2	  demands	   an	   answer	   that	   is	   legally	   coherent,	   efficient	   and	  protective.	   That	   demand	   compels	   for	   evidence	   principles	   shared	   among	   the	  states	  that	  constitute	  the	  European	  Union.	  Where	  are	  thus	  these	  principles	  to	  be	  found?	  In	  order	  to	  engage	  with	  this	  question,	  we	  need	  to	  look	  closer	  to	  evidence	  law,	  its	  definition	  and	  internal	  logic.	  There	  are	  principles	  and	  concepts	  that	  drive	  its	  function	  and	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  these	  there	  is	  also	  the	  concept	  of	  fairness.	  Without	  analyzing	  a	  definition	  of	  fairness	  and	  focusing	  on	  the	  purposes	  of	  this	  thesis	  we	  move	   straight	   into	   the	   legal	   realm	   where	   fairness	   in	   Europe	   is	   widely	   and	  commonly	  accepted,	  construed	  and	  forwarded.	  The	  platform	  for	  the	  rest	  of	  this	  analysis	   becomes	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe,	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	  Rights	   and	   especially	   its	   Article	   6	   on	   the	   right	   to	   a	   fair	   trial.	   Article	   6	   is	  represented	   as	   related	   to	   evidence	   law.	   It	   is	   argued	   that	   criminal	   procedure,	  fairness	  in	  trial	  and	  evidence	  law	  are	  interdependent	  legal	  concepts.	  The	  chapter	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2 	  For	   a	   presentation	   of	   transnational	   organised	   crime	   see	   among	   others,	   D	   McClean,	  
Transnational	  Organized	  Crime	  –	  A	   commentary	  on	   the	  UN	  Convention	  and	   its	  Protocols,	   Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007.	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closes	   with	   a	   small	   introduction	   on	   the	   tendencies	   of	   the	   European	   Court	   of	  Human	  Rights	  towards	  evidence	  law	  while	  applying	  Article	  6.	  	  
	  
	  
2.1.	   The	   need	   of	   common	   evidence	   principles	   in	   European	   criminal	  
procedures	  	  Transnational	  law	  enforcement3	  is	  one	  of	  the	  areas	  that	  currently	  attract	  a	  lot	  of	  attention	   and	   have	   given	   rise	   to	   significant	   controversy	   within	   the	   European	  Union.	   Its	   practical	   importance	   is	   without	   doubt	   great	   both	   for	   prosecution	  authorities	  and	  EU	  citizens.	  The	  approach	  of	   transnational	   law	  enforcement	  on	  the	   basis	   of	   common,	   shared	   fundamental	   procedural	   principles	   have	   to	  concentrate	   on	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   citizen.4	  Such	   an	   approach	   will	   focus	   on	  European	   legal	   values	   and	  will	   respond	   to	   a	   convergence5	  of	   several	   European	  criminal	   procedural	   laws	   that	   respect	   its	   very	   substance.	   The	   phase	   of	  investigation	  in	  transnational	  law	  enforcement	  in	  the	  EU	  is	  laden	  with	  problems.	  This	  part	  of	  the	  process	  is	  particularly	  significant	  as	  the	  investigation	  is	  normally	  conducted	  in	  more	  than	  one	  state.	  	  	  Far	  more	  difficult,	  however,	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  transnational	  gathering	  and	  use	  of	  evidence,	  since	  in	  that	  case	  one	  must	  take	  into	  account	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  different	  investigation	  processes.6	  In	  a	  united	  Europe,	  a	  transnational	  criminal	  procedure	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  See	   also	   V	   Mitsilegas,	   ‘From	   National	   to	   Global,	   From	   Empirical	   to	   Legal:	   The	   Ambivalent	  Concept	   of	   Transnational	   Organized	   Crime’,	   in	   Critical	   Reflections	   on	   Transnational	   Organized	  
Crime,	  Money	   Laundering,	   and	   Corruption,	   ed.	   Margaret	   E.	   Beare,	   University	   of	   Toronto	   Press,	  2003,	  pp	  55-­‐87.	  4	  See	   also	  Av	  Bogdandy,	   ‘The	  European	  Union	   as	   a	  Human	  Rights	  Organization?	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  core	  of	  the	  European	  Union’,	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review,	  (2000)	  Vol.	  37,	  pp	  1307-­‐1338.	  5	  There	   is	   a	   lot	   of	   discussion	   about	   convergence	   in	   criminal	   procedure.	   See	   N	   Jorg,	   S	   Field,	   C	  Brants,	   ‘Are	   Inquisitorial	   and	   Adversarial	   Systems	   Converging?’	   in	   C	   Harding	   et	   al,	   Criminal	  
Justice	  Europe:	  A	  Comparative	  Study	  (Oxford,	  Clarendon	  Press,	  1995),	  p	  41;	  JD	  Jackson,	  ‘The	  Effect	  of	   Human	   Rights	   on	   Criminal	   Evidentiary	   Processes:	   Towards	   Convergence,	   Divergence	   or	  Realignment’	  (2005)	  68	  MLR	  737.	  Also	  A	  Esmein,	  A	  History	  of	  Continental	  Criminal	  Procedure	  with	  
Special	   Reference	   to	   France	   (trans	   J	   Simpson,	   Boston,	   MA,	   Little	   Brown	   &	   Co,	   1913;	   reprinted	  Union,	  NJ,	  The	  Lawbook	  Exchange,	  2000)	  p	  604:	  ‘The	  trend	  of	  the	  trial	  procedure	  in	  the	  various	  European	  countries	  is	  shown	  rather	  by	  common	  characteristics	  than	  by	  essential	  differences’.	  6	  See	  (i.a.)	  J	  Spencer,	  An	  Academic	  Critique	  of	  the	  EU-­‐Aquis	  in	  Relation	  to	  Trans-­‐Border	  Evidence-­‐Gathering,	   in	   ERA	   Forum,	   Special	   Issue	   2005,	   Dealing	   with	   European	   Evidence,	   p	   28,	   and	  especially	  pp	  36-­‐37,	  S	  Gleß,	  Eine	  akademische	  Kritik	  des	  „EU-­‐Aquis“	  zur	  grenzüberschreitenden	  Beweissammlung,	  in	  ERA	  (Hrsg.),	  Dealing	  with	  European	  Evidence,	  p	  41	  and	  especially	  p	  44.	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should	  focus	  on	  solving	  the	  problem	  of	  the	  use	  of	  evidence,	  which	  is	  obtained	  in	  other	  member-­‐states	  under	  national	  criminal	  procedures.	  One	  could	  argue	  that	  this	  goal	  can	  be	  achieved	  through	  the	  harmonization	  of	  the	  evidentiary	  rules	  and	  the	   rules	   that	   impose	   certain	   measures	   of	   investigation;	   moreover,	   that	   these	  rules	  should	  establish	  a	  modicum	  of	  protection	  of	  fundamental	  human	  rights	  that	  respects	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	  criminal	  process	  under	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  rule	  of	   law	   and	   fair	   trial.	   Whichever	   the	   model	   adopted,	   it	   should	   certainly	   be	  engulfed	  into	  these	  standards.	  Gathering	  and	  admissibility	  of	  evidence	  is	  one	  of	  the	   top	   priority	   subjects	   within	   the	   realm	   of	   the	   evolving	   and	   developing	  European	  criminal	  law.	  	  	  In	  order	  to	  address	  the	  peculiarities	  of	  the	  matter	  on	  the	  EU	  level,	  one	  ought	  to	  begin	   from	   some	   fundamental	   common	   ground	   on	   evidence	   law.	   It	   is	   by	  understanding	  its	  principles	  and	  concepts	  of	  function	  that	  the	  key	  role	  of	  fairness	  on	   evidence	   matters	   can	   be	   revealed.	   Speaking	   about	   fairness	   in	   Europe,	   one	  inevitably	   thinks	   of	   Article	   6	   of	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights,	  which	   although	   written	   for	   other	   purposes	   and	   under	   specific	   historical	  circumstances,	  constitutes	  a	  coherent	  doctrinal	  approach	  on	  the	  matter.	  Fairness	  is	   not	   only	   related	   to	   evidence	   but	   is	   also	   next	   to	   it,	   an	   integral	   element	   of	   an	  ideal	   criminal	   procedure.	   The	   systemic	   interdependence	   between	   the	   three	  (procedure,	   fairness	   and	   evidence)	   is	   well	   enough	   construed	   in	   Article	   6	   and	  serves	  as	  the	  environment	  needed	  for	  some	  principles	  of	  evidential	  fairness	  that	  could	   suffice	   and	   be	   utilised	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   European	   criminal	   law	  mentioned	  above	  towards	  a	  more	  functional	  transnational	  law	  enforcement.	  But	  to	  comprehend	  all	  that,	  one	  should	  start	  from	  evidence.	  	  	  
2.2.	  Evidence	  law:	  a	  definition	  and	  some	  basic	  principles	  	  Evidence	   is	  governed	  by	   its	  own	  rules.	   ‘Conventional	  definitions	  of	   the	   ‘‘Law	  of	  Evidence’’	  describe	  it	  as	  ‘‘adjectival’’	  as	  opposed	  to	  ‘‘substantive’’	  law,	  a	  branch	  of	  legal	   doctrine	   pertaining	   to	   secondary	   issues	   of	   procedure	   than	   primary	   legal	  rights	  and	  duties.	  A	  more	  informative	  working	  definition	  is	  that	  Law	  of	  Evidence	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regulates	  the	  generation,	  collection,	  organization,	  presentation,	  and	  evaluation	  of	  information	  (‘‘evidence’’)	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  resolving	  disputes	  about	  past	  events	  in	   legal	  adjudication.	  Less	   technically,	  we	  might	  say	   in	  broad	  terms	  that	  Law	  of	  
Evidence	  governs	  fact-­‐finding	  in	  legal	  proceedings’.7	  	  
Roberts	  and	  Zuckerman8	  state	  some	  foundational	  principles	  of	  criminal	  evidence	  that	   ‘provide	   the	  structural	   scaffolding	  and	  serve	  as	  moral	   touchstones’	   for	   the	  rest.9	  Firstly,	   a	   fundamental	   concern	   of	   criminal	   evidence	   is	   the	   truth	   and	   the	  conformity	  with	   it	   as	   nearly	   as	   possible.	   Factual	   accuracy10	  is	   the	   utter	   goal	   of	  evidence	  law.11	  A	  second	  principle	  relates	  with	  the	  priority	  that	  the	  protection	  of	  the	   citizens	   enjoys.	   Trials	   are	   fallible.12	  It	   is	   possible	   that	   a	   guilty	   person	   is	  acquitted	  or	   an	   innocent	   convicted.	  The	  modern	   criminal	   process	  has	   an	   error	  preference	  to	  the	  first.	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  there	  is	  a	  heavy	  burden	  of	  proof	  on	  prosecution	  and	  that	  is	  why	  defence’s	  arsenal	  is	  full	  of	  rights.	  Beling	  writes	  that	  ‘to	   commit	   a	   crime	   depends	   on	   us;	   but	   whether	   we’ll	   be	   on	   the	   dock	   or	   not	  doesn’t’.13	  Protecting	  the	  innocent	  from	  conviction	  is	  a	  bias	  that	  resides	  in	  every	  system	   of	   criminal	   evidence.	  Blackstone	  boasted	   for	   example	   that	   ‘English	   law	  considers	   it	   better	   to	   let	   ten	   guilty	   men	   go	   free	   than	   to	   convict	   one	   single	  innocent’.14	  	  	  Directly	   linked	   to	   the	  protection	  of	   citizen	   is	   also	   the	  principle	  of	   the	   so-­‐called	  minimum	   state	   intervention	   that	   derives	   from	   liberal	   concepts	   of	   personal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  P	  Roberts	  and	  A	  Zuckerman,	  Criminal	  Evidence	  (Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2004)	  p	  2.	  8	  See	   also	   A	   Zuckerman,	   The	   Principles	   of	   Criminal	   Evidence	   (Oxford,	   Oxford	   University	   Press,	  1989).	  9	  P	   Roberts	   and	  A	   Zuckerman,	  Criminal	  Evidence,	   p	   18;	   see	   also	   Ι	   Dennis,	  The	  Law	  of	  Evidence,	  (Sweet	  &	  Maxwell,	  1999).	  10	  G	  Williams,	  ‘Law	  and	  Fact’	  [1976]	  Crim	  LR	  472.	  11	  W	   Twining,	   Theories	   of	   Evidence:	   Bentham	   and	   Wigmore	   (London,	   Weidenfeld	   &	   Nicolson,	  1985),	  ch	  1.	  12	  A	  Ashworth	  and	  M	  Redmayne,	  The	  Criminal	  Process	  (Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2004)	  p	  24.	  13	  See	  also	  E	  Beling,	  Deutsches	  Reichsstrafprozessrecht	  (Goldbach,	  Keip	  Verlag,	  1997).	  14	  P	  Roberts	   and	  A	   Zuckerman,	  Criminal	  Evidence,	   p	   19	   (f	   68).	   See	   also	  W	  Twining,	  Theories	  of	  
Evidence:	  Bentham	  and	  Wigmore	   (London,	  Weidenfeld	   &	   Nicolson,	   1985)	   p	  95-­‐98;	   G	  Williams,	  
The	  Proof	  of	  Guilt	  (London,	  Stevens,	  3rd	  edn,	  1963),	  p	  186-­‐188.	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autonomy.15	  According	  to	  this	  principle	  the	  state	  should	  interfere	  in	  individuals’	  lives	   within	   the	   frame	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   proportionality.	   Consequently,	   the	  demand	   for	   efficient	   proceedings	   should	   be	   filtered	   by	   this	   rationale	   when	   it	  comes	   to	   coercive	   measures	   and	   other	   investigative	   actions.	   Furthermore,	   all	  these	  apply	  with	  particular	  accent	  to	  the	  principle	  of	  humane	  treatment.	  As	  Kant	  puts	   it:	   ‘Every	   human	   being	   has	   a	   legitimate	   claim	   to	   respect	   from	   his	   fellow	  human	  beings	  and	   is	   in	   turn	  bound	  to	  respect	  every	  other.	  Humanity	   itself	   is	  a	  dignity;	   for	   a	   human	   being	   cannot	   be	   used	  merely	   as	   a	  means	   by	   any	   human	  being	  (either	  by	  others	  or	  even	  by	  himself)	  but	  must	  always	  be	  used	  at	  the	  same	  time	   as	   an	   end.	   It	   is	   just	   in	   this	   that	   his	   dignity	   (personality)	   consists’.16	  Consequently,	   every	   use	   of	   torture	   as	   measure	   of	   coercion	   is	   absolutely	  disqualified.17	  	  	  Last	  but	  not	  least,	  stands	  the	  principle	  of	  maintaining	  high	  standards	  of	  propriety	  in	   the	   criminal	   process.	   This	   last	   principle	   is	   the	   door	   of	   evidence	   to	   fairness.	  High	   standards	   of	   propriety	   are	   the	   safeguard	   of	   the	   legitimacy	   and	   moral	  integrity	  of	   the	  proceedings.	  To	   this	   rationale	  belong	  rules	  of	   charging	  and	   fair	  warning	  of	   the	  allegations,	  balance	  of	  power	  between	  prosecution	  and	  defence,	  etc.	  This	  way	  the	  innocent	  is	  protected	  and	  the	  accused	  is	  qualified	  to	  an	  active	  and	   respected	   participant	   of	   the	   trial.	   Evidently,	   this	   last	   principle	   which	  embodies	  fairness,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  next,	  is	  consistent	  with	  and	  forwards	  all	  other	  aforementioned	   four.	   Furthermore,	   apart	   from	   being	   part	   of	   a	   theoretical	  package	  of	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  criminal	  evidence,	  fairness	  could	  also	  star	  as	   a	   central	   concept	   of	   evidence	   next	   to	   the	   traditional	   two:	   relevance	   and	  admissibility.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  15 	  See	   also	   P	   Roberts,	   ‘Privacy,	   Autonomy	   and	   Criminal	   Justice	   Rights:	   Philosophical	  Preliminaries’	   in	   P	   Alldridge	   and	   C	   Brants	   (eds),	   Personal	   Autonomy,	   The	   Private	   Sphere	   and	  
Criminal	  Law:	  A	  Comparative	  Study	  (Oxford,	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2001).	  16	  I	  Kant,	  The	  Metaphysics	  of	  Morals	  ([1797]	  M	  Gregor	  (ed),	  Cambridge,	  CUP,	  1996)	  p	  209.	  17	  See	  also	  ECHR:	  ‘No	  one	  shall	  be	  subjected	  to	  torture	  or	  to	  inhuman	  or	  degrading	  treatment	  or	  punishment’	  (Article	  3).	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2.3.	  Admissibility,	  relevance	  and	  fairness	  as	  concepts	  of	  evidence	  law	  	  We	  will	   turn	   again	   to	   the	   definition	   and	   principles	   of	   evidence	   law	  within	   the	  context	  of	  Article	  6	  ECHR.	   It	   is	  high	  time	  we	  took	  a	  closer	   look	   into	  some	  basic	  concepts	  of	  evidence	  and	  detected	  the	  place	  of	  fairness	  among	  them.	  ‘Relevance	  and	   admissibility	   are	   understood	   as	   ‘‘basic	   concepts’’	   of	   the	   Law	   of	   Evidence.	  They	   are	   primary	   conceptual	   building-­‐blocks	   of	   Evidence	   scholarship	   and	   trial	  practice,	  which	  may	  be	  employed	  directly	  in	  their	  own	  right,	  or	  incorporated	  into	  more	  complex	  evidentiary	  rules,	  doctrines,	  and	  principles’.18	  	  Behind	   the	   term	   admissibility	   there	   is	   a	   question	   that	   also	   explains	   in	   the	  simplest	   manner	   the	   concept	   of	   it:	   Should	   a	   particular	   piece	   of	   evidence	   be	  admitted	  into	  the	  trial?	  There	  are	  different	  ways	  of	  answering	  this	  question,	  but	  the	   question	   itself	   is	   common	   in	   every	   legal	   order. 19 	  The	   decision	   on	  admissibility	  of	  evidence	  consists	  of	  questions	  of	  law	  that	  are	  for	  the	  judiciary	  to	  answer.	  Where	   in	   principle	   the	   admissibility	   of	   evidence	   into	   trial	   is	   not	   free,	  there	  are	  two	  key	  questions	  to	  be	  answered	  that	  determine	  the	  fate	  of	  evidential	  material.	  The	  first	  of	  them	  brings	  to	  the	  scene	  the	  concept	  of	  relevance.	  	  In	  order	  to	  conclude	  on	  the	  admissibility	  of	  evidence	  the	  judge	  should	  first	  ask:	  is	  the	  evidence	   in	  hand	  relevant?	   ‘Relevance	  denotes	  a	  relationship	  such	  that	  one	  fact	   (x)	  has	  some	  bearing	  on	  another	   fact	   (y),	  where	   the	  meaning	  of	   ‘has	  some	  bearing	  on’	   is	  supplied	  by	  the	  objectives	  of	  a	  designated	  enterprise’.20	  ‘Any	  two	  facts	   to	   which	   it	   is	   applied	   are	   so	   related	   to	   each	   other	   that	   according	   to	   the	  common	  course	  of	  events	  one	  either	  taken	  by	  itself	  or	  in	  connection	  with	  other	  facts	   proves	   or	   renders	   probable	   the	   past,	   present	   or	   future	   existence	   or	   non-­‐existence	  of	  the	  other’.21	  The	  nature,	  the	  quantum	  and	  the	  logic	  of	  legal	  relevance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  P	  Roberts	  and	  A	  Zuckerman,	  Criminal	  Evidence,	  p	  95.	  19	  There	  are	  countries	  for	  example	  that	  allow	  free	  admissibility	  of	  evidence,	  whereas	  other	  that	  impose	  restrictive	  rules	  about	  the	  types	  of	  evidence	  that	  may	  be	  used	  to	  establish	  the	  defendant’s	  guilt.	  These	  rules	  in	  the	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  world	  are	  known	  as	  exclusionary	  rules	  of	  evidence.	  See	  also	  J	  Dressler,	  Understanding	  Criminal	  Procedure	  (Matthew	  Bender,	  2nd	  edn,	  1997),	  ch	  21.	  20	  P	  Roberts	  and	  A	  Zuckerman,	  Criminal	  Evidence,	  p	  98.	  21	  James	  Fitzjames	  Stephen,	  A	  Digest	  of	  the	  Law	  of	  Evidence	  (Stevens,	  12	  edn.,	  1948),	  Art	  1.	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is	   out	   of	   the	   scope	   of	   this	   thesis.22	  As	   long	   as	   evidence	   is	   relevant,	   there	   is	  another	  question	  about	  the	  luck	  of	  proffered	  evidence	  on	  admission	  or	  exclusion.	  	  The	  second	  step	  of	  the	  admissibility	  inquiry	  has	  to	  do	  with	  whether	  the	  evidence	  is	   subject	   to	   any	  applicable	   exclusionary	   rules.	  There	  are	   exclusionary	   rules	   as	  opposed	  to	  the	  concept	  of	  free	  admissibility	  of	  evidence,	  but	  there	  are	  also	  other	  that	  exist	  in	  every	  state	  whether	  follows	  the	  concept	  of	  free	  admissibility	  or	  not.	  These	  exclusionary	  rules	  refer	  to	  evidence	  obtained	  illegally	  or	  in	  breach	  of	  the	  rules	   referring	   to	   the	   gathering	   of	   evidence.	   If	   the	   evidence	   in	   question	   is	   not	  subject	   to	   any	   exclusionary	   rule	   or,	   although	   it	   is,	   there	   is	   an	   applicable	  inclusionary	   exception	   to	   the	   applicable	   exclusionary	   rule,	   the	   evidence	   is	  admissible.	  	  The	  exclusionary	  rules,	  wherever	   they	  are	  met,	  cover	  several	  different	  areas	  of	  rationales	   (reasons	   for	   exclusion)	   that	   vary	   from	   the	   discovery	   of	   truth	   to	   the	  propriety	  of	  the	  proceedings.	  The	  last	  element	  is	  the	  area	  where	  the	  exclusionary	  rules	  intersect	  with	  fairness	  and	  therefore	  allow	  a	  space	  to	  be	  given	  for	  a	  more	  systematic	  approach	  of	   the	   latter	  as	  one	  of	   the	  basic	  concepts	  of	  evidence.	  The	  concept	   of	   ‘fair	   trial’	   is	   time	   to	   be	   included	   in	   the	   canon	   of	   basic	   evidentiary	  concepts,	  proposal	   that	   is	  made	  openly	   in	   the	   scholarship	  of	   evidence	   law.23	  In	  this	  way,	  fairness	  can	  serve	  as	  a	  third	  question	  in	  the	  admissibility	  inquiry	  or	  as	  
conditio	  sine	  qua	  non	   integrated	  in	  the	  second	  question,	  establishing	  a	  standard	  filter	   on	   admissibility.	   Hence,	   evidence	   should	   not	   only	   be	   relevant	   and	   not	  subject	   to	   any	   exclusionary	   rule,	   but	   furthermore	   it	   should	   be	   gathered	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  22	  On	   relevance	   see	   also	   e.g.	   JB	   Thayer,	   A	   Preliminary	   Treatise	   on	   Evidence	   (Boston,	   reprinted	  1969,	  1898);	  Sir	  R	  Cross,	  ‘Some	  Proposals	  for	  the	  Reform	  of	  the	  Law	  of	  Evidence’,	  (1961)	  24	  MLR	  32;	  P	  Berger	  and	  T	  Luckmann,	  The	  Social	  Construction	  of	  Reality	  (London,	  1967);	  J	  Bentham,	  The	  
Collected	   Works	   of	   Jeremy	   Bentham	   (London,	   UCL,	   1968-­‐1982);	   WG	   Dickson,	   Evidence	  (Edinburgh,	  T&T	  Clark,	  3rd	  edn,	  1887).	  	  23	  In	  England	  and	  Wales,	  ‘considerations	  of	  fairness	  have	  lately	  become	  crucial	  to	  determinations	  of	  admissibility,	  first	  through	  imaginative	  judicial	  interpretations	  of	  section	  78	  of	  the	  Police	  and	  Criminal	   Evidence	   Act	   (PACE)	   1984,	   and	   subsequently	   under	   the	   Human	   Rights	   Act’.	   See	   P	  Roberts	  and	  A	  Zuckerman,	  Criminal	  Evidence,	   ch.	  3	  and	  4.	  Section	  78	  of	  PACE	  1984	   ‘appears	   to	  invite	  trial	  judges	  to	  undertake	  wide-­‐ranging	  scrutiny	  of	  the	  circumstances	  in	  which	  prosecution	  evidence	  was	  obtained,	  and	  to	  utilize	  their	  discretion	  to	  exclude	  any	  evidence	  which	  might	  have	  a	  serious	  detrimental	   impact	  on	  the	  fairness	  of	  the	  proceedings.	  Commentators’	   initial	  scepticism	  as	   to	   whether	   78	   would	   really	   turn	   out	   in	   practice	   to	   mean	   what	   it	   apparently	   says	   must	   be	  understood	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  common	  law’s	  ancient	  hostility	  towards	  the	  exclusion	  of	  evidence	  on	  grounds	  of	  unfairness,	  impropriety,	  or	  illegality’	  (pp	  95,	  147).	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treated	   in	   a	   proper	   (fair)	   way	   in	   order	   to	   be	   admissible.	   The	   acceptance	   of	  fairness	  as	  one	  of	   the	  basic	   concepts	  of	   evidence	   law	  unlocks	   the	  possibility	  of	  forming	  a	  common	  corpus	  of	  evidentiary	  principles	  that	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  approach	  otherwise	   due	   to	   the	   different	   constructions	   of	   evidentiary	   rules	   among	   the	  states	  of	  united	  Europe.	  	  The	   ideal	   starting	   point	   for	   the	   attempt	   of	   understanding	   and	   forwarding	   a	  European	  criminal	  evidence	  concept	  on	  the	  grounds	  of	  fairness	  is	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  and	  the	  Court’s	  case	  law.	  The	  main	  reason	  for	  that	  is	  the	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  Convention	  which	  sets	  the	  ‘right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial’	  in	  criminal	  cases.	  In	  addition,	  the	  Council	   of	   Europe	   is	   the	   oldest	   international	   organisation	   working	   towards	  European	   integration	   and	   all	   its	   members	   are	   also	   EU	   member-­‐states.	  Furthermore,	   the	  Treaty	  on	  European	  Union	   (Maastricht	  Treaty)	  proclaims	   the	  respect	  of	   fundamental	  rights	  as	  guaranteed	  in	  the	  ECHR,	  providing	  substantial	  proof	   that	   there	   is	   also	   a	   legislative	   thread	   of	   inheritance	   between	   the	   two	  organisations.24	  	  	  
2.4.	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights:	  the	  text	  	  The	   title	   of	   the	   Article	   6	   reads	   ‘Right	   to	   a	   fair	   trial’.25	  It	   is	   divided	   into	   three	  paragraphs	   in	   which	   the	   right	   in	   discussion	   is	   shaped.	   In	   the	   text	   of	   the	   first	  paragraph	   appears	   the	   word	   ‘fair’	   that	   seems	   to	   be	   differentiated	   in	   terms	   of	  meaning	   in	   comparison	  with	   the	   notion	   of	   fairness	   as	   a	  whole,	   defined	   by	   the	  title.26	  Besides,	   the	   title	  was	  added	   to	   the	  Convention	  by	  Protocol	  No	  11	  which	  speaks	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  deliberate	  distinction	  between	  the	  two	  words	  rather	  than	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  See	   Article	   F	   para	   2	   of	  Maastricht	   Treaty:	   ‘2.	  The	  Union	   shall	   respect	   fundamental	   rights,	   as	  guaranteed	  by	   the	  European	  Convention	   for	   the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	   and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms	   signed	   in	   Rome	   on	   4	   November	   1950	   and	   as	   they	   result	   from	   the	   constitutional	  traditions	  common	  to	  the	  Member	  States,	  as	  general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law’.	  	  25	  For	   an	   analysis	   of	   Article	   6	   see	   among	   others	   S	   Stavros,	  The	  Guarantees	   for	  Accused	  Persons	  
under	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (Dordrecht:	  Martinus	  Nijhoff,	  1993).	  26	  SJ	  Summers,	  Fair	  Trials	  (Oxford,	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2007),	  ‘The	  use	  of	  the	  word	  “fair”,	  in	  the	  text	  suggests	  that	  it	  has	  a	  different	  role	  from	  the	  notion	  of	  fairness	  as	  a	  whole,	  defined	  by	  the	  title’	  (p	  102).	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random	   repetition.	   Hence,	   there	   is	   fairness	   of	   Article	   6§§1-­‐3	   and	   the	   more	  specific	  conception	  of	  it	  mentioned	  in	  the	  first	  paragraph.	  	  Article	  6	  –	  Right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial.	  1.	  In	  the	  determination	  of	  his	  civil	  rights	  and	  obligations	  or	  of	  any	  criminal	  charge	  against	  him,	  everyone	   is	  entitled	  to	  a	   fair	  and	  public	  hearing	  within	  a	  reasonable	  time	  by	  an	  independent	  and	  impartial	  tribunal	  established	  by	  law.	  Judgment	  shall	  be	  pronounced	  publicly	  but	  the	  press	  and	  public	  may	  be	  excluded	  from	  all	   or	  part	  of	   the	   trial	   in	   the	   interests	  of	  morals,	  public	  order	  or	  national	   security	   in	   a	  democratic	  society,	  where	  the	  interests	  of	  juveniles	  or	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  private	  life	  of	  the	  parties	  so	  require,	  or	  to	  the	  extent	  strictly	  necessary	  in	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  court	  in	  special	  circumstances	  where	  publicity	  would	  prejudice	  the	  interests	  of	  justice.	  	  2.	   Everyone	   charged	  with	   a	   criminal	   offence	   shall	   be	   presumed	   innocent	   until	   proved	  guilty	  according	  to	  law.	  	  3.	  Everyone	  charged	  with	  a	  criminal	  offence	  has	  the	  following	  minimum	  rights:	  a.	   to	   be	   informed	   promptly,	   in	   a	   language	  which	   he	   understands	   and	   in	   detail,	   of	   the	  nature	  and	  cause	  of	  the	  accusation	  against	  him;	  b.	  to	  have	  adequate	  time	  and	  facilities	  for	  the	  preparation	  of	  his	  defence;	  c.	   to	  defend	  himself	   in	  person	  or	  through	   legal	  assistance	  of	  his	  own	  choosing	  or,	   if	  he	  has	  not	  sufficient	  means	  to	  pay	  for	  legal	  assistance,	  to	  be	  given	  it	  free	  when	  the	  interests	  of	  justice	  so	  require;	  d.	  to	  examine	  or	  have	  examined	  witnesses	  against	  him	  and	  to	  obtain	  the	  attendance	  and	  examination	  of	  witnesses	  on	  his	  behalf	  under	  the	  same	  conditions	  as	  witnesses	  against	  him;	  e.	   to	   have	   the	   free	   assistance	   of	   an	   interpreter	   if	   he	   cannot	   understand	   or	   speak	   the	  language	  used	  in	  court.	  	  In	   Article	   6	   ECHR	   a	   total	   scenario	   of	   fairness	   is	   constructed.	   The	   context	   of	  fairness	  consists	  of	  the	  procedure,	  the	  fairness	  stricto	  sensu	  and	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  accused.	   This	   is	   the	   environment	   in	   which	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   situates	   the	  protection	  of	  the	  citizen	  and	  does	  so	  in	  an	  efficient,	  to	  the	  individual	  application	  opportunity	  concentrated,	  way.	  Hence,	  there	  is	  a	  catalogue	  of	  rights	  in	  paragraph	  3,	   so	   that	   the	   individuals	   can	   detect	  more	   effectively	   breaches	   of	   fairness	   and	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apply	  to	  the	  Court,	  which	  in	  return	  can	  easier	  examine	  the	  cases	  brought	  before	  it.	  	  
	  
2.5.	   Implied	   interdependence	   of	   criminal	   process,	   fairness	   and	   evidence	  
law	  	  Before	  dealing	  briefly	  with	  the	  content	  of	  Article	  6,	  it	  would	  be	  useful	  to	  pinpoint	  the	   interdependence	   between	   criminal	   procedure,27	  fairness	   and	   evidence,	   as	  these	   three	   elements	   are	   developed	   together	   in	   the	   internal	   system	   of	   the	  Convention’s	  Article	  under	  examination.	  The	  research	  of	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  in	  Europe	   has	   to	   take	   into	   account	   a	   threefold	   guarantee	   of	   fairness,	   which	  comprises	  procedure,	  fairness	  and	  evidence	  as	  points	  of	  peak.	  This	  conception	  is	  strongly	  supported	  by	  Article’s	  6	  ECHR	  orientations,	  which,	  although	  are	  rights-­‐based28	  –for	   practical	   reasons–	   reveal	   the	   importance	   of	   the	   relation	   between	  these	  three	  elements	  for	  a	  fair	  trial.	  This	  kind	  of	  approach	  could	  be	  deemed	  to	  be	  appropriate	  to	  accommodate	  sufficiently	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  citizen.	  	  The	   relation	   between	   evidence	   and	   fairness	   was	   illustrated	   above	   in	   the	  discussion	  of	  different	  concepts	  of	  evidence	   law	  as	  well	  as	  principles	  of	   it.	  This	  relation	   is	   further	   strengthened	   by	   the	   essence	   and	   purposes	   of	   criminal	  procedure	   that	   brings	   together	   all	   three	   elements;	   a	   point	   of	   view	   that	   is	  integrated	  in	  Article	  6,	  as	  we	  will	  see.	  Evidence	  has	  been	  described	  as	  the	  soul29	  of	  the	  (criminal)	  process	  or	  its	  core.30	  Indeed,	  evidence	  and	  evidence	  law	  are	  the	  spine	  of	  the	  whole	  criminal	  procedure.	  Evidential	  matters	  are	  met	  not	  only	  in	  the	  main	   trial	  but	  also	  at	  every	  single	  stage	  of	   the	  procedure.	  From	  the	  moment	  of	  
notitia	   criminis	   until	   a	   potential	   decision	   for	   conviction	   or	   acquittal	   and	   the	  appeals,	  problems	  linked	  to	  evidence	  appear	  and	  need	  to	  be	  resolved.	  Therefore,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  27	  U	   Berz,	   ‘Möglichkeiten	   und	   Grenzen	   einer	   Beschleunigung	   des	   Strafverfahrens’	  NJW	   (1982)	  729.	  28	  D	  Harris,	  ‘The	  Right	  to	  a	  Fair	  Trial	  in	  Criminal	  Proceedings	  as	  a	  Human	  Right’,	  16	  ICLQ	  (1964)	  352.	  29	  R	   Perrot,	   ‘Le	   droit	   à	   la	   prevue’	   in	   Effektiver	   Rechtsschutz	   und	   verfassungsmäßige	   Ordnung	  (Bielefeld,	  Gieseking-­‐Verlag,	  1983)	  p	  95:	  ‘la	  preuve	  est	  l’	  âme	  du	  procès’.	  30	  WJ	   Habscheid	   writes	   similarly	   to	   Perrot	   about	   the	   core	   of	   process:	   ‘…	   das	   Kernstück	   des	  Prozesses’,	  SJZ	  (80)	  1984,	  p	  382.	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approaching	  and	  understanding	  criminal	  procedure	  is	  crucial	  in	  the	  sequence	  of	  thought	  for	  conceiving	  evidential	  fairness.	  The	  strong	  link	  between	  the	  three	  will	  be	  obvious	  as	  we	  try	  to	  create	  a	  thin	  theory	  of	  criminal	  process.	  	  According	   to	   Ashworth	   and	   Redmayne,	   a	   normative	   approach	   of	   the	   criminal	  process	   would	   suggest	   that	   the	   starting	   point	   of	   understanding	   its	   essence	  should	  be	  some	  basic	  values	  that	  form	  political	  theories,	  criminal	  justice	  systems	  and	  hence	   the	  criminal	  process.	  Here,	   these	  values	  are	  of	  a	   liberal	  state,	  where	  state	   power	   is	   limited	   and	   citizens	   are	   regarded	   as	   rights	   bearers.31	  These	  individuals	  are	  responsible	  for	  their	  actions,	  fact	  that	  makes	  way	  to	  the	  adoption	  of	  desert-­‐sentencing	  concepts,	  where	  sentences	  are	  proportional	  to	  wrongdoing.	  All	  these	  should	  operate	  through	  a	  set	  of	  proper	  procedures.	  This	  phrase	  doesn’t	  say	  anything	  on	  the	  content	  of	  the	  procedures	  but	  suggests	  that	  they	  should	  be	  consistent,	   more	   predictable,	   less	   arbitrary	   and	   open	   to	   the	   public.32	  Another	  point	   is	   that	  criminal	  process	   is	  one	  of	   the	  state	  responses	   towards	  crime.	   It	   is	  not	  the	  only	  one	  and	  doesn’t	  necessarily	  lead	  to	  a	  trial.	  As	  it	  is	  said,	  prosecution	  is	  used	  only	  as	  last	  resort.33	  	  	  Transparent	  procedures	  guide	   the	  different	  agents	  and	   institutions	   involved	   to	  the	  decisions	  needed	  for	  the	  progress	  of	  the	  process.	  The	  concept	  of	  responsible	  individuals	   that	   should	   be	   treated	   proportionally	   to	   their	   blameworthy	   deeds	  leads	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  fact-­‐finding	  matters	  at	  every	  stage	  of	  the	  procedure.	  Depending	  on	  the	  accuracy	  of	  the	  facts	  a	  case	  may	  end	  up	  to	  trial	  or	  be	  put	  out	  of	  the	  system	  of	  criminal	   justice.	  Apparently,	  procedure	  (in	   terms	  of	   investigation	  and	  trial)	  and	  evidence	  are	  strongly	  linked.	  The	  end	  result	  of	  this	  process	  is	  not	  our	  sole	  concern.	  Procedures	  involve	  human	  beings	  and	  it	   is	  essential	  that	  they	  are	  treated	  with	  dignity.34	  The	  normative	  mosaic	  given	  above	  sheds	  light	  to	  the	  concept	   of	   criminal	   process	   adopted	   in	   that	   thesis.	   It	   follows	   the	   arguments	  of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  31	  A	  Ashworth	  and	  M	  Redmayne,	  The	  Criminal	  Process	  (Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2004)	  p	  20.	  32	  Ibid.,	  p	  21.	  33	  K	  Hawkins,	  Law	  as	  Last	  Resort	  (Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2003).	  34	  A	  Ashworth	  and	  M	  Redmayne,	  The	  Criminal	  Process,	  p	  22:	  ‘Whether	  or	  not	  an	  assembly	  line	  is	  good	   can	   be	   judged	   largely	   in	   terms	   of	   its	   end	   results:	  whether	   the	   car	   it	   produces	   is	   of	   good	  quality.	   It	   does	   not	   matter	   how	   the	   metal,	   plastic,	   paint,	   etc.	   is	   treated	   during	   the	   process	   of	  achieving	  the	  end.	  Criminal	  procedure	  is	  different	  because	  it	  deals	  with	  people’.	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Ashworth	  and	  Redmayne:	  The	  purpose	  of	   the	  criminal	  process	   is	   to	  bring	  about	  
accurate	  determinations	  through	  fair	  procedures.35	  	  	  The	   first	  purpose	  of	   criminal	  process	   is	  accurate	  determinations.	  Except	   for	  all	  the	   administrative	   and	   managerial	   decisions	   that	   the	   enterprise	   of	   criminal	  justice	   involves,	   accurate	   determinations	   refer	   to	   fact-­‐finding.	   Evidence	  determines	  procedure	  and	  accuracy	  in	  fact-­‐finding	  is	  the	  maxim	  needed	  for	  the	  procedural	   decisions.	   This	   is	   the	   acceptable	   normative	   result	   for	   a	   criminal	  process.	  Whether	  someone	  is	  guilty	  or	  not	  should	  be	  accurately	  determined.	  	  In	   addition,	   the	   second	   purpose	   of	   criminal	   process	   is	   fair	   procedures	   at	   all	  stages.	   Only	   through	   fair	   procedures,	   establishment	   of	   concepts	   such	   as	   due	  process	  or	  nullum	  crimen	  nulla	  poena	  sine	   lege	   and	   respect	  of	   rights	   can	  occur.	  The	   sentence	   ‘accurate	   determinations	   through	   fair	   procedures’	  mean	   that	   the	  way	  to	  accurate	  evidence	  is	  fairness;	  a	  conclusion	  we	  came	  up	  with	  also	  while	  we	  were	  examining	  evidence	  law	  concepts.	  With	  all	  that	  in	  mind	  we	  can	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  now	  to	  Article	  6	  of	  ECHR.	  	  	  
2.6.	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights:	  a	  presentation	  	  In	   the	   first	   paragraph	   of	   Article	   6	   the	   setting	   of	   the	   trial	   (the	   procedure)	   is	  described.	   The	   fairness	   of	   the	   trial	   is	   proclaimed	   and	   utilised	   (‘everyone	   is	  entitled	   to	   a	   fair	   […]	   hearing’)	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   the	   individual	   applications	  beside	   the	   public	   hearing	   requirement.	   The	   latter	   is	   subject	   to	   exceptions	   that	  are	  of	  particular	  significance36	  since	  put	   in	   the	  contractual	   text.	  The	  reasonable	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  35	  Ibid.,	  p	  26.	  36 	  These	   exceptions	   do	   not	   lead	   to	   the	   conclusion	   that	   public	   hearing	   is	   not	   the	   main	  characteristic	  of	  the	  trial	  phase.	  Indeed,	  publicity	  forms	  the	  features	  of	  the	  trial.	  Albeit	  that	  fact,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  accept	  that	  public	  hearing	  is	  a	  principle	  of	  the	  trial	  that	  if	  absent	  the	  whole	  essence	  of	   it	   is	   jeopardised.	   This	   is	   also	   historically	   acknowledged.	   See	   for	   example,	   D	   Hume,	  
Commentaries	  on	  the	  Law	  of	  Scotland,	  Respecting	  Crimes	  (Edinburgh,	  Bell	  &	  Bradfute,	  1844)	  ii,	  at	  304	  and	  JHA	  MacDonald,	  A	  Practical	  Treatise	  on	  the	  Criminal	  Law	  of	  Scotland	  (Edinburgh,	  William	  Green	   &	   Son,	   1894),	   p	   426.	   Although	   publicity	   is	   not	   a	   conditio	   sine	   qua	  non	   for	   the	   trial,	   the	  opposite	   should	   be	   said	   about	   ‘publicity’	   between	   the	   parties	   and	   especially	   for	   the	   accused	  (Parteienöffentlichkeit	   as	   opposed	   to	   Volksöffentlichkeit).	   See	   on	   that	   E	   Beling,	   Deutsches	  
Reichsstrafprozessrecht	  (Goldbach,	  Keip	  Verlag,	  1997).	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time	   requirement	   forms	   partly	   and	   indicates	   indirectly	   the	   immediate	  proceedings	  requirement,37	  whilst	  the	  principle	  of	  orality38	  is	  based	  on	  the	  word	  ‘hearing’.	  The	  milestone	  of	  a	  legal	  procedure	  is	  set	  by	  the	  appointment	  of	  judging	  to	   tribunals	   distinguished	   by	   judicial	   impartiality	   (‘by	   an	   independent	   and	  impartial	  tribunal	  established	  by	  law’).	  	  While	  the	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial	  is	  construed	  into	  a	  certain	  procedure	  (tribunal,	  fair	  trial	  stricto	  sensu,	  public	  hearing,	  reasonable	  time)	  in	  paragraph	  1,	  in	  paragraph	  2	  of	  the	  Convention,	  a	  single	  phrase	  is	  met	  that	  sets	  the	  so-­‐called	  presumption	  of	  innocence.	   The	   presumption	   of	   innocence	   has	   its	   origin	   in	   the	  Déclaration	  des	  
droits	   de	   l’homme	   et	   du	   citoyen	   of	   28	   August	   1789.39	  The	   provision	   of	   the	  presumption	   could	   be	   seen	   as	   the	   savoir	   vivre	   of	   criminal	   process.	  Whilst	   the	  right	   to	   a	   fair	   trial	   is	   utilised	   through	   rights	   (para	   3)	   in	   a	   distinct	   form	   of	  procedure	  (para	  1),	  there	  is	  a	  certain	  way	  (para	  2)	  that	  should	  inspire	  all	  actions	  and	   decisions	   during	   the	   whole	   process.	   The	   presumption	   of	   innocence	  comprises	  the	  manners	  of	  criminal	  proceedings.	  	  	  	  In	  paragraph	  3	  of	  Article	  6	  ECHR	  the	  minimum	  rights	  of	  everyone	  charged	  with	  a	  criminal	  offence	  are	  moulded.	  Besides,	  The	  Strasbourg	  Court’s	  conception	  of	  fair	  trial	   is	   evidently	   rights-­‐based	   as	   it	   relies	   on	   the	   Convention.	   The	   purpose	   of	  including	   in	   Convention’s	   text	   particular	   rights	   has	   the	   practical	   rationale	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  37 	  See	   SJ	   Summers,	   Fair	   Trials	   (Oxford,	   Hart	   Publishing,	   2007)	   p	   48;	   E	   Kern	   /	   C	   Roxin,	  Strafverfahrensrecht,	   9th	   edn,	   (München,	   CH	  Beck,	   1969)	   p	   201.	   See	   also,	   CJA	  Mittermaier,	  Die	  
Mündlichkeit,	   das	   Anklageprinzip,	   die	   Öffentlichkeit	   und	   das	   Geschworenengericht	   in	   ihrer	  
Durchführung	   in	   den	   verschiedenen	   Gesetzgebungen	   dargestellt	   und	   nach	   den	   Forderungen	   des	  
Rechts	   und	   der	   Zweckmäßigkeit	   mit	   Rücksicht	   auf	   die	   Erfahrung	   der	   verschiedenen	   Länder	  (Stuttgart	  and	  Tübingen,	  Cotta,	  1845),	  p	  246.	  	  38	  Quod	  est	  in	  actis	  non	  est	  in	  mundo	  (paraphrase	  of	  the	  Latin	  phrase	  from	  Roman	  Law:	  Quod	  non	  
est	  in	  actis,	  non	  est	  in	  mundo	   –	  What	   is	  not	   in	   the	  documents	  does	  not	  exist)!	   It	   is	   true	   that	   the	  advantages	  of	  orality	  are	  numerous.	  Firstly,	  the	  personal	  contact	  with	  a	  human	  presence	  in	  court	  has	  a	  completely	  different	  impact	  in	  comparison	  to	  a	  written	  statement.	  The	  oral	  communication,	  open	   to	  a	   relation	  of	   thesis	   and	  antithesis,	  question	  and	   response	   is	   able	   to	   shed	   full	   light	   to	  a	  case	   and	   give	   life	   to	   evidential	   elements	   drafted	   in	   paper.	   Additionally,	   the	   principle	   of	   orality	  prohibits	   potential	   negative	   surprises	   for	   the	   accused	   entering	   the	   trial	   through	   unknown	  inculpating	  evidence	   submitted	   in	  writing.	  That	  happened	   in	   the	   trial	  of	   the	  notorious	  political	  scandal	   of	   Dreyfus	   Affair.	   See	   also	   J	   Baumann,	  Grundbegriffe	   und	   System	  des	   Strafrechts	   –	  Eine	  
Einführung	   an	   Hand	   von	   Fällen,	   2nd	   edn,	   (Stuttgart,	   Kohlhammer,	   1966).	   Subsequently,	   the	  content	   of	   any	   evidence	   submitted	   in	  writing	   cannot	   be	   examined	   at	   trial,	   unless	   it	   takes	   oral	  character	  in	  court	  and	  is	  put	  under	  the	  control	  of	  every	  party	  of	  the	  trial.	  39	  ‘Tout	   homme	   étant	   présumé	   innocent	   jusqu'à	   ce	   qu'il	   ait	   été	   déclaré	   coupable	   […]’	   (‘[…]	   all	  persons	  are	  held	  innocent	  until	  they	  shall	  have	  been	  declared	  guilty	  […]’),	  Déclaration	  des	  droits	  
de	  l’homme	  et	  du	  citoyen	  of	  28	  August	  1789,	  Art	  9.	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helping	   both	   individuals	   and	   the	   Court	   to	   establish	   more	   easily	   and	   firmly	  citizen’s	  protection	   in	  Europe	  which	   is	   said	   to	  be	   the	  ultima	  ratio	   of	   the	  whole	  criminal	  process.	  Undoubtedly,	  rights	  are	  the	  tools	  of	  examination	  of	  violation	  of	  Article	  6.40	  In	  spite	  of	  that	  fact,	  they	  should	  not	  function	  outside	  of	  their	  context	  of	   fairness	   and	   procedure.	   Not	   because	   the	   latter	   are	   more	   significant.	  Undoubtedly,	   the	   normative	   approach	   of	   criminal	   process	   and	   the	   notion	   of	  fairness	  share	  with	  rights	  the	  rationale	  of	  protecting	  the	  citizen.	  Nonetheless,	  it	  is	  rights’	   capacity	   to	   unbalance	   the	  whole	   institution	   of	   criminal	   process,	   if	   their	  context	  is	  not	  understood.41	  Fairness	  and	  procedure	  shepherd	  rights	  into	  a	  role	  that	   forwards	   their	   better	   operation.	   For	   the	   same	   reason,	   the	   best	  understanding	   of	   a	   concept	   on	   evidential	   fairness	   cannot	   exist	   outside	   its	   own	  environment.	  	  For	   the	  completion	  of	   this	  section,	  we	  will	   take	  a	  closer	  but	  quick	  glimpse	   into	  paragraph	   3	   and	   the	   rights	   provisioned	   there.	   Article	   6§3(a)	   guarantees	   every	  accused	   the	   right	   to	   be	   informed	   of	   the	   accusation.	   Apparently,	   without	   the	  information	  on	  the	  accusation	  the	  defence	  can	  be	  proved	  useless,	  as	  the	  right	  to	  defend	   oneself	   cannot	   be	   effectively	   exercised.	   Furthermore,	   this	   Kafkaesque	  situation	  that	  arises42	  has	  also	  certain	  implications	  for	  evidential	  matters.	  	  	  After	  being	  essentially	  brought	  into	  existence,	  the	  defence	  in	  criminal	  procedure	  is	   further	  armed	  by	   the	  right	  of	  adequate	   time	  and	   facilities	   for	   its	  preparation	  (3b).	  This	  provision	   is	  directly	   linked	   to	   evidence,	   since	   the	  preparation	  of	   the	  defence	   counsel	   consists	   in	   responding	   on	   evidence	   against	   the	   accused	   and	  providing	  potential	  acquitting	  or	  mitigating	  elements	   for	  the	  case.	  According	  to	  the	   European	   Commission	   of	   Human	   Rights,	   ‘facilities’	   here	   ‘include	   the	  opportunity	  [for	  the	  accused]	  to	  acquaint	  himself,	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  preparing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  40	  Besides,	  Article	  6	   in	   itself,	   even	   if	   it	   implies	  a	   coherent	   concept	  of	   fair	   criminal	  procedure,	   is	  titled	  as	  a	  right.	  That	  also	  proves	  the	  rights-­‐based	  approach	  which	  is	  practical	  and	  inevitable	  in	  a	  Convention	   on	  Human	  Rights!	   There	   are	   also	   theoretical	   analyses	   on	  Article	   6	   that	   apprehend	  everything	   in	   it	  as	  rights.	  For	  an	  example,	  see	  S	  Trechsel,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Criminal	  Proceedings	  (Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005).	  	  41	  SJ	  Summers,	  Fair	  Trials,	  p	  184.	  42	  S	  Trechsel,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Criminal	  Proceedings,	  p	  193.	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his	   defence,	   with	   the	   results	   of	   investigations	   carried	   out	   throughout	   the	  proceedings’.43	  	  The	   right	   to	   defend	   oneself	   and	   to	   have	   the	   assistance	   of	   counsel	   is	   set	   in	  paragraph	  3(c).	  The	  right	  to	  a	  defence	  seems	  to	  be	  self-­‐evident	  and	  it	  has	  several	  aspects.44	  However,	  an	   important	  parameter	   that	  should	  be	  pointed	  out	  here	   is	  that	   through	   this	   right	   the	   Convention	   acknowledges	   the	   central	   position	   and	  participation	  of	  the	  defence	  in	  the	  criminal	  proceedings.	  	  	  Following	  the	  right	  to	  a	  defence,	  the	  right	  to	  test	  witness	  evidence	  is	  described.	  Evidently,	  by	  the	  recognition	  of	  such	  a	  right	  the	  accused	  is	  deemed	  to	  be	  subject	  and	  not	  object	  of	   the	  proceedings.	  The	  rights	  provided	   in	  Article	  6§3(d)	  enable	  him	  or	  her	   to	   influence	   the	  course	  of	   the	  proceedings	  and	   the	  direction,	  which	  they	  will	  take.45	  	  Last	  but	  not	  least,	  ‘[e]veryone	  charged	  with	  a	  criminal	  offence	  has	  the	  […	  right…]	  to	  have	  the	  free	  assistance	  of	  an	  interpreter	  if	  he	  cannot	  understand	  or	  speak	  the	  language	  used	  in	  court’.46	  As	  the	  European	  Commission	  of	  Human	  Rights	  put	  it:	  ‘In	  general	  [the	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial]	  includes	  not	  only	  his	  right	  to	  be	  present	  but	  also	   to	  hear	  and	   follow	   the	  proceedings’.47	  With	   that	  provision	   the	   circle	  of	   the	  ‘minimum’	   rights	   that	   everyone	   should	   have	   while	   charged	   with	   a	   criminal	  offence,	  according	  to	  ECHR,	  is	  closed.	  	  Paragraph	   3	   of	   article	   6	   is	   characterised	   by	   a	   descriptive	   minimalism.48	  The	  rights	   set	   are	   not	   exhaustive	   and	   they	   are	   meant	   to	   be	   further	   honed	   by	   the	  Court’s	  case	   law.	  As	  said	  before,	  paragraph	  1	  shapes	   the	  setting	  of	   the	   trial	   (or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  43	  Guy	  Jespers	  v.	  Belgium,	  no.	  8404/78,	  29	  Sep	  1982,	  §	  56.	  44	  For	  an	  analysis	  on	  the	  technical,	  psychological,	  humanitarian	  and	  structural	  aspect	  of	  the	  right	  to	  a	  defence	  see	  S	  Trechsel,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Criminal	  Proceedings,	  p	  245-­‐247.	  45	  Ibid.,	  p	  293.	  46	  Article	  6	  §	  3(e),	  ECHR.	  47	  Roos	  v	  Sweden,	  no.	  19598/92,	  6	  Apr	  1994.	  48	  Nielsen	  v	  Denmark,	  no.	  343/57,	  15	  Mar	  1961,	  (1961)	  3	  YB	  494,	  §	  52.	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the	  procedure)	  comprising	  the	  stricto	  sensu49	  notion	  of	  fairness	  and	  principles	  of	  the	  trial,	  while	  paragraph	  2	  draws	  the	  way,	  the	  manners	  of	  the	  proceedings.	  The	  last	  paragraph	  is	  not	  only	  a	  tool	  of	  examination	  as	  it	  was	  argued	  above,	  but	  also	  a	  counterbalance	   for	   the	   potentially	   accused	   citizen	   to	   the	   prosecuting	   state	  power.	   Before	   concentrating	   on	   the	   case	   law	   in	   relation	   to	   evidence,	   we	   will	  observe	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  towards	  evidence	  matters.	  	  	  
2.7.	  Trends	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  towards	  evidence	  	  Every	  time	  that	  the	  Court	  deals	  with	  an	  application	  has	  to	  ensure	  the	  compliance	  of	  the	  contract	  states	  to	  the	  fundamental	  orders	  of	  the	  Convention.50	  It	  moves	  in	  a	  zone	  where	  two	  different	  systems	  of	  justice	  are	  met,	  the	  Anglo-­‐Saxon	  and	  the	  continental,	  as	  well	  as	  an	  amount	  of	   legal	  traditions,	  every	  one	  of	  them	  with	  its	  own	   peculiarities.	   Hence,	   it	   avoids	   taking	   part	   in	   an	   open	   dispute	   of	   the	  directions	  set	  by	  national	  legislations.	  It	  acknowledges	  the	  self-­‐government	  and	  authority	   of	   national	   legislators	   and	   leaves	   them	   a	   margin	   of	   appreciation	   in	  relation	  to	  the	  method	  utilised	  to	  satisfy	  the	  demands	  of	  fair	  trial.	  In	  that	  process,	  it	  can	  also	  tolerate	  obvious	  legislative	  deficiencies,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  overall	  view	  of	  the	   process	   in	   discussion	   is	   not	   blurred	   irreparably.	   It	   avoids	   generalisations,	  without	   dealing	   exhaustively	   with	   all	   the	   aspects	   of	   an	   issue,	   confining	   its	  assessment	  in	  particular	  facts	  of	  the	  case	  discussed.	  It	  examines	  a	  case	  as	  a	  whole	  and	   not	   in	   every	   stage	   of	   it	   as	   a	   process	   and	   that	   leads	   occasionally	   to	   vague	  opinions	  and	  insufficient	  justifications.	  	  Especially	   in	   relation	   to	   evidence	   in	   a	   criminal	   procedure,	   the	   Court	   does	   not	  express	  an	  opinion	  either	  on	  the	  admissibility	  of	  evidence	  or	  on	  the	  evaluation	  of	  it,	  as	  Article	  6	  does	  not	  introduce	  such	  rules.	  The	  national	  legal	  orders	  have	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  49	  The	  stricto	  sensu	  notion	  of	  fairness	  is	  prescribed	  in	  the	  text	  of	  Article	  6	  whereas	  the	  lato	  sensu	  notion	  of	   it	   in	   the	   title	  of	   the	  Article.	  See	  also	  SJ	  Summers,	  Fair	  Trials	   (Oxford,	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2007),	  p102.	  50	  K	  Ambos,	   ‘Der	  Europäische	  Gerichtshof	   für	  Menschenrechte	  und	  die	  Verfahrensrechte’,	  ZStW,	  115/3	  (2003)	  583.	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first	  and	  last	  word	  on	  that,	  as	  long	  as	  they	  give	  reasons	  about	  their	  decisions.51	  Therefore,	  task	  of	  the	  Court	  is	  to	  examine	  whether	  the	  case	  in	  question	  had	  a	  fair	  character,	  as	  it	  was	  managed	  as	  a	  whole.52	  According	  to	  the	  Court’s	  judgments,	  a	  process	   can	   be	   characterised	   as	   fair	   when	   every	   party	   in	   the	   trial	   is	   given	   a	  reasonable	   opportunity	   to	   present	   its	   case	   in	   a	  way	   that	   they	   are	   not	   put	   in	   a	  disadvantageous	  position,	  as	  the	  principle	  of	  equality	  of	  arms	  demands.	  	  	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  defence	  of	  the	  accused	  should	  be	  informed	  of	  all	  the	  evidence	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  conclusion	  of	  conviction	  or	  acquittal.53	  The	  difficulties	  that	  may	  be	  met	   during	   the	   pre-­‐trial	   stage	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   access	   of	   defence	   to	   the	  evidentiary	  material	  must	   be	   totally	   cured	   during	   the	   trial	   before	   the	   national	  courts.	  A	  prohibition	  of	  disclosure	  of	  evidence	  can	  take	  place	  only	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  public	  interest	  under	  the	  term	  that	  a	  national	  judicial	  process	  of	  evaluation	  and	  approval	  of	  that	  decision	  is	  made	  beforehand.54	  Furthermore,	  every	  party	  at	  the	  trial	  should	  not	  only	  have	  the	  opportunity	  to	  present	  every	  evidentiary	  material	  needed	   for	   the	   support	  of	   their	   claim	  but	  also	  become	  aware	  and	  comment	  on	  any	  evidential	  submission	  made.	   In	  general,	   it	  can	  be	  said	  that	  a	  procedure	  has	  been	   carried	  out	   ‘fairly’	   according	   to	   the	  Court,	  when	   the	   rights	  of	   the	  defence	  are	   respected	   and	   especially	   when	   the	   applicant	   is	   given	   the	   opportunity	   to	  question	   the	  evidence	  and	   its	  use	  and	  examine	   the	  witnesses;	  moreover,	  when	  the	   self-­‐incriminated	   confessions	   have	   been	   made	   willingly	   and	   without	  entrapment,	   and	   the	   whole	   circumstances	   of	   collecting	   the	   evidence	   cannot	  shake	  its	  persuasiveness	  and	  precision.	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  no.	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  22	  Feb	  2007,	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  58.	  52	  L	  Wildhaber,	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  mit	  der	  EMRK’,	  ZSR	  98	  II	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  365.	  53	  Dowsett	  v.	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  Kingdom,	  no.	  39482/98,	  24	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  2003,	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  41;	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  Kingdom,	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  1992,	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  247-­‐B,	  (1993)	  15	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  §	  36;	  Fitt	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  no.	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   2000-­‐II,	   (2000)	   30	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   §	   44;	   GMR	   and	   AKP	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	   nos.	   29522/95,	  30056/96	  and	  30574/96,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐IX,	   (2001)	  33	  EHRR	  11,	  §	  112;	   Jasper	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  Kingdom,	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   Feb	   2000,	   (2000)	   30	   EHRR	   441,	   §	   51;	   PG	   and	   JH	   v.	   United	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   no.	  44787/98,	  25	  Sep	  2001,	   §	  67;	  Rowe	  and	  Davis	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	   no.	  28901/95	  ECHR	  2000-­‐II,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  1,	  §	  60.	  54	  See	  Atlan	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	   no.	  36533/97,	  19	   June	  2001,	   (2002)	  34	  EHRR	  33;	  Fitt	  v.	  United	  
Kingdom,	   no.	   29777/96,	   ECHR,	   2000-­‐II,	   (2000)	   30	   EHRR	   480;	   Jasper	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	   no.	  27052/95,	  16	  Feb	  2000,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  441;	  Rowe	  and	  Davis	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  28901/95,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐II,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  1.	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  Transnational	  combating	  of	  crime	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  has	  to	  be	  driven	  by	  the	  maxim	   of	   protection	   of	   the	   citizen.	   That	   can	   be	   realised	   by	   the	   adoption	   of	  transparent	  rules	  of	  conduct	  for	  transnational	  law	  enforcement	  while	  gathering	  evidence	   admissible	   by	   a	   court	   of	   law.	   This	   presupposes	   principles	   that	   are	  common	  between	  different	  EU	  member	  states	  with	  different	  criminal	  procedures	  and	   evidential	   rules.	   Although	   we	   are	   far	   from	   a	   complete	   legislative	  harmonisation	   of	   the	  European	   criminal	   procedures	   there	   is	   a	  way	   forward	   to	  this	   thorny	   problem.	   Evidence	   law	   is	   built	   upon	   definitions,	   principles	   and	  concepts	   that	   include	   and	   presume	   fairness.	   Fairness	   is	   a	   concrete	   concept	   of	  evidence	   law	   that	   finds	   more	   and	   more	   its	   place	   between	   relevance	   and	  admissibility	  as	  basic	  concepts	  of	  evidence.	  Moreover,	  fairness	  as	  a	  concept	  has	  a	  robust	   European	   past,	   present	   and	   future	   as	   it	   is	   moulded	   by	   the	   Strasbourg	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  Teixeira	  de	  Castro	  v.	  Portugal,	   no.	  25829/94,	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  Reports	  1998-­‐IV,	  1451,	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  EHRR	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  Averill	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  Kingdom,	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   ECHR	   2000-­‐VI,	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  (2001)	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  France,	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   Series	  A	  141-­‐A,	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  Reports	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  Article	  34	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  ECHR.	  59	  T	  Vogler,	  ‘Straf-­‐	  und	  Strafverfahrensrechtliche	  Fragen	  in	  der	  Spruchenpraxis	  der	  Europäischen	  Kommission	  und	  des	  Europäischen	  Gerichtshof	  für	  Menschenrechte’	  ZStW	  89	  (1977)	  761.	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Court,	  which	   applies	  Article	   6	  ECHR	  producing	   valuable	   case	   law.	  The	   relation	  between	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   and	   European	   Union	   and	   the	   implied	  interdependence	   of	   criminal	   procedure,	   evidence	   law	   and	   fairness	   in	   Article	   6	  ECHR	   pave	   a	   way	   worth	   exploring	   pursuit	   of	   a	   concept	   of	   a	   European	   fair	  criminal	   evidence	   concept.	   Although	   this	   will	   not	   produce	   common	   evidence	  rules,	   it	   can	   establish	   a	   platform	   of	   principles	   that	   forwards	   convergence,	  harmonisation	  and	  cooperation	   in	  evidential	  matters	  respecting	  and	  protecting	  the	  European	  citizen.	   In	   the	   following	   chapter	   the	  environment	  of	   this	   concept	  will	  be	  discovered	  as	  it	  is	  demonstrated	  in	  ECHR	  Art.	  6.	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3.	  Environment	  of	  a	  concept	  on	  evidential	  fairness	  	  3.1.	  Article	  6	  paragraph	  1:	  procedural	  leftovers	  3.1.1.	  The	  right	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  The	   whole	   Article	   6	   is	   regarded	   as	   relevant	   to	   evidence	   law.	   The	  interdependence	   between	   procedure,	   fairness	   and	   evidence	   proves	   that	  argument	   clearly.	   Criminal	   procedure	   (§1)	   is	   strongly	   linked	   to	   criminal	  evidence,	  while	  at	  the	  same	  time	  fairness	  in	  Article	  6,	  as	  expressed	  specifically	  in	  its	   stricto	   sensu	   form	   and	   the	   manners	   that	   the	   presumption	   of	   innocence	  demands,	   completes	   the	  relation	  of	  evidence	  matters	  with	  paragraphs	  1	  and	  2.	  Paragraph	   3,	   as	   mentioned	   before,	   illustrates	   a	   provisional	   paradigm	   of	  application	   for	   citizen’s	   defence	   rights	   that	   are	   also	   pertinent	   to	   evidence.	  Consequently,	   the	   sum	   of	   Article	   6	   forms	   the	   environment	   of	   a	   concept	   on	  evidential	  fairness.	  	  	  However,	  there	  are	  some	  parts	  of	  it	  that	  are	  more	  directly	  linked	  to	  evidence,	  as	  opposed	  to	  others	  that	  are	  less	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  related	  to	  it.	  In	  other	  words,	  there	   is	   a	   distinction	   between	   rights	   conducive	   to	   an	   environment	   of	   fair	  evidence	   and	   rights	   directly	   related	   to	   evidence	   law.	   The	   directness	   and	   non-­‐directness	   of	   the	   matter	   are	   conditioned	   by	   the	   definition	   and	   principles	   of	  evidence	  law,	  which	  unveil	  four	  areas	  of	  fairness	  closer	  to	  evidence	  (see	  diagram	  below).	  These	  are	  the	  areas	  from	  which	  the	  principles	  of	  evidential	  fairness	  will	  eventually	  be	  distilled.	  	  	  This	   particular	   separation	   and	   presentation	   of	   Article	   6	   stems	   from	   a	   holistic	  approach	  to	  it.60	  Article	  6	  as	  a	  normative	  textual	  system	  seems	  to	  have	  many	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  a	  complex	  system.	  Here,	  it	  is	  enough	  to	  say	  that	  paragraph	  one	   illustrates	   the	   fair	   institution	   of	   criminal	   process.	   One	   can	   imagine	   it	   as	   a	  building,	   a	  department	   store	  with	   four	   storeys;	   those	  of	   impartial	   tribunal,	   fair	  trial	   (stricto	  sensu),	  public	  hearing	  and	  reasonable	   time.	   In	   this	  building,	  and	   in	  the	  surroundings	  as	  well,	   there	   is	   the	  air	  of	   the	  presumption	  of	   innocence	   that	  covers	   the	   whole	   area	   of	   Article	   6	   (paragraph	   2).	   Paragraph	   3	   depicts	   the	  products,	   the	  goods	  of	   this	   system;	  applications	  which	  as	   the	  Court	  has	   clearly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  60	  Such	   an	   approach	   resembles	   the	   one	   offered	   also	   by	   the	   systems	   theory.	   For	   a	   thorough	  presentation	   of	   the	   systems	   theory	   see	   H	   Willke,	   Systemtheorie	   I:	   Eine	   Einführung	   in	   die	  
Grundprobleme,	  Stuttgart	  1982	  (Fischer	  UTB);	  6.	  Aufl.	  2000.	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stated,	   are	   not	   exhaustive.	   All	   Article	   6	   is	   evidence	   related,	   but	   basically	   the	  principles	  of	  a	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept	  emanate	  (naturally)	  from	  this	  ‘air’	  that	  covers	  everything	  (the	  presumption	  of	  innocence)	  and	  the	  storey	  situated	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  fairness;	  fair	  trial	  stricto	  sensu	  (adversarialism,	  reasoned	  judgments,	  illegally	  obtained	  evidence).	  All	  that	  remains	  since	  it	  is	  evidence	  relevant	  should	  also	  be	  analysed	  here,	  whether	  refers	  to	  the	  procedure	  or	  the	  rights	  of	  paragraph	  3.	  	  It	   is	   about	   time	   to	   concentrate	   on	   the	   environment	   of	   evidential	   fairness,	   by	  observing	  the	  case	   law	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights.	  Firstly,	  we	  will	  focus	   on	   paragraphs	   1	   and	   3,	   on	   the	   subjects	   that	   are	   not	   directly	   linked	   to	  evidence	   law.	   Secondly,	   we	   will	   approach	   fairness	   stricto	   sensu	   (§1)	   and	   the	  presumption	  of	   innocence	  (§2),	  since	   from	  them	  emanate	  the	   four	  key	  areas	  of	  
adversarialism,	   reasoned	   judgment,	   presumption	  of	   innocence	   itself	   and	   illegally	  
obtained	  evidence	   (entrapment,	  privilege	  against	   self-­‐incrimination	  and	  right	   to	  silence).	  	  	  
Diagram	  I:	  Fairness	  in	  criminal	  evidence	  is	  accordance	  to	  its	  principles	  and	  definition	  
	  Criminal	  Evidence	  	   Principles	  of	  Criminal	  Evidence61	  A	  generation	  B	  collection	  C	  organisation	  OF	  information	  D	  presentation	  E	  evaluation	  
I	  factual	  accuracy	  II	  protection	  of	  the	  innocent	  III	  humane	  treatment	  IV	  minimum	  state	  intervention	  V	  propriety	  of	  criminal	  process	  
	  Fairness	  in	  Criminal	  Evidence	  Adversarialism	  (6§1	  ECHR)	  Reasoned	  Judgment	  (6§1	  ECHR)	  Presumption	  of	  Innocence	  (6§2	  ECHR)	  Illegally	  Obtained	  Evidence	  (6§§1-­‐2	  ECHR)	  
C,	  D,	  E	  –	  I,	  V	  E	  –	  I,	  V	  C	  –	  II,	  III	  A,	  B	  –	  II,	  III,	  IV	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  61	  See	  also	  A	  Zuckerman,	  The	  Principles	  of	  Criminal	  Evidence	   (Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1989).	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3.1.	  Article	  6	  paragraph	  1:	  procedural	  leftovers	  	  
3.1.1.	  The	  right	  to	  an	  independent	  and	  impartial	  tribunal	  	  The	   text	   of	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   reads:	   ‘…	   everyone	   is	  entitled	  to	  a…	  hearing…	  by	  an	  independent	  and	  impartial	  tribunal	  established	  by	  law’	  (Art.	  6§1).	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  guarantee	  of	  an	  independent	  and	  impartial	  tribunal	   is	   also	   reflected	   in	   the	   case	   law	  of	   the	   Strasbourg	  Court.	   It	   is	   the	   first	  element	   examined	   by	   the	   Court	   in	   every	   case	   brought	   before	   it.62	  In	   principle,	  according	   to	   the	  Court’s	   rationale,	   there	   is	  no	  reason	   to	   further	  examination	  of	  the	   proceedings	   as	   far	   as	   a	   tribunal	   does	   not	   conform	   to	   the	   requirements	   of	  independence	   and	   impartiality.	   If	   the	   Court	   holds	   that	   there	   has	   been	   such	   a	  breach,	   it	   is	   apparent	   that	   the	   trial	   cannot	   be	   fair	   and	   it	   does	   not	   proceed	   to	  examine	  the	  criteria	  of	  public	  hearing	  or	  reasonable	  time.63	  	  The	   Court	   relies	   on	   certain	   criteria	   in	   order	   to	   examine	  whether	   a	   tribunal	   is	  independent	   or	   not.64	  These	   requirements	   have	   also	   served	   the	   purpose	   of	  defining	   the	   term	   ‘tribunal’	   itself. 65 	  ‘The	   Court	   reiterates	   that	   in	   order	   to	  establish	  whether	  a	   tribunal	  can	  be	  considered	  “independent”	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	  Article	  6§1,	  regard	  must	  be	  had,	  inter	  alia,	  to	  the	  manner	  of	  appointment	  of	  its	  members	   and	   their	   term	   of	   office,	   the	   existence	   of	   safeguards	   against	   outside	  pressures 66 	  and	   the	   question	   whether	   it	   presents	   an	   appearance	   of	  independence’.67	  Despite	   the	   significance	  of	   the	  definition	  of	   independence	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  62	  S	  Trechsel,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Criminal	  Proceedings,	  p	  45	  et	  seq.	  63	  See	  e.g.	  Çiraklar	  v.	  Turkey,	  28	  Oct	  1998,	  Reports	  1998-­‐VII,	  3059,	  (2001)	  32	  EHRR	  23,	  §§	  44-­‐45;	  
Demicoli	   v.	  Malta,	   27	   Aug	   1991,	   Series	   A	   no.	   210,	   (1992)	   14	   EHRR	   47,	   §	   43;	   Findlay	   v.	  United	  
Kingdom,	  25	  Feb	  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐I,	  263,	   (1997)	  24	  EHRR	  211,	  §	  80;	   Incal	  v.	  Turkey,	  9	   June	  1998,	  Reports	  1998-­‐IV,	  1547,	  (2000)	  29	  EHRR	  449,	  §	  74;	  Özertikoglu	  v.	  Turkey,	  no.	  48438/99,	  22	  Jan	  2004,	  §	  25;	  see	  also	  exceptions	  e.g.	  Coëme	  and	  others	  v.	  Belgium,	  nos.	  32492/96,	  32547/96,	  32548/96	  and	  33210/96,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐VII,	  75,	  §	  80,	  Öcalan	  v.	  Turkey,	  no.	  46221/99,	  12	  Mar	  2003,	  (2003)	  37	  EHRR	  10,	  §	  80.	  64	  See	   also	   P	   van	   Dijk	   and	   GJH	   van	   Hoof,	   Theory	   and	   Practice	   of	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	  
Human	  Rights	  (The	  Hague,	  Kluwer	  Law	  International,	  1998),	  pp	  451	  et	  seq.	  65	  Le	  Compte,	  Van	  Leuven	  and	  De	  Meyere	  v.	  Belgium,	  23	  June	  1981,	  Series	  A	  no.	  43,	  (1982)	  4	  EHRR	  1,	  §	  55.	  66	  S	   Stavros,	  The	  Guarantees	   for	  Accused	  Persons	  under	  Article	   6	   of	   the	  European	  Convention	   on	  
Human	  Rights	  (Dordrecht:	  Martinus	  Nijhoff,	  1993),	  p	  134	  et	  seq.	  67	  Incal	   v.	  Turkey,	  9	   June	  1998,	  Reports	  1998-­‐IV,	  1547,	   (2000)	  29	  EHRR	  449,	  §	  65.	  See	  also	  e.g.	  
Çiraclar	  v.	  Turkey,	  §	  38;	  Findlay	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  25	  Feb	  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐I,	  263,	  (1997)	  24	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tribunal	  for	  the	  whole	  guarantee,	  most	  crucial	  appears	  the	  role	  of	  impartiality68	  in	  relation	  to	  evidence.	  	  	  3.1.1.1.	  Impartiality	  	  Put	   in	   negative	   terms	   by	   the	   Court,	   ‘impartiality	   normally	   denotes	   absence	   of	  prejudice	  or	  bias’.69	  Apart	  from	  that	  negative	  definition,	  the	  Court,	  since	  the	  very	  first	   judgments	   concerned	   with	   the	   right	   to	   an	   independent	   and	   impartial	  tribunal,70	  has	  made	  a	  distinction	  between	  two	  different	  aspects	  of	  impartiality,	  labelled	   as	   ‘subjective’	   and	   ‘objective’	   approach	   or	   test	   correspondingly.	   ‘As	   to	  the	   condition	   of	   “impartiality”	  within	   the	  meaning	   of	   that	   provision,	   there	   are	  two	   tests	   to	   be	   applied:	   the	   first	   consists	   in	   trying	   to	   determine	   the	   personal	  conviction	   of	   a	   particular	   judge	   in	   a	   given	   case	   and	   the	   second	   in	   ascertaining	  whether	  the	  judge	  offered	  guarantees	  sufficient	  to	  exclude	  any	  legitimate	  doubt	  in	  this	  respect’.71	  	  	  	  3.1.1.2.	  The	  subjective	  approach	  
	  The	   Court,	   probably	   also	   due	   to	   solidarity	   feelings	   with	   national	   judges72,	   is	  reluctant	   to	   hold	   a	   violation	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   lack	   of	   impartiality	   under	   the	  subjective	   test.73	  Its	  presumption	   is	   rather	   that	   the	   judge	   is	   impartial;	  hence,	   it	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  EHRR	  211,	  §	  73;	  Kadubec	  v.	  Slovakia,	  2	  Sept	  1998,	  Reports	  1998-­‐VI,	  2518,	  (2001)	  33	  EHRR	  41,	  §	  56;	  Langborger	  v.	  Sweden,	  22	  June	  1989,	  Series	  A	  no.	  155,	  (1990)	  12	  EHRR	  416,	  §	  32;	  Lauko	  v.	  
Slovakia,	   2	   Sept	   1998,	   Reports	   1998-­‐VI,	   2492,	   (2001)	   33	   EHRR	   40,	   §	  63;	  McGonnell	   v.	  United	  
Kingdom,	  no.	  28488/95,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐II,	  107,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  289,	  §	  48.	  68	  See	   also	   E	   Schmidt,	   Deutsches	   Strafprozessrecht:	   Ein	   Koleg	   (Göttingen,	   Vandenhoeck	   und	  Ruprecht,	  1967),	  p	  39.	  69	  Piersack	  v.	  Belgium,	  1	  Oct	  1982,	  Series	  A	  no.	  53,	  (1983)	  5	  EHRR	  169,	  §	  30.	  70	  De	   Cubber	   v.	   Belgium,	   26	   Oct	   1984,	   Series	   A	   no.	   86,	   (1985)	   7	   EHRR	   236,	   §	   24;	   Piersack	   v.	  
Belgium,	  1	  Oct	  1982,	  Series	  A	  no.	  53,	  (1983)	  5	  EHRR	  169,	  §	  30.	  71	  Incal	  v.	  Turkey,	  9	   June	  1998,	  Reports	  1998-­‐IV,	  1547,	   (2000)	  29	  EHRR	  449,	  §	  65.	  See	  also	  e.g.	  
Hauschildt	   v.	   Denmark,	   24	   May	   1989,	   Series	   A	   no.	   154,	   (1990)	   12	   EHRR	   266,	   §	  46;	   Thorgeir	  
Thorgeirson	  v.	  Iceland,	  25	  June	  1992,	  Series	  A	  no.	  239,	  (1992)	  14	  EHRR	  843,	  §	  49.	  72	  Barford	  v.	  Denmark,	  22	  Feb	  1998,	  Series	  A	  no.	  149.	  73	  S	  Trechsel,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Criminal	  Proceedings	  (Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2005),	  p	  63.	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requires	  really	  strong	  evidence	  to	  render	  this	  preoccupation.74	  This	  fact	  is	  clearly	  illustrated	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Remli.	  	  	  The	  applicant	  was	  a	  French	  national	  of	  Algerian	  origin.	  Before	  the	  hearing	  began,	  someone	  overheard	  a	  member	  of	  the	  jury	  stating	  ‘what’s	  more,	  I’m	  a	  racist’	  and	  submitted	   this	   incident	   to	   the	   court.	  According	   to	   the	   latter,	   these	  words	  were	  spoken	  before	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  first	  hearing	  in	  the	  instant	  case	  and	  not	  in	  the	  presence	  of	   the	   judges	  of	   the	  court.	  The	  court	  was	  thus	  not	  able	  to	  take	   formal	  note	  of	   events	  alleged	   to	  have	  occurred	  out	  of	   its	  presence.75	  One	  could	  expect	  that	  the	  Strasbourg	  Court	  would	  apply	  the	  subjective	  test,	  but	  the	  Court	  avoiding	  that	   instead	   found	   a	   violation	   of	   Article	   6	   based	   on	   the	   failing	   of	   the	   national	  court	  to	  examine	  properly	  the	  allegations	  made	  regarding	  the	  racist	  behaviour:	  ‘Like	   the	   Commission,	   the	   Court	   considers	   that	   Article	   6§1	   of	   the	   Convention	  imposes	  an	  obligation	  on	  every	  national	  court	  to	  check	  whether,	  as	  constituted,	  it	  is	   “an	   impartial	   tribunal”	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	   that	  provision	  where,	  as	   in	   the	  instant	  case,	  this	  is	  disputed	  on	  a	  ground	  that	  does	  not	  immediately	  appear	  to	  be	  manifestly	  devoid	  of	  merit’.76	  	  	  Similarly	  in	  Gregory,	  during	  hearing	  a	  note	  was	  passed	  to	  the	  judge	  reading:	  ‘Jury	  showing	  racial	  overtones.	  1	  member	  to	  be	  excused’.	  The	  judge	  showed	  the	  note	  to	  both	  counsel	  and	  since	  the	  defence	  counsel	  didn’t	  press	  strongly	  for	  dismissal	  of	   the	   jury,	  he	   just	  addressed	  a	   firmly	  worded	  redirection	   to	   them.77	  The	  Court	  affirmed	  that	  handling	  of	  the	  case	  and	  found	  no	  violation	  of	  objective	  impartiality	  escaping	  the	  subjective	  test.	  	  	  The	   Court	   distinguished	   the	   case	   of	   Sander	   from	   Gregory.	   In	   Sander	   a	   juror	  passed	  a	  note	  to	  the	  judge	  reading	  that	  fellow	  jurors	  were	  making	  openly	  racist	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  Reports	   1998-­‐VIII,	   3103,	   (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  827,	   §	  48;	  De	  
Cubber	  v.	  Belgium,	  26	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  1984,	  Series	  A	  no.	  86,	  (1985)	  7	  EHRR	  236,	  §	  25;	  Hauschildt	  v.	  Denmark,	  24	  May	  1989,	  Series	  A	  no.	  154,	  (1990)	  12	  EHRR	  266,	  §	  47;	  Le	  Compte,	  Van	  Leuven	  and	  De	  Meyere	  v.	  Belgium,	  23	  June	  1981,	  Series	  A	  no.	  43,	  (1982)	  4	  EHRR	  1,	  §	  58;	  Piersack	  v.	  Belgium,	  1	  Oct	  1982,	  Series	  A	  no.	  53,	  (1983)	  5	  EHRR	  169,	  §	  30;	  Thorgeir	  Thorgeirson	  v.	  Iceland,	  25	  June	  1992,	  Series	  A	  no.	  239,	  (1992)	  14	  EHRR	  843,	  §	  50.	  75	  Remli	  v.	  France,	  23	  Apr	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐II,	  559,	  §§	  6-­‐15.	  76	  Ibid.,	  §	  48.	  77	  Gregory	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  22299/93,	  25	  Feb	  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐I,	  §	  47.	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remarks	   and	   jokes.	   The	   judge	   admonished	   the	   jury	   and	   following	   to	   that	   he	  received	   a	   joint	   letter	   signed	   by	   all	   jury	   members	   and	   another	   by	   a	   juror	  admitting	  his	  misunderstood	  behaviour	  while	  denying	  his	   racist	   attitude.	  After	  that,	   the	   judge	  proceeded	  with	   the	   trial.	  The	  Court	  held	  differently	   though:	   ‘An	  admonition	  or	  direction	  by	  a	   judge,	  however	  clear,	  detailed	  and	  forceful,	  would	  not	  change	  racist	  views	  overnight.	  In	  the	  present	  case	  the	  judge	  was	  faced	  with	  a	  serious	   allegation	   that	   the	   applicant	   risked	   being	   condemned	   because	   of	   his	  ethnic	   origin.	  Moreover,	   one	   of	   the	   jurors	   indirectly	   admitted	   to	  making	   racist	  comments.	   The	   Court	   considers	   that	   the	   judge	   should	   have	   reacted	   in	   a	  more	  robust	  manner	   than	  merely	   seeking	  vague	  assurances	   that	   the	   jurors	  could	  set	  aside	  their	  prejudices	  and	  try	  the	  case	  solely	  on	  the	  evidence.	  By	  failing	  to	  do	  so,	  the	   judge	   did	   not	   provide	   sufficient	   guarantees	   to	   exclude	   any	   objectively	  justified	  or	   legitimate	  doubts	  as	   to	   the	   impartiality	  of	   the	  court’.78	  A	  bit	   further	  proceeded	   the	   partly	   concurring,	   partly	   dissenting	   opinion	   of	   Judge	   Loucaides	  who	   stated	   that	   a	   lacking	   in	   impartiality	   from	  a	   subjective	  point	   of	   view	   could	  also	  have	  been	  established.	  	  	  In	  Ferrantelli	  and	  Santangelo,	   among	  other	   indicators	   of	   personal	   bias,	   a	   judge	  had	  previously	  participated	  in	  a	  trial	  of	  one	  of	  the	  applicants.	  Although	  there	  was	  strong	   evidence	   of	   bias	   based	   on	   the	   subjective	   approach	   the	   Court	   found	   a	  violation	   applying	   the	   objective	   test	   since	   the	   applicants	   ‘did	   not	   question	   the	  personal	  impartiality	  of	  the	  judge	  concerned’.79	  	  In	   addition,	   in	  Kyprianou,	   the	   applicant	  was	   a	   lawyer	   interrupted	  by	   a	  witness	  during	   cross-­‐examination.	   Angry	   by	   that	   fact,	   he	   argued	   with	   the	   judges	   who	  took	  offence	  and	  put	  him	  in	  prison	  for	   five	  days	   for	  contempt	  of	   the	  court.	  The	  Court	  applied	  here	  both	  the	  objective	  and	  subjective	  approach,	  accepting	  also	  a	  personal	  bias.	   ‘The	  Court	   considers	   that	   the	  decisive	   feature	  of	   the	   case	   is	   that	  the	   judges	   of	   the	   court	   which	   convicted	   the	   applicant	   were	   the	   same	   judges	  before	  whom	  the	  contempt	  was	  allegedly	  committed.	  This	   in	   itself	   is	  enough	  to	  raise	   legitimate	  doubts,	  which	  are	  objectively	   justified,	  as	   to	   the	   impartiality	  of	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  Sander	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  34129/96,	  9	  May	  2000,	  §§	  30,	  34.	  79	  Ferrantelli	  and	  Santangelo	  v.	  Italy,	  7	  Aug	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐III,	  937,	  (1997)	  23	  EHRR	  288,	  §	  57.	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the	  court	  –	  nemo	  judex	  in	  causa	  sua’.80	  Moreover,	  on	  the	  subjective	  test	  it	  stated	  that	   ‘the	   lack	   of	   impartiality	   is	   evidenced	   by	   the	   intemperate	   reaction	   of	   the	  judges	   to	   the	   conduct	   of	   the	   applicant,	   as	   evidenced	   by	   their	   haste	   to	   try	   him	  summarily	   for	   the	   criminal	   offence	   of	   contempt	   of	   court	   without	   availing	  themselves	   of	   other	   alternative,	   less	   drastic,	   measures	   such	   as	   a	   warning,	  reporting	   the	  applicant	   to	  his	  professional	  body,	   refusing	   to	  hear	   the	  applicant	  unless	  he	  withdrew	  his	  statements,	  or	  asking	  him	  to	  leave	  the	  courtroom’.81	  	  	  3.1.1.3.	  The	  objective	  approach	  
	  As	  far	  as	  the	  objective	  test	  is	  concerned,	  the	  Court	  focuses	  on	  whether	  the	  judge	  can	  be	  regarded	  as	  impartial	  from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  an	  ‘objective	  observer’82	  or	  ‘ordinary	  citizen’.83	  As	  the	  Court	  repeats	  in	  many	  instances	  the	  dictum	  by	  Lord	  Heward,	   ‘justice	   must	   not	   only	   be	   done;	   it	   must	   also	   be	   seen	   to	   be	   done’.84	  Furthermore,	  ‘appearances	  may	  be	  of	  a	  certain	  importance’.85	  These	  appearances	  are	  met	  in	  many	  instances	  in	  the	  case	  law	  and	  pertain	  to	  the	  prior	  participation	  or	  involvement	  of	  the	  judge	  in	  the	  same	  case.	  	  In	  Piersack,	   the	   applicant	  was	   convicted	   for	  murder	   by	   the	   Court	   of	   Cassation	  presided	  by	  a	  judge	  who	  previously	  participated	  in	  the	  same	  case	  as	  a	  prosecutor	  in	  the	  court	  of	  first	  instance.	  The	  Court	  stated	  that	  ‘if	  an	  individual,	  after	  holding	  in	  the	  public	  prosecutor’s	  department	  an	  office	  whose	  nature	  is	  such	  that	  he	  may	  have	  to	  deal	  with	  a	  given	  matter	  in	  the	  course	  of	  his	  duties,	  subsequently	  sits	  in	  the	   same	   case	   as	   a	   judge,	   the	  public	   are	   entitled	   to	   fear	   that	   he	  does	  not	   offer	  sufficient	   guarantees	   of	   impartiality’.86	  Consequently,	   in	   an	   indirect	   way	   the	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  Kyprianou	  v.	  Cyprus,	  no.	  73797/01,	  27	  Jan	  2004,	  §	  34.	  81	  Ibid.,	  §	  41.	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  Pullar	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  10	  June	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐III,	  783,	  (1996)	  22	  EHRR	  391,	  §	  39.	  83	  Belilos	  v.	  Switzerland,	  29	  Apr	  1988,	  Series	  A	  no.	  132,	  (1998)	  10	  EHRR	  466,	  §	  67.	  84	  Delcourt	  v.	  Belgium,	  17	  Jan	  1970,	  Series	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  no.	  11,	  (1979-­‐80)	  1	  EHRR	  355,	  §	  31.	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  Series	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   EHRR	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  Iceland,	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  Series	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  (1992)	  14	  EHRR	  843,	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  169,	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Strasbourg	  Court	   acknowledged	   the	   concept	  of	  prosecution	  as	  being	  adversary	  to	  the	  accused	  person.	  	  A	  rather	  conspicuous	  case	  of	  partiality	  is	  that	  of	  Findlay.	  Many	  of	  the	  functions	  of	  the	  military	  criminal	  proceedings	  concerning	  the	  case	  were	  accumulated	   in	   the	  hands	  of	  the	  convening	  officer	  who	  played	  a	  significant	  role	  before	  the	  hearing.	  He	  was	   the	   one	   to	  decide	  which	   charges	   should	  be	  brought	   and	  which	   type	  of	  court	   martial	   was	   most	   appropriate.	   He	   convened	   the	   court	   martial	   and	  appointed	  its	  members	  and	  the	  prosecuting	  and	  defending	  officers.87	  In	  view	  of	  the	  obscure	  participation	  of	  the	  convening	  officer	   in	  the	  proceedings,	   the	  Court	  considered	  that	  the	  applicant’s	  misgivings	  about	  the	  impartiality	  of	  the	  tribunal	  which	  dealt	  with	  his	  case	  were	  objectively	  justified.88	  	  After	   domestic	   law	   had	   been	   changed	   and	   the	   power	   of	   the	   convening	   officer	  reduced,	   the	   Court	   dealt	   with	   the	   same	   problem	   in	   Morris,	   still	   not	   being	  convinced	   about	   the	   impartiality	   and	   independence	   of	   the	   military	   tribunal.	  Although	   there	   were	   more	   safeguards	   in	   favour	   of	   impartiality,	   ‘the	   Court	  considered	  their	  presence	  as	  insufficient	  to	  exclude	  the	  risk	  of	  outside	  pressure	  being	  brought	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  two	  relatively	  junior	  serving	  officers	  who	  sat	  on	  the	  applicant’s	   court	  martial.	   In	  particular,	   it	  noted	   that	   those	  officers	  had	  no	   legal	  training,	   that	   they	   remained	   subject	   to	   army	   discipline	   and	   reports,	   and	   that	  there	  was	  no	  statutory	  or	  other	  bar	  to	  their	  being	  made	  subject	  to	  external	  army	  influence	  when	  sitting	  in	  the	  case.	  This	  is	  a	  matter	  of	  particular	  concern	  in	  a	  case	  where	   the	   offence	   charged	   directly	   involves	   a	   breach	   of	  military	   discipline.	   In	  this	   respect,	   the	   position	   of	   the	  military	  members	   of	   the	   court	  martial	   cannot	  generally	  be	  compared	  with	  that	  of	  a	  member	  of	  a	  civilian	  jury,	  who	  is	  not	  open	  to	  the	  risk	  of	  such	  pressures’.89	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  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  25	  Feb	  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐I,	  263,	  (1997)	  24	  EHRR	  211,	  §	  74.	  88	  Ibid.,	  §	  80,	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  in	  Coyne	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  25942/94,	  24	  Sept	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  Reports	  1997-­‐V;	  
Mills	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	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  89	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The	   same	   issue	   was	   also	   examined	   in	   Cooper,	   with	   the	   Court	   reaching	   the	  opposite	   conclusion.	  Here,	   the	   Court	   found	   a	   clear	   separation	   of	   functions	   and	  sufficient	  counterbalances	  for	  the	  lack	  of	  experience	  and	  the	  accountability	  of	  the	  martial	  judges.90	  Another	  case	  of	  significant	  importance	  on	  the	  matter	  discussed	  was	  De	  Cubber.	   In	   this	   case	   a	   judge	   participated	   in	   the	   proceedings	   first	   as	   an	  investigator	   and	   following	   to	   that	   as	   trial	   judge.	   The	   Court	   took	   into	  consideration	  various	  factors	  in	  order	  to	  support	  its	  view91,	  although	  it	  could	  just	  have	   referred	   to	   the	   role	   of	   such	   an	   investigative	   judge,	   who	   appears	   as	   an	  adversary	  towards	  the	  accused.	  	  	  Oppositely,	  in	  Bulut,	  the	  Court	  found	  no	  violation	  to	  the	  right	  to	  an	  independent	  and	   impartial	   tribunal,	   although	   the	   judge	   in	   question	   was	   involved	   in	   both	  investigation	  and	  trial.	  ‘In	  the	  instant	  case	  the	  fear	  that	  the	  trial	  court	  might	  not	  be	   impartial	   was	   based	   on	   the	   fact	   that	   one	   of	   its	   members	   had	   questioned	  witnesses	   during	   the	   preliminary	   investigation.	   Undoubtedly,	   this	   kind	   of	  situation	   may	   give	   rise	   to	   misgivings	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   accused	   as	   to	   the	  impartiality	  of	  the	  judge.	  	  	  However,	   whether	   these	   misgivings	   should	   be	   treated	   as	   objectively	   justified	  depends	  on	  the	  circumstances	  of	  each	  particular	  case;	  the	  mere	  fact	  that	  a	  trial	  judge	  has	  also	  dealt	  with	  the	  case	  at	  the	  pre-­‐trial	  stage	  cannot	  be	  held	  as	  in	  itself	  justifying	  fears	  as	  to	  his	  impartiality.	  The	  Judge	  in	  question	  was	  not	  responsible	  for	   preparing	   the	   case	   for	   trial	   or	   for	   deciding	  whether	   the	   accused	   should	   be	  brought	   to	   trial.	   In	   fact,	   it	   has	   not	   been	   established	   that	   he	   had	   to	   take	   any	  procedural	   decisions	   at	   all.	   His	   role	   was	   limited	   in	   time	   and	   consisted	   of	  questioning	   two	  witnesses.	   It	  did	  not	  entail	   any	  assessment	  of	   the	  evidence	  by	  him	  nor	  did	  it	  require	  him	  to	  reach	  any	  kind	  of	  conclusion	  as	  to	  the	  applicant’s	  involvement’.92	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  25	  Feb.	  1992,	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  A	  no.	  227,	   (1992)	  14	  EHRR	  692;	  Tierce	  
and	  others	  v.	  San	  Marino,	  nos.	  24954/94,	  24971/94	  and	  24972/94,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐IX,	  167,	  (2002)	  34	  EHRR	  25.	  92	  Bulut	   v.	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   22	   Feb	   1996,	   Reports	   1996-­‐II,	   346	   (1997)	   24	   EHRR	   84,	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  24	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An	   interesting	   modification	   happened	   in	   the	   case	   of	   Fey.	   Here,	   the	   applicant,	  similarly	  to	  De	  Cubber,	  was	  tried	  by	  a	  single	   judge	  that	  performed	  investigative	  duties	   prior	   to	   the	   trial.	   The	   Court,	   listed	   a	   number	   of	   reasons	   (as	   done	   in	  De	  
Cubber)	  to	  support	  its	  decision,	  which	  this	  time	  was	  opposite.	  Although	  the	  judge	  took	  part	   in	  both	   investigation	  and	  trial	  was	  not	  regarded	  as	  personally	  biased	  since	   ‘what	  matters	   is	   the	  extent	  and	  nature	  of	   the	  pre-­‐trial	  measures	  taken	  by	  the	   judge’.93	  Apart	   from	  taking	   into	  consideration	  several	  different	   indicators94,	  the	  Court	   in	  Fey	   didn’t	  provide	  a	   clear-­‐cut	  pattern	   for	   its	   future	   reasoning	  and	  concluded:	   ‘Thus,	   the	  extent	   and	  nature	  of	   the	  pre-­‐trial	  measures	   taken	  by	   the	  District	  Court	   judge	  are	  clearly	  distinguishable	   from	  those	  that	  were	  dealt	  with	  in	  the	  above-­‐mentioned	  De	  Cubber	  judgment’.95	  	  	  Finally,	   in	  Nortier,	  a	   juvenile	  judge	  also	  tried	  a	  case	  in	  which	  he	  was	  previously	  involved	  as	  an	   investigating	   judge.	  The	  Court	   found	  no	  violation	  of	  Article	  6§1,	  since:	  ‘Apart	  from	  his	  decisions	  relating	  to	  the	  applicant’s	  detention	  on	  remand,	  the	   Juvenile	   Judge	  made	  no	  other	  pre-­‐trial	  decisions	   than	   the	  one	  allowing	   the	  application	   made	   by	   the	   prosecution	   for	   a	   psychiatric	   examination	   of	   the	  applicant,	  which	  was	   not	   contested	   by	   the	   latter.	  He	  made	   no	   other	   use	   of	   his	  powers	  as	  investigating	  judge’.96	  	  Under	  certain	  circumstances,	   it	  appears	   that	   the	  Court	  regards	  as	   impartial	   the	  judge	   who	   has	   participated	   prior	   to	   the	   proceedings	   as	   a	   prosecutor	   or	  investigator.	  It	  doesn’t	  rely	  though	  merely	  on	  these	  labels,	  but	  also	  on	  the	  agents’	  acts,	   in	   order	   to	   examine	   whether	   their	   behaviour	   is	   adversary	   towards	   the	  applicants.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   act	   of	   detention	   on	   remand	   in	   Nortier	   couldn’t	  justify	   partiality:	   ‘The	  mere	   fact	   that	   a	   trial	   judge	   or	   an	   appeal	   judge	   has	   also	  made	   pre-­‐trial	   decisions	   in	   the	   case,	   including	   those	   concerning	   detention	   on	  remand,	  cannot	  be	  held	  as	   in	   itself	   justifying	  fears	  as	  to	  his	   impartiality’.97	  That	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  255-­‐A,	  (1993)	  16	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  A	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  (1992)	  14	  EHRR	  843,	  §	  53.	  94	  Ibid.,	  §§	  31-­‐34.	  95	  Ibid.,	  §	  35.	  96	  Nortier	  v.	  Netherlands,	  24	  Aug	  1993,	  Series	  A	  no.	  267,	  (1994)	  17	  EHRR	  273,	  §	  34.	  97	  Hauschildt	  v.	  Denmark,	  24	  May	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  Series	  A	  no.	  154,	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  EHRR	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can	   happen	   only	   under	   special	   circumstances	   according	   to	   the	   Court98	  such	   as	  those	  in	  Hauschildt.	  	  	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  Court	  couldn’t	  but	  come	  to	  a	  different	  conclusion.	  The	  applicant’s	  request	  for	  release	  after	  his	  detention	  on	  remand	  was	  rejected	  several	  times	  by	  judges	  who	  were	  sitting	  in	  his	  trial.	  The	  judges	  while	  performing	  their	  pre-­‐trial	  duties	  relied	  on	  a	  section	  of	  Danish	  law	  that	  required	  for	  detention	  a	  ‘particularly	  confirmed	   suspicion’	   that	   the	   accused	   had	   committed	   the	   crime(s)	  with	  which	  was	   charged.	   ‘This	   wording	   has	   been	   officially	   explained	   as	   meaning	   that	   the	  judge	  has	  to	  be	  convinced	  that	   there	   is	  “a	  very	  high	  degree	  of	  clarity”	  as	   to	   the	  question	  of	   guilt.	  Thus	   the	  difference	  between	   the	   issue	   the	   judge	  has	   to	   settle	  when	   applying	   this	   section	   and	   the	   issue	   he	   will	   have	   to	   settle	   when	   giving	  judgment	  at	  the	  trial	  becomes	  tenuous’.99	  	  In	  Saraiva	  de	  Carvahlo	  though,	  the	  Court	  dealing	  with	  a	  similar	  question	  decided	  rather	  oppositely.	  Here,	   the	   judge	  who	  tried	  the	  case	  had	   issued	  prior	  to	  that	  a	  
despacho	  de	  pronúncia	  which	  is	  a	  decision	  that	  a	  case	  can	  be	  tried	  before	  a	  court.	  The	  Court,	  as	  usual,	  didn’t	  refer	  to	  any	  principles	  but	  dealt	  with	  the	  details	  of	  the	  case	   to	   find	   no	   breach	   of	   Article	   6§1.	   Interesting	   is	   the	   judgment	   of	   the	  Portuguese	   Constitutional	   Court,	   which	   ‘emphasised	   the	   need	   to	   distinguish	  between	  the	  indictment,	  which	  was	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  public	  prosecutor’s	  office,	  and	  the	  despacho	  de	  pronúncia.	  The	  latter	  was	  designed	  solely	  to	  verify	  the	  probability	   of	   guilt	   in	   order	   to	   avoid	   a	   trial	   where	   there	   was	   no	   prima	   facie	  evidence.	   It	  was	   thus	   a	   decision	   on	   the	   viability	   of	   the	   indictment	   and	   did	   not	  entail	   any	   prejudice	   on	   the	   part	   of	   the	   judge	   when	   the	   merits	   were	   being	  considered.	   It	   consequently	   served	  as	  a	   filter	  and	  a	   safeguard.	  Even	   if	  his	   legal	  classification	   of	   the	   facts	  was	   different,	   a	   judge	   did	   not	   act	   as	   a	   prosecutor.’100	  The	   focal	   point	   though,	   it	   should	   have	   been	  whether	   the	   judge	   had	   to	  make	   a	  decision	  based	  on	  evidence	  that	  he	  was	  going	  to	  confront	  later	  on	  trial.	  Although	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  98	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   51-­‐52;	   see	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   Rossi	   v.	   France,	   no.	   11879/75	   (1989)	   63	   DR	   105;	   Sainte-­‐Marie	   v.	  
France,	  16	  Dec	  1992,	  Series	  A	  no.	  253-­‐A,	  (1993)	  16	  EHRR	  116,	  §§	  32	  et	  seq.	  100	  Saraiva	  de	  Carvahlo	  v.	  Portugal,	  22	  Apr	  1994,	  Series	  A	  no.	  286-­‐B,	  (1994)	  18	  EHRR	  534,	  §	  20;	  see	  also	  Ben	  Yaacoub	  v.	  Belgium,	  no.	  9976/82,	  27	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  1987,	  A127-­‐A;	  Castillo	  Algar	  v.	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the	  Court	   and	   the	  Commission	  had	  pointed	   to	   this	   direction,101	  the	   case	   law	   in	  
Saraiva	  de	  Carvahlo	  didn’t	  seem	  to	  break	  the	  habit	  of	  methodology	  concentrated	  in	  unsystematic	  factual	  details.	  	  Another	   situation	   that	  questions	   impartiality	  of	   the	   trial	   judge	  or	   judges	  arises	  when	   a	   judgement	   is	   quashed	   and	   sent	   back	   to	   be	   tried	   by	   the	   same	   court.	   In	  
Diennet,	   the	  applicant	  was	   tried	   twice	  by	   three	  out	  of	   seven	  sitting	   judges.	  The	  Strasbourg	   Court	   found	   no	   violation	   as,	   ‘even	   if	   the	   second	   decision	   had	   been	  differently	  worded,	  it	  would	  necessarily	  have	  had	  the	  same	  basis,	  because	  there	  were	   no	   new	   factors.	   The	   applicant’s	   fears	   therefore	   cannot	   be	   regarded	   as	  having	  been	  objectively	  justified’.102	  	  In	  Thomann,	  the	  applicant	  was	  tried	  a	  second	  time	  upon	  request	  from	  the	  same	  court,	   as	   his	   first	   trial	  was	   held	   in	  absentia.	   The	   Court	   found	   no	   violation	   and	  followed	   the	   view	   of	   the	   Swiss	   Federal	   Court	   that	   ‘judges	   who	   retry	   in	   the	  defendant’s	   presence	   a	   case	   that	   they	   have	   first	   had	   to	   try	   in	   absentia	   on	   the	  basis	  of	   the	  evidence	  that	   they	  had	  available	  to	  them	  at	   the	  time	  are	   in	  no	  way	  bound	  by	  their	  first	  decision.	  They	  undertake	  a	  fresh	  consideration	  of	  the	  whole	  case;	  all	  the	  issues	  raised	  by	  the	  case	  remain	  open	  and	  this	  time	  are	  examined	  in	  adversarial	  proceedings	  with	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  more	  comprehensive	  information	  that	  may	  be	  obtained	  from	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	  defendant	  in	  person.	  That	  is	  in	  fact	  what	  happened	  in	  the	  present	  case’.103	  	  	  However,	   a	   violation	   was	   detected	   in	   Oberschlick,	   where	   three	   judges	   were	  members	  of	  both	  trial	  and	  appeal,	   fact	  that	  was	  also	  prohibited	  by	  the	  Austrian	  Code	   of	   Criminal	   Procedure.104	  The	   Court	   decided	   that	   the	   Vienna	   Court	   of	  Appeal,	  when	  hearing	  the	  applicant’s	  case	  in	  the	  second	  set	  of	  proceedings,	  was	  not	   an	   ‘independent	   and	   impartial	   tribunal’	   and	   was	   not	   ‘established	   by	   law’,	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  Nov	  1987,	  A127-­‐A,	  §§	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  102	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  A	  325-­‐A,	  (1996)	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  EHRR	  554,	  §	  38.	  103	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  June	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  Reports	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  (1997)	  24	  EHRR	  553,	  §	  35.	  104	  C	  Zanghí,	  ‘La	  nouvelle	  Cour	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  prévue	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  le	  Protocole	  n.	  11	  à	  la	  Convention	  Européenne	  des	  Droits	  de	  l’	  Homme:	  réexamen	  des	  arrest	  et	  impartialité	  des	  Juges’,	  in	  S	  Busuttil	  (ed),	  Mainly	  
Human	  Rights,	  Studies	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since	   not	   only	   the	   President	   but	   also	   the	   other	   two	   members	   of	   the	   Court	   of	  Appeal	  should	  have	  withdrawn	  ex	  officio.105	  	  	  The	  Court	  has	  also	  dealt	  with	  many	  cases	  in	  which	  a	  member	  of	  the	  judiciary	  had	  played	   several	   roles	   in	   the	   criminal	   proceedings	   as	   long	   as	   other	   where	   the	  question	   of	   impartiality	   was	   justifiably	   raised.106	  In	   all	   these	   cases	   the	   Court	  seems	   to	   put	   stress	   on	   the	   details	   rather	   than	   try	   to	   formulate	   basic	   and	  understandable	  principles.	  Although,	  the	  handling	  of	  the	  great	  bulk	  of	  the	  cases	  may	   be	   regarded	   as	   satisfactory,	   the	   reluctance	   of	   the	   Strasbourg	   Court	   to	  articulate	  rules	   that	  would	   limit	  confusion	   is	  disappointing.107	  Both	  approaches	  on	   impartiality	   tend	   to	   end	   up	   to	   the	   objective	   test,	   as	   it	   was	   shown.	  Consequently,	   a	   crystal	   clear	   objective	   approach	   involving	   evidence	   could	   be	  proposed	  on	  the	  subject.	  A	  maxim	  that	  could	  be	  forwarded	  from	  the	  Court’s	  case	  law	   would	   demand	   that	   since	   evidence	   is	   examined,	   involvement	   in	   both	  investigation	  and	  trial	  is	  by	  all	  means	  unacceptable.	  In	  other	  words,	  any	  decision	  that	   involves	   examination	   of	   evidence	   would	   exclude	   the	   examiner	   from	  participating	  in	  any	  other	  stage	  of	  the	  proceedings.	  	  	  	  
3.1.2.	  The	  right	  to	  a	  public	  hearing	  	  
	  ‘In	  the	  determination	  of	  his	  civil	  rights	  and	  obligations	  or	  of	  any	  criminal	  charge	  against	  him,	  everyone	  is	  entitled	  to	  a	  fair	  and	  public	  hearing	  within	  a	  reasonable	  time	   by	   an	   independent	   and	   impartial	   tribunal	   established	   by	   law.	   Judgment	  shall	  be	  pronounced	  publicly	  but	  the	  press	  and	  public	  may	  be	  excluded	  from	  all	  or	  part	  of	  the	  trial	  in	  the	  interests	  of	  morals,	  public	  order	  or	  national	  security	  in	  a	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  Oberschlick	  v.	  Austria,	  23	  May	  1991,	  Series	  A	  no.	  204,	  (1995)	  19	  EHRR	  389,	  §§	  48-­‐52.	  106	  See	   e.g.	   Artico	   v.	   Italy,	  13	   May	   1980,	   Series	   A	   no.	   37,	   (1981)	   3	   EHRR	   1;	   Jón	   Kristinsson	   v.	  
Iceland,	   no.	   12170/86,	   1	   Mar	   1990,	   A171-­‐B;	   Kleyn	   and	   others	   v.	   Netherlands,	   nos.	   39343/98,	  39651/98,	   43147/98	   and	   46664/99,	   28	   Mar	   2003,	   ECHR	   2003-­‐VI,	   61,	   (2004)	   38	   EHRR	   14;	  
McGonnell	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  28488/95,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐II,	  107,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  289;	  Padovani	  v.	  Italy,	  26	  Feb	  1993,	  Series	  A	  no.	  257-­‐B;	  Procola	  v.	  Luxembourg,	  28	  Sept	  1995,	  Series	  A	  no.	  326,	  (1996)	  22	  EHRR	  193;	  Thorgeir	  Thorgeirson	  v.	  Iceland,	  25	  June	  1992,	  Series	  A	  no.	  239,	  (1992)	  14	  EHRR	  843.	  107	  See	  P	  Van	  Dijk,	  ‘Article	  6§1	  of	  the	  Convention	  and	  the	  concept	  of	  “objective	  impartialityˮ’,	  in	  P	  Mahoney,	   F	   Matscher,	   H	   Petzold,	   L	   Wildhaber	   (eds),	   Protection	   des	   droits	   de	   l’homme:	   la	  
perspective	   européene.	   Mélanges	   à	   la	   mémoire	   de	   Rolv	   Ryssdal	   /	   Protecting	   Human	   Rights:	   The	  
European	  Perspective,	  Studies	  in	  Memory	  of	  Rolv	  Ryssdal	  (Cologne,	  Carl	  Heymanns	  Verlag,	  2000).	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democratic	   society,	   where	   the	   interests	   of	   juveniles	   or	   the	   protection	   of	   the	  private	   life	   of	   the	   parties	   so	   require,	   or	   to	   the	   extent	   strictly	   necessary	   in	   the	  opinion	   of	   the	   court	   in	   special	   circumstances	  where	   publicity	  would	   prejudice	  the	  interests	  of	  justice’	  (ECHR,	  Article	  6§1).	  
	  ‘The	   public	   character	   of	   proceedings	   before	   the	   judicial	   bodies	   referred	   to	   in	  Article	  6§1	  protects	  litigants	  against	  the	  administration	  of	  justice	  in	  secret	  with	  no	  public	  scrutiny;	  it	  is	  also	  one	  of	  the	  means	  whereby	  confidence	  in	  the	  courts,	  superior	   and	   inferior,	   can	   be	   maintained.	   By	   rendering	   the	   administration	   of	  justice	   visible,	   publicity	   contributes	   to	   the	   achievement	   of	   the	   aim	   of	   Article	  6§1’.108	  This	   view	   of	   the	   Court	   was	   further	   honed	   by	   the	   Commission	   and	  summarised	  again	  by	  the	  Court:	   ‘the	  Commission	  observed	  that	  the	  right	  of	  the	  accused	   to	   a	   public	   hearing	   was	   not	   only	   an	   additional	   guarantee	   that	   an	  endeavour	  would	  be	  made	  to	  establish	  the	  truth	  but	  also	  helped	  to	  ensure	  that	  he	   was	   satisfied	   that	   his	   case	   was	   being	   determined	   by	   a	   tribunal,	   the	  independence	   and	   impartiality	   of	   which	   he	   could	   verify.	   Furthermore,	   the	  Commission	  considered	  that	  this	  right	   followed	  from	  the	  object	  and	  purpose	  of	  Article	   6	   taken	   as	   a	   whole’.109	  It	   is	   not	   clear	   however	   how	   public	   hearings	  support	   fairness.	   Although	   it	   is	   clear	   from	   the	   wording	   that	   public	   hearing	  requirement	  is	  not	  a	  constituent	  element	  of	  fairness	  but	  a	  factor	  that	  bestows	  a	  quality	  on	  it,	  there	  is	  no	  pointing	  out	  of	  how	  this	  should	  transpire.	  Furthermore,	  even	  though	  fairness	  and	  publicity	  are	  distinct,	   it	   is	  possible	  that	   the	  Court	  can	  find	  a	  violation	  of	  both	  requirements.110	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  108	  Pretto	  and	  others	  v.	  Italy,	  8	  Dec	  1993,	  Series	  A	  no.	  71,	  (1984)	  6	  EHRR	  182,	  §	  21;	  see	  also	  e.g.	  
Diennet	  v.	  France,	  26	  Sept	  1995,	  Series	  A	  325-­‐A,	  (1996)	  21	  EHRR	  554,	  §	  33;	  Ernst	  and	  others	  v.	  
Belgium,	  no.	  33400/96,	  15	  July	  2003,	  §	  65;	  Guisset	  v.	  France,	  no.	  33933/96,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐IX,	  501,	  (2002)	  34	  EHRR	  47,	  §	  72;	  Lamanna	  v.	  Austria,	  no.	  28923/95,	  10	  July	  2001,	  §	  30;	  Riepan	  v.	  Austria,	  no.	  35115/97,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐XII,	  §	  27;	  Stefanelli	  v.	  San	  Marino,	  no.	  35396/97,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐II,	  159,	  (2001)	  33	  EHRR	  16,	  §	  19;	  Sutter	  v.	  Switzerland,	  22	  Feb	  1984,	  Series	  A	  no.	  74,	  (1984)	  6	  EHRR	  272,	  §	  26;	   Szücz	   v.	   Austria,	   24	   Nov	   1997,	   Reports	   1997-­‐VII,	   §	  42;	  Werner	   v.	   Austria,	   24	   Nov	   1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐VII,	  2496,	  (1998)	  26	  EHRR	  310,	  §	  55.	  109	  Fejde	  v.	  Sweden,	  29	  Oct	  1991,	  Series	  A	  no.	  212-­‐C,	  (1994)	  17	  EHRR	  14,	  §	  28.	  See	  also	  e.g.	  Axen	  v.	  
Germany,	  8	  Dec	  1983,	  Series	  A	  no.	  72,	  (1984)	  6	  EHRR	  195,	  §	  25;	  Helmers	  v.	  Sweden,	  29	  Oct	  1991,	  Series	  A	  no.	  212-­‐A,	  (1993)	  15	  EHRR	  285,	  §	  33;	  Jan	  Åke	  Anderson	  v.	  Sweden,	  22	  Feb	  1992,	  Series	  A	  226-­‐A,	  (1993)	  15	  EHRR	  218,	  §	  24;	  Tierce	  and	  others	  v.	  San	  Marino,	  nos.	  24954/94,	  24971/94	  and	  24972/94,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐IX,	  167,	  (2002)	  34	  EHRR	  25,	  §	  92.	  110	  Göç	   v.	  Turkey,	  no.	  36590/97,	  ECHR	  2002-­‐V,	  133,	  §	  46:	   ‘The	  Chamber	  considered	   that	   it	  was	  unnecessary	   to	  rule	  on	   the	  merits	  of	   this	  complaint	  since	   it	  had	  concluded	   that	   the	   facts	  of	   the	  case	  disclosed	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  applicant’s	  right	  to	  an	  adversarial	  procedure.	  The	  Grand	  Chamber,	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At	  that	  point,	  a	  comment	  on	  the	  publicity	  and	  its	  placing	  in	  Article	  6	  should	  also	  be	  submitted.	  The	  exception	   included	   in	   the	  public	  hearing	  requirement	   is	  also	  mentioned	  in	  the	  body	  of	  the	  text	  of	  ECHR	  in	  Article	  6.	  This	  doesn’t	   lead	  to	  the	  conclusion	   that	  public	  hearing	   is	  not	  an	  element	   relevant	   to	   the	   fairness	  of	   the	  proceedings.	  Indeed,	  publicity	  forms	  the	  appearing	  of	  the	  trial	  and	  contributes	  to	  fairness.	  Despite	  that	  fact,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  accept	  that	  public	  hearing	  is	  a	  principle	  that	   if	   absent	   the	  whole	   essence	   of	   fair	   trial	   is	   jeopardised.	   Since	   there	   is	   this	  exception	   that	   is	   expressed	   verbally	   even	   in	   the	   Convention	   text,	   one	   cannot	  accept	   the	  public	   hearing	   requirement	   as	   conditio	  sine	  qua	  non	   of	   fairness.	   For	  example,	  the	  Court	  recognised	  that	  point	  in	  Engel,	  where	  the	  hearings	  have	  taken	  place	  in	  camera	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  parties	  and	  not	  publicly.111	  	  	  The	   public	   hearing	   requirement	   has	   a	   particular	   importance	   in	   cases	   where	  evidence	   is	   heard.	   ‘All	   the	   evidence	   must	   in	   principle	   be	   produced	   in	   the	  presence	   of	   the	   accused	   at	   a	   public	   hearing	   with	   a	   view	   to	   adversarial	  argument’.112	  This	   requirement,	   that	   all	   evidence	   should	   be	   led	   directly	   before	  the	   judge	   or	   the	   fact-­‐finder,	   is	   the	   principle	   of	   immediacy.	   The	   principle	   of	  immediate	  proceedings,	  existing	  in	  common	  law	  tradition	  and	  theoretically	  dealt	  with	   to	   great	   extent	   in	   continental	   Europe,	   especially	   in	   German	   law,	   is	   often	  mistakenly	  mixed	  up	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  orality.113	  The	  judge	  should	  rely	  only	  on	  his	  or	  her	  own	  perception	  and	  not	  on	  findings	  produced	  by	  the	  pre-­‐trial	  stage.	  The	   principle	   of	   immediacy	   (Unmittelbarkeit)	   aims	   –among	   other	   things–	   at	  limiting	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   investigation	   to	   the	   trial	   phase.	  Only	   the	   evidence	  with	  which	  the	  judge	  came	  in	  personal	  contact	  can	  be	  used	  towards	  a	  conviction.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  for	  its	  part,	  considers	  that	  the	  two	  complaints	  raised	  by	  the	  applicant	  under	  Article	  6	  are	  distinct	  and	   thus	   merit	   separate	   consideration.	   It	   is	   true	   that	   the	   complaints,	   taken	   separately,	   each	  amount	   to	   a	   criticism	   of	   the	   fairness	   of	   the	   domestic	   proceedings	   within	   the	   meaning	   of	  paragraph	   1	   of	   that	   Article.	   However,	   given	   the	   fundamental	   nature	   of	   the	   right	   to	   a	   public	  hearing,	   of	   which	   the	   right	   to	   an	   oral	   hearing	   is	   one	   aspect,	   the	   Court	   is	   of	   the	   view	   that	   the	  applicant’s	  complaint	  under	  this	  head	  cannot	  be	  taken	  to	  be	  absorbed	  by	  a	  finding	  that	  his	  right	  to	   an	   adversarial	   procedure	   was	   breached.	   The	   complaint	   should	   therefore	   be	   considered	  separately	  on	  its	  merits,	  the	  more	  so	  as	  it	  was	  the	  applicant’s	  principal	  complaint	  under	  Article	  6’.	  111	  Engel	  and	  others	  v.	  Netherlands,	  8	  June	  1976,	  Series	  A	  no.	  22,	  (1979-­‐80)	  1	  EHRR	  647,	  §	  89.	  112	  Barberà,	  Messengué	  and	  Jabardo	  v.	  Spain,	  6	  Dec	  1988,	  Series	  A	  no.	  146,	  (1989)	  11	  EHRR	  360,	  §	  78.	  113	  For	   a	   historical	   overview	   on	   the	   distinction	   between	   the	   two	   principles,	   see	   S	   Maas,	   Der	  
Grundsatz	  der	  Unmittelbarkeit	  in	  der	  Reichsstrafprozessordnung	  (Breslau,	  Schlechter,	  1907).	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Ideally,	   in	   this	   way,	   fact-­‐finding	   derived	   from	   pre-­‐trial	   evidence	   submitted	   in	  writing	  –at	  least	  where	  a	  hearing	  is	  possible–	  must	  be	  left	  out	  of	  the	  equation.	  	  	  3.1.2.1.	  The	  case	  law	  
	  The	  exception	  set	  out	  in	  the	  text	  of	  Article	  6	  regarding	  public	  hearing	  has	  given	  rise	   to	   a	   number	   of	   cases114	  dealing	  with	   that	   limitation	   and	   the	   possibility	   of	  others	  implied	  and	  not	  expressed	  in	  the	  text	  of	  the	  Convention.	  In	  Campbell	  and	  
Fell,	   the	   Court	   relied	   on	   the	   expressed	   limitations	   of	   Article	   6	   finding	   no	  others.115	  In	  Albert	  and	  Le	  Compte,	   the	   Court	   cast	   doubt	   on	  whether	   the	   public	  hearing	   requirement	   applies	   equally	   to	   civil	   and	   criminal	   cases.116	  In	   Schuler-­‐
Zgraggen	   the	   Court	   noted	   that	   the	   case	   at	   issue	   hadn’t	   had	   the	   characteristics	  that	  would	  speak	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  necessity	  of	  a	  hearing.	  It	  lacked	  the	  element	  of	  public	  importance;	  it	  was	  highly	  technical	  and	  better	  dealt	  with	  in	  writing	  than	  in	  oral	   argument.	   In	  addition,	   its	  nature	  was	  private	  and	  medical,	   fact	   that	  would	  undoubtedly	  have	  deterred	   the	  applicant	   from	  seeking	   to	  have	   the	  presence	  of	  the	  public.117	  Moreover,	   in	  Botten,	   one	   can	   read	   that	   ‘Article	  6	  does	  not	  always	  require	   a	   right	   to	   a	   public	   hearing’.	   In	   Schuler-­‐Zgraggen	   though,	   the	   Court’s	  statement	  is	  linked	  with	  the	  assumption	  that	  there	  had	  been	  a	  tacit	  waiver	  and	  in	  
Botten	  the	  statement	  assumingly	  refers	  only	  to	  appeal	  proceedings.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  in	  Göç,	  the	  Court	  found	  a	  violation	  of	  the	  public	  hearing	  requirement,	  with	  eight	   judges	   dissenting:	   ‘case	   law	   lays	   down	   three	   criteria	   for	   determining	  whether	   there	   are	   “exceptional	   circumstances”	  which	   justify	   dispensing	  with	   a	  public	  hearing:	  there	  must	  be	  no	  factual	  or	  legal	  issue	  which	  requires	  a	  hearing;	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  114	  S	   Trechsel,	  Human	  Rights	   in	  Criminal	  Proceedings	  (Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	   Press,	   2005)	   p	  117	  et	  seq.	  115	  Campbell	  and	  Fell	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  28	  June	  1984,	  Series	  A	  no.	  80	  (1985)	  7	  EHRR	  165,	  §	  90;	  the	   Court	   contrasted	   this	   case	   with	   Golder,	   where	   there	   were	   limitations	   permitted	   by	  implication	  because	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  right	  in	  question.	  116	  Albert	  and	  Le	  Compte	  v.	  Belgium,	  10	  Feb	  1983,	  Series	  A	  no.	  58,	  (1983)	  5	  EHRR	  533,	  §	  30.	  117	  Schuler-­‐Zgraggen	  v.	  Switzerland,	  24	   June	  1993,	  Series	  A	  no.	  263,	   (1993)	  16	  EHRR	  405,	  §	  30;	  see	  also	  Zumtobel	  v.	  Austria,	  21	  Sept	  1993,	  Series	  A	  no.	  268-­‐A,	  (1994)	  17	  EHRR	  116,	  §	  23;	  Fischer	  v.	  Austria,	  26	  Apr	  1995,	  Series	  A	  no.	  312,	  (1995)	  20	  EHRR	  349,	  §	  44;	  Lino	  Carlos	  Varela	  Assalino	  v.	  
Portugal,	  no.	  64336/01,	  25	  Apr	  2002.	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the	  questions	  which	  the	  court	  is	  required	  to	  answer	  must	  be	  limited	  in	  scope	  and	  no	  public	  interest	  must	  be	  at	  stake’.118	  	  	  As	   far	   as	   the	   exceptions	   set	   out	   in	   the	  ECHR	  are	   concerned,	   they	  haven’t	   been	  discussed	  a	  lot	  in	  the	  Strasbourg	  case	  law.	  In	  Campbell	  and	  Fell,	  the	  Court	  relied	  on	  problems	  of	  security	  and	  public	  order.119	  In	  Diennet,	  the	  ECtHR	  noted	  that	  the	  need	   of	   protecting	   confidentiality	   could	   justify	   the	   holding	   of	   proceedings	   on	  camera;	  however,	  this	  rule	  should	  be	  strictly	  applied.120	  In	  other	  cases,	  the	  Court	  reaches	   the	   conclusion	   that	   there	   are	   no	   special	   features	   to	   justify	   the	   non-­‐application	  of	  public	  hearing	  requirement.121	  
	  The	  right	  to	  a	  public	  hearing	  is	  part	  of	  the	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial	  but,	  as	  mentioned	  before,	  it	  contributes	  to	  it	  rather	  than	  constitutes	  one	  of	  its	  essential	  elements.	  As	  the	  Court	  held	  in	  Göç,	  whenever	  there	  is	  a	  need	  to	  a	  hearing	  due	  to	  a	  factual	  or	  legal	   issue	   then	  no	  exception	   is	  acceptable.	  Under	   the	   latter	  circumstances,	   the	  requirement	  of	  public	  hearing	  is	  transformed	  into	  crucial	  factor	  for	  fair	  criminal	  evidence.	   All	   in	   all,	   contrary	   to	   that,	   only	   the	   adversarial	   manner	   for	   the	  examination	  of	  evidence	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  norm	  that	  bears	  no	  exceptions,	  as	  it	  will	  be	  shown	  later	  on.	  	  	  
3.1.3.	  The	  right	  to	  be	  tried	  within	  a	  reasonable	  time	  	  
	  ‘In	  the	  determination…	  of	  any	  criminal	  charge	  against	  him,	  everyone	  is	  entitled	  to	  a…	  hearing	  within	  a	  reasonable	  time’	  (ECHR,	  Article	  6§1).122	  In	  Wemhoff,	   the	  Court	  set	  out	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  guarantee	  stating	  that	  the	  exact	  goal	  of	  this	  right	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  118	  Göç	   v.	   Turkey,	   no.	   36590/97,	   ECHR	   2002-­‐V,	   133,	   joint	   partly	   dissenting	   opinion	   of	   judges	  
Wildhaber,	  Costa,	  Ress,	  Türmen,	  Bîrsan,	  Jungwiert,	  Maruste	  and	  Ugrekhelidze.	  119	  Campbell	  and	  Fell	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  28	  June	  1984,	  Series	  A	  no.	  80	  (1985)	  7	  EHRR	  165,	  §	  89.	  120	  ‘While	   the	  need	   to	  protect	  professional	   confidentiality	   and	   the	  private	   lives	  of	  patients	  may	  justify	   holding	   proceedings	   in	   camera,	   such	   an	   occurrence	   must	   be	   strictly	   required	   by	   the	  circumstances’.	  Diennet	  v.	  France,	  26	  Sept	  1995,	  Series	  A	  325-­‐A,	  (1996)	  21	  EHRR	  554,	  §	  34.	  121	  Botten	  v.	  Norway,	  19	  Feb	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐I,	  126,	  (2001)	  32	  EHRR	  3,	  §	  53.	  122	  See	   also	   P	   van	   Dijk	   and	   GJH	   van	   Hoof,	   Theory	   and	   Practice	   of	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	  
Human	  Rights,	  pp	  442-­‐443.	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in	  criminal	  proceedings123	  is	  to	  make	  sure	  that	  individuals	  facing	  accusations	  do	  not	  need	  to	  bear	  the	  weight	  of	  a	  charge	  for	  long	  time	  and	  that	  the	  charge	  itself	  is	  determined.124	  A	   speedy	   trial	   could	   be	   viewed	   as	   means	   for	   the	   accused	   to	  prepare	  a	  sufficient	  and	  effective	  defence.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  passage	  of	  time	  could	  result	  to	  loss	  of	  critical	  evidence125	  and	  from	  that	  point	  of	  view	  this	  right	  serves	  indirectly	  the	  sensible	  administration	  of	  it.126	  	  	  
3.2.	  Article	  6	  paragraph	  3:	  utilities	  of	  defence	  rights	  	  
3.2.1.	  The	  right	  to	  be	  informed	  of	  the	  accusation	  	  ‘Everyone	  charged	  with	  a	  criminal	  offence	  has	  the	  following	  minimum	  rights:	  (a)	  to	  be	   informed	  promptly,	   in	   a	   language	  which	  he	  understands	  and	   in	  detail,	   of	  the	   nature	   and	   cause	   of	   the	   accusation	   against	   him;’	   (ECHR,	   Article	   6§3).	   The	  right	  to	  be	  informed	  of	  the	  accusation	  has	  two	  aspects.127	  The	  first	  one	  refers	  to	  the	   information	  given	   to	   the	  accused	   immediately	  or	  early	  enough	  so	   that	   they	  are	   able	   to	   prepare	   their	   defence.	   The	   second,	   logically	   derived	   from	   the	   first,	  enjoins	  that	  the	  accusation	  must	  remain	  as	  it	  is	  during	  the	  criminal	  procedure.	  If	  that	  is	  not	  possible,	  the	  accused	  and	  their	  defence	  must	  be	  informed	  promptly,	  as	  the	  first	  aspect	  imposes,	  so	  that	  they	  can	  exercise	  functionally	  the	  defence	  role.	  By	  any	  means,	  the	  accused	  must	  not	  be	  surprised	  by	  the	  accusation	  which	  should	  be	  known	  to	  them	  beforehand	  and	  in	  time	  that	  is	  sufficient	  so	  that	  can	  be	  met.128	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  123	  S	  Trechsel,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Criminal	  Proceedings,	  p	  134	  et	  seq.	  124	  Wemhoff	  v.	  Germany,	  27	  June	  1968,	  Series	  A	  no.	  7,	  (1979-­‐80)	  1	  EHRR	  55,	  The	  Law,	  §	  18.	  125	  S	   Stavros,	  The	  Guarantees	   for	  Accused	  Persons	  under	  Article	  6	  of	   the	  European	  Convention	  on	  
Human	  Rights	  (Dordrecht:	  Martinus	  Nijhoff,	  1993),	  p	  77.	  126 	  See	   also	   P	   Baauw,	   ‘Reasonable	   Time	   and	   Successive	   Proceedings:	   A	   Case-­‐study’,	   in	   M	  Bulterman,	  A	  Hendriks	  and	  J	  Smith	  (eds),	  To	  Baehr	  in	  Our	  Minds:	  Essays	  on	  Human	  Rights	  from	  the	  
Heart	  of	  the	  Netherlands	  (Utrecht:	  Netherlands	  Institute	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  1998).	  127	  S	  Trechsel,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Criminal	  Proceedings,	  p	  195;	  see	  also	  192	  et	  seq.	  128	  Pélissier	  and	  Sassi	  v.	  France,	  no.	  25444/94,	  ECHR	  1999-­‐II,	  279,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  715,	  §§	  50,	  62;	  see	  also	  Chichlian	  and	  Ekindjian	  v.	  France,	  27	  Nov	  1989,	  Series	  A	  no.	  162-­‐B,	  (1991)	  13	  EHRR	  553,	  
Gea	  Catalàn	  v.	  Spain,	  10	  Feb	  1995,	  Series	  A	  no.	  309,	  (1995)	  20	  EHRR	  266;	  Dallos	  v.	  Hungary,	  no.	  29082/95,	  ECHR	  2001-­‐II,	  189,	   (2003)	  37	  EHRR	  22;	  Sadak	  and	  others	  v.	  Turkey,	  nos.	  29900/96,	  29901/96,	   29902/96,	   29903/96,	   ECHR	   2001-­‐VIII,	   267,	   (2003)	   36	   EHRR	   26;	   Sipavicius	   v.	  
Lithuania,	  no.	  49093/99,	  21	  Feb	  2002.	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The	   Convention	   provisions	   that	   the	   information	   provided	   must	   be	   in	   detail	  making	  understandable	  the	  nature	  and	  cause	  of	  the	  accusation.	  Nature	  and	  cause	  of	  the	  accusation	  refer	  to	  the	  facts	  and	  the	  legal	  qualification	  that	  consists	  of.129	  The	   information	   given	   doesn’t	   necessarily	   include	   a	   warning	   as	   this	   is	   not	  covered	   by	   Article	   6§3(a).	   In	   addition,	   the	   information	   doesn’t	   need	   to	   be	  followed	   up	   by	   the	   evidence	   upon	   which	   it	   is	   based.130	  That	   claim	   may	   be	  protected	  by	  Article	  6§3(b),	  the	  right	  to	  adequate	  time	  and	  facilities	  or	  the	  right	  to	   a	   fair	   trial,	   especially	   its	   feature	   about	   the	   adversarial	   nature	   of	   the	  proceedings.131	  	  	  3.2.1.1.	  Accusation:	  the	  facts	  
	  With	   regard	   to	   the	   facts,	   it	   is	   crucial	   that	   the	   information	   should	   include	   the	  blameworthy	   action,	   the	   time	   and	   place	   of	   the	   alleged	   crime	   and	   the	   possible	  participation	   of	   others.	   In	   Mattoccia,	   the	   Court	   held	   that	   ‘the	   information	  contained	   in	   the	   accusation	   was	   characterised	   by	   vagueness	   as	   to	   essential	  details	  concerning	  time	  and	  place,	  was	  repeatedly	  contradicted	  and	  amended	  in	  the	   course	   of	   the	   trial,	   and	   in	   view	   of	   the	   lengthy	   period	   that	   had	   elapsed	  between	   the	  committal	   for	   trial	   and	   the	   trial	   itself	   (more	   than	   three	  and	  a	  half	  years)	  compared	  to	  the	  speed	  with	  which	  the	  trial	  was	  conducted	  (less	  than	  one	  month),	   fairness	  required	  that	   the	  applicant	  should	  have	  been	  afforded	  greater	  opportunity	  and	  facilities	  to	  defend	  himself	   in	  a	  practical	  and	  effective	  manner,	  for	  example	  by	  calling	  witnesses	  to	  establish	  an	  alibi’.132	  Hence,	  the	  Court	  could	  not	   ‘see	   how	   the	   evidence	   gathered	   at	   trial	   could	   be	   sufficient,	   given	   that	   the	  “cause”	   of	   the	   accusation	   had	   been	   changed	   at	   a	   stage	   […]	  when	   the	   applicant	  could	   no	   longer	   react	   to	   it	   other	   than	   on	   appeal’.133	  It	   should	   be	   observed	  however,	  that	  these	  details	  are	  expected	  to	  be	  given	  in	  relation	  to	  crimes	  that	  can	  be	  determined	  in	  time	  and	  place.	  Under	  other	  circumstances,	  such	  expectations	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  129	  Sacramati	  v.	  Italy,	  no.	  23369/94,	  6	  Sept	  1995.	  130	  Ibid.	  131	  Fitt	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	   no.	   29777/96,	   ECHR	   2000-­‐II,	   367,	   (2000)	   30	   EHRR	   480,	   §	  44;	  
Papageorgiou	  v.	  Greece,	  22	  Oct	  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐VI,	  2277,	  (2004)	  38	  EHRR	  30,	  §	  36.	  132	  Mattoccia	  v.	  Italy,	  no.	  23969/94,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐IX,	  89,	  (2003)	  36	  EHRR	  47,	  §	  71.	  133	  Ibid.,	  §	  70.	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can	   prove	   to	   be	   impossible	   to	   satisfy.	   Lastly,	   it	   is	   up	   to	   the	   domestic	   law	  (substantive	  and	  procedural)	  to	  draw	  exact	  rules	  on	  that	  matter.	  	  	  3.2.1.2.	  Accusation:	  the	  law	  
	  As	  far	  as	  the	  law	  is	  concerned,	  there	  are	  examples	  in	  the	  Court’s	  case	  law,	  where	  the	  conviction	  deferred	  from	  the	  indictment.134	  Moreover,	  a	  violation	  was	  found	  in	   Pélissier	   and	   Sassi,	   where	   the	   applicants	   were	   found	   guilty	   of	   aiding	   and	  abetting	   criminal	   bankruptcy,	   while	   they	   were	   accused	   of	   criminal	  bankruptcy. 135 	  In	   Dallos, 136 	  ‘aggravated	   embezzlement’	   ended	   up	   ‘fraud’,	   in	  
Sadak,137	  ‘treason	  against	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  State’	  changed	  into	  ‘belonging	  to	  an	  organisation	   set	   up	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   destroying	   the	   integrity	   of	   the	   State’,	   in	  
Sipavicius,138	  the	  ‘abuse	  of	  office’	  became	  ‘official	  negligence’.139	  In	  all	  these	  cases,	  however,	   no	   violation	   was	   found	   since	   these	   defects	   were	   cured	   during	   the	  appeal	   hearings.	   Furthermore,	   where	   the	   main	   crime	   was	   transformed	   as	  attempt	  of	  the	  same	  crime,	  the	  Court	  found	  no	  violation,	  as	  the	  criminal	  activity	  was	  understood	  as	  ‘one	  single	  offence	  which	  could	  be	  committed	  in	  two	  different	  ways’.140	  If	  the	  case	  is	  exactly	  the	  opposite,	  namely	  the	  transformation	  of	  a	  crime	  in	  attempt	  to	  a	  main	  crime,	  then	  a	  violation	  can	  be	  found,	  as	  additional	  evidence	  would	  be	  required	  for	  such	  an	  establishment.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  134	  Chichlian	  and	  Ekindjian	  v.	  France,	  27	  Nov	  1989,	  Series	  A	  no.	  162-­‐B,	  (1991)	  13	  EHRR	  553.	  135	  Pélissier	  and	  Sassi	  v.	  France,	  no.	  25444/94,	  ECHR	  1999-­‐II,	  279,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  715,	  §§	  55-­‐62.	  ‘Aiding	  and	  abetting	  did	  not	  constitute	  an	  element	  intrinsic	  to	  the	  initial	  accusation	  known	  to	  the	  applicants	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  proceedings’	  (§	  61).	  136	  Dallos	  v.	  Hungary,	  no.	  29082/95,	  ECHR	  2001-­‐II,	  189,	  (2003)	  37	  EHRR	  22,	  §	  48.	  137	  Sadak	  and	  others	  v.	  Turkey,	  nos.	  29900/96,	  29901/96,	  29902/96,	  29903/96,	  ECHR	  2001-­‐VIII,	  267,	  (2003)	  36	  EHRR	  26,	  §§	  51-­‐52.	  138	  Sipavicius	  v.	  Lithuania,	  no.	  49093/99,	  21	  Feb	  2002,	  §§	  29-­‐30.	  139	  S	  Trechsel,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Criminal	  Proceedings,	  p	  202.	  140	  Shahzad	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	   no.	   34225/96,	   22	   Oct	   1997,	   The	   Facts;	   KL	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	  32715/96,	  22	  Oct	  1997.	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3.2.1.3.	  Initiative	  towards	  the	  information	  	  
	  The	  right	  to	  be	  informed	  is	  primarily	  the	  entitlement	  of	  the	  accused	  to	  obtain	  the	  information.	  At	   least,	   this	   is	   the	   interpretation	  of	   the	  Court.	   It	   doesn’t	   focus	   so	  much	  on	  the	  obligation	  of	  the	  authorities	  to	  communicate	  with	  the	  accused	  and	  convey	   the	   information	   as	   on	   whether	   the	   accused	   could	   have	   obtained	   the	  relevant	   information.	   This	   is	   not	   really	   satisfactory,	   but	   was	   not	   the	   case	   in	  
Pélissier	  and	  Sassi,	  where	  the	  Court	  held	  that	  ‘the	  mere	  fact	  that	  the	  civil	  party’s	  additional	   submissions	   were	   made	   available	   at	   the	   Court	   of	   Appeal’s	   registry	  could	   not	   suffice,	   by	   itself,	   to	   satisfy	   the	   requirements	   of	   paragraph	   3	   (a)	   of	  Article	   6	   of	   the	   Convention’.141	  Here,	   the	   fact,	   that	   the	   accused	   could	   have	  attained	   the	   information	   needed,	   which	   was	   available	   in	   the	   court’s	   registry,	  wasn’t	  enough.	  The	  authorities	  should	  have	  acted	  towards	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  this	  need.	  In	  Kamasinski,	  the	  mere	  fact	  of	  interrogation	  of	  the	  accused	  on	  the	  subject	  was	   sufficient	   to	   establish	   that	   he	   was	   informed:	   ‘Mr	   Kamasinski	   had	   been	  questioned	   at	   length	   and	   in	   the	   presence	   of	   interpreters	   about	   the	   suspected	  offences,	  firstly	  by	  the	  police	  and	  then	  by	  the	  investigating	  judges.	  On	  this	  basis	  alone	   he	   must	   have	   been	   made	   aware	   in	   sufficient	   detail	   of	   the	   accusations	  levelled	   against	   him’.142	  Regrettably,	   the	   Court	   expects	   from	   the	   applicants	   to	  take	   action	   for	   their	   information,	   as	   it	   did	   from	  Mr	   Campbell	   who	   refused	   to	  attend	   a	   hearing	   before	   the	   Board	   of	   Visitors	   where	   he	   could	   have	   been	  informed.143	  Of	   course,	   there	   are	   limitations	   to	   what	   can	   be	   expected	   by	   an	  accused,	   especially	   when	   he	   or	   she	   is	   abroad	   and	   the	   authorities	   should	   take	  measures	  to	  inform	  him	  or	  her	  properly.144	  	  
	  Although	   the	   Court	   tends	   to	   follow	   an	   approach	   focusing	   more	   on	   the	  functionality	  of	  the	  subject	  (i.e.	  that	  the	  accused	  must	  be	  informed)	  rather	  than	  the	  obligation	  of	  the	  authorities	  to	  make	  everything	  that	   is	  necessary	  to	  inform	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  141	  Pélissier	  and	  Sassi	  v.	  France,	  no.	  25444/94,	  ECHR	  1999-­‐II,	  279,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  715,	  §	  55.	  142	  Kamasinski	  v.	  Austria,	  19	  Dec	  1989,	  Series	  A	  no.	  168,	  (1991)	  13	  EHRR	  36,	  §	  80.	  143	  Campbell	  and	  Fell	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  28	  June	  1984,	  Series	  A	  no.	  80	  (1985)	  7	  EHRR	  165,	  §	  96;	  see	  also	  Rabenseifer	  v.	  Austria,	  no.	  24154/94,	  28	  Feb	  1996;	  Salinga	  v.	  Germany,	  no.	  22534/93,	  7	  Dec	  1994;	  Stoitchkov	  and	  Shindarov	  v.	  Bulgaria,	  no.	  24571/94	  and	  24572/94,	  28	  June	  1995.	  144	  T	   v.	   Italy,	   12	  Oct	  1992,	   Series	  A	  no.	  245-­‐C,	   §§	  28-­‐29;	   see	   also	  Colozza	   v.	   Italy,	   12	  Feb	  1985,	  Series	  A	  no.	  89,	  (1985)	  7	  EHRR	  516.	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him/her,	   there	   are	   interesting	   elements	   that	   lead	   to	   the	   right	   direction,	   as	   the	  Court	  notes	  that	  the	  duty	  to	  inform	  the	  accused	  promptly	  and	  in	  detail	  of	  the	  full	  accusation	   against	   him	   rests	   entirely	   on	   the	   prosecuting	   authority’s	   shoulders	  and	  cannot	  be	  complied	  with	  passively	  by	  making	  information	  available	  without	  bringing	  it	  to	  the	  attention	  of	  the	  defence.145	  	  	  3.2.1.4.	  Form	  of	  informing	  	  
	  As	   far	   as	   the	   form	   of	   the	   information	   is	   concerned	   the	   case	   law	   of	   the	   ECtHR	  seems	   to	   be	   contradictory.146	  On	   the	   one	   hand,	   it	   is	   mentioned	   that	   ‘Article	  6§3(a)	   does	   not	   impose	   any	   special	   formal	   requirement	   as	   to	   the	   manner	   in	  which	   the	   accused	   is	   to	  be	   informed	  of	   the	  nature	   and	   cause	  of	   the	   accusation	  against	  him’.147	  On	   the	  other	  hand,	   in	   the	  previous	  paragraph	  of	   the	   same	  case	  (Sipavicius)	  one	  can	  read:	  ‘The	  provisions	  of	  paragraph	  3	  (a)	  of	  Article	  6	  point	  to	  the	  need	  for	  special	  attention	  to	  be	  paid	  to	  the	  notification	  of	  the	  “accusation”	  to	  the	   defendant.	   Particulars	   of	   the	   offence	   play	   a	   crucial	   role	   in	   the	   criminal	  process,	  in	  that	  it	  is	  from	  the	  moment	  of	  their	  service	  that	  the	  suspect	  is	  formally	  put	  on	  written	  notice	  of	  the	  factual	  and	  legal	  basis	  of	  the	  charges	  against	  him’.148	  The	  requirement	  of	  written	  notice	  is	  met	  previously	  in	  Kamasinski.149	  But	  before	  
Sipavicius	   and	   following	  Kamasinski	   the	  word	   ‘written’	  was	  omitted	   in	  Pélissier	  
and	  Sassi!150	  All	  in	  all,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  Court	  does	  expect	  a	  kind	  of	  formality.	  ‘To	  inform	  someone	  of	  a	  prosecution	  brought	  against	  him	  is,	  however,	  a	  legal	  act	  of	  such	  importance	  that	   it	  must	  be	  carried	  out	   in	  accordance	  with	  procedural	  and	  substantive	   requirements	   capable	   of	   guaranteeing	   the	   effective	   exercise	   of	   the	  accused’s	   rights,	   as	   is	   moreover	   clear	   from	   Article	   6	   para.	   3	   (a)	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  145	  Mattoccia	  v.	  Italy,	  no.	  23969/94,	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  (2003)	  36	  EHRR	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  Trechsel,	  Human	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  v.	  Lithuania,	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  Denmark,	  no.	  24867/94,	  15	  May	  1996;	  Pélissier	  and	  Sassi	  v.	  France,	  no.	  25444/94,	  ECHR	  1999-­‐II,	  279,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  715,	  §	  53.	  	  148	  Ibid.,	  §	  27.	  149	  Kamasinski	  v.	  Austria,	  19	  Dec	  1989,	  Series	  A	  no.	  168,	  (1991)	  13	  EHRR	  36,	  §	  79.	  150	  Pélissier	  and	  Sassi	  v.	  France,	  no.	  25444/94,	  ECHR	  1999-­‐II,	  279,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  715,	  §	  51.	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Convention’.151	  This	  view	  is	  not	  satisfactory.152	  The	  Court	  should	  take	  a	  stance	  in	  favour	  of	  formal,	  written	  informing	  of	  the	  accused.	  	  The	   information	   about	   the	   accusation	   is	   the	   starting	   point	   for	   the	   defence	   to	  prepare	  the	  related	  arsenal	  and	  to	  participate	  effectively	  in	  the	  proceedings	  and	  the	   flow	   of	   evidence.	   It	   should	   be	   upon	   the	   authorities	   involved	   in	   criminal	  proceedings	  to	  ensure	  that	  this	  information	  reaches	  the	  accused,	  while	  it	  should	  cover	  factual	  and	  legal	  details.	  Lastly,	  it	  would	  be	  more	  preferable	  if	  conveyed	  in	  a	  formal	  and	  written	  manner.	  	  	  	  
3.2.2.	  The	  right	  to	  have	  adequate	  time	  and	  facilities	  	  ‘Everyone	  charged	  with	  a	  criminal	  offence	  has	  the	  following	  minimum	  rights:	  (b)	  to	  have	  adequate	   time	  and	   facilities	   for	   the	  preparation	  of	  his	  defence;’	   (ECHR,	  Article	   6§3).153	  When	   one	   reads	   this	   sub-­‐paragraph	   of	   Article	   6§3	   struggles	   to	  understand	  the	  substance	  of	  this	  particular	  right.	  Speaking	  about	  adequate	  time,	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  also	  guaranteed	  by	  Article	  6§3(a)	  as	  it	  was	  previously	  discussed.154	  As	   far	   as	   the	   facilities	   are	   concerned,	   all	   the	   sub-­‐paragraphs	   of	  Article	  6§3	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  such:	  the	  right	  to	  be	   informed	  of	  the	  nature	  of	   the	  charge,155	  the	  right	  to	  counsel,156	  the	  right	  to	  summon	  and	  question	  witnesses,157	  the	  right	  to	  the	  services	  of	  an	  interpreter.158	  All	  in	  all,	  from	  Article	  6§1,	  one	  can	  draw	   the	   conclusion	   that	   the	   right	   to	   be	   heard	   in	   front	   of	   a	   tribunal	   is	   also	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  151	  T	  v.	  Italy,	  12	  Oct	  1992,	  Series	  A	  no.	  245-­‐C,	  §	  28.	  152	  See	  the	  better	  view	  of	  the	  Commission	  in	  Nielsen	  v.	  Denmark.	  153	  See	   also	   P	   van	   Dijk	   and	   GJH	   van	   Hoof,	   Theory	   and	   Practice	   of	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	  
Human	  Rights,	  pp	  465-­‐467.	  154	  S	  Trechsel,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Criminal	  Proceedings,	  p	  209;	  see	  also	  208	  et	  seq.	  155	  Dallos	   v.	  Hungary,	  no.	  29082/95,	  ECHR	  2001-­‐II,	  189,	   (2003)	  37	  EHRR	  22,	  §	  47;	  Mattoccia	   v.	  
Italy,	  §	  60;	  Pélissier	  and	  Sassi	  v.	  France,	  no.	  25444/94,	  ECHR	  1999-­‐II,	  279,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  715,	  §§	  54,	  63.	  156	  Melin	  v.	  France,	  22	  June	  1993,	  Series	  A	  no.	  261-­‐A,	  (1994)	  17	  EHRR	  1,	  §	  21.	  157	  Mattoccia	  v.	  Italy,	  no.	  23969/94,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐IX,	  89,	  (2003)	  36	  EHRR	  47,	  §	  71.	  158	  Caresana	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  31541/96,	  29	  Aug	  2000.	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‘facility’!159	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  this	  right,	  although	  essential	  in	  substance,	  has	  little	  effect	  in	  practice.160	  	  	  Facilities	   ‘include	   the	  opportunity	   [for	   the	  accused]	   to	  acquaint	  himself,	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	  preparing	  his	  defence,	  with	  the	  results	  of	  investigations	  carried	  out	  throughout	   the	   proceedings’.161	  Consequently,	  while	   the	   right	   in	   Article	   6§3(a)	  covers	   the	   information	  given	   about	   the	   accusation,	  Article	  6§3(b)	   refers	   to	   the	  grounds	   on	  which	   this	   accusation	   is	   based,	   with	  which	   the	   accused	   should	   be	  acquainted.	  This	  right	  is	  always	  put	  in	  the	  context	  of	  equality	  of	  arms:	  ‘As	  regards	  the	  interpretation	  of	  the	  term	  “facilities”,	  the	  Commission	  notes	  firstly	  that	  in	  any	  criminal	   proceedings	   brought	   by	   a	   state	   authority,	   the	   prosecution	   has	   at	   its	  disposal,	   to	   back	   the	   accusation,	   facilities	   deriving	   from	   its	   powers	   of	  investigation	   supported	   by	   judicial	   and	   police	   machinery	   with	   considerable	  technical	  resources	  and	  means	  of	  coercion.	  It	  is	  in	  order	  to	  establish	  equality,	  as	  far	  as	  possible,	  between	  the	  prosecution	  and	  the	  defence	  that	  national	  legislation	  in	   most	   countries	   entrusts	   the	   preliminary	   investigation	   to	   a	   member	   of	   the	  judiciary	  or,	  if	  it	  entrusts	  the	  investigation	  to	  the	  Police	  Prosecutor’s	  Department,	  instructs	   the	   latter	   to	   gather	   evidence	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   accused	   as	   well	   as	  evidence	  against	  him.	  It	  is	  also,	  and	  above	  all,	  to	  establish	  the	  same	  equality	  that	  the	   “rights	   of	   the	   defence”,	   of	   which	   Article	   6	   paragraph	   3	   of	   the	   Convention	  gives	   a	   non-­‐exhaustive	   list,	   have	   been	   instituted.	   The	   Commission	   has	   already	  had	  occasion	  to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  so-­‐called	  “equality	  of	  arms”	  principle	  could	  be	  based	   not	   only	   on	   Article	   6,	   paragraph	   1,	   but	   also	   on	   Article	   6,	   paragraph	   3,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  159	  S	  Trechsel,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Criminal	  Proceedings,	  p	  209.	  160	  Cases	  that	  refer	  to	  a	  violation	  of	  Article	  6	  §	  3	  (b):	  Campbell	  and	  Fell	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  28	  June	  1984,	  Series	  A	  no.	  80	  (1985)	  7	  EHRR	  165;	  Chichlian	  and	  Ekindjian	  v.	  France,	  27	  Nov	  1989,	  Series	  A	   no.	   162-­‐B,	   (1991)	   13	   EHRR	   553;	   Domenichini	   v.	   Italy,	  15	   Nov	   1996,	   Reports	   1996-­‐V,	   2195,	  (2001)	   32	   EHRR	   4;	   GB	   v.	   France,	   no.	   44069/98,	   ECHR	   2001-­‐X,	   25,	   (2002)	   35	   EHRR	   36;	  
Hadjianastassiou	   v.	   Greece,	  no.	   16	   Dec	   1992,	   Series	   A	   no.	   252,	   (1993)	   16	   EHRR	   219;	   Lanz	   v.	  
Austria,	  no.	  24430/94,	  31	  Jan	  2002;	  Mattoccia	  v.	  Italy,	  no.	  23969/94,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐IX,	  89,	  (2003)	  36	   EHRR	   47;	  Pélissier	  and	  Sassi	   v.	  France,	   no.	   25444/94,	   ECHR	   1999-­‐II,	   279,	   (2000)	   30	   EHRR	  715,;	  Sadak	  and	  others	  v.	  Turkey,	  nos.	  29900/96,	  29901/96,	  29902/96,	  29903/96,	  ECHR	  2001-­‐VIII,	  267,	   (2003)	  36	  EHRR	  26;	  T.	   v.	  Austria,	  no.	  27783/95,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐XI;	  Vacher	   v.	  France,	   17	  Dec	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐VI,	  2138,	  (1997)	  24	  EHRR	  482.	  161	  Guy	  Jespers	   v.	  Belgium,	   no.	   8404/78,	  29	  Sep	  1982,	   §	  56;	   see	   also	  Fitt	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	   no.	  29777/96,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐II,	  367,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  480,	  §§	  46-­‐50;	  Foucher	  v.	  France,	  18	  Mar	  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐II,	  452	  (1998)	  25	  EHRR	  234,	  §	  27;	  Jasper	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  27052/95,	  16	  Feb	  2000,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  441,	  §§	  55-­‐57;	  Rowe	  and	  Davies	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  28901/95,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐II,	  287,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  1,	  §	  46-­‐50.	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especially	   sub-­‐paragraph	   (b)’.162	  Speaking	   of	   equality,	   this	   principle	   was	   not	  always	  defended	  with	   success	  by	   the	  Court.	   In	  Kremzow,	   the	  applicant	  had	   the	  opportunity	   to	   examine	   the	   ‘croquis’	   (Attorney	   General’s	   position	   paper)	   only	  three	  weeks	  before	  the	  trial,	  although	  the	  prosecution	  was	  familiarised	  with	  it.163	  	  In	  the	  countries	  which	  have	  a	  common	  law	  system	  one	  can	  speak	  about	  access	  to	  the	  file,	  whereas	  in	  the	  common	  law	  tradition,	  about	  disclosure	  to	  the	  defence	  of	  the	  evidence,	  when	  referring	  to	  facilities	  that	  should	  be	  available	  to	  the	  defence.	  In	   Atlan,	   the	   Court	   said	   that	   ‘Article	   6§1	   requires	   in	   principle	   that	   the	  prosecution	   authorities	   should	   disclose	   to	   the	   defence	   all	  material	   evidence	   in	  their	   possession	   for	   or	   against	   the	   accused’. 164 	  In	   Edwards, 165 	  ‘The	   Court	  considers	  that	  it	  is	  a	  requirement	  of	  fairness	  under	  paragraph	  1	  of	  Article	  6	  (art.	  6-­‐1),	   indeed	   one	   which	   is	   recognised	   under	   English	   law,	   that	   the	   prosecution	  authorities	   disclose	   to	   the	   defence	   all	   material	   evidence	   for	   or	   against	   the	  accused	  and	  that	  the	  failure	  to	  do	  so	  in	  the	  present	  case	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  defect	  in	  the	  trial	  proceedings’.166	  Furthermore,	  the	  Commission	  has	  stated	  that	  ‘it	  matters	  little…	   by	   whom	   and	   when	   the	   investigation	   is	   carried	   out.	   In	   view	   of	   the	  diversity	   of	   legal	   systems	   existing	   in	   the	   states	   party	   to	   the	   Convention	   the	  Commission	  cannot	  restrict	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  terms	  “facilities”	  to	  acts	  carried	  out	  during	   certain	   specified	   phases	   of	   the	   proceedings,	   e.g.	   the	   preliminary	  investigation.	  Any	  investigations	  [the	  Public	  Prosecutor’s	  Department]	  causes	  to	  be	  carried	  out	  in	  connection	  with	  criminal	  proceedings	  and	  the	  findings	  thereof	  consequently	   form	   part	   of	   the	   “facilities”	   within	   the	   meaning	   of	   Article	   6	  paragraph	  3	  (b)	  of	  the	  Convention’.167	  Whichever	  the	  legal	  system	  consequently,	  the	  guarantee	  is	  drawn	  wide.	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  EHRR	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  (1989)	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  EHRR	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  163	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  the	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  have	  been	  to	  some	  extent	  disadvantaged	  in	  the	  preparation	  of	  his	  defence,	   he	   nevertheless	   had	   “adequate	   time	   and	   facilities”	   to	   formulate	   his	   response	   to	   the	  
croquis’.	  Kremzow	  v.	  Austria,	  21	  Sept	  1993,	  Series	  A	  no.	  268-­‐B,	  (1994)	  17	  EHRR	  322,	  §	  50.	  164	  Atlan	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  36533/97,	  19	  June	  2001,	  (2002)	  34	  EHRR	  33,	  §	  40;	  see	  also	  Rowe	  
and	  Davis	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  28901/95,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐II,	  287,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  1,	  §	  60.	  165	  S	   Field	   and	   J	   Young,	   ‘Disclosure,	   Appeals	   and	   Procedural	   Traditions,	   Edwards	   v.	   United	  
Kingdom’	  ,	  Crim	  LR	  (1994)	  264.	  166	  Edwards	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  16	  Feb	  1992,	  Series	  A	  no.	  247-­‐B	  (1993)	  15	  EHRR	  417,	  §	  36.	  167	  Guy	  Jaspers	  v.	  Belgium,	  no.	  8404/78,	  29	  Sep	  1982,	  §	  56.	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3.2.3.	  The	  right	  to	  defend	  oneself	  and	  to	  have	  the	  assistance	  of	  counsel	  	  ‘Everyone	  charged	  with	  a	  criminal	  offence	  has	  the	  following	  minimum	  rights:	  (c)	  to	  defend	  himself	  in	  person	  or	  through	  legal	  assistance	  of	  his	  own	  choosing	  or,	  if	  he	  has	  not	  sufficient	  means	  to	  pay	  for	   legal	  assistance,	   to	  be	  given	  it	   free	  when	  the	   interests	   of	   justice	   so	   require;’	   (ECHR,	   Article	   6§3). 168 	  Article	   6§3(c)	  provisions	   three	   rights	   to	   a	   person	   charged	  with	   a	   criminal	   offence:	   to	   defend	  himself	  in	  person,	  to	  defend	  himself	  through	  legal	  assistance	  of	  his	  own	  choosing	  and	  to	  be	  given	  legal	  assistance	  free,	  where	  this	  is	  applicable.169	  In	  order	  to	  link	  the	  corresponding	  phrases	  together,	   the	  English	  text	  employs	  on	  each	  occasion	  the	   disjunctive	   ‘or’;	   the	   French	   text	   however,	   utilises	   the	   equivalent	   ‘ou’	   only	  between	  the	  phrases	  enouncing	  the	  first	  and	  the	  second	  right;	  thereafter,	  it	  uses	  the	  conjunctive	  ‘et’.170	  The	  ‘travaux	  préparatoires’	  contain	  hardly	  any	  explanation	  of	   this	   linguistic	   difference.	   They	   reveal	   solely	   that	   in	   the	   course	   of	   a	   final	  examination	  of	  the	  draft	  Convention,	  on	  the	  eve	  of	  its	  signature,	  a	  Committee	  of	  Experts	   made	   ‘a	   certain	   number	   of	   formal	   corrections	   and	   corrections	   of	  translation’,	   including	   the	   replacement	  of	   ‘and’	  by	   ‘or’	   in	   the	  English	  version	  of	  Article	   6§3(c).171	  Having	   regard	   to	   the	   object	   and	   purpose	   of	   this	   paragraph,	  which	  is	  designed	  to	  ensure	  effective	  protection	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  defence,	  the	  French	  text	  seems	  to	  provide	  more	  reliable	  guidance;	  on	  this	  point	  the	  Court	  and	  the	  Commission	  concur.172	  In	  this	  context,	  the	  right	  to	  defend	  oneself	  is	  going	  to	  be	   discussed	   as	   long	   as	   the	   right	   to	   contact	   with	   counsel	   as	   both	   relevant	   to	  evidence	  matters.	  	  
	  3.2.3.1.	  The	  right	  to	  defend	  oneself	  
	  Although	  this	  is	  not	  verbally	  expressed	  in	  paragraph	  1	  of	  Article	  6,	  the	  object	  and	  aim	  of	   the	  Article	   taken	  as	  a	  whole	  demonstrate	   that	   a	  person	   ‘charged	  with	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  168	  See	  also	  N	  Cahen,	  ‘Le	  droit	  à	  la	  assistance	  d’	  un	  défenseur’,	  Rev	  trim	  dr	  h	  7	  (1991)	  371.	  169	  S	  Trechsel,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Criminal	  Proceedings,	  p	  244;	  see	  also	  et	  seq.	  170	  Ibid.,	  p	  244.	  171	  Collected	  Edition	  of	  the	  ‘Travaux	  préparatoires’,	  vol.	  IV,	  p	  1010.	  172	  Pakelli	  v.	  Germany,	  25	  Apr	  1983,	  Series	  A	  no.	  64,	  (1984)	  6	  EHRR	  1,	  §	  31.	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criminal	   offence’	   is	   entitled	   to	   take	   part	   in	   the	   hearings.173	  This	   principle	   was	  further	  structured	  in	  Stanford,	  as	  Article	  6,	  taken	  as	  a	  whole,	  guarantees	  the	  right	  of	  an	  accused	  to	  participate	  effectively	  in	  a	  criminal	  trial.	  In	  general	  this	  includes,	  among	  other	  things,	  his	  right	  to	  be	  present	  and	  the	  right	  to	  hear	  and	  follow	  the	  proceedings.174	  	  	  An	   important	   issue	  on	   the	   subject	   is	   the	   trials	   in	  absentia.175	  The	  Committee	  of	  Ministers	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   has	   adopted	   a	   Resolution176	  that	   might	   be	  helpful	  to	  be	  compared	  with	  the	  norms	  emerging	  by	  the	  Court’s	  case	  law.	  If	  the	  accused	   is	   absent,	   wherever	   the	   possibility	   of	   a	   retrial	   is	   open	   there	   is	   no	  violation	   regarding	   the	   fairness	   of	   the	   proceedings.	   When	   the	   domestic	   rules	  allow	  for	  a	  trial	  to	  be	  held	  notwithstanding	  the	  absence	  of	  a	  person,	  that	  person	  should	   be	   able	   to	   obtain,	   from	   a	   court	   which	   has	   heard	   him,	   a	   fresh	  determination	   of	   the	   merits	   of	   the	   charge	   once	   he	   becomes	   aware	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  173	  Colozza	   v.	   Italy,	   12	   Feb	   1985,	   Series	   A	   no.	   89,	   (1985)	   7	   EHRR	   516,	   §	   27;	   see	   also	  Barberà,	  
Messegué	  and	   Jabardo	   v.	  Spain,	   6	  Dec	   1988,	   Series	  A	   no.	   146,	   (1989)	   11	  EHRR	  360,	   §§	   34,	   78;	  
Belziuk	  v.	  Poland,	  25	  Mar	  1998,	  Reports	  1998-­‐II,	  558,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  614,	  §	  37;	  Brozicek	  v.	  Italy,	  19	  Feb	  1989,	  Series	  A	  no.	  167,	  (1990)	  12	  EHRR	  371,	  §	  45;	  FCB	  v.	  Italy,	  28	  Aug	  1991,	  Series	  A	  no.	  208-­‐B,	  (1992)	  14	  EHRR	  909,	  §	  33;	  Monnell	  and	  Morris	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  2	  Mar	  1987,	  Series	  A	  no.	  115,	  (1988)	  10	  EHRR	  205,	  §	  56;	  T	  v.	  Italy,	  12	  Oct	  1992,	  Series	  A	  no.	  245-­‐C,	  §	  26;	  Zana	  v.	  Turkey,	  25	  Nov	  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐VII,	  2533,	  (1999)	  27	  EHRR	  667,	  §	  68.	  174	  Stanford	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  23	  Feb	  1994,	  Series	  A	  no.	  282-­‐A,	  (1994)	  15/4-­‐6	  HRLJ	  188,	  §	  26.	  175 	  I	   Fahrenhorst,	   ‘Art.	   6	   EMRK	   und	   die	   Verhandlung	   gegen	   Abwesende:	   zugleich	   eine	  Besprechung	   der	   Entscheidung	   Colozza	   und	   Rubinat	   des	   EGMR	   vom	   12.02.1985’,	   EuGRZ	   10	  (1985)	  629.	  176	  Resolution	   (75)	   11	   –	   On	   The	   Criteria	   Governing	   Proceedings	   Held	   In	   The	   Absence	   Of	   The	  Accused	   (Adopted	  by	   the	  Committee	  of	  Ministers	  on	  21	  May	  1975	  at	   the	  245th	  meeting	  of	   the	  Ministers’	  Deputies):	  1.	  No	  one	  may	  be	  tried	  without	  having	  first	  been	  effectively	  served	  with	  a	  summons	  in	  time	  to	  enable	  him	  to	  appear	  and	  to	  prepare	  his	  defence,	  unless	  it	  is	  established	  that	  he	  has	  deliberately	  sought	  to	  evade	  justice.	  –	  2.	  The	  summons	  must	  state	  the	  consequences	  of	  any	  failure	  by	   the	  accused	   to	  appear	  at	   the	   trial.	  –	  3.	  Where	   the	  court	   finds	   that	  an	  accused	  person	  who	   fails	   to	   appear	   at	   the	   trial	   has	   been	   served	   (atteint)	   with	   a	   summons,	   it	   must	   order	   an	  adjournment	  if	  it	  considers	  personal	  appearance	  of	  the	  accused	  to	  be	  indispensable	  or	  if	  there	  is	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  he	  has	  been	  prevented	  from	  appearing.	  –	  4.	  The	  accused	  must	  not	  be	  tried	  in	  his	   absence,	   if	   it	   is	  possible	   and	  desirable	   to	   transfer	   the	  proceedings	   to	  another	   state	  or	   to	  apply	   for	  extradition.	  –	  5.	  Where	  the	  accused	  is	   tried	   in	  his	  absence,	  evidence	  must	  be	  taken	  in	  the	  usual	  manner	  and	  the	  defence	  must	  have	  the	  right	  to	  intervene.	  –	  6.	  A	  judgement	  passed	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  accused	  must	  be	  notified	  to	  him	  according	  to	  the	  rules	  governing	  the	  service	  of	  the	  summons	  to	  appear	  and	  the	  time-­‐limit	  for	  lodging	  an	  appeal	  must	  not	  begin	  to	  run	  until	  the	  convicted	   person	   has	   had	   effective	   knowledge	   of	   the	   judgement	   so	   notified,	   unless	   it	   is	  established	  that	  he	  has	  deliberately	  sought	  to	  evade	  justice.	  –	  7.	  Any	  person	  tried	  in	  his	  absence	  must	  be	  able	  to	  appeal	  against	  the	  judgement	  by	  whatever	  means	  of	  recourse	  would	  have	  been	  open	  to	  him,	  had	  he	  been	  present.	  –	  8.	  A	  person	  tried	  in	  his	  absence	  on	  whom	  a	  summons	  has	  not	  been	   served	   in	  due	   and	  proper	   form	  shall	   have	   a	   remedy	  enabling	  him	   to	  have	   the	   judgement	  annulled.	  –	  9.	  A	  person	  tried	  in	  his	  absence,	  but	  on	  whom	  a	  summons	  has	  been	  properly	  served	  is	  entitled	   to	  a	  retrial,	   in	   the	  ordinary	  way,	   if	   that	  person	  can	  prove	   that	  his	  absence	  and	   the	   fact	  that	  he	  could	  not	  inform	  the	  judge	  thereof	  were	  due	  to	  reasons	  beyond	  his	  control.	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proceedings.177	  The	  trial	  in	  absentia	  could	  be	  a	  result	  of	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  defendant	  to	   appear.178	  ‘The	   right	   of	   everyone	   charged	   with	   a	   criminal	   offence	   to	   be	  effectively	   defended	   by	   a	   lawyer	   is	   one	   of	   the	   basic	   features	   of	   a	   fair	   trial.	   An	  accused	   does	   not	   lose	   this	   right	   merely	   on	   account	   of	   not	   attending	   a	   court	  hearing’.179	  The	  courts	  must	  diligently	  try	  to	  contact	  the	  accused	  and	  assure	  that	  he	  or	  she	  is	  informed	  properly	  in	  order	  to	  attend	  trial.	  The	  latter	  ‘must	  not	  be	  left	  with	  the	  burden	  of	  proving	  that	  he	  was	  not	  seeking	  to	  evade	   justice	  or	  that	  his	  absence	  was	  due	  to	  force	  majeure’.180	  	  It	   is	   also	   possible	   for	   the	   accused	   to	   waive	   his	   or	   her	   right	   to	   be	   present	   at	  trial. 181 	  But	   since	   at	   stake	   is	   a	   right	   of	   the	   defence	   this	   waiver	   ‘must	   be	  established	  in	  an	  unequivocal	  manner’.182	  The	  appearance	  of	  the	  accused	  at	  trial	  is	  rather	  a	  principle;	  that	  is	  why	  he	  or	  she	  is	  obliged	  to	  be	  present.	  If	  the	  accused	  fails	  to	  do	  so,	  a	  sanction	  for	  his	  or	  her	  absence	  cannot	  be	  excluded.	  In	  Poitrimol,	  the	  French	  courts	  decided	  to	  apply	  a	  harsh	  sanction	  on	  the	  applicant,	  namely	  the	  depravation	  of	  the	  right	  to	  legal	  assistance.	  The	  Strasbourg	  Court	  decided	  that	  it	  is	  of	  the	  first	  importance	  that	  a	  defendant	  should	  appear.	  Not	  only	  because	  of	  the	  right	  his	  has	  to	  a	  hearing	  but	  also	  of	  the	  need	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  examination	  of	  evidence,	   namely	   verifying	   the	   accuracy	   of	   his	   statements	   and	   compare	   them	  with	  those	  of	  the	  victim	  and	  of	  the	  witnesses.	  The	  legislature	  must	  accordingly	  be	  able	   to	   discourage	   unjustified	   absences.	   In	   Poitrimol,	   however,	   it	   was	   held	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   12	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  no.	  89,	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   9	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  1984,	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  EHRR	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  23	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  1993,	  Series	  A	  no.	  277-­‐A,	  (1994)	  18	  EHRR	  130,	  §	  30;	  Van	  Geyseghem	  v.	  Belgium,	  26	  Mar	  1995,	  ECHR	  1999-­‐I,	  157,	  (2001)	  32	  EHRR	  24,	  §	  29.	  179	  Van	  Geyseghem	  v.	  Belgium,	  26	  Mar	  1995,	  ECHR	  1999-­‐I,	  157,	  (2001)	  32	  EHRR	  24,	  §	  34;	  see	  also	  
Goedhart	  v.	  Belgium,	  no.	  34989/97,	  20	  Mar	  2001,	  §	  26;	  Krombach	  v.	  France,	  no.	  29731/96,	  ECHR	  2001-­‐II;	   Lala	   v.	   Netherlands,	   22	   Sept	   1994,	   Series	   A	   no.	   297-­‐A,	   (1994)	   18	   EHRR	   586,	   §	   33;	  
Pelladoah	  v.	  Netherlands,	  22	  Sept	  1994,	  Series	  A	  no.	  297-­‐B,	   (1995)	  19	  EHRR	  81,	  §	  40;	  Stroek	  v.	  
Belgium,	  nos.	  36449/97	  and	  36467/97,	  20	  Mar	  2001.	  180	  Colozza	  v.	  Italy,	  12	  Feb	  1985,	  Series	  A	  no.	  89,	  (1985)	  7	  EHRR	  516,	  §	  30.	  	  181	  Ibid.,	  §	  28.	  See	  also	  T	  Marauhn,	  ‘The	  Right	  of	  the	  Accused	  to	  be	  Tried	  in	  his	  or	  her	  Presence’	  in	  D	  Weissbrodt	  and	  R	  Wolfrum	  (eds),	  The	  Right	  to	  a	  Fair	  Trial	  (Berlin,	  Springer,	  1998).	  182	  Albert	   and	   Le	   Compte	   v.	  Belgium,	   10	   Feb	   1983,	   Series	   A	   no.	   58,	   (1983)	   5	   EHRR	   533,	   §	   35;	  
Colozza	  v.	  Italy,	  12	  Feb	  1985,	  Series	  A	  no.	  89,	  (1985)	  7	  EHRR	  516,	  §	  28;	  Le	  Compte,	  Van	  Leuven	  
and	  De	  Meyere	   v.	  Belgium,	  23	   June	  1981,	  Series	  A	  no.	  43,	   (1982)	  4	  EHRR	  1,	  §	  59;	  Neumeister	   v.	  
Austria,	  27	  June	  1968,	  Series	  A	  no.	  8,	  (1979-­‐80)	  1	  EHRR	  91,	  §	  36;	  Zana	  v.	  Turkey,	  25	  Nov	  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐VII,	  2533,	  (1999)	  27	  EHRR	  667,	  §	  70.	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unnecessary	   for	   the	   Court	   to	   decide	   whether	   it	   is	   permissible	   in	   principle	   to	  punish	  such	  absences	  by	  ignoring	  the	  right	  to	  legal	  assistance,	  since	  at	  all	  events	  the	  suppression	  of	  that	  right	  was	  disproportionate	  in	  the	  circumstances.183	  	  	  3.2.3.2.	  The	  right	  to	  contact	  with	  counsel	  
	  In	  Can,	   the	  Commission	  found	  about	  Article	  6§3(c)	  that	  unlike	  Article	  6§3(b)	   is	  not	  especially	  tied	  to	  considerations	  relating	  to	  the	  preparation	  of	  the	  trial,	  but	  gives	   the	   accused	   a	  more	   general	   right	   to	   assistance	   and	   support	   by	   a	   lawyer	  throughout	   the	   whole	   proceedings.184 	  The	   Commission	   continued	   as	   to	   the	  functions	   of	   counsel	   in	   the	   criminal	   process	   that	   they	   include	   not	   only	   the	  preparation	   of	   the	   trial	   itself,	   but	   also	   the	   control	   of	   the	   lawfulness	   of	   any	  measures	   taken	   in	   the	   course	  of	   the	   investigation	  phase,	   the	   identification	   and	  presentation	  of	  any	  means	  of	  evidence	  at	  an	  early	  stage	  where	  it	  is	  still	  possible	  to	   trace	   new	   relevant	   facts	   and	   where	   the	   witnesses	   have	   a	   fresh	   memory,	  further	  assistance	  to	  the	  accused	  regarding	  any	  complaints	  which	  he	  might	  wish	  to	   make	   in	   relation	   to	   his	   detention	   concerning	   its	   justification,	   length	   and	  conditions,	  and	  generally	  to	  assist	  the	  accused	  who	  by	  his	  detention	  is	  removed	  from	   his	   normal	   environment.	   It	   further	   pointed	   out	   that	   several	   of	   these	  functions	   are	   interfered	   with	   or	   made	   impossible	   if	   the	   defence	   counsel	   can	  communicate	  with	  his	  client	  only	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  court	  official.	  Therefore	  it	  is	   in	  principle	  incompatible	  with	  the	  right	  to	  effective	  assistance	  by	  a	  lawyer	  to	  subject	   the	   defence	   counsel’s	   contacts	   with	   the	   accused	   to	   supervision	   by	   the	  court.185	  	  	  The	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  is	  elaborated	  in	  Öcalan:	  ‘The	  Court	  refers	  to	  its	  settled	  case	   law	   and	   reiterates	   that	   an	   accused’s	   right	   to	   communicate	   with	   his	   legal	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  183	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   23	   Nov	   1993,	   Series	   A	   no.	   277-­‐A,	   (1994)	   18	   EHRR	   130,	   §	  35;	   see	   also	  
Deweer	  v.	  Belgium,	  27	  Feb	  1980,	  Series	  A	  no.	  35,	  (1979-­‐80)	  2	  EHRR	  439,	  §	  49;	  Guérin	  v.	  France,	  29	  July	  1998,	  Reports	  1998-­‐V,	  1857;	  Khalfaoui	  v.	  France,	  no.	  34791/97,	  ECHR	  1999-­‐IX,	  (2001)	  31	  EHRR	  42,	  §	  46;	  Omar	  v.	  France,	  29	  July	  1998,	  Reports	  1998-­‐V,	  1829,	  (2000)	  29	  EHRR	  210;	  Pfeifer	  
and	  Plankl	  v.	  Austria,	  25	  Feb.	  1992,	  Series	  A	  no.	  227,	  (1992)	  14	  EHRR	  692,	  §	  37.	  184	  Can	  v.	  Austria,	  Commission	  Report,	  no.	  93000/81,	  12	  July	  1984,	  Series	  A	  no.	  96,	  §	  54.	  185	  Ibid.,	  §§	  55-­‐57.	  
 74 
representative	  out	  of	  hearing	  of	  a	  third	  person	  is	  part	  of	  the	  basic	  requirements	  of	   a	   fair	   trial	   in	   a	   democratic	   society	   and	   follows	   from	   Article	   6§3(c)	   of	   the	  Convention.	   If	   a	   lawyer	   were	   unable	   to	   confer	   with	   his	   client	   and	   receive	  confidential	   instructions	   from	   him	   without	   such	   surveillance,	   his	   assistance	  would	   lose	   much	   of	   its	   usefulness,	   whereas	   the	   Convention	   is	   intended	   to	  guarantee	  rights	  that	  are	  practical	  and	  effective.	  The	  importance	  to	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  defence	  of	  ensuring	  confidentiality	  in	  meetings	  between	  the	  accused	  and	  his	  lawyers	   has	   been	   affirmed	   in	   various	   international	   instruments,	   including	  European	  instruments.	  However,	  as	  stated	  above	  restrictions	  may	  be	  imposed	  on	  an	   accused’s	   access	   to	   his	   lawyer	   if	   good	   cause	   exists.	   The	   relevant	   issue	   is	  whether,	   in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   proceedings	   taken	   as	   a	   whole,	   the	   restriction	   has	  deprived	  the	  accused	  of	  a	  fair	  hearing’.186	  There	  are	  several	  cases	  that	  apply	  the	  right	  also	  during	  police	  investigations.187	  	  	  The	   accused	   as	   a	   party	   in	   the	   criminal	   proceedings	   is	   represented	   by	   their	  counsel.	  It	  is	  the	  counsel	  of	  the	  defence	  that	  incarnates	  the	  procedural	  role	  of	  the	  accused.	   It	   is	   thus	   of	   utter	   importance	   that	   contact	   with	   counsel	   should	   be	  guaranteed	   for	   the	   accused	   from	   the	   very	   moment	   that	   a	   criminal	   process	  commences	  against	   them.	  As	   long	  as,	   trials	   in	  absentia	   are	  concerned,	   it	   is	   true	  that	   the	  presence	  of	   the	  accused	   in	  criminal	  proceedings	  exceeds	   their	   right	   to	  defend	   oneself	   and	   also	   the	   limits	   of	   this	   chapter	   indeed.	   The	   presence	   of	   the	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  EHRR	  10,	  §	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  187	  Averill	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  36408/97,	  6	  June	  2000,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐VI,	  203,	  (2001)	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  EHRR	  36,	  §	  61;	  Brennan	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  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  39846/98,	  ECHR	  2001-­‐X,	  211	  (2002)	  34	  EHRR	  18,	  §§	  46-­‐48;	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  and	  Fell	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  28	  June	  1984,	  Series	  A	  no.	  80	  (1985)	  7	  EHRR	  165,	  §§	  111-­‐113;	   John	  Murray	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  18731/91,	  8	  Feb	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐I,	  30,	   (1996)	  22	  EHRR	  29,	  §§	  59,	  62,	  64;	  Imbrioscia	  v.	  Switzerland,	  24	  Nov	  1993,	  Series	  A	  no.	  275,	  (1994)	  17	  EHRR	  441,	  §§	  36,	  38;	  Magee	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  28135/95,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐VI,	  159,	  (2001)	  31	  EHRR	  35,	  §§	   41,	   59-­‐61;	  Öcalan	   v.	  Turkey,	   no.	   46221/99,	   12	  Mar	   2003,	   (2003)	   37	   EHRR	  10,	   §§	   140-­‐143;	  
Sarikaya	  v.	  Turkey,	  no.	  36115/97,	  22	  Apr	  2004,	  §§	  67-­‐68;	  Teixeira	  de	  Castro	  v.	  Portugal,	  9	   June	  1998,	  Reports	  1998-­‐IV,	  1451,	  (1999)	  28	  EHRR	  101,	  §	  39.	  As	   it	  was	  put	   in	  Salduz	  v.	  Turkey,	  no.	  36391/02,	  27	  Nov	  2008,	  §	  55:	  ‘the	  Court	  finds	  that	  in	  order	  for	  the	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial	  to	  remain	  sufficiently	  “practical	  and	  effective”	  Article	  6	  §	  1	  requires	  that,	  as	  a	  rule,	  access	  to	  a	  lawyer	  should	  be	  provided	  as	  from	  the	  first	  interrogation	  of	  a	  suspect	  by	  the	  police,	  unless	  it	  is	  demonstrated	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  particular	  circumstances	  of	  each	  case	  that	  there	  are	  compelling	  reasons	  to	  restrict	  this	  right.	  Even	  where	  compelling	  reasons	  may	  exceptionally	  justify	  denial	  of	  access	  to	  a	  lawyer,	  such	  restriction	  –whatever	  its	  justification–	  must	  not	  unduly	  prejudice	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  accused	  under	   Article	   6.	   The	   rights	   of	   the	   defence	   will	   in	   principle	   be	   irretrievably	   prejudiced	   when	  incriminating	  statements	  made	  during	  police	   interrogation	  without	  access	  to	  a	   lawyer	  are	  used	  for	   a	   conviction’.	   See	   also	   A	   Ashworth,	   ‘Case	   comment	   on	  Magee	   v.	   United	   Kingdom’	   Crim	   LR	  (2000)	  681.	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accused	   is	   a	   demand	   that	   conforms	   to	   the	   communicative	   character	   of	   the	  criminal	  procedure	  and	  its	  conceptual	  structure	  of	  blame,	  conviction,	  stigma	  and	  punishment.188	  	  	  
3.2.4.	  The	  right	  to	  test	  witness	  evidence	  	  ‘Everyone	  charged	  with	  a	  criminal	  offence	  has	  the	  following	  minimum	  rights:	  (d)	  to	  examine	  or	  have	  examined	  witnesses	  against	  him	  and	  to	  obtain	  the	  attendance	  and	   examination	   of	   witnesses	   on	   his	   behalf	   under	   the	   same	   conditions	   as	  witnesses	  against	  him;’	   (ECHR,	  Article	  6§3).189	  Article	  6§3(d)	  presents	   the	  only	  guarantee190	  in	  the	  Convention	  which	  appears	  to	  be	  directly	  related	  to	  evidence.	  	  	  The	   Court	   has	   emphatically	   repeated	   that	   ‘The	   Court	   reiterates	   that	   the	  admissibility	  of	  evidence	  is	  primarily	  a	  matter	  for	  regulation	  by	  national	  law	  and	  as	  a	  general	  rule	  it	  is	  for	  the	  national	  courts	  to	  assess	  the	  evidence	  before	  them.	  The	   Court’s	   task	   under	   the	   Convention	   is	   not	   to	   give	   a	   ruling	   as	   to	   whether	  statements	   of	   witnesses	   were	   properly	   admitted	   as	   evidence,	   but	   rather	   to	  ascertain	   whether	   the	   proceedings	   as	   a	   whole,	   including	   the	   way	   in	   which	  evidence	   was	   taken,	   were	   fair’.191 	  The	   truth	   is	   different	   though;	   the	   Court	  inevitably	  deals	  with	   admissibility	   since	   it	   answers	   to	   the	  question	  of	  whether	  the	  rule	  set	  by	  sub-­‐paragraph	  (d)	  is	  complied	  with.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  188	  IH	  Dennis,	  ‘The	  Critical	  Condition	  of	  Criminal	  Law’	  [1997]	  Current	  Legal	  Problems,	  213	  at	  241.	  189	  See	  also	  M	  Holdgaard,	  ‘The	  Right	  to	  Cross-­‐Examine	  Witnesses:	  Case	  Law	  under	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights’,	  NJIL	  (2003)	  83.	  190	  S	  Trechsel,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Criminal	  Proceedings,	  p	  291	  et	  seq.	  191	  Van	  Mechelen	  and	  others	  v.	  Netherlands,	  23	  Apr	  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐III,	  691,	  (1998)	  25	  EHRR	  647,	   §	   50;	   see	   also	   e.g.	  Doorson	   v.	  Netherlands,	   26	  Mar	   1996,	   Reports	   1996-­‐II,	   446,	   (1996)	   22	  EHRR	   330,	   §	   67;	  Lucà	   v.	   Italy,	   no.	   33354/96,	   ECHR	   2001-­‐II,	   167,	   §	  38;	  Perna	   v.	   Italy	   (GC),	   no.	  48898/99,	  6	  May	  1993,	  §	  26;	  Sadak	  and	  others	  v.	  Turkey,	  nos.	  29900/96,	  29901/96,	  29902/96,	  29903/96,	  ECHR	  2001-­‐VIII,	  267,	  (2003)	  36	  EHRR	  26,	  §	  63;	  Vidal	  v.	  Belgium,	  22	  Apr	  1992,	  Series	  A	  no.	  235-­‐B,	  §	  34;	  Visser	  v.	  Netherlands,	  no.	  26668/95,	  14	  Feb	  2002,	  §	  43.	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3.2.4.1.	  Testing	  witnesses	  
	  In	   a	   highly	   debatable	   statement	   the	   Court	   said	   that	   ‘all	   the	   evidence	   must	  normally	  be	  produced	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  accused	  at	  a	  public	  hearing	  with	  a	  view	  to	  adversarial	  argument.	  This	  does	  not	  mean,	  however,	  that	  the	  statement	  of	  a	  witness	  must	  always	  be	  made	  in	  court	  and	  in	  public	  if	  it	  is	  to	  be	  admitted	  in	  evidence;	   in	   particular,	   this	  may	   prove	   impossible	   in	   certain	   cases.	   The	   use	   in	  this	  way	  of	  statements	  obtained	  at	  the	  pre-­‐trial	  stage	  is	  not	  in	  itself	  inconsistent	  with	  paragraphs	  3	  (d)	  and	  1	  of	  Article	  6,	  provided	  that	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  defence	  have	  been	  respected.	  As	  a	  rule,	  these	  rights	  require	  that	  the	  defendant	  be	  given	  an	  adequate	  and	  proper	  opportunity	  to	  challenge	  and	  question	  a	  witness	  against	  him,	   either	   when	   he	   was	   making	   his	   statements	   or	   at	   a	   later	   stage	   of	   the	  proceedings’.192	  The	  Court’s	  point	   is	   that	  as	   far	  as	   the	   rights	  of	   the	  defence	  are	  respected	   the	   witness	   evidence	   can	   be	   also	   under	   special	   circumstances	   tried	  non-­‐publicly	   and	   not	   at	   trial.	   In	   addition,	   it	   is	   important	   that	   ‘no	   conviction	  should	  be	  based	  either	  solely	  or	  to	  a	  decisive	  extent’193	  on	  evidence	  not	  being	  in	  accordance	  with	  Article	  6§3(d).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  192	  Asch	  v.	  Austria,	  26	  Apr	  1991,	  Series	  A	  no.	  203,	   (1993)	  15	  EHRR	  597,	  §	  27;	  see	  also	  Barberà,	  
Messegué	  and	  Japardo	  v.	  Spain,	  6	  Dec	  1988,	  Series	  A	  no.	  146,	  (1989)	  11	  EHRR	  360,	  §	  78;	  Delta	  v.	  
France,	  19	  Dec	  1990,	  Series	  A	  no.	  191-­‐A,	  (1993)	  16	  EHRR	  574,	  §	  36;	  Ferrantelli	  and	  Santangelo	  v.	  
Italy,	  7	  Aug	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐III,	  937,	  (1997)	  23	  EHRR	  288,	  §	  57;	  Isgrò	  v.	  Italy,	  19	  Feb	  1991,	  Series	  A	  no.	  194-­‐A,	  (1991)	  12/3	  HRLJ	  1000,	  §	  34;	  Kostovski	  v.	  Netherlands,	  20	  Nov	  1989,	  Series	  A,	  no.	  166	  (1990)	  12	  EHRR	  140,	  §	  41;	  Saïdi	  v.	  France,	  20	  Sept	  1993,	  Series	  A	  no.	  261-­‐C,	  (1994)	  17	  EHRR	   251,	   §	  43;	   Solakov	   v.	   FYROM,	   no.	   47023/99,	   ECHR	   2001-­‐X,	   29,	   §	  57;	   SN	   v.	   Sweden,	   no.	  34209/96,	  ECHR	  2002-­‐V,	  245,	  (2004)	  39	  EHRR	  13,	  §	  44;	  Van	  Mechelen	  and	  others	  v.	  Netherlands,	  23	  Apr	  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐III,	  691,	  (1998)	  25	  EHRR	  647,	  §	  51;	  Windisch	  v.	  Austria,	  27	  Sept	  1990,	  Series	  A	  no.	  186,	  (1991)	  13	  EHRR	  281,	  §	  26.	  193	  Birutis	  and	  others	  v.	  Lithuania,	  nos.	  47698/99	  and	  48115/99,	  28	  Mar	  2002,	  §	  29;	  see	  also	  e.g.	  
AM	  v.	  Italy,	  no.	  37019/97,	  ECHR	  1999-­‐IX,	  §	  25;	  Craxi	  v.	  Italy,	  no.	  34896/97,	  15	  Dec	  2002,	  §	  86;	  
Cyprus	  v.	  Turkey,	  no.	  25781/94,	  ECHR	  2001-­‐IV,	  1,	  (2002)	  35	  EHRR	  30;	  22/5-­‐8	  HRLJ	  217,	  §	  109;	  
Doorson	   v.	  Netherlands,	   26	  Mar	   1996,	   Reports	   1996-­‐II,	   446,	   (1996)	   22	   EHRR	   330,	   §	  76;	  Hulki	  
Günes	  v.	  Turkey,	  no.	  28490/95,	  19	  June	  2003,	  Reports	  2003-­‐VII,	  §	  86;	  Lucà	  v.	  Italy,	  no.	  33354/96,	  ECHR	  2001-­‐II,	  167,	  §	  40;	  PS	  v.	  Germany,	  no.	  33900/96,	  20	  Dec	  2001,	  (2003)	  36	  EHRR	  61,	  §	  24;	  
Rachdad	  v.	  France,	  no.	  71846/01,	  13	  Nov	  2003,	  §	  23;	  Sadak	  and	  others	  v.	  Turkey,	  nos.	  29900/96,	  29901/96,	   29902/96,	   29903/96,	   ECHR	   2001-­‐VIII,	   267,	   (2003)	   36	   EHRR	   26,	   §	   65;	   Solakov	   v.	  
FYROM,	   no.	   47023/99,	  ECHR	  2001-­‐X,	   29,	   §	  57;	  Van	  Mechelen	  and	  others	   v.	  Netherlands,	   23	  Apr	  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐III,	  691,	  (1998)	  25	  EHRR	  647,	  §	  55;	  Visser	  v.	  Netherlands,	  no.	  26668/95,	  14	  Feb	  2002,	  §	  43.	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3.2.4.2.	  Definition	  of	  witness	  	  
	  For	   the	   determination	   of	   the	   term	   ‘witness’	   the	   Court	   follows	   its	   own	  autonomous	  notion,	  as	  it	  does	  also	  in	  other	  circumstances.194	  In	  Lucà,	  the	  Court	  held	  that	   ‘where	  a	  deposition	  may	  serve	  to	  a	  material	  degree	  as	   the	  basis	   for	  a	  conviction,	   then,	   irrespective	  of	  whether	   it	  was	  made	  by	  a	  witness	   in	   the	  strict	  sense	  or	  by	  a	  co-­‐accused,	  it	  constitutes	  evidence	  for	  the	  prosecution	  to	  which	  the	  guarantees	  provided	  by	  Article	  6	  §§	  1	  and	  3(d)	  of	  the	  Convention	  apply’.195	  	  
	  3.2.4.3.	  Application	  during	  criminal	  proceedings	  
	  The	   right	   to	   test	   witness	   evidence	   may	   apply	   to	   different	   stages	   of	   the	  proceedings.	  In	  principle,	  the	  evidence	  must	  be	  presented	  at	  trial.	  ‘However,	  the	  use	  as	  evidence	  of	  statements	  obtained	  at	  the	  stage	  of	  the	  police	  inquiry	  and	  the	  judicial	  investigation	  is	  not	  in	  itself	  inconsistent	  with	  paragraphs	  3	  (d)	  and	  1	  of	  Article	  6,	  provided	  that	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  defence	  have	  been	  respected.	  As	  a	  rule	  these	   rights	   require	   that	   the	   defendant	   be	   given	   an	   adequate	   and	   proper	  opportunity	  to	  challenge	  and	  question	  a	  witness	  against	  him	  either	  when	  he	  was	  making	  his	  statements	  or	  at	  a	  later	  stage	  of	  the	  proceedings’.196	  Indeed,	  the	  Court	  has	   spoken	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   application	   of	   Article	   6	   in	   pre-­‐trial	   proceedings:	  ‘Certainly	   the	   primary	   purpose	   of	   Article	   6	   as	   far	   as	   criminal	   matters	   are	  concerned	   is	   to	  ensure	  a	   fair	   trial	  by	  a	   “tribunal”	  competent	   to	  determine	   “any	  criminal	   charge”,	  but	   it	  does	  not	   follow	   that	   the	  Article	  6	  has	  no	  application	   to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  194	  Artner	  v.	  Austria,	  28	  Aug	  1992,	  Series	  A,	  no.	  242-­‐A,	  §	  19;	  Asch	  v.	  Austria,	  26	  Apr	  1991,	  Series	  A	  no.	  203,	  (1993)	  15	  EHRR	  597,	  §	  25;	  Delta	  v.	  France,	  19	  Dec	  1990,	  Series	  A	  no.	  191-­‐A,	  (1993)	  16	  EHRR	  574,	  §	  34;	   Isgrò	   v.	   Italy,	   19	  Feb	  1991,	  Series	  A	  no.	  194-­‐A,	   (1991)	  12/3	  HRLJ	  1000,	  §	  33;	  
Kostovski	  v.	  Austria,	  20	  Nov	  1989,	  Series	  A,	  no.	  166	  (1990)	  12	  EHRR	  140,	  §	  40;	  Lucà	  v.	  Italy,	  no.	  33354/96,	  ECHR	  2001-­‐II,	  167,	  §	  41;	  Lüdi	  v.	  Switzerland,	  no.	  12433/86,	  15	  June	  1992,	  Series	  A	  no.	  238,	   (1993)	  13	  EHRR	  173,	   §	  44;	  Perna	   v.	   Italy	   (GC),	   no.	   48898/99,	  6	  May	  1993,	   §	  29;	  Pullar	   v.	  
United	  Kingdom,	  10	  June	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐III,	  783,	  (1996)	  22	  EHRR	  391,	  §	  45;	  SN	  v.	  Sweden,	  no.	   34209/96,	   ECHR	  2002-­‐V,	   245,	   (2004)	  39	  EHRR	  13,	   §	  45;	  Solakov	   v.	  FYROM,	   no.	   47023/99,	  ECHR	   2001-­‐X,	   29,	   §	  57;	   Vidal	   v.	   Belgium,	   22	   Apr	   1992,	   Series	   A	   no.	   235-­‐B,	   §	  33;	  Windisch	   v.	  
Austria,	  27	  Sept	  1990,	  Series	  A	  no.	  186,	  (1991)	  13	  EHRR	  281,	  §	  23.	  195	  Lucà	  v.	  Italy,	  no.	  33354/96,	  ECHR	  2001-­‐II,	  167,	  §	  41.	  196	  Saïdi	  v.	  France,	  20	  Sept	  1993,	  Series	  A	  no.	  261-­‐C,	  (1994)	  17	  EHRR	  251,	  §	  43;	  see	  also	  e.g.	  AM	  v.	  
Italy,	   no.	   37019/97,	   ECHR	   1999-­‐IX,	   §	   43;	   Birutis	   and	   others	   v.	   Lithuania,	   nos.	   47698/99	   and	  48115/99,	  28	  Mar	  2002,	  §	  28;	  SN	  v.	  Sweden,	  no.	  34209/96,	  ECHR	  2002-­‐V,	  245,	  (2004)	  39	  EHRR	  13,	  §	  44.	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pre-­‐trial	   proceedings.	   […]	   Other	   requirements	   of	   Article	   6	   –especially	   of	  paragraph	  3–	  may	  also	  be	  relevant	  before	  a	  case	  is	  sent	  for	  trial	  if	  and	  in	  so	  far	  as	  the	  fairness	  of	  the	  trial	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  seriously	  prejudiced	  by	  an	  initial	  failure	  to	  comply	  with	   them’.197	  According	   to	   the	  Court,	  witness	  evidence	   that	   is	  decisive	  ought	  to	  be	  examined	  by	  the	  defence	  at	  any	  time	  of	  the	  proceedings	  so	  that	  the	  rights	  of	   the	  accused	  are	   respected:	   ‘where	  a	   conviction	   is	  based	  solely	  or	   to	  a	  decisive	   degree	   on	   depositions	   that	   have	   been	   made	   by	   a	   person	   whom	   the	  accused	  has	  had	  no	  opportunity	  to	  examine	  or	  to	  have	  examined,	  whether	  during	  the	   investigation	   or	   at	   the	   trial,	   the	   rights	   of	   the	   defence	   are	   restricted	   to	   an	  extent	  that	  is	  incompatible	  with	  the	  guarantees	  provided	  by	  Article	  6’.198	  
	  
	  3.2.4.4.	  Exercising	  the	  right	  to	  test	  witnesses	  
	  The	  right	  to	  test	  witness	  evidence	  can	  be	  exercised	  by	  the	  accused,	  the	  counsel	  of	  defence	   or	   the	   two	   together.	   The	   latter	   variation	   is	   the	   most	   functional	   and	  desirable.	  In	  Isgrò,	  the	  accused	  alone	  was	  confronted	  with	  an	  important	  witness.	  Although	   the	   Commission	   found	   a	   violation,	   the	   Court	   held	   that	   in	   the	   instant	  case	   the	   aim	   of	   the	   confrontation	   had	   not	   required	   the	   presence	   of	   the	  applicant’s	  lawyer	  as	  essential;	  since	  it	  had	  been	  open	  to	  the	  accused	  to	  question	  and	   comment	   himself,	   his	   rights	   under	   Article	   6§3(d)	   had	   been	   sufficiently	  exercised	   and	   secured. 199 	  Fortunately,	   this	   argument	   was	   rejected	   later	   in	  
Artico.200	  	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   exercise	   of	   the	   right	   solely	   by	   the	   counsel	   meets	   the	  expectations	  of	  the	  guarantee,	  as	  it	  was	  illustrated	  in	  Kamasinski.201	  The	  witness	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  197	  Pisano	  v.	  Italy,	  no.	  36732/97,	  27	  July	  2000,	  (2002)	  34	  EHRR	  27,	  §	  27.	  198	  Lucà	  v.	   Italy,	  no.	  33354/96,	  ECHR	  2001-­‐II,	  167,	  §	  40;	  see	  also	  e.g.	  AM	  v.	   Italy,	  no.	  37019/97,	  ECHR	  1999-­‐IX,	  §	  25;	  Craxi	   v.	   Italy,	  no.	  34896/97,	  15	  Dec	  2002,	  §	  86;	  Hulki	  Günes	   v.	  Turkey,	  no.	  28490/95,	  19	  June	  2003,	  Reports	  2003-­‐VII,	  187,	  §	  86;	  Rachdad	  v.	  France,	  no.	  71846/01,	  13	  Nov	  2003,	  §	  23;	  Sadak	  and	  others	   v.	  Turkey,	   nos.	  29900/96,	  29901/96,	  29902/96,	  29903/96,	  ECHR	  2001-­‐VIII,	   267,	   (2003)	   36	   EHRR	  26,	   §	   65;	   Solakov	   v.	  FYROM,	   no.	   47023/99,	   ECHR	  2001-­‐X,	   29,	  §	  57.	  199	  Isgrò	  v.	  Italy,	  19	  Feb	  1991,	  Series	  A	  no.	  194-­‐A,	  (1991)	  12/3	  HRLJ	  1000,	  §	  36.	  200	  Artico	  v.	  Italy,	  13	  May	  1980,	  Series	  A	  no.	  37,	  (1981)	  3	  EHRR	  1,	  §	  35.	  201	  Kamasinski	   v.	   Austria,	   19	   Dec	   1989,	   Series	   A	   no.	   168,	   (1991)	   13	   EHRR	   36,	   §	  91:	   ‘For	   the	  purposes	  of	  Article	  6	  §	  3	  (d)	  Mr	  Kamasinski	  must	  be	  identified	  with	  the	  counsel	  who	  acted	  on	  his	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needs	   to	  be	  examined	  or	   to	  have	  been	  examined,	  as	   the	   text	  of	   the	  Convention	  reads.	   If	   the	  witness	   is	   abroad	   then	   it	   is	  possible	   to	  be	   tested	  via	   commissions	  rogatory	   and	   exceptionally	   letters	   rogatory.	   The	   Court	   puts	   stress	   on	   cross-­‐examination	  and	  oral	  test.202	  	  	  3.2.4.5.	  Absent	  and	  anonymous	  witnesses	  
	  There	  are	  a	  number	  of	  limitations	  to	  the	  right	  to	  test	  witness	  evidence	  streaming	  from	  the	  particularities	  of	   the	  cases	   in	  concreto.	  There	  are	  circumstances	  when	  the	   witness	   testified	   during	   investigation	   doesn’t	   appear	   at	   trial,	   when	   the	  witness	  is	  an	  undercover	  agent	  and	  should	  remain	  unknown,	  when	  the	  witness	  is	  afraid	  of	  retaliations,	  thus	  hides	  in	  anonymity,	  when	  the	  witness	  is	  a	  victim	  who	  can	  be	  further	  traumatised	  by	  testifying	  at	  trial.	  
	  In	  continental	  Europe,	  where	  the	  principle	  of	   immediacy	   is	  often	  not	  the	  norm,	  many	   testimonies	   of	   witnesses	   during	   pre-­‐trial	   stages	   of	   the	   proceedings	   are	  read	   in	   court.	   ‘In	   itself,	   the	   reading	   out	   of	   statements	   in	   this	   way	   cannot	   be	  regarded	  as	  being	   inconsistent	  with	  Article	  6	   §§	  1	   and	  3(d)	  of	   the	  Convention,	  but	  the	  use	  made	  of	  them	  as	  evidence	  must	  nevertheless	  comply	  with	  the	  rights	  of	   the	  defence,	  which	   it	   is	   the	   object	   and	  purpose	   of	  Article	   6	   to	   protect’.203	  In	  order	   for	   such	   compliance	   to	   take	   place,	   should	   the	   defendant	   question	   the	  witness.	  Regrettably,	   the	  Court	  didn’t	   find	  a	  violation	  where	   this	  didn’t	  happen	  due	   to	   the	   absence	   of	   the	   witness,	   on	   the	   grounds	   that	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   only	  witness	   could	   not	   be	   found	   ‘did	   not	   in	   itself	   make	   it	   necessary	   to	   halt	   the	  prosecution’;204	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  behalf,	   and	  he	   cannot	   therefore	   attribute	   to	   the	   respondent	   State	   any	   liability	   for	  his	   counsel’s	  decisions	  in	  this	  respect’.	  202	  Windisch	  v.	  Austria,	  27	  Sept	  1990,	  Series	  A	  no.	  186,	  (1991)	  13	  EHRR	  281,	  §	  28;	  see	  also	  e.g.	  AM	  v.	   Italy,	   no.	   37019/97,	   ECHR	   1999-­‐IX,	   §	  27;	   SN	   v.	   Sweden,	   no.	   34209/96,	   ECHR	   2002-­‐V,	   245,	  (2004)	  39	  EHRR	  13,	  §	  50;	  Solakov	  v.	  FYROM,	  no.	  47023/99,	  ECHR	  2001-­‐X,	  29,	  §	  62.	  203	  Unterpertinger	  v.	  Austria,	  24	  Nov	  1986,	  Series	  A	  no.	  110,	  (1991)	  13	  EHRR	  175,	  §	  31;	  Windisch	  v.	  Austria,	  27	  Sept	  1990,	  Series	  A	  no.	  186,	  (1991)	  13	  EHRR	  281,	  §	  26.	  204	  Artner	  v.	  Austria,	  28	  Aug	  1992,	  Series	  A,	  no.	  242-­‐A,	  §	  21.	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In	  another	  case,	  it	  was	  held	  that,	  it	  had	  been	  open	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  to	  have	  regard	   to	   such	   a	   submission	   of	   witness	   evidence	   obtained	   by	   the	   police,	  especially	   since	   it	   could	  have	   considered	   that	   statement	   to	  be	   corroborated	  by	  other	  evidence	  before	  it!205	  In	  Lüdi,	  the	  Court	  accepted	  limitations	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  witness	  who	  was	  an	  undercover	  agent,	  but	  not	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  he	  shouldn’t	  be	  tested	   at	   all.	   The	   applicant	   knew	   the	   agent’s	   face,	   as	   he	   had	   met	   him	   before	  several	   times,	   so	   that	   he	   could	   confront	   him	  at	   trial	  without	   his	   identity	   being	  revealed.206	  	  As	  far	  as	  the	  intimidated	  witnesses	  are	  concerned,207	  the	  Court	  has	  stated	  that	  ‘It	  is	   true	   that	   Article	   6	   does	   not	   explicitly	   require	   the	   interests	   of	   witnesses	   in	  general,	  and	  those	  of	  victims	  called	  upon	  to	  testify	  in	  particular,	  to	  be	  taken	  into	  consideration.	  However,	  their	  life,	  liberty	  or	  security	  of	  person	  may	  be	  at	  stake,	  as	   may	   interests	   coming	   generally	   within	   the	   ambit	   of	   Article	   8	   of	   the	  Convention.	  Such	  interests	  of	  witnesses	  and	  victims	  are	  in	  principle	  protected	  by	  other,	   substantive	   provisions	   of	   the	   Convention,	   which	   imply	   that	   Contracting	  States	   should	   organise	   their	   criminal	   proceedings	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   those	  interests	  are	  not	  unjustifiably	  imperilled.	  Against	  this	  background,	  principles	  of	  fair	   trial	   also	   require	   that	   in	  appropriate	   cases	   the	   interests	  of	   the	  defence	  are	  balanced	   against	   those	   of	   witnesses	   or	   victims	   called	   upon	   to	   testify’. 208	  Anonymity	   is	   the	   case	   here	   repeated,	   which	   is	   acceptable209	  with	   reservations	  from	  the	  Court,	  which	  prohibits	  a	  conviction	  based	  ‘solely	  or	  to	  a	  decisive	  extent	  on	  anonymous	  evidence’.210	  Anonymity	  is	  the	  norm	  for	  the	  vulnerable	  witnesses	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  205	  Doorson	  v.	  Netherlands,	  26	  Mar	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐II,	  446,	  (1996)	  22	  EHRR	  330,	  §	  81.	  206	  Lüdi	  v.	  Switzerland,	  no.	  12433/86,	  15	  June	  1992,	  Series	  A	  no.	  238,	  (1993)	  13	  EHRR	  173,	  §§	  45-­‐50.	  207	  See	  also	  R	  Munday,	  ‘The	  Proof	  of	  Fear’	  (1993)	  143	  NLJ	  542	  and	  587.	  208	  Doorson	   v.	  Netherlands,	   26	  Mar	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐II,	   446,	   (1996)	  22	  EHRR	  330,	   §	  70;	   see	  also	  Van	  Mechelen	  v.	  Netherlands,	  23	  Apr	  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐III,	  691,	  (1998)	  25	  EHRR	  647,	  §	  53.	  209	  The	   use	   of	   anonymous	   witnesses	   is	   expressly	   not	   incompatible	   with	   the	   Convention	   in	   all	  circumstances;	   see	  Birutis	  and	  others	   v.	  Lithuania,	  nos.	  47698/99	  and	  48115/99,	  28	  Mar	  2002,	  §	  29;	  Doorson	   v.	  Netherlands,	   26	  Mar	   1996,	   Reports	   1996-­‐II,	   446,	   (1996)	   22	   EHRR	   330,	   §	   72;	  
Kostovski	  v.	  Netherlands,	  20	  Nov	  1989,	  Series	  A,	  no.	  166	  (1990)	  12	  EHRR	  140,	  §	  43;	  Van	  Mechelen	  v.	   Netherlands,	   23	   Apr	   1997,	   Reports	   1997-­‐III,	   691,	   (1998)	   25	   EHRR	   647,	   §	   54;	   Visser	   v.	  
Netherlands,	  no.	  26668/95,	  14	  Feb	  2002,	  §	  43.	  	  210	  Kostovski	  v.	  Netherlands,	  20	  Nov	  1989,	  Series	  A,	  no.	  166	  (1990)	  12	  EHRR	  140,	  §	  44;	  see	  also	  e.g.	  Birutis	  and	  others	  v.	  Lithuania,	  nos.	  47698/99	  and	  48115/99,	  28	  Mar	  2002,	  §	  29;	  Doorson	  v.	  
Netherlands,	   26	  Mar	   1996,	   Reports	   1996-­‐II,	   446,	   (1996)	   22	   EHRR	   330,	   §	   76;	   Van	  Mechelen	   v.	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too;211	  in	   such	   cases,	   the	   criminal	   proceedings	   ‘are	   often	   conceived	   of	   as	   an	  ordeal	  by	   the	  victim,	   in	  particular	  when	   the	   latter	   is	  unwillingly	   confronted	  by	  the	  defendant’.212	  
	  The	  natural	  realm	  of	  the	  right	  of	  the	  accused	  to	  test	  witness	  evidence	  is	  the	  trial	  stage,	   where	   the	   adversarial	   element	   dominates.	   However,	   as	   its	   case	   law	  confirms,	  the	  Court	  is	  interested	  mainly	  in	  the	  satisfaction	  of	  the	  right	  of	  Article	  6§3(d),	   without	   focusing	   on	   any	   particular	   phase	   of	   the	   proceedings	   during	  which	   this	   guarantee	   should	   be	   secured.	   The	   Court	   doesn’t	   exclude	   the	  possibility	  also	  that	  the	  right	  to	  test	  witness	  evidence	  be	  satisfied	  only	  during	  the	  investigation,	   without	   being	   exercised	   again	   at	   trial.	   Is	   that	   a	   tendency	   that	  speaks	   in	   favour	   of	   a	   potential	   upgrade	   of	   the	   pre-­‐trial	   proceedings	   with	  elements	   that	  would	  add	  to	   their	  determinative	  role	  and	  overshadow	  the	  trial?	  This	  fear	  is	  cast	  out	  by	  the	  different	  purposes	  of	  the	  different	  stages	  in	  criminal	  proceedings.213	  In	   addition,	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	   Court	   doesn’t	   impose	   to	   the	  member-­‐states	   a	   certain	  model	   of	   criminal	   procedure,	   but	   is	   rather	   willing	   to	  give	   to	   the	  domestic	   legislatures	   the	  opportunity	   to	  organise	   their	  proceedings	  so	   that	   a	   possible	   pre-­‐trial	  witness	   testimony	   be	   validly	   exploited	   in	   the	   court	  room.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Netherlands,	   23	   Apr	   1997,	   Reports	   1997-­‐III,	   691,	   (1998)	   25	   EHRR	   647,	   §	   55;	   Visser	   v.	  
Netherlands,	  no.	  26668/95,	  14	  Feb	  2002,	  §	  43.	  211	  See	   also	   L	   Ellison,	   The	   Adversarial	   Process	   and	   the	   Vulnerable	   Witness	   (Oxford,	   Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2001).	  212	  SN	  v.	  Sweden,	  no.	  34209/96,	  ECHR	  2002-­‐V,	  245,	  (2004)	  39	  EHRR	  13,	  §	  47.	  213	  The	  goal	  of	  the	  criminal	  trial	  is	  through	  accurate	  determinations	  and	  fair	  proceedings	  to	  come	  to	   a	   conclusion	   on	   conviction	   or	   acquittal	   of	   the	   person	   accused.	   In	   trial,	   the	   adjudication	   of	  evidence	   as	   it	   is	   provided	   by	   the	   previous	   investigative	   phase	   takes	   place.	   Here	   the	   judicial	  decision	   requires	   a	   high	   level	   of	   conviction.	   See	   also	   M	   Delmas-­‐Marty	   and	   JR	   Spencer	   (eds),	  
European	  Criminal	  Procedures	  (Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2006)	  pp	  600-­‐602	  on	  the	  level	   of	   certainty,	   which	   must	   be	   reached	   in	   establishing	   guilt	   by	   evidence.	   As	   far	   as	   the	  investigation	   is	  concerned,	   its	  goal	   is	  not	   to	  be	  determinative	   in	   the	  way	   that	   trial	   is.	   It	  doesn’t	  involve	   a	   determination	   of	   the	   guilt	   or	   innocence	   of	   the	   accused.	   Its	   purpose	   is	   to	   further	   the	  investigation	  and	  prepare	  the	  trial	  if	  needed.	  Apart	  from	  issues	  related	  to	  collecting	  and	  handling	  evidence	  there	  is	  also	  a	  decision	  to	  be	  made	  on	  that	  evidence	  which	  is	  whether	  it	  is	  sufficient	  for	  the	  case	  to	  proceed	  to	  trial.	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3.2.5.	  The	  right	  to	  the	  free	  assistance	  of	  an	  interpreter	  	  
	  ‘Everyone	  charged	  with	  a	  criminal	  offence	  has	  the	  following	  minimum	  rights:	  (e)	  to	  have	  the	  free	  assistance	  of	  an	  interpreter	  if	  he	  cannot	  understand	  or	  speak	  the	  language	   used	   in	   court’	   (ECHR,	   Article	   6§3).214	  Although,	   the	   right	   to	   the	   free	  assistance	  of	  an	  interpreter	  seems	  peripheral,	  it	  could	  be	  seen	  as	  part	  of	  the	  right	  to	   be	  heard;	   hence	   as	   a	   right	   in	   the	  heart	   of	   fair	   trial.215	  In	  Stanford,	   the	  Court	  held	  that	  Article	  6	  ‘guarantees	  the	  right	  of	  an	  accused	  to	  participate	  effectively	  in	  a	   criminal	   trial.	   In	   general	   this	   includes,	   inter	   alia,	   not	   only	   his	   right	   to	   be	  present,	  but	  also	  to	  hear	  and	  follow	  the	  proceedings’.216	  	  	  	  3.2.5.1.	  Importance	  for	  the	  proceedings	  	  
	  Apart	  from	  being	  a	  right	  for	  the	  accused,	  the	  interest	  of	  having	  the	  assistance	  of	  an	  interpreter	  concerns	  the	  whole	  procedure	  and	  its	  participants.	  It	  is	  not	  only	  a	  right	  of	  the	  defence	  but	  also	  an	  essential	  prerequisite	  for	  the	  proper	  functioning	  of	  the	  administration	  of	  justice.	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  the	  court	  ex	  officio	  should	  react	   in	  any	  case	   in	  which	   the	   interpretation	   is	   inadequate	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	  the	  procedure.217	  Indeed,	   the	   judge,	   as	   ‘the	  ultimate	  guardian	  of	   the	   fairness	  of	  the	  proceedings’,	  should	  protect	  the	  well-­‐functioning	  of	  the	  trial	  and	  ensure	  that	  the	  accused	  doesn’t	  encounter	  difficulties	  due	  to	  language	  reasons.218	  In	  Cuscani,	  although	  the	  defence	  had	  waived	  the	  right,	  the	  Court	  found	  a	  violation	  of	  Article	  6§1	   in	   conjunction	   with	   6§3(e)	   since,	   ‘the	   onus	   was	   on	   the	   judge	   to	   reassure	  himself	   that	   the	   absence	   of	   an	   interpreter	   at	   the	   hearing	   on	   26	   January	   1996	  would	   not	   prejudice	   the	   applicant’s	   full	   involvement	   in	   a	   matter	   of	   crucial	  importance	  for	  him’.219	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  214	  S	  Trechsel,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Criminal	  Proceedings,	  p	  327	  et	  seq.	  215	  ‘In	  general	  [the	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial]	   includes	  not	  only	  his	  right	  to	  be	  present	  but	  also	  to	  hear	  and	  follow	  the	  proceedings’	  (Roos	  v.	  Sweden,	  no.	  19598/92,	  6	  Apr	  1994).	  	  216	  Stanford	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  23	  Feb	  1994,	  Series	  A	  no.	  282-­‐A,	  (1994)	  15/4-­‐6	  HRLJ	  188,	  §	  26.	  217	  Kamasinski	  v.	  Austria,	  19	  Dec	  1989,	  Series	  A	  no.	  168,	  (1991)	  13	  EHRR	  36,	  §	  74.	  218	  Cuscani	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  32771/96,	  24	  Sept	  2002,	  (2003)	  36	  EHRR	  2,	  §	  39.	  219	  Ibid.,	  38.	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3.2.5.2.	  Application	  of	  the	  right	  during	  the	  proceedings	  	  
	  The	   need	   of	   interpretation	   arises	   when	   the	   defendant	   cannot	   speak	   or	  understand	   the	   language	  used	   in	   court.	  A	   closely	   associated	  problem	   to	   that	   is	  that	  the	  defendant	  would	  possibly	  not	  cooperate.	  In	  these	  cases	  the	  court	  should	  test	   his	   or	   her	   linguistic	   proficiency	   by	   hearing	   evidence.	   In	   a	   case	  where	   the	  applicant	   had	   lived	   in	   the	   United	   Kingdom	   for	   thirteen	   years,	   the	   Commission	  was	  satisfied	  that	  he	  had	  sufficient	  knowledge	  of	  the	  language.220	  In	  addition,	  in	  another	   case	   it	   relied	   on	   the	   findings	   of	   the	   domestic	   court	   regarding	   the	  competence	   of	   the	   accused	   in	   German.221	  At	   issue	   here	   is	   only	   the	   linguistic	  proficiency	  of	  the	  accused.	  If	  a	  witness	  is	  the	  subject	  of	  this	  matter,	  that	  might	  be	  dealt	  with	  under	  Article	  6§3(d)	  and	  not	  3(e).222	  	  The	  text	  of	   the	  Convention	  by	  reading	   ‘used	   in	  court’	  gives	   the	   impression	  that	  the	  guarantee	  of	  Article	  6§3(e)	  does	  not	  apply	   to	  any	  preliminary	  proceedings.	  This	   was	   also	   the	   interpretation	   proposed	   by	   the	   German	   government	   in	  
Luedicke,	   Belkacem	   and	   Koç.223	  In	   Kamasinski	   the	   Court	   made	   it	   clear	   that	   the	  right	  applies	  also	  to	  the	  ‘pre-­‐trial	  proceedings’.224	  In	  fact	  the	  right	  has	  numerous	  applications	  referring	  to	  the	  court	  proceedings,	  the	  preliminary	  proceedings,	  the	  documents	  of	   the	   trial	  and	   the	  conversations	  between	   the	  accused	  and	  his/her	  counsel.225	  	  The	  need	  for	  interpretation	  primarily	  arises	  during	  the	  hearing	  at	  trial.	  It	  is	  not	  necessary	   that	   the	   interpretation	   is	  simultaneous;	   it	  can	  also	  be	  consecutive.226	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  220	  Santa	  Cruz	  Ruiz	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  Commission	  Report,	  The	  Law,	  §	  3.	  221	  SEK	  v.	  Switzerland,	  Commission	  Report,	  The	  Law,	  §	  1:	  ‘The	  Commission	  notes	  further	  that	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal,	  in	  its	  judgment	  of	  8	  March	  1989,	  dealt	  extensively	  with	  the	  applicant’s	  complaint	  that	  he	  had	  no	  sufficient	  command	  of	  German	  and	  concluded	  that	   the	  applicant	  did	  sufficiently	  understand	  German.	  These	   findings	  were	   confirmed	  by	   the	  Court	  of	  Cassation	  and	   the	  Federal	  Court	  in	  their	  respective	  judgments.	  The	  Commission	  also	  notes	  that	  there	  is	  no	  indication	  that	  at	  the	   time	   of	   his	   interrogation	   by	   the	   police,	   the	   applicant	   had	   asked	   for	   the	   assistance	   by	   an	  interpreter,	  especially	  after	  having	  been	  assisted	  by	  counsel’.	  222	  PSV	  v.	  Finland,	  no.	  23378/94,	  18	  Jan	  1995;	  C	  v.	  France,	  17276/90,	  13	  May	  1992.	  223	  Luedicke,	  Belkacem	  and	  Koç,	  Series	  A	  no.	  29,	  (1979-­‐80)	  2	  EHRR	  149,	  §	  48.	  224	  Kamasinski	  v.	  Austria,	  19	  Dec	  1989,	  Series	  A	  no.	  168,	  (1991)	  13	  EHRR	  36,	  §§	  74,	  76.	  225	  PJ	   Duffy,	   ‘Luedicke,	   Belkacem	   and	   Koç:	   A	   Discussion	   of	   the	   Case	   and	   of	   Certain	   Questions	  Raised	  by	  It’	  HRR	  (1979)	  98.	  226	  Ibid.,	  §	  83.	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Of	  course	  if	  the	  accused	  does	  not	  appear	  for	  the	  trial,	  even	  if	  he	  has	  paid	  for	  the	  interpreter	  who	  has	  been	  summoned	  to	  assist	  him,	  doesn’t	  suffer	  any	  violation	  of	  the	   right. 227 	  As	   a	   rule	   of	   thumb,	   everything	   said	   or	   happened	   during	   the	  proceedings	  must	  be	  interpreted	  to	  the	  accused,	  every	  single	  sentence	  even	  if	  it	  doesn’t	  directly	  concern	  him.	  In	  Kamasinski	   though,	  the	  Court	  responded	  to	  the	  applicant’s	  complaints	  that	  certain	  questions	  to	  the	  witnesses	  weren’t	  translated	  to	   him	   that	   this	   ‘in	   itself	   does	   not	   suffice	   to	   establish	   a	   violation	   of	   sub-­‐paragraphs	   (d)	   or	   (e)’.228	  This	   response	   explains	   the	   relative	   character	   of	   the	  right	   and	   it	   is	   more	   a	   result	   of	   the	   inability	   of	   the	   applicant	   to	   support	   his	  argument	   (i.e.	   inadequate	   interpretation)	   in	   that	   particular	   case	   rather	   than	  of	  the	  view	  of	  the	  Court	  regarding	  the	  application	  of	  the	  guarantee.	  	  	  As	  far	  as	  the	  pre-­‐trial	  proceedings	  are	  concerned,	  the	  right	  to	  the	  free	  assistance	  of	   an	   interpreter	   also	   applies	   to	   them,	   as	  mentioned	   before,	   confirmed	   by	   the	  Court	   in	   Kamasinski.229	  In	   Luedicke,	   Belkacem	   and	   Koç	   the	   Court	   enumerates	  several	  instances	  where	  free	  interpretation	  must	  be	  available:	  the	  appearance	  of	  the	   accused	   before	   the	   judge,	   the	   review	   of	   his	   detention	   on	   remand,	   the	  translation	  of	   the	   indictment	  and	  the	   trial	  hearing.230	  This	   is	  understandable	  as	  the	   investigation	   and	   the	   trial	   phases	   have	   different	   gravity	   from	   country	   to	  country	  with	  respect	  to	  evidence	  and	  its	  evaluation.	  	  Consequently,	   the	   Court	   has	   interpreted	   the	   right	   as	   requiring	   not	   only	  interpretation	   during	   hearing	   but	   also	   translating	   of	   important	   documents.231	  Here,	   it	   is	   also	   understandable	   that	   the	   relation	   of	   oral	   and	   documentary	  evidence	   may	   vary	   among	   different	   jurisdictions	   and	   the	   guarantee	   of	   Article	  6§3(e)	   aims	   at	   eliminating	   any	   possible	   inequalities	   by	   applying	   it	   also	   in	  documents.	  Indeed,	  in	  many	  countries	  the	  file	  of	  a	  case	  plays	  an	  important	  role	  to	  the	   whole	   procedure.	   Nevertheless,	   ‘paragraph	   3	   (e)	   does	   not	   go	   so	   far	   as	   to	  require	   a	   written	   translation	   of	   all	   items	   of	   written	   evidence	   or	   official	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  227	  See	  Fedele	  v.	  Germany,	  Commission	  Report.	  228	  Kamasinski	  v.	  Austria,	  19	  Dec	  1989,	  Series	  A	  no.	  168,	  (1991)	  13	  EHRR	  36,	  §	  83.	  229	  Ibid.,	  §	  74.	  230	  Luedicke,	  Belkacem	  and	  Koç,	  Series	  A	  no.	  29,	  (1979-­‐80)	  2	  EHRR	  149,	  §	  49.	  231	  Ibid.,	  §	  48.	  
 85 
documents	   in	   the	  procedure.	  The	   interpretation	   assistance	  provided	   should	  be	  such	  as	  to	  enable	  the	  defendant	  to	  have	  knowledge	  of	  the	  case	  against	  him	  and	  to	  defend	  himself,	  notably	  by	  being	  able	  to	  put	  before	  the	  court	  his	  version	  of	   the	  events’,232	  in	   other	  words	   Article	   6§3(e)	   ‘signifies	   that	   an	   accused	  who	   cannot	  understand	   or	   speak	   the	   language	   used	   in	   court	   has	   the	   right	   to	   the	   free	  assistance	   of	   an	   interpreter	   for	   the	   translation	   or	   interpretation	   of	   all	   those	  documents	   or	   statements	   in	   the	   proceedings	   instituted	   against	   him	  which	   it	   is	  necessary	  for	  him	  to	  understand	  in	  order	  to	  have	  the	  benefit	  of	  a	  fair	  trial’.233	  In	  a	  situation	   like	   that	   the	   accused	   must	   prove	   that	   the	   document	   that	   wasn’t	  translated	   hindered	   his	   or	   her	   defence.	   That	   might	   be	   the	   case	   when	   the	  judgment	   is	   not	   translated	   to	   the	   accused	   who	  wishes	   to	   appeal.	   However,	   in	  
Kamasinski	   again,	   the	   Court	   decided	   that	   ‘as	   a	   result	   of	   the	   oral	   explanations	  given	   to	   him,	   Mr	   Kamasinski	   sufficiently	   understood	   the	   judgment	   and	   its	  reasoning	  to	  be	  able	  to	  lodge,	  with	  the	  assistance	  of	  [counsel],	  an	  appeal	  against	  sentence	   and	   an	   extensive	  plea	   of	   nullity	   challenging	  many	   aspects	   of	   the	   trial	  and	  the	  judgment’.234	  	  	  3.2.5.3.	  Communications	  covered	  by	  the	  right	  	  
	  Lastly,	   the	   interpreter	   should	   have	   the	   opportunity	   to	   communicate	   with	   the	  counsel	  of	  the	  defence.235	  The	  court	  must	  provide	  an	  interpreter	  to	  the	  accused	  if	  the	  latter	  is	  appointed	  a	  counsel	  who	  doesn’t	  speak	  the	  language	  of	  his	  client.236	  That	   was	   confirmed	   in	   Lagerblom,	   where	   the	   applicant	   complained	   that	   his	  appointed	   lawyer	   couldn’t	   speak	   in	   the	   language	   of	   the	   accused	   and	   the	   court	  didn’t	   appointed	   another	   lawyer	  who	   could	   speak	   in	   Finnish.	   The	   Court	   didn’t	  find	  any	  violation	  since	   the	  applicant	  could	  speak	   ‘street	  Swedish’.	   ‘Noting	   that	  the	  applicant	  described	  his	  proficiency	  as	  “street	  Swedish”	  and	  that	  he	  thus	  had	  a	  certain	   command	   of	   the	   language,	   the	   Court	   cannot	   find	   that	   he	   was	   so	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  232	  Kamasinski	  v.	  Austria,	  19	  Dec	  1989,	  Series	  A	  no.	  168,	  (1991)	  13	  EHRR	  36,	  §	  74.	  233	  Luedicke,	  Belkacem	  and	  Koç,	  28	  Nov	  1978,	  Series	  A	  no.	  29,	  (1979-­‐80)	  2	  EHRR	  149,	  §	  48.	  234	  Kamasinski	  v.	  Austria,	  19	  Dec	  1989,	  Series	  A	  no.	  168,	  (1991)	  13	  EHRR	  36,	  §	  85.	  235	  S	  Trechsel,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Criminal	  Proceedings,	  pp	  338-­‐339.	  236	  See	  X	  v.	  Austria,	  where	  the	  Commission	  mistakenly	  held	  that	  the	  Article	  6	  §	  3	  (e)	  guarantees	  only	  for	  the	  communication	  of	  the	  interpreter	  with	  the	  accused	  and	  the	  judge.	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handicapped	  that	  he	  could	  not	  at	  all	  communicate	  with	  [counsel]	  or	  understand	  him’.237	  	  
	  The	  right	  to	  free	  assistance	  of	  an	  interpreter	  is	  a	  valuable	  tool	  for	  the	  accused	  as	  it	  enables	  them	  to	  participate	  effectively	  in	  the	  proceedings	  communicating	  with	  the	   participants	   and	   coming	   to	   substantive	   contact	   with	   material	   evidence.	  Although	   it	   seems	   to	   be	   technical,	   its	   establishment	   suffices	   the	   needs	   of	   fair	  criminal	   evidence	   and	   brings	   to	   a	   relative	   completion	   the	   basic	   rights	   of	   the	  accused	  in	  criminal	  proceedings	  as	  chartered	  in	  the	  Convention.	  	  	  	  
Conclusions	  	  The	  Strasbourg	  Court	  has	  certainly	  various	  views	  related	  to	  evidence	  matters,	  as	  the	  whole	  Article	  6	  is	  dotted	  with	  evidence	  related	  problems.	  Even	  though	  some	  of	   them	   are	   not	   directly	   linked	   to	   evidence	   law	   definitions	   and	   principles,	   are	  evidence	  related	  and	  some	  of	  them	  even	  totally	  evidence	  referring,	  i.e.	  the	  issue	  of	   witnesses.	   Some	   of	   the	   Strasbourg’s	   dicta	   are	   constant,	   while	   other	   have	  changed	  through	  the	  years;	  some	  are	  characterised	  by	  cohesion	  and	  others	  are	  unsystematic.	  By	  all	  means	  there	  are	  many	  that	  could	  be	  criticised	  and	  rejected	  and	  many	  to	  be	  praised.	  By	  definition,	  the	  work	  of	  the	  Court	  is	  detached	  from	  a	  system	  of	  rules	  and	  moves	  towards	  the	  finding	  of	  in	  concreto	  solutions	  under	  the	  light	   of	   the	   Convention.	   These	   solutions	   however,	   create	   an	   environment	   for	   a	  concept	   of	   fair	   criminal	   evidence	   revealing	   some	   logic	   about	   it	   and	   paving	   the	  way	   for	   its	   principles.	   There	   seems	   to	   be	   a	   core	   of	   principles	   that	   could	   be	  distilled	  from	  ECtHR’s	  case	  law	  referring	  to	  elements	  of	  Article	  6	  directly	  linked	  to	   evidence.	   These	   elements,	   which	  will	   be	   discussed	   next,	   will	   lead	   us	   to	   the	  principles	   that	   could	   serve	   as	   a	   minimum	   acceptable	   starting	   point	   for	   future	  common	  evidence	  rules	  among	  the	  states	  of	  Europe.	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  14	  Jan	  2003,	  §	  62.	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Introduction	  
	  We	  have	   seen	   so	   far	   that	   a	   coherent	   European	   first	   answer	   to	   the	   problem	   of	  evidence	  gathering	  and	  admissibility	   for	  the	  purposes	  of	   transnational	  criminal	  law	  cases	  can	  come	  from	  the	  ECHR	  Art.	  6	  and	  the	  relevant	  ECtHR’s	  case	  law.	  This	  is	  the	  place	  from	  which	  a	  concept	  of	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  in	  Europe	  originates.	  After	  the	  origin	  of	   the	  concept,	   its	  environment	  was	  explored	  as	  we	  discovered	  the	  elements	  of	  Article	  6	  that	  refer	  to	  evidence	  but	  cannot	  produce	  principles	  of	  a	  holistic	   fair	   evidence	   concept	   due	   to	   their	   loose	   link	   with	   definitions	   and	  principles	   of	   evidence	   law	   (although	   some	   of	   them	   refer	   purely	   to	   evidence	  matters,	   i.e.	   witnesses).	   In	   this	   last	   chapter	   of	   the	   first	   part	   dedicated	   to	   the	  conception	  of	  evidential	  fairness	  we	  move	  into	  the	  case	  law	  that	  deals	  with	  these	  elements	  of	  Article	  6	  that	  are	  directly	  linked	  to	  evidence	  law	  and	  lead	  to	  concrete	  principles	   of	   a	   concept	   on	   evidential	   fairness.	   These	   are:	   a.	   the	   principle	   of	  adversarial	  proceedings,	  b.	  the	  principle	  of	  reasoned	  judgments,	  c.	  the	  principle	  of	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  and	  finally	  d.	  the	  principle	  of	  excluding	  illegally	  obtained	  evidence.	  	  
	  
	  
4.1.	  Adversarialism:	  emerging	  from	  the	  core	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  fairness	  	  
4.1.1.	  The	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial	  stricto	  sensu	  
	  ‘…	  Everyone	  is	  entitled	  to	  a	  fair…	  hearing’	  (Art.	  6§1).	  We	  referred	  earlier	  to	  the	  contextual	  distinction	  between	  fairness	  lato	  and	  stricto	  sensu.238	  In	  addition,	  the	  relationship	   between	   the	   general	   guarantees	   of	   Article	   6§1	   and	   the	   ‘elements’	  presented	   in	  paragraphs	  2	   and	  3	   is	   another	  matter.	  These	  were	   set	   out	  by	   the	  Commission	  in	  Nielsen:	  ‘Article	  6	  of	  the	  Convention	  does	  not	  define	  the	  notion	  of	  “fair	   trial”	   in	   a	   criminal	   case.	   Paragraph	   3	   of	   the	   Article	   enumerates	   certain	  specific	   rights	   which	   constitute	   essential	   elements	   of	   that	   general	   notion,	   and	  paragraph	  2	  may	  be	  considered	   to	  add	  another	  element.	  The	  words	  “minimum	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  238	  See	   also	   S	   Trechsel,	   Human	   Rights	   in	   Criminal	   Proceedings,	   p	   81	   et	   seq.	   who	   refers	   to	   the	  general	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial.	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rights”,	   however,	   clearly	   indicate	   that	   the	   six	   rights	   specifically	   enumerated	   in	  paragraph	  3	  are	  not	  exhaustive,	  and	  that	  a	  trial	  may	  not	  conform	  to	  the	  general	  standard	  of	  a	  “fair	  trial”,	  even	  if	  the	  minimum	  rights	  guaranteed	  by	  paragraph	  3	  –and	  also	  the	  right	  set	  forth	  in	  paragraph	  2–	  have	  been	  respected.	  	  	  The	  relationship	  between	  the	  general	  provision	  of	  paragraph	  1	  and	  the	  specific	  provisions	  of	  paragraph	  3,	  seem	  to	  be	  as	  follows:	  In	  a	  case	  where	  no	  violation	  of	  paragraph	   3	   is	   found	   to	   have	   taken	   place,	   the	   question	   whether	   the	   trial	  conforms	  to	  the	  standard	  laid	  down	  by	  paragraph	  1	  must	  be	  decided	  on	  the	  basis	  of	   a	   consideration	   of	   the	   trial	   as	   a	   whole,	   and	   not	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   an	   isolated	  consideration	   of	   one	   particular	   aspect	   of	   the	   trial	   or	   one	   particular	   incident.	  Admittedly,	   one	   particular	   incident	   or	   one	   particular	   aspect	   even	   if	   not	   falling	  within	  the	  provisions	  of	  paragraphs	  2	  or	  3,	  may	  have	  been	  so	  prominent	  or	  may	  have	  been	  of	  such	  importance	  as	  to	  be	  decisive	  for	  the	  general	  evaluation	  of	  the	  trial	   as	  a	  whole.	  Nevertheless,	   even	   in	   this	   contingency,	   it	   is	  on	   the	  basis	  of	   an	  evaluation	   of	   the	   trial	   in	   its	   entirety	   that	   the	   answer	   must	   be	   given	   to	   the	  question	  whether	  or	  not	  there	  has	  been	  a	  fair	  trial’.239	  	  	  Consequently,	   the	   Court	   has	   the	   opportunity	   to	   evaluate	   the	   proceedings	   as	   a	  whole	  moulding	  the	  amorphous	  part	  of	  the	  provision	  for	  the	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial.	  In	  Barberà,	  for	  example,	  the	  Strasbourg	  Court	  concluded	  that	  the	  trial	  as	  a	  whole	  did	  not	  satisfy	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	  fair	  and	  public	  hearing,	  taking	  into	  account	  ‘the	  belated	  transfer	  of	  the	  applicants	  from	  Barcelona	  to	  Madrid,	  the	  unexpected	  change	   in	   the	   court’s	  membership	   immediately	  before	   the	  hearing	  opened,	   the	  brevity	  of	  the	  trial	  and,	  above	  all,	  the	  fact	  that	  very	  important	  pieces	  of	  evidence	  were	  not	  adequately	  adduced	  and	  discussed	  at	  the	  trial	  in	  the	  applicants’.240	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  approaching	  every	  criminal	  process	  as	  a	  whole	  has	  enabled	  the	   Court	   to	   reach	   the	   opposite	   conclusion:	   the	   fair	   character	   of	   a	   trial	   is	  established	  although	  some	  of	   the	  minimum	  guarantees	  are	  not	   respected.	  That	  was	  the	  case	  in	  Asch,	  where	  the	  applicant	  had	  not	  had	  the	  opportunity	  to	  cross-­‐	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  239	  Commission	  Report	  in	  Nielsen	  v.	  Denmark,	  §	  52.	  240	  Barberà,	  Messegué	  and	  Japardo	  v.	  Spain,	  6	  Dec	  1988,	  Series	  A	  no.	  146,	   (1989)	  11	  EHRR	  360,	  §	  89.	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examine	   a	   witness	   and	   in	   Stanford,	   where	   the	   applicant	   couldn’t	   follow	   the	  procedure	   due	   to	   acoustic	   problems.241	  This	   manoeuvre	   of	   the	   Court	   is	   also	  accepted	  by	   the	  Commission.242	  Moreover,	   apart	   from	   these	   –directly	   linked	   to	  Article	   6,	   related	   to	   evidence–	   issues,	   the	   Court	   through	   the	   holistic	   approach	  denied	  a	  violation	  in	  cases	  of	  illegally	  obtained	  evidential	  material.243	  The	  Court	  has	   held	   that	   it	   cannot	   perform	   as	   substitute	   of	   the	   national	   courts	   in	   the	  determination	  of	  admissibility	  of	   evidence.	  The	   latter	  are	  primarily	   competent;	  hence	  the	  Court	  should	  limit	  itself	  in	  examining	  the	  proceedings	  as	  a	  whole	  and	  whether	   the	  national	   courts	   tried	   to	   remedy	  any	   irregularities	   that	  might	  have	  appeared.244	  	  	  The	  Court’s	  approach	  is	  clearer	  in	  Helle,	  where	  it	  can	  be	  read:	  ‘The	  Court’s	  task	  is	  to	  assess	  whether	  or	  not	  those	  proceedings	  taken	  as	  a	  whole	  were	  fair	  within	  the	  meaning	  of	  Article	  6§1	  having	  regard	  to	  all	  the	  relevant	  circumstances,	  including	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  dispute	  and	  the	  character	  of	  the	  proceedings	  in	  issue,	  the	  way	  in	  which	  the	  evidence	  was	  dealt	  with	  and	  whether	  the	  proceedings	  afforded	  the	  applicant	  an	  opportunity	  to	  state	  his	  case	  under	  conditions	  which	  did	  not	  place	  him	  at	   a	   substantial	  disadvantage	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   his	   [adversary]’.245	  It	   seems	   that	   the	  Court	  has	  decided	  to	  leave	  Article	  6	  in	  a	  mist	  of	  ambiguity.	  The	  holistic	  approach	  might	  prove	  to	  be	  in	  favour	  of	  an	  applicant	  when	  it	  has	  an	  extending	  character	  or	  the	  opposite	  if	  a	  limiting	  view	  is	  held.	  In	  both	  cases	  though,	  it	  is	  unclear,	  what	  the	  exact	  meaning	  of	  the	  minimum	  rights	  and	  the	  guarantees	  or	  elements	  of	  Article	  6	  is.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  241	  Asch	   v.	   Austria,	   26	   Apr	   1991,	   Series	   A	   no.	   203,	   (1993)	   15	   EHRR	   597;	   Stanford	   v.	   United	  
Kingdom,	  23	  Feb	  1994,	  Series	  A	  no.	  282-­‐A.	  242	  See	  e.g.	  Choudhary	  v.	  United	  Kingdom.	  243	  See	  e.g.	  Atlan	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  36533/97,	  19	  June	  2001,	  (2002)	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  EHRR	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  EHRR	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  EHRR	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In	   terms	   of	   evidence,	   although	   the	   Court’s	   reluctance	   in	   dealing	   with	   such	  matters	   is	   justified	   up	   to	   a	   point,	   it	   cannot	   lead	   to	   judgments	   that	   violate	   the	  Convention.	   The	   Court’s	   incompetence	   to	   determine	   the	   admissibility	   of	  evidence	  doesn’t	  mean	  that	  evidence	  is	  an	  issue	  alien	  to	  Article	  6.	  Far	  from	  being	  that,	  evidence	  runs	  through	  the	  whole	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial;	  from	  paragraph	  1	  to	  all	  the	  specific	  rights	  mentioned	  in	  3.	  As	  far	  as	  the	  core	  notion	  of	  fairness	  discussed	  here	   is	   concerned,	   it	   involves	  many	   different	   aspects.	   Those	   that	   appear	   to	   be	  interesting	   for	   evidential	  matters	   are	   the	   principle	   of	   adversarial	   proceedings,	  the	  principle	  of	  equality	  of	  arms	  and	   the	   right	   to	  a	   reasoned	   judgment246,	  with	  adversarialism	  embodying	  the	  most	  significant	  role	  amongst	  them.247	  	  	  
	  
4.1.2.	  The	  principle	  of	  adversarial	  proceedings	  	  Fairness	   (stricto	   sensu)	   in	   criminal	   proceedings	   refers	   among	   other	   things	   to	  adversarialism.	   ‘The	  right	   to	  an	  adversarial	   trial	  means,	   in	  a	  criminal	  case,	   that	  both	  prosecution	  and	  defence	  must	  be	  given	  the	  opportunity	  to	  have	  knowledge	  of	  and	  comment	  on	  the	  observations	  filed	  and	  the	  evidence	  adduced	  by	  the	  other	  party’.248	  This	  provision	   is	  also	  extended	   to	   independent	  parties	  or	   factors	   that	  are	  able	  to	  influence	  the	  court’s	  decision	  (i.e.	  independent	  experts).249	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  246	  Entrapment	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   also	   a	   subject	   that	   the	   Court	   addresses	  within	   the	   context	   of	   fairness	   stricto	  
sensu.	   Entrapment	   and	   the	   discussion	   of	   agents	   provocateurs	   is	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   under	   the	   title	   of	  illegally	  obtained	  evidence	  here,	  which	  apart	  from	  those	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  also	  issues	  of	  self-­‐incrimination	  and	  silence	  of	  the	  accused.	  The	  latter	  are	  dealt	  with	  by	  the	  Court	  within	  the	  frame	  of	  Article	  6§2	  as	  deemed	  to	  be	  produced	  by	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence.	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  Austria,	   19	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   Series	   A	   no.	   168,	   (1991)	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   36,	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  102;	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   Manninen	   v.	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  3	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  EHRR	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  §	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  e.g.	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  Turkey,	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  2002-­‐V,	  133,	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  Mantovanelli	   v.	  
 92 
The	   requirement	   of	   adversarial	   procedure	   in	   criminal	   cases	   appears	   in	   the	  Court’s	   case	   law	  with	   respect	   to	   Article	   6	   in	  Barberà,	  where	   it	  was	   noted	   that	  every	  piece	  of	  evidence	  must	  be	  produced	  with	  the	  accused	  present	  ‘with	  a	  view	  to	   adversarial	   argument’. 250 	  By	   the	   relevant	   progress	   in	   the	   case	   law,	   the	  concepts	   of	   adversarialism	   and	   equality	   of	   arms	   are	   also	   cited	   together:	   ‘the	  principle	   of	   equality	   of	   arms	   is	   only	   one	   feature	   of	   the	  wider	   concept	   of	   a	   fair	  trial,	   which	   also	   includes	   the	   fundamental	   right	   that	   the	   criminal	   proceedings	  should	  be	  adversarial’;251	  furthermore,	  ‘it	  is	  a	  fundamental	  aspect	  of	  the	  right	  to	  a	  fair	   trial	   that	   the	  criminal	  proceedings,	   including	  elements	  of	   such	  proceedings	  which	   relate	   to	   procedure,	   should	   be	   adversarial	   and	   that	   there	   should	   be	  equality	  of	  arms	  between	  the	  prosecution	  and	  the	  defence’.252	  	  	  It	  is	  apparent,	  that	  the	  distinction	  between	  adversarial	  proceedings	  and	  equality	  of	  arms	  is	  often	  difficult	  in	  the	  Court’s	  case	  law,253	  although	  the	  principles	  bear	  a	  different	  meaning.	  While	  the	  equality	  of	  arms	  requirement	  is	  concerned	  with	  the	  balance	   between	   the	   parties	   in	   the	   proceedings,	   the	   principle	   of	   adversarial	  proceedings	  deals	  with	  the	  chance	  that	  both	  parties	  should	  have	   in	  challenging	  evidence.	  In	  most	  occasions,	  this	  means	  that	  one	  party	  should	  have	  the	  chance	  to	  challenge	   the	  submissions	  of	   the	  other	  and	   failing	   to	  do	  so	  results	   in	  breach	  of	  both	   equality	   of	   arms	   and	   adversarialism.	   In	   Krcmar,254	  there	   was	   evidence	  collected	   by	   the	   court	   and	   not	   communicated	   to	   either	   side.	   Therefore,	   no	  violation	  of	  the	  equality	  of	  arms	  could	  be	  found.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  Court	  held	  that	  there	  was	  a	  violation	  of	  adversarialism	  based	  on	  Article	  6	  of	   the	  Convention.	  A	  demand	  of	  adversarial	  proceedings	  means	  that	  the	  parties	  have	  ‘the	  opportunity	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not	   only	   to	  make	   known	   any	   evidence	   needed	   for	   their	   claims	   to	   succeed,	   but	  also	   to	   have	   knowledge	   of,	   and	   comment	   on,	   all	   evidence	   adduced	   or	  observations	  filed,	  with	  a	  view	  to	   influencing	  the	  court’s	  decision’.255	  Moreover,	  ‘a	  party	  to	  the	  proceedings	  must	  have	  the	  possibility	  to	  familiarise	  itself	  with	  the	  evidence	  before	  the	  court,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  possibility	  to	  comment	  on	  its	  existence,	  contents	   and	   authenticity	   in	   an	   appropriate	   form	   and	   within	   an	   appropriate	  time,	  if	  need	  be,	  in	  a	  written	  form	  and	  in	  advance’.256	  	  In	  addition,	  the	  Court	  has	  given	  to	  this	  right	  an	  absolute	  character	  that	  situates	  it	  in	   the	   heart	   of	   fairness.	   The	   requirement	   of	   the	   equality	   of	   arms	   stands	  independent	   of	   any	   further	   ‘quantifiable	   unfairness	   flowing	   from	   a	   procedural	  inequality’.	   It	   is	   utterly	   upon	   the	   defence	   to	   evaluate	   the	   situation	   and	   decide	  whether	  a	  prosecutorial	  submission	  deserves	  to	  be	  answered.	  For	  this	  reason	  it	  is	  unfair	  for	  the	  prosecution	  to	  make	  any	  submission	  to	  court	  without	  the	  similar	  knowledge	   of	   the	   defence.257	  It	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   the	   provision	   is	   made	  irrespectively	  of	  whether	  the	  domestic	  court	  laid	  an	  emphasis	  to	  the	  submission	  or	   not.258	  Furthermore,	   it	   is	   an	   obligation	   of	   the	   domestic	   court	   to	   inform	   the	  accused	   of	   any	   submission	  made	   by	   the	   prosecution.	   In	   an	   application,	   it	   was	  argued	  that	  the	  applicant	  could	  have	  consulted	  the	  file	  of	  the	  case	  at	  the	  Court	  of	  Cassation	  and	  obtained	  a	  copy	  of	  the	  Principal	  Public	  Prosecutor’s	  opinion.	  The	  Court	   held	   that	   this	   argument	   could	   not	   constitute	   a	   sufficient	   safeguard	   to	  ensure	  the	  applicant’s	  right	  to	  an	  adversarial	  procedure.	  According	  to	  the	  Court’s	  opinion	  and	  with	  respect	  to	  fairness,	   it	  was	  an	  obligation	  of	  the	  authorities	  and	  especially	  the	  registry	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Cassation	  to	  inform	  the	  applicant	  that	  the	  opinion	  had	  been	  filed;	   furthermore,	   they	  should	  have	  proposed	  to	  him	  that	  he	  could	  also	  comment	  on	  it	  in	  writing,	  if	  he	  wished	  so.	  The	  argument	  that	  it	  was	  a	  common	   practice	   at	   the	   time	   that	   the	   lawyer	   of	   the	   applicant	   should	   seek	   of	  consultation	   on	   the	   case	   file,	  was	   dismissed	   by	   the	   Court,	   as	   this	   requirement,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  255	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   33;	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   18	   Feb	   1997,	   Reports	  1997-­‐I,	  101	  (1998)	  25	  EHRR	  709,	  §	  42.	  256	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  no.	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  (2001)	  31	  EHRR	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   EHRR	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  20	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  (1997)	  23	  EHRR	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namely	   to	   expect	   from	   the	   applicant’s	   lawyer	   to	   take	   the	   initiative	   to	   inform	  himself	  periodically	  on	  the	  elements	  of	   the	   file,	  would	  place	  a	  disproportionate	  burden	  on	  him	  ‘and	  would	  not	  necessarily	  have	  guaranteed	  a	  real	  opportunity	  to	  comment	  on	  the	  opinion	  since	  he	  was	  never	  made	  aware	  of	  the	  timetable	  for	  the	  processing	  of	  the	  appeal’259.	  	  	  The	   right	   to	   adversarial	   proceedings	   includes	   the	   duty	   of	   the	   authorities	   to	  disclose	   evidence.	   According	   to	   the	   Strasbourg	   Court,	   the	   prosecution	   cannot	  withhold	   evidence	   but	   should	   communicate	   it	   to	   the	   defence.	   The	   Court	   has	  repeated	   in	   many	   cases	   related	   to	   United	   Kingdom	   that	   the	   prosecution	  authorities	  should	  disclose	  to	  the	  accused	  all	  material	  evidence	  (for	  and	  against	  them),	  a	  principle	  derived	  from	  Article	  6§1	  and	  also	  acknowledged	  under	  English	  law.	  In	  addition,	  a	  failure	  of	  the	  prosecution	  to	  do	  so	  can	  produce	  unacceptable	  defects	  in	  the	  criminal	  proceedings.260	  However,	  the	  entitlement	  to	  disclosure	  of	  relevant	  evidence	  is	  not	  an	  absolute	  right.261	  The	  Court	  takes	  into	  consideration	  several	   competing	   interests,	   such	   as	   national	   security	   or	   the	   protection	   of	  vulnerable	   witnesses	   that	  may	   fear	   of	   reprisals	   or	   the	   discretion	   about	   secret	  police	   methods	   of	   investigation	   of	   crime,	   which	   must	   be	   weighed	   against	   the	  rights	   of	   the	   accused.	   ‘In	   some	   cases	   it	   may	   be	   necessary	   to	   withhold	   certain	  evidence	   from	  the	  defence	  so	  as	   to	  preserve	   the	   fundamental	   rights	  of	  another	  individual	   or	   to	   safeguard	   an	   important	   public	   interest.	   However,	   only	   such	  measures	   restricting	   the	   rights	   of	   the	   defence	  which	   are	   strictly	   necessary	   are	  permissible	   under	   Article	   6§1.	   Moreover,	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   that	   the	   accused	  receives	  a	   fair	   trial,	   any	  difficulties	  caused	   to	   the	  defence	  by	  a	   limitation	  on	   its	  rights	  must	   be	   sufficiently	   counterbalanced	  by	   the	  procedures	   followed	  by	   the	  judicial	  authorities’.262	  The	  Court’s	  role	  though	  in	  such	  cases	  would	  be	  limited	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  259	  Göç	  v.	  Turkey,	  no.	  36590/97,	  ECHR	  2002-­‐V,	  133,	  §	  57;	  See	  e.g.	  Brandstetter	  v.	  Austria,	  28	  Aug	  1991,	  Series	  A	  no.	  211,	  (1993)	  15	  EHRR	  379,	  §	  67.	  260	  Edwards	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  16	  Feb	  1992,	  Series	  A	  no.	  247-­‐B	  (1993)	  15	  EHRR	  417,	  §	  36;	  see	  e.g.	  Dowsett	   v.	  United	   Kingdom,	   no.	   39482/98,	   24	   June	   2003,	   ECHR	   2003-­‐VII,	   259,	   (2004)	   38	  EHRR	  41,	  §	  41;	  Fitt	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  29777/96	  ECHR,	  2000-­‐II,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  480,	  §	  44;	  
IJL,	  GMR	  and	  AKP	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	   nos.	   29552/95,	   30056/96	   and	   30574/96,	   ECHR	   2000-­‐IX,	  (2001)	   33	   EHRR	   11,	   §	   112;	   Jasper	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	   no.	   27052/95,	   16	   Feb	   2000,	   (2000)	   30	  EHRR	  441,	  §	  51;	  PG	  and	  JH	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  44787/98,	  25	  Sep	  2001,	  §	  67;	  Rowe	  and	  Davis	  v.	  
United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  28901/95,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐II,	  287,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  1,	  §	  60.	  	  261	  Jasper	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  27052/95,	  16	  Feb	  2000,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  441,	  §	  52.	  262	  Fitt	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  29777/96	  ECHR,	  2000-­‐II,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  480,	  §	  45.	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scrutinising	  the	  decision-­‐making	  procedure	  to	  ensure	  that,	  as	   far	  as	  possible,	   it	  complied	  with	  the	  requirements	  to	  provide	  adversarial	  proceedings	  and	  equality	  of	   arms	   and	   incorporated	   adequate	   safeguards	   to	   protect	   the	   interests	   of	   the	  accused.263	  	  The	   non-­‐disclosure	  was	   accepted	   by	   the	   Court	   in	   cases	  where	   the	   evidence	   in	  question	  was	  not	  put	  to	  the	   jury,	   the	   issue	  was	  commented	  by	  the	  defence	  and	  the	   need	   for	   disclosure	  was	   at	   all	   times	   assessed	   by	   the	   judge.264	  By	   contrast,	  when	  this	  assessment	  is	  made	  solely	  by	  the	  prosecution	  which	  does	  not	  lay	  the	  evidence	  before	  the	  trial	  judge	  so	  that	  the	  latter	  can	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	  such	  non-­‐disclosure	  is	  strictly	  necessary,	  there	  is	  a	  breach	  of	  Article	  6.265	  Finally,	  the	  duty	   to	   disclose	   evidence	   does	   not	   concern	   only	   the	   prosecution	   but	   also	   the	  court	  itself.266	  	  	  
4.1.3.	  The	  principle	  of	  equality	  of	  arms	  	  
	  In	  this	  context,	  we	  should	  also	  examine	  the	  value	  of	  equality	  of	  arms267	  since	   it	  closely	  concerns	  adversarial	  proceedings	  requirement	  and	  it	  is	  usually	  mistaken	  for	   it.	   The	   principle	   of	   equality	   of	   arms	   first	   appeared	   in	   the	   case	   law	   of	   the	  Commission	   in	   civil	   proceedings.268	  Then	   it	   was	   also	   introduced	   into	   criminal	  matters.269	  The	   earliest	   definition	   of	   the	   principle	   reads:	   “equality	   of	   arms”	  implies	  that	  each	  party	  must	  be	  afforded	  a	  reasonable	  opportunity	  to	  present	  his	  case	   –including	   his	   evidence–	   under	   conditions	   that	   do	   not	   place	   him	   at	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  263	  Jasper	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  27052/95,	  16	  Feb	  2000,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  441,	  §	  53.	  264	  Fitt	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  29777/96	  ECHR,	  2000-­‐II,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  480,	  §§	  47-­‐49;	  Jasper	  v.	  
United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  27052/95,	  16	  Feb	  2000,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  441,	  §§	  55-­‐56;	  PG	  and	  JH	  v.	  United	  
Kingdom,	  no.	  44787/98,	  25	  Sep	  2001,	  §§	  70-­‐73.	  	  265	  Rowe	   and	   Davis	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	   no.	   28901/95,	   ECHR	   2000-­‐II,	   287,	   (2000)	   30	   EHRR	   1,	  §§	  62,	   65.	   See	   also	  Atlan	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	   no.	   36533/97,	   19	   June	  2001,	   (2002)	  34	  EHRR	  33;	  
Dowsett	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  39482/98,	  24	   June	  2003,	  ECHR	  2003-­‐VII,	  259,	   (2004)	  38	  EHRR	  41.	  266	  See	  Skondrianos	  v.	  Greece,	  nos.	  63000/00,	  74291/01	  and	  74292/01,	  18	  Dec	  2003.	  267	  See	  also	  E	  Müller,	  ‘Der	  Grundsatz	  der	  Waffengleichkeit	  im	  Strafverfahren’,	  NJW	  (1976)	  1063.	  268	  Szwabowiez	  v.	  Sweden;	  See	  also	  e.g.	  Günther	  Struppat	  v.	  Germany;	  J	  and	  R	  Kaufman	  v.	  Belgium.	  269	  Ofner	  and	  Hopfinger	  v.	  Austria,	  nos	  524/59	  and	  617/59,	  23	  Nov	  1962	  (1963)	  6	  YB	  718;	  Pataki	  
and	  Dunshirn	  v.	  Austria,	  nos	  596/59	  and	  789/60,	  28	  Mar	  1963	  (1963)	  6	  YB	  718;	  X	  v.	  Sweden.	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substantial	   disadvantage	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis	   his	   opponent’.270	  The	   earliest	   definition	   in	   a	  criminal	  case	  though	  states	  ‘that	  under	  the	  principle	  of	  equality	  of	  arms,	  as	  one	  of	  the	   features	   of	   the	  wider	   concept	   of	   a	   fair	   trial,	   each	  party	  must	   be	   afforded	   a	  reasonable	   opportunity	   to	   present	   his	   case	   under	   conditions	   that	   do	   not	   place	  him	   at	   a	   disadvantage	   vis-­‐à-­‐vis’.271	  The	   references	   to	   evidence	   and	   the	   word	  ‘substantial’	  have	  been	  omitted.	  However,	  equality	  of	  arms	  is	  applicable	  in	  both	  criminal	   and	   civil	   cases	   in	   which	   the	   term	   ‘equality	   of	   arms’	   bears	   the	   same	  meaning. 272 	  In	   all	   the	   relevant	   cases,	   the	   accused	   was	   deprived	   of	   the	  opportunity	   to	   exercise	   rights,	   although	   the	   opposing	   party	   had	   been	   given	  similar	  chances.	  	  
	  It	  should	  be	  pointed	  out	  though,	  that	  a	   literal	  equality	  of	  arms	  is	   in	  one	  way	  or	  another	   impossible	   in	   criminal	   proceedings.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   the	   inequality	  between	  prosecution	  authorities	  and	  the	  accused	  is	  a	  typical	  element	  of	  criminal	  process.	  The	  potential	  consequence	  of	  the	  dock	  puts	  automatically	  every	  accused	  person	   in	   a	   disadvantageous	   position.	   The	   attack	   against	   his	   or	   her	  moral	   and	  social	   status	   and	   the	   torment	   experienced	   by	   the	   accused,	   put	   next	   to	   the	  prestige	  of	  a	  state	  authority	  as	  the	  prosecution,	  that	  has	  at	  disposal	  the	  crushing	  power	  of	   state	  mechanisms	  and	   the	  police	   in	  particular,	  draws	   the	  unbalanced	  scenery.	  Nonetheless,	  that	  doesn’t	  mean	  there	  mustn’t	  be	  made	  utmost	  effort	  so	  that	  the	  ultima	  ratio	  of	  the	  criminal	  process	  (i.e.	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  citizen)273	  isn’t	   reduced	   to	  mere	  wishful	   thinking.	   Hence,	   it	   is	  more	   accurate	   to	   speak	   of	  equality	  of	  opportunities	  rather	  than	  of	  equality	  of	  arms.	  	  The	  principle	  as	  conceived	  by	  the	  Court	  is	  not	  inherent	  in	  a	  specific	  type	  of	  legal	  cultures	   but	   applies	   to	   all	   different	   legal	   traditions.	   Besides,	   equality	   of	   arms	  forwards	   the	   idea	   of	   balance	   in	   the	   proceedings	   rather	   than	   requiring	   the	  acknowledgement	   of	   a	   certain	   right.	   Several	   imbalances	   may	   occur	   and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  270	  Dombo	  Beheer	  BV	  v	  Netherlands,	  27	  Oct	  1993,	  Series	  A	  no.	  274	  (1994)	  18	  EHRR	  213,	  §	  33.	  271	  Bulut	  v.	  Austria,	  22	  Feb	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐II,	  346	  (1997)	  24	  EHRR	  84,	  §	  47.	  272	  Foucher	  v.	  France,	  18	  Mar	  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐II,	  452	  (1998)	  25	  EHRR	  234,	  §	  23;	  Josef	  Fischer	  v.	  Austria,	  no.	  33382/96,	  17	  Jan	  2002,	  §	  18;	  Kuopila	  v.	  Finland,	  no.	  27752/95,	  27	  Apr	  2000	  (2001)	  33	   EHRR	   25,	   §	   37;	   Lanz	   v.	   Austria,	   no.	   24430/94,	   31	   Jan	   2002,	   §	   57;	   Öcalan	   v.	   Turkey,	   no.	  46221/99,	  12	  Mar	  2003,	  (2003)	  37	  EHRR	  10,	  §	  159.	  273	  S	  Trechsel,	  ‘Liberty	  and	  Security	  of	  Person’	  in	  RSJ	  MacDonald,	  F	  Matscher	  and	  H	  Petzold	  (eds),	  
The	  European	  System	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  (Dordrecht,	  Martinus	  Nijhoff,	  1993).	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interestingly	   all	   of	   them	   are	   evidence-­‐related:	   inequalities	   in	   accessing274 ,	  submitting275,	   disclosing276	  evidence	   and	   in	   relation	   to	   expert	   evidence277	  as	  well.	  	  	  Although	   the	   Court	   seems	   to	   have	   a	   right	   conception	   about	   the	   principle	   of	  equality	  of	  arms,	  its	  interpretation	  lacks	  sometimes	  the	  expected	  coherence.	  The	  Court’s	   reasoning	   changed	   between	   two	   cases	   against	   Belgium	   in	   which	   the	  applicants	   complained	   about	   the	   same	  procedure.	   Both	   of	   them	  dealt	  with	   the	  participation	  in	  the	  proceedings	  of	  the	  avocat	  général	  and	  whether	  he	  should	  be	  regarded	   as	   opposing	   party	   or	   not	   to	   the	   defence.278	  Despite	   the	   fact	   that	   the	  complaints	  were	   identical,	   the	   legislation	  and	   judicial	  practice	   in	  Belgium	  were	  the	   same,	   and	   the	   facts	   of	   the	   case	   were	   the	   same,	  Borgers	   case	   was	   decided	  differently	  from	  Delcourt	  case.279	  Even	  if	  the	  Court	  construes	  well	  the	  equality	  of	  arms	  requirement	  of	   fairness,	   it	   seems	   that	   it	   cannot	  apply	   it	   satisfactorily	  and	  consistently	   all	   the	   time,	   although	   the	   decision	   in	   Borgers	   could	   be	   seen	   as	   a	  progress.	   In	   particular,	   the	   question	   arisen	   was	   whether	   the	   presence	   of	   the	  
avocat	   général	  during	   the	   deliberations	   of	   the	   court	   was	   compatible	   with	   the	  equality	  of	  arms	  principle.	  	  	  In	   Borgers	   the	   Court	   held	   that	   the	   inequality	   in	   the	   instant	   case	   was	   further	  irrupted	  by	  the	  avocat	  général’s	  participation,	  in	  the	  court’s	  deliberations,	  as	  he	  was	   present	   in	   them	   as	   an	   advisor.	   ‘Assistance	   of	   this	   nature,	   given	  with	   total	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  Bendenoun	  v.	  France,	  24	  Feb	  1994,	  Series	  A	  no.	  284,	  (1994)	  18	  EHRR	  54,	  §§	  49-­‐53;	  Foucher	  v.	  
France,	  18	  Mar	  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐II,	  452	  (1998)	  25	  EHRR	  234,	  §§	  26-­‐38;	  Vermeulen	  v.	  Belgium,	  20	  Feb	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐I,	  224,	  (2001)	  32	  EHRR	  15,	  §	  33.	  275	  Borgers	  v.	  Belgium,	   30	  Oct	  1991,	   Series	  A	  no.	  214-­‐B,	   (1993)	  15	  EHRR	  92,	   §§	  27-­‐29;	  Bulut	  v.	  
Austria,	   22	   Feb	   1996,	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   24	   EHRR	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   §§	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   v.	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   Reports	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   101,	   (1998)	   25	   EHRR,709,	   §	   24;	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   v.	  
Belgium,	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  Ruiz-­‐Mateos	  v.	  Spain,	  23	  June	  1993,	  Series	  A	  no.	  262	  (1993)	  16	  EHRR	  505,	  §§	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  Fitt	  v.	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  Kingdom,	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  29777/96	  ECHR,	  2000-­‐II,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  480,	  §§	  46-­‐50;	  Jasper	  v.	  
United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  27052/95,	  16	  Feb	  2000,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  441,	  §§	  55-­‐57;	  Kress	  v.	  France,	  no.	  39594/98,	  ECHR	  2001-­‐VI,	  §§	  73;	  Kuopila	  v.	  Finland,	  no.	  27752/95,	  27	  Apr	  2000	  (2001)	  33	  EHRR	  25,	  §	  38;	  Rowe	  and	  Davis	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  28901/95,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐II,	  287,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  1.	  277	  Brandstetter	  v.	   Austria,	  28	   Aug	   1991,	   Series	   A	   no.	   211,	   (1993)	   15	   EHRR	   379,	   §	   45;	  Dombo	  
Beheer	  BV	  v	  Netherlands,	  27	  Oct	  1993,	  Series	  A	  no.	  274	  (1994)	  18	  EHRR	  213,	  §§	  30-­‐35.	  278	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  v.	  Belgium,	  17	  Jan	  1970,	  Series	  A	  no.	  11,	  (1979-­‐80)	  1	  EHRR	  355;	  Borgers	  v.	  Belgium,	  30	  Oct	  1991,	  Series	  A	  no.	  214-­‐B,	  (1993)	  15	  EHRR	  92.	  279	  As	   stated	   in	   the	   dissenting	   opinion	   of	   Judge	   Storme	   (ad	   hoc	   Belgian	   judge)	   in	   Borgers	   v.	  
Belgium,	  30	  Oct	  1991,	  Series	  A	  no.	  214-­‐B,	  (1993)	  15	  EHRR	  92.	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objectivity,	  may	  be	  of	  some	  use	  in	  drafting	  judgments,	  although	  this	  task	  falls	  in	  the	  first	  place	  to	  the	  Court	  of	  Cassation	  itself.	  It	  is	  however	  hard	  to	  see	  how	  such	  assistance	  can	   remain	   limited	   to	   stylistic	   considerations,	  which	  are	   in	  any	  case	  often	   […	   inseparable]	   from	  substantive	  matters,	   if	   it	   is	   in	  addition	   intended,	   as	  the	   Government	   also	   affirmed,	   to	   contribute	   towards	   maintaining	   the	  consistency	  of	   the	  case	   law’.280	  Even	   if	   the	  assistance	  of	   the	  avocat	  general	  was	  limited	   in	   the	   case	   at	   issue,	   one	   could	   justifiably	   think	   that	   the	   deliberations’	  occasion	   gave	   the	   opportunity	   to	   him	   to	   support	   once	   again,	   without	   the	  interference	  of	  the	  applicant	  this	  time,	  his	  view	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  dismissal	  of	  the	  appeal.	   It	   is	   also	   interesting	   that	   in	   the	   context	   of	   equality	   of	   arms	   the	   Court	  refers	   also	   to	   the	   importance	   of	   appearance,	   as	   it	   does	   for	   impartiality.281	  It	   is	  crucial	  whether	  the	  doubts	  raised	  by	  appearances	  can	  be	  held	  to	  be	  objectively	  justified.282	  This	  approach	  was	  also	  confirmed	  in	  other	  cases.283	  	  Finally,	  in	  the	  same	  context,	  the	  role	  of	  the	  reporting	  judge	  in	  the	  French	  Court	  of	  Cassation	  should	  be	  mentioned,	  that	  gave	  rise	  to	  a	  number	  of	  judgements	  by	  the	  Court.	   It	   was	   common	   ground	   that	   well	   before	   the	   hearing	   in	   the	   court	   of	  cassation	  the	  advocate-­‐general	  would	  receive	  the	  report	  and	  draft	  judgment	  that	  had	  been	  prepared	  by	  the	  reporting	  judge.	  The	  report	  was	  in	  two	  parts:	  the	  first	  contained	   a	   description	   of	   the	   facts,	   procedure	   and	   grounds	   of	   appeal	   and	   the	  second	  a	   legal	   analysis	  of	   the	   case	  and	  an	  opinion	  on	   the	  merits	  of	   the	  appeal.	  Those	  documents	  however,	  were	  not	  communicated	  to	  the	  defence.	  The	  parties’	  lawyers	  were	  informed	  of	  the	  recommendation	  in	  the	  report	  (whether	  an	  appeal	  is	   to	  be	  declared	   inadmissible,	   to	  be	  dismissed,	  or	   to	  be	  allowed	   in	  whole	  or	   in	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  Belgium,	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  Series	  A	  no.	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  (1993)	  15	  EHRR	  92,	  §	  28.	  	  281	  Ibid.,	  §§	  24;	  see	  also	  e.g.	  Bulut	  v.	  Austria,	  22	  Feb	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐II,	  346	  (1997)	  24	  EHRR	  84,	  §	  47;	  Kress	  v.	  France,	  no.	  39594/98,	  ECHR	  2001-­‐VI,	  §§	  81-­‐82;	  Lanz	  v.	  Austria,	  no.	  24430/94,	  31	   Jan	   2002,	   §	   57;	  Öcalan	   v.	  Turkey,	   no.	   46221/99,	   12	  Mar	   2003,	   (2003)	   37	   EHRR	   10,	   §	   159;	  
Slimane-­‐Kaїd	  (No	  2)	   v.	  France,	  no.	  48943/99,	  27	  Nov	  2003,	  §	  20;	  Vermeulen	   v.	  Belgium,	  20	  Feb	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐I,	  224,	  (2001)	  32	  EHRR	  15,	  §	  34.	  	  282	  Brandstetter	  v.	  Austria,	  28	  Aug	  1991,	  Series	  A	  no.	  211,	  (1993)	  15	  EHRR	  379,	  §	  44.	  283	  APBP	  v.	  France,	  §§	  28-­‐29;	  Fontaine	  and	  Bertin	  v.	  France,	  no.	  38410/97	  and	  40373/98,	  8	  July	  2003,	  §§	  64-­‐69;	  JJ	  v.	  Netherlands,	  27	  Mar	  1998,	  Reports	  1998-­‐II,	  603,	  (1999)	  28	  EHRR	  168;	  Kress	  v.	  France,	  no.	  39594/98,	  ECHR	  2001-­‐VI,	   §	  77;	  Lobo	  Machado	  v.	  Portugal,	   20	  Feb	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐I,	   195,	   §§	   32,	   34;	   Slimane-­‐Kaїd	   (No	   2)	   v.	   France,	   no.	   48943/99,	   27	   Nov	   2003,	   §	   20;	  
Vermeulen	  v.	  Belgium,	  20	  Feb	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐I,	  224,	  (2001)	  32	  EHRR	  15,	  §	  34.	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part)	   by	   a	   note,	   which	   didn’t	   include	   a	   detailed	   reasoning. 284 	  ‘Given	   the	  importance	  of	   the	   reporting	   judge’s	   report,	   the	  advocate-­‐general’s	   role	  and	   the	  consequences	  of	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  proceedings,	  the	  imbalance	  thus	  created	  by	  the	  failure	  to	  give	  like	  disclosure	  of	  the	  report	  to	  the	  defence	  is	  not	  reconcilable	  with	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	  fair	  trial’.285	  	  	  
4.2.	  The	  reasoned	  judgement:	  towards	  evaluation	  of	  information	  	  Within	  the	  core	  of	  fairness	  stricto	  sensu,286	  the	  obligation	  of	  judicial	  authorities	  to	  give	  reasons	   for	   their	  decisions	  should	  be	  also	  discussed.287	  In	   fact,	  any	   judicial	  decision	  is	  burdened	  with	  this	  obligation.288	  The	  right	  to	  appeal	  is	  strongly	  linked	  with	   this	   requirement.	  As	   the	  Court	  has	  held,	   the	  national	   courts	  must	  provide	  sufficient	  indications	  regarding	  the	  reasoning	  on	  which	  their	  decisions	  are	  based.	  Without	   the	   compliance	   to	   this	   requirement,	   the	   accused	   would	   lack	   the	  opportunity	  to	  exercise	  effectively	  their	  rights,	  especially	  the	  right	  to	  appeal.289	  	  	  Moreover,	   the	   Court	   speaking	   of	   its	   role	   has	   stated	   that	   it	   is	   for	   it	   to	   examine	  whether	  the	  method	  of	  reasoning	  given	  by	  the	  national	  court	  leads	  to	  results	  that	  are	  compatible	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Convention.290	  Furthermore,	  the	  Court	  puts	   emphasis	   on	   the	   fact	   that	   –apart	   from	   the	   other	   rights	   that	   can	  be	   better	  applied–	  a	  reasoned	  judgment	  constitutes	  the	  demonstration	  to	  the	  parties	  that	  their	   right	   to	  be	  heard	  was	   totally	   respected.	   In	   addition,	   the	  Court	   repeatedly	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  284	  Reinhardt	  and	  Slimane-­‐Kaїd	  v.	  France,	  31	  Mar	  1998,	  Reports	  1998-­‐II,	  640,	  (1999)	  28	  EHRR	  59,	  §	  105.	  285	  Ibid.;	   see	  also	  e.g.	  Berger	  v.	  France,	  no.	  48221/99,	  ECHR	  2002-­‐X,	  13,	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  42-­‐43;	  Crochard	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Six	   others	   v.	   France,	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   68255/01,	   68256/01,	   68257/01,	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   68259/01,	   68260/01,	  68261/01,	  3	  Feb	  2004,	  §	  13;	  Fontaine	  and	  Bertin	  v.	  France,	  no.	  38410/97	  and	  40373/98,	  8	  July	  2003,	  §§	  61-­‐63;	  MacGee	  v.	  France,	  no.	  46802/99,	  7	  Jan	  2003,	  §	  15;	  Lilly	  v.	  France,	  no.	  53892/00,	  14	  Oct	   2003,	   §	  24;	  Pascolini	   v.	   Italy,	   no.	   45019/98,	   26	   June	   2003,	   §	   23;	   Slimane-­‐Kaїd	  (No	  2)	   v.	  
France,	  no.	  48943/99,	  27	  Nov	  2003,	  §	  17;	  Weil	  v.	  France,	  no.	  49843/99,	  5	  Feb	  2004,	  §§	  26-­‐27.	  286	  S	  Trechsel,	  ‘Why	  Must	  Trials	  be	  Fair?’	  IsLR	  31	  (1-­‐3)	  (1997)	  94.	  287	  Hirvisaari	  v.	  Finland,	   no.	   49684/99,	   27	   Sept	   2001,	   §	  30	   (‘Article	   6	  §	  1	   obliges	   courts	   to	   give	  reasons	  for	  their	  decisions’).	  288	  In	  its	  report	  the	  Commission	  for	  example	  found	  a	  violation	  because	  no	  reasons	  had	  been	  given	  to	  grant	  the	  refusal	  to	  a	  request	  that	  a	  witness	  be	  heard	  in	  Bricmont	  v.	  Belgium,	  §§	  151-­‐153.	  289	  R	  Esser,	  Auf	  dem	  Weg	  zu	  einem	  europäischen	  Strafverfahrensrecht	   (Berlin,	  De	  Gruyter	  Recht,	  2002),	  p	  746.	  290	  Hadjianastassiou	  v.	  Greece,	  no.	  16	  Dec	  1992,	  Series	  A	  no.	  252,	  (1993)	  16	  EHRR	  219,	  §	  33.	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refers	   to	   the	   right	   to	   appeal,	   as	   a	   reasoned	   decision	   affords	   a	   party	   this	  possibility,	   as	   well	   as	   the	   possibility	   of	   having	   the	   decision	   reviewed	   by	   an	  appellate	  body.	  ‘It	  is	  only	  by	  giving	  a	  reasoned	  decision	  that	  there	  can	  be	  public	  scrutiny	   of	   the	   administration	   of	   justice’.291	  The	   obligation	   to	   give	   reasons,	   not	  only	   stems	   from	   Article	   6§1,	   but	   also	   finds	   its	   justification	   in	   the	   right	   to	   be	  heard,	  the	  right	  to	  appeal	  and	  the	  general	  principle	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law292.	  
	  Linking	   the	   obligation	   to	   give	   reasons	   with	   the	   right	   to	   a	   fair	   hearing	   as	   an	  expression	   of	   fair	   trial,	   one	   could	   argue	   that	   the	   Strasbourg	   Court	   holds	   that	  every	  court	  has,	  in	  view	  of	  the	  above	  right,	  two	  obligations:	  the	  appropriate	  audit	  of	   the	   arguments,	   claims	   or	   evidence	   brought	   before	   a	   court	   by	   the	   parties,	  without	   prejudice	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   issue	   of	   whether	   these	   are	   relevant	   to	   its	  decision293	  and	  secondly	  giving	  reasons	  for	  the	  decision.294	  ‘The	  effect	  of	  Article	  6§1	   is,	   inter	   alia,	   to	   place	   the	   “tribunal”	   under	   a	   duty	   to	   conduct	   a	   proper	  examination	  of	  the	  submissions,	  arguments	  and	  evidence	  adduced	  by	  the	  parties,	  without	   prejudice	   to	   its	   assessment	   of	   whether	   they	   are	   relevant	   to	   its	  decision’.295	  	  	  On	   the	   sufficiency	   of	   the	   reasons	   given	   the	   Court	   has	   been	   rather	   unclear.	  Although	  the	  Court	  has	  reiterated	  that	  Article	  6§1	  imposes	  an	  obligation	  on	  the	  national	   courts	   to	  give	   reasons	   for	   their	   judgments,	   it	   adds	   that	   this	   statement	  cannot	  mean	   that	   the	   reasoning	   is	   required	   to	   cover	   every	   single	   argument.	   It	  depends	   on	   the	   nature	   of	   the	   judgment	   the	   extent	   to	   which	   this	   duty	   to	   give	  reasons	  applies.	  Moreover,	  the	  Court	  regards	  inter	  alia,	  as	  necessary	  to	  consider	  seriously	   ‘the	   diversity	   of	   the	   submissions	   that	   a	   litigant	  may	  bring	   before	   the	  courts	   and	   the	   differences	   existing	   in	   the	   Contracting	   States	   with	   regard	   to	  statutory	   provisions,	   customary	   rules,	   legal	   opinion	   and	   the	   presentation	   and	  drafting	   of	   judgments.	   This	   is	   why	   the	   question	  whether	   a	   court	   has	   failed	   to	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  Suominen	  v.	  Finland,	  no.	  37801/97,	  1	  July	  2003,	  §	  37.	  292	  See	  also	  ibid.	  293	  See	  e.g.	  Perez	  v.	  France,	  no.	  47287/99,	  12	  Feb	  2004,	  §	  80;	  Van	  de	  Hurk	  v.	  Netherlands,	  19	  Apr	  1994,	  Series	  A	  no.	  288,	  (1994)	  18	  EHRR	  481,	  §	  59;	  Van	  Kück	  v.	  Germany,	  no.	  35968/97,	  12	  June	  2003,	  §	  48.	  294	  Perez	  v.	  France,	  no.	  47287/99,	  12	  Feb	  2004,	  §	  81.	  295	  Kraska	  v.	  Switzerland,	  19	  Apr	  1993,	  Series	  A	  no.	  254-­‐B,	  (1994)	  18	  EHRR	  188,	  §	  30.	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fulfil	   the	  obligation	   to	   state	   reasons,	  deriving	   from	  Article	  6	  of	   the	  Convention,	  can	  only	  be	  determined	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  circumstances	  of	  the	  case.’296	  Certainly,	  the	  obligation	   to	  give	   reasons	  will	   include	  answering	   to	   the	  main	  claims	  of	   the	  parties.297	  	  	  Serious	  limitations	  to	  the	  requirement	  that	  reasons	  be	  given	  impose	  the	  jury	  trial	  of	   the	  common	  law	  and	  the	  appeal	   judgements	  that	   lead	  to	  a	   judgement	  that	   is	  identical	  to	  the	  previous	  one.	  On	  the	  latter	  matter	  the	  Court	  has	  emphasised	  that	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  fair	  procedure298	  imposes	  on	  the	  judicial	  authorities	  of	  member-­‐states	   which	   have	   given	   sparse	   reasons	   for	   their	   decisions,	   whether	   by	  incorporating	   the	   reasons	   of	   a	   lower	   court	   or	   otherwise,	   that	   they	   should	  address	   the	   crucial	   claims	   submitted	   by	   the	   parties.	   The	   mere	   endorsement	  without	   further	  ado	  of	   the	   findings	  reached	  by	  a	   lower	  court	   is	  not	  acceptable.	  The	  Court	  noted	  that	  this	  requirement	  is	  all	  the	  more	  important	  where	  a	  litigant	  has	   not	   been	   able	   to	   present	   his	   case	   orally	   in	   the	   domestic	   proceedings	   and	  hence	  the	  reasoned	  decision	  is	  the	  essential	  means	  to	  exert	  his	  rights.299	  	  	  
4.3.	  The	  presumption	  of	  innocence:	  savoir	  vivre	  of	  criminal	  procedure	  	  ‘Everyone	   charged	   with	   a	   criminal	   offence	   shall	   be	   presumed	   innocent	   until	  proved	   guilty	   according	   to	   law’	   (ECHR,	   Article	   6§2).300	  The	   presumption	   of	  innocence	   was	   also	   included	   in	   The	   Universal	   Declaration	   of	   Human	   Rights	  (1948)	   in	  Article	  11§1:	   ‘Everyone	  charged	  with	  a	  penal	  offence	  has	  the	  right	  to	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  Helle	  v.	  Finland,	  19	  Dec	  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐VIII,	  2911,	  (1998)	  26	  EHRR	  159,	  §	  55;	  Hiro	  Balani	  v.	  Spain,	  9	  Dec	  1994,	  Series	  A	  no.	  303-­‐B,	  (1995)	  19	  EHRR	  566,	  §	  27;	  Ruiz	  Torija	  v.	  Spain,	  9	  Dec	  1994,	  Series	  A	  no.	  303-­‐A,	  (1995)	  19	  EHRR	  553,	  §	  29;	  see	  also	  e.g.	  Firestone	  Tire	  and	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  Co,	  
Firestone	  Tyre	  and	  Rubber	  Co	  Ltd,	  and	   International	  Synthetic	  Rubber	  Co	  Ltd	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  5460/72	  (1973)	  43	  CD	  99,	  16	  Y	  b	  152;	  Garcia	  Ruiz	  v.	  Spain,	  no.	  30544/96,	  ECHR	  1999-­‐I,	  87,	  (2001)	  31	  EHRR	  22,	  §	  26;	  Higgins	  and	  others	  v.	  France,	  19	  Feb	  1998,	  Reports	  1998-­‐I,	  44,	  (1999)	  27	  EHRR	  703,	  §	  42.	  297	  See	  Donadze	  v.	  Georgia,	  no.	  74644/01,	  7	  Mar	  2006,	  §	  32.	  298	  See	   also	   JM	   Landis	   and	   L	   Goodstein,	   ‘When	   is	   Justice	   Fair?	   An	   Integrated	   Approach	   to	   the	  Outcome	  versus	  Procedure	  Debate’	  Am	  Bar	  Found	  Res	  J	  (1986)	  675.	  299	  Helle	  v.	  Finland,	  19	  Dec	  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐VIII,	  2911,	  (1998)	  26	  EHRR	  159,	  §	  60.	  300	  See	  also	  P	  Auvret,	  ‘Le	  droit	  à	  la	  présomption	  d’	  innocence’,	  JCP	  I	  (1994)	  3892.	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be	   presumed	   innocent	   until	   proved	   guilty	   according	   to	   law	   in	   a	   public	   trial	   at	  which	  he	  has	  had	  all	  the	  guarantees	  necessary	  for	  his	  defence’.301	  	  The	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  ‘requires,	  inter	  alia,	  that	  when	  carrying	  out	  their	  duties,	  the	  members	  of	  a	  court	  should	  not	  start	  with	  the	  preconceived	  idea	  that	  the	   accused	  has	   committed	   the	   offence	   charged’.302	  Here,	   one	   can	   see	   clearly	   a	  point	  where	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  and	  the	  right	  to	  an	  impartial	  tribunal	  meet,	  although	  the	  first	  is	  broader	  applying	  also	  to	  other	  officials	  involved	  in	  the	  criminal	   proceedings.	   In	   a	   number	   of	   cases,	   applicants	   have	   claimed	   that	   both	  their	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial	  and	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  had	  been	  violated.	  In	  these	   cases,	   the	   Court	   tends	   to	   examine	   the	   violation	   of	   the	   first	   paragraph	   of	  Article	  6.	  If	  a	  breach	  is	  found,	  the	  examination	  stops	  there,	  as	  it	   is	  held	  that	  the	  second	  paragraph	  is	  ‘absorbed’	  by	  the	  first.303	  There	  are	  also	  cases	  in	  which	  the	  Court	  has	  proceeded	  in	  examining	  paragraph	  2	  only	  to	  hold	  that	  no	  violation	  of	  the	   presumption	   of	   innocence	   was	   found.304	  In	   addition,	   the	   presumption	   of	  innocence	   is	   strongly	   linked	   to	   the	   privilege	   against	   self-­‐incrimination	   and	   the	  right	   to	   silence305	  (while	   also	   with	   the	   reversed	   burden	   of	   proof.	   All	   of	   them	  examined	  below).	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  302	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  Jabardo	  v.	  Spain,	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  Dec	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  Series	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  no.	  146,	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  11	  EHRR	  360,	  §	  77;	  Lavents	  v.	  Latvia,	  no.	  58442/00,	  28	  Nov	  2002,	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  125.	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  Austria,	  6	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  EHRR	  191,	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  Turkey,	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  28340/95,	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  others	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  2000-­‐VII,	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  France,	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  EHRR	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  14	  EHRR	  47,	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  34;	  Deweer	   v.	  Belgium,	   27	  Feb	  1980,	   Series	  A	  no.	  35,	   (1979-­‐80)	  2	  EHRR	  439,	   §	  56;	  
Funke	  v.	  France,	  no.	  10828/84,	  25	  Feb	  1993,	  Series	  A	  no.	  256-­‐A,	  (1993)	  16	  EHRR	  297,	  §	  45;	  IJL,	  
GMR	   and	   AKP	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	   nos.	   29552/95,	   30056/96	   and	   30574/96,	   ECHR	   2000-­‐IX,	  (2001)	  33	  EHRR	  11,	  §	  142.	  304	  Hentrich	  v.	  France,	  22	  Sept	  1994,	  Series	  A	  no.	  296-­‐A,	  (1994)	  18	  EHRR	  440,	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  64.	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  McGuiness	  v.	  Ireland,	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  ECHR	  2000-­‐XII,	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  EHRR	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   no.	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   21	   Dec	   2000,	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  40;	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  United	   Kingdom,	   no.	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  17	  Dec	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  Reports	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   (1997)	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  EHRR	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  68;	  Shannon	   v.	  United	  
Kingdom,	  no.	  6563/03,	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4.3.1.	  Evaluation	  of	  Evidence	  
	  The	  Strasbourg	  Court	  never	  acts	  as	  a	  tribunal	  of	  fourth	  instance.	  Judging	  on	  the	  matter	  of	  presumption	  of	   innocence,	   it	  can	  conclude	  that	  there	  is	  a	  breach	  only	  by	  the	  judgement	  of	  the	  domestic	  court.	  For	  example,	  the	  Reykjavik	  district	  court	  once	  convicted	  an	  applicant,	  as	  it	  couldn’t	  be	  clear	  from	  the	  facts	  of	  the	  case	  and	  the	   other	   elements	   produced	   at	   trial	   that	   the	   applicant	   was	  more	   likely	   to	   be	  innocent	  than	  guilty.	  Here,	  the	  ECtHR	  found	  an	  obvious	  violation,	  as	  no	  benefit	  of	  doubt	  was	  given	  to	  the	  applicant.306	  ‘Court	  judges,	  in	  fulfilling	  their	  duties,	  should	  not	  start	  with	  the	  conviction	  or	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  accused	  committed	  the	  act	   with	   which	   he	   is	   charged’.307	  This	   statement	   brings	   close,	   as	   mentioned	  before,	  the	  guarantees	  of	  Article	  6	  paragraphs	  one	  and	  two.	  In	  Lavents,	  the	  judge	  proceeded	  in	  two	  unacceptable	  statements	  saying	  that	  she	  didn’t	  believe	  that	  the	  accused	  is	  innocent	  and	  that	  he	  should	  prove	  his	  innocence.308	  The	  interrogative	  form	  of	  the	  statements	  didn’t	  prevent	  the	  Court	   from	  finding	  a	  violation,	  as	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  should	  be	  applied	  practically	  and	  effectively	  in	  order	  to	  function	  properly.309	  	  Apart	   from	   the	   judges,	   the	   experts310	  are	   expected	   to	   be	   impartial,	  where	   they	  are	   appointed	   by	   the	   court	   and	   not	   by	   the	   parties.	   In	   jurisdictions	   where	   the	  expert	   is	   ‘a	  neutral	  and	   impartial	  auxiliary	  of	   the	  court,	  appointed	  by	   the	  court	  itself’311	  is	  also	  bound	  by	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence.	  That	  is	  held	  by	  the	  Court	  in	  Bönisch,	  as	  the	  role	  of	  the	  expert	  was	  rather	  against	  the	  accused.312	  In	  Bernard,	  the	   report	   of	   a	   psychiatrist	   described	   the	   applicant	   as	   a	   dangerous	   criminal,	  including	   comments	   that	   revealed	   a	   tone	   of	   partiality.	   The	   Court	   of	   Cassation	  dismissed	   the	   appeal,	   holding	   that	   the	   comments	   referred	   to	   in	   that	   ground	  of	  appeal	  did	  not	  constitute	  a	  breach	  of	  the	  oath	  sworn	  by	  the	  experts	  to	  assist	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  306	  Vilborg	  Yrsa	  Sigurðardóttir	  v.	  Iceland,	  no.	  32451/96,	  30	  May	  2000,	  §	  10.	  307	  X	  v.	  Germany,	  The	  Law.	  308	  Lavents	  v.	  Latvia,	  no.	  58442/00,	  28	  Nov	  2002,	  §	  124.	  309	  Ibid.,	   §	  126;	   see	   also	   Ensslin,	   Baader	   and	   Raspe	   v.	   Germany,	   nos.	   7572/76,	   7586/76	   and	  7587/76,	   Commission	   decision	   of	   8	   July	   1978,	  Decisions	   and	  Reports	   (DR)	   14;	  Ninn-­‐Hansen	   v.	  
Denmark,	  no.	  29972/95,	  ECHR	  1999-­‐V,	  321.	  310	  See	  also	  HA	  Hammelmann,	  ‘Expert	  Evidence’	  (1947)	  10	  MLR	  32.	  	  311	  Bönisch	  v.	  Austria,	  6	  May	  1985,	  Series	  A	  no.	  92,	  (1987)	  9	  EHRR	  191,	  §	  30.	  312	  Ibid.,	  §	  32.	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court	   on	   their	   honour	   and	   according	   to	   their	   conscience. 313 	  Although	   the	  Commission	   found	   a	   violation	   of	   Article	   6§1	   and	   therefore	   didn’t	   proceed	   to	  examine	  a	  breach	  of	  Article	  6§2,	  the	  Court	  concluded	  that	  there	  was	  no	  violation	  of	  either	  paragraph	  1	  or	  2.	  	  	  According	  to	  the	  Court,	  ‘the	  two	  specialists	  appointed	  by	  the	  investigating	  judge	  logically	   had	   to	   start	   from	   the	   working	   hypothesis	   that	   the	   applicant	   had	  committed	   the	   crimes	  which	   had	   given	   rise	   to	   the	   prosecution.	  The	   file	   shows	  that	  the	  applicant’s	  conviction	  was	  based	  on	  all	  the	  charges	  preferred	  and	  on	  the	  evidence	  obtained	  during	   the	   investigation	  and	  discussed	  at	   the	  hearings.	  That	  being	  so,	  the	  Court	  cannot	  regard	  the	  statements	  in	  issue,	  which	  formed	  only	  one	  part	  of	  the	  evidence	  submitted	  to	  the	  jury,	  as	  contrary	  to	  the	  requirements	  of	  a	  fair	   trial	   and	   the	   presumption	   of	   innocence’.	   314 	  This	   opinion	   of	   the	   Court	  contradicts	   its	  own	  wording,	  when	   it	  holds	   that	   ‘the	  presumption	  of	   innocence	  enshrined	   in	   Article	   6§2	   of	   the	   Convention	   is	   one	   of	   the	   elements	   of	   a	   fair	  criminal	  trial	  required	  by	  Article	  6§1.	  It	  will	  be	  violated	  if	  a	  statement	  of	  a	  public	  official	  concerning	  a	  person	  charged	  with	  a	  criminal	  offence	  reflects	  an	  opinion	  that	  he	  is	  guilty	  before	  he	  has	  been	  proved	  so	  according	  to	  law.	  It	  suffices,	  even	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  any	   formal	   finding,	   that	   there	   is	   some	  reasoning	   to	  suggest	   that	  the	   official	   regards	   the	   accused	   as	   guilty’.315	  Again	   here,	   it	   is	   manifest	   the	  arbitrary	   character	   of	   the	   Court’s	   decisions	   that	   often	   lack	   systematicity	   and	  continuity.	   Rather	   than	   trying	   to	   present	   its	   thoughts	   as	   part	   of	   a	   system,	   the	  Court	   concentrates	   on	   details	   that	   do	   not	   contribute	   to	   the	   formulation	   of	  concrete	  and	  incontrovertible	  principles.	  	  	  The	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  is	  one	  of	  the	  pillars	  of	  the	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial	  and	  constitutes	   the	   manners	   by	   which	   the	   accused	   should	   be	   treated	   during	   the	  whole	   criminal	   process,	   from	   its	   early	   start	   until	   the	   final	   and	   undisputed	  conviction.	   The	   right	   to	   be	   presumed	   innocent	   is	   the	   norm	   that	   should	  characterise	   the	   behaviour	   and	   decision	   making	   of	   all	   authorities	   involved	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  313	  Bernard	  v.	  France,	  23	  Apr	  1998,	  Reports	  1998-­‐II,	  867,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  808,	  §	  20.	  314	  Ibid.,	  §§	  38,	  40	  315	  Daktaras	  v.	  Lithuania,	  no.	  42095/98,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐X,	  489,	  (2002)	  34	  EHRR	  60,	  §	  41;	  Böhmer	  v.	  
Germany,	  no.	  37568/97,	  3	  Oct	  2002,	  (2004)	  38	  EHRR	  19,	  §	  56.	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criminal	   proceedings.	   As	   it	   will	   be	   clarified	   below,	   this	   requirement	   is	  miscellaneous	  having	  varied	  applications	  in	  criminal	  procedure.	  	  	  
4.3.2.	  Reversed	  burden	  of	  proof	  	  	  Cases	   that	   involve	   reversed	   burden	   of	   proof	   are	   strongly	   related	   to	   the	  presumption	   of	   innocence. 316 	  In	   Kyprianou,	   the	   applicant,	   a	   lawyer,	   while	  representing	   his	   client	   in	   a	   case	   of	  murder,	  was	   charged	  with	   contempt	   of	   the	  court.	  According	  to	  the	  domestic	  court,	  what	  the	  lawyer	  said	  and	  in	  particular	  the	  manner	  with	  which	  he	  addressed	  the	  Court	  constituted	  contempt.	  The	  applicant	  had	   two	   choices:	   either	   to	  maintain	  what	   he	   said	   and	   to	   give	   reasons	  why	   no	  sentence	   should	  be	   imposed	  on	  him	  or	   to	  decide	  whether	  he	   should	   retract.317	  This	   is	   a	   case	  of	   reversed	  burden	  of	   proof	  which	  was	   found	  by	   the	   Strasbourg	  Court	  as	  violating	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence.318	  	  In	   Salabiaku,	   the	   applicant,	   a	   national	   of	   Zaire,	  went	   to	   the	   airport	   in	   Paris	   to	  collect	  a	  parcel.	  He	  expected	  the	  parcel	  to	  contain	  samples	  of	  African	  food.	  As	  he	  was	   unable	   to	   find	   it,	   he	   approached	   an	   airline	   official	   who	   directed	   him	   to	   a	  padlocked	  trunk	  which	  had	  remained	  uncollected	  and	  bore	  an	  Air	  Zaïre	  luggage	  ticket	  but	  no	  name.	  The	  official	  suggested	  that	  he	  left	  it	  where	  it	  was,	  intimating	  to	  him	  that	  it	  might	  contain	  prohibited	  goods.	  The	  applicant	  took	  possession	  of	  it	  nevertheless,	  and	  passed	  through	  the	  channel	   for	  passengers	  having	  nothing	  to	  declare.	  Customs	  officials	  then	  detained	  the	  applicant	  and	  forced	  the	  lock	  of	  the	  trunk	  to	  find	   lying	  underneath	  victuals,	  a	  welded	  false	  bottom	  which	  concealed	  10	   kg	   of	   herbal	   and	   seed	   cannabis.	   Two	   days	   later	   a	   parcel	   addressed	   to	   the	  applicant	   arrived	   in	   Brussels	   instead	   of	   Paris,	   which	   had	   been	   the	   intended	  destination.319	  The	  applicant	  was	  given	  the	  benefit	  of	  doubt,	  but	  he	  was	  charged	  for	   smuggling.	   The	   law	   read	   that	   any	   person	   found	   with	   undeclared	   goods	   is	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  316	  RJ	  Allen,	  ‘Burdens	  of	  Proof,	  Uncertainty,	  and	  Ambiguity	  in	  Modern	  Legal	  Discource’	  (1994)	  17	  
Harvard	  Journal	  of	  Law	  and	  Public	  Policy	  627.	  	  317	  Kyprianou	  v.	  Cyprus,	  no.	  73797/01,	  27	  Jan	  2004,	  §	  53.	  318	  Ibid.,	  §	  56.	  319	  Salabiaku	  v.	  France,	  7	  Oct	  1988,	  Series	  A	  no.	  141-­‐A,	  (1991)	  13	  EHRR	  379,	  §§	  8-­‐15.	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presumed	   guilty	   of	   smuggling.	   The	   accused	   might	   exculpate	   himself	   by	  establishing	   ‘a	  case	  of	   force	  majeure’	  resulting	   ‘from	  an	  event	  responsibility	  for	  which	  is	  not	  attributable’	  to	  him	  and	  which	  ‘it	  was	  absolutely	  impossible	  for	  him	  to	   avoid’,	   such	   as	   ‘the	   absolute	   impossibility	   of	   knowing	   the	   contents	   of	   a	  package’.320	  	  The	   ECtHR	   stated	   that:	   ‘Presumptions	   of	   fact	   or	   of	   law	   operate	   in	   every	   legal	  system.	   Clearly,	   the	   Convention	   does	   not	   prohibit	   such	   presumptions	   in	  principle.	   It	   does,	   however,	   require	   the	   Contracting	   States	   to	   remain	   within	  certain	  limits	  in	  this	  respect	  as	  regards	  criminal	  law’.	  It	  criticised	  the	  opinion	  of	  the	  Commission321	  that	  the	  particular	  presumption	  was	  an	  element	  of	  the	  offence	  itself,	   suggesting	   that	   in	   that	   case,	   the	   legislator	   could	   easily	   undermine	   the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Convention	  at	  anytime.	   ‘Article	  6§2	  does	  not	  therefore	  regard	  presumptions	  of	  fact	  or	  of	  law	  provided	  for	  in	  the	  criminal	  law	  with	  indifference.	  It	   requires	   States	   to	   confine	   them	   within	   reasonable	   limits	   which	   take	   into	  account	   the	   importance	   of	   what	   is	   at	   stake	   and	   maintain	   the	   rights	   of	   the	  defence’.	  322	  But	  it	  is	  not	  so	  self-­‐evident	  what	  it	  is	  meant	  by	  being	  ‘at	  stake’	  in	  the	  Court’s	   phraseology.	   It	   does	   not	   shed	   light	   on	   the	   inclination	   of	   the	   Court	   to	  presumptions.	  It	  probably	  refers	  to	  the	  use	  of	  presumptions	  preferably	  in	  minor	  crimes,	  but	  this	  is	  a	  logical	  assumption	  and	  not	  a	  deductive	  approach	  of	  the	  text	  of	  Salabiaku.	   In	  addition,	   it	   is	   important	   for	   the	  Court	   that,	   the	  person	  was	  not	  left	   entirely	   without	   a	   means	   of	   defence323	  but	   he	   could	   present	   opposing	  evidence	  or	  arguments.	  The	  Court	  namely,	  had	  ‘a	  genuine	  freedom	  of	  assessment	  in	  this	  area’.	  	  In	  Pham	  Hoang,	  the	  applicant	  was	  arrested	  at	  the	  wheel	  of	  a	  car	  towards	  which	  other	  people	  carrying	  drugs	  were	  walking.324	  The	  accused	  was	  convicted	  on	  the	  basis	   of	   a	   reversed	   burden	   of	   proof325	  and	   the	   Court	   found	   no	   violation	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  320	  Ibid.,	  §	  19.	  321	  Salabiaku	  v.	  France,	  Commission	  Report,	  §§	  74-­‐75.	  322	  Ibid.,	  §	  28.	  323	  Ibid.,	  §	  29.	  324	  Pham	  Hoang	  v.	  France,	  25	  Sept	  1992,	  Series	  A	  no.	  243,	  (1993)	  16	  EHRR	  53,	  §	  9.	  325	  The	   French	  Customs	  Code	   in	  Aricle	   373	   states:	   ‘In	   any	  proceedings	   concerning	   a	   seizure	   of	  goods,	  the	  burden	  of	  proving	  that	  no	  offence	  has	  been	  committed	  shall	  be	  on	  the	  person	  whose	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presumption	   of	   innocence326 	  since	   ‘the	   Court	   of	   Appeal	   duly	   weighed	   the	  evidence	   before	   it,	   assessed	   it	   carefully	   and	   based	   its	   finding	   of	   guilt	   on	   it.	   It	  refrained	   from	   any	   automatic	   reliance	   on	   the	   presumptions	   created	   in	   the	  relevant	   provisions	   of	   the	   Customs	   Code	   and	   did	   not	   apply	   them	   in	   a	  manner	  incompatible	  with	  Article	  6	  §§	  1	  and	  2’.327	  	  In	   a	   case	   concerning	  Swedish	   tax	   law,	   the	  Court	   confirmed	  what	   it	   had	   said	   in	  
Salabiaku,	  giving	  a	  clearer	  approach	  on	  presumptions.	  Here	  also	  it	  stated	  that	  the	  presumption	   reversed	   was	   not	   irrefutable	   justifying	   the	   rationale	   of	   such	  presumptions	   in	   tax	   related	   crimes. 328 	  Apart	   from	   tax	   related	   crimes	   the	  Commission	   also	   has	   found	   no	   violation	   in	   offences	   connected	   with	   road-­‐traffic.329	  The	   Court	   seems	   to	   understand	   the	   concept	   of	   reversed	   burden	   of	  proof	  as	  a	   function	  needed	   in	  a	  state	  operating	   like	  a	   tool	  of	  efficiency	   in	  areas	  such	   as	   customs	   or	   traffic	   order.	   Its	   reasoning	   though	   lacks	   the	   clarity	   of	   a	  doctrinal	  line	  that	  could	  justify	  the	  bending	  of	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  against	  the	  interests	  of	  the	  accused.	  	  As	  long	  as	  vicarious	  liability	  is	  concerned,	  ‘it	  is	  a	  fundamental	  rule	  of	  criminal	  law	  that	   criminal	   liability	   does	   not	   survive	   the	   person	   who	   has	   committed	   the	  criminal	   act’.330	  In	   that	   case	   from	   which	   this	   sentence	   is	   taken,	   a	   fine	   for	   tax	  evasion	  was	   imposed	   to	   the	  heirs	  of	   the	  perpetrator.	  The	  Commission	   saw	   the	  fine	   as	   part	   of	   the	   inheritance	   and	   consequently	   found	   no	   violation	   of	   Article	  6§2.331	  The	  Court	  held	  differently	  in	  the	  end	  stating	  that	  ‘inheritance	  of	  the	  guilt	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  goods	  have	  been	  seized’.	  Pham	  Hoang	  v.	  France,	  25	  Sept	  1992,	  Series	  A	  no.	  243,	  (1993)	  16	  EHRR	  53,	  §	  22.	  326	  See	   also	   P	   van	   Dijk	   and	   GJH	   van	   Hoof,	   Theory	   and	   Practice	   of	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	  
Human	  Rights,	  pp	  461-­‐462.	  327	  Ibid.,	  §	  36.	  328	  Västberga	  Taxi	  Aktiebolag	  and	  Vulic	  v.	  Sweden,	  no.	  36985/97,	  23	  July	  2002,	  §	  115:	  ‘The	  Court	  also	  has	  regard	  to	  the	  financial	  interests	  of	  the	  State	  in	  tax	  matters,	  taxes	  being	  the	  State's	  main	  source	  of	  income.	  A	  system	  of	  taxation	  principally	  based	  on	  information	  supplied	  by	  the	  taxpayer	  would	  not	  function	  properly	  without	  some	  form	  of	  sanction	  against	  the	  provision	  of	  incorrect	  or	  incomplete	  information,	  and	  the	  large	  number	  of	  tax	  returns	  that	  are	  processed	  annually	  coupled	  with	   the	   interest	   in	   ensuring	   a	   foreseeable	   and	   uniform	   application	   of	   such	   sanctions	  undoubtedly	  require	  that	  they	  be	  imposed	  according	  to	  standardised	  rules’.	  329	  See	  e.g.	  JP,	  KR	  and	  GH	  v.	  Austria.	  330	  AP,	  MP	  and	  TP	  v.	  Switzerland,	  29	  Aug	  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐V,	  1477,	  (1998)	  26	  EHRR	  541,	  §	  48;	  see	  also	  EL,	  RL	  and	  JO-­‐L	  v.	  Switzerland,	  no.	  20919/92,	  29	  Aug	  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐V,	  1509,	  §	  53.	  331	  AP,	  MP	  and	  TP	  v.	  Switzerland,	  Commission	  Report,	  §	  48.	  
 108 
of	  the	  dead	  is	  not	  compatible	  with	  the	  standards	  of	  criminal	   justice	  in	  a	  society	  governed	  by	  the	  rule	  of	  law’.332	  
	  
	  
4.4.	  Illegally	  obtained	  evidence:	  entrapment	  and	  self-­‐entrapment	  	  
4.4.1.	  Entrapment	  	  The	   exclusion	   of	   improperly	   obtained333	  evidence	   is	   a	   matter	   that	   every	   state	  party	  deals	  with	  on	  its	  own.	  That	  kind	  of	  evidence	  is	  provided	  after	  violation	  of	  fundamental	   human	   rights.	   Needless	   to	   say	   that	   the	   collection	   of	   evidence	   in	  violation	   of	   defendant’s	   constitutional	   rights	   in	   a	   state	   will	   also	   appear	   to	   be	  against	   Articles	   3334	  and	   8335	  of	   ECHR.	   The	   question	   here	   is	   what	   is	   going	   to	  happen	  if	  that	  evidence	  collected	  is	  brought	  before	  a	  court	  of	   law.	  Is	   it	  possible	  for	  a	  national	  court	  to	  use	  the	  whole	  or	  part	  of	  that	  evidence?336	  If	  the	  answer	  is	  positive,	   which	   are	   the	   criteria	   that	   should	   be	   met	   so	   that	   the	   final	   decree	  satisfies	  the	  standards	  of	  a	  fair	  trial?337	  	  The	  ECtHR	  has	  poorly	  dealt,	  in	  an	  open	  manner,	  with	  the	  matter	  of	  compatibility	  between	   the	   collection	   and	   use	   of	   improperly	   obtained	   evidence338	  and	   the	  principle	   of	   fair	   trial.339	  The	  ECtHR	   is	   rather	   circumspect,	   avoiding	   intervening	  drastically	   in	   the	   penal	   systems	   of	   the	   state	   parties.	   It	   has	   been	   considered	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  332	  AP,	  MP	  and	  TP	  v.	  Switzerland,	  29	  Aug	  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐V,	  1477,	  (1998)	  26	  EHRR	  541,	  §	  48.	  333	  D	  Ormerod,	  ‘ECHR	  and	  the	  Exclusion	  of	  Evidence:	  Trial	  Remedies	  for	  Article	  8	  Breaches’	  Crim	  
LR	  (2003)	  61.	  334	  Prohibition	   of	   torture:	   ‘No	   one	   shall	   be	   subjected	   to	   torture	   or	   to	   inhuman	   or	   degrading	  treatment	  or	  punishment’	  (Article	  3	  ECHR).	  335	  Right	  to	  respect	  for	  private	  and	  family	  life:	  1.	  Everyone	  has	  the	  right	  to	  respect	  for	  his	  private	  and	  family	  life,	  his	  home	  and	  his	  correspondence.	  –	  2.	  There	  shall	  be	  no	  interference	  by	  a	  public	  authority	   with	   the	   exercise	   of	   this	   right	   except	   such	   as	   is	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   law	   and	   is	  necessary	   in	   a	   democratic	   society	   in	   the	   interests	   of	   national	   security,	   public	   safety	   or	   the	  economic	  well-­‐being	  of	  the	  country,	  for	  the	  prevention	  of	  disorder	  or	  crime,	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  health	  or	  morals,	  or	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  rights	  and	  freedoms	  of	  others’	  (Article	  8	  ECHR).	  336	  A	   Zuckerman,	   Illegally-­‐Obtained	   Evidence	   –	   Discretion	   as	   a	   Guardian	   of	   Legitimacy’	   [1987]	  
CLP	  55.	  337	  See	  also	  S.	  Lubig	  /	  J.	  Sprenger,	  ‘Beweisverwertungsverbote	  aus	  dem	  Fairnessgebot	  des	  Art.	  6	  EMRK	  in	  der	  Rechtsprechung	  des	  EGMR’,	  ZIS	  2008,	  pp	  433-­‐440.	  338	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  some	  cases	  related	  to	  the	  right	  against	  self-­‐incrimination	  or	  the	  use	  of	  anonymous	  witnesses.	  339	  See	  A	  Ashworth,	  ‘Article	  6	  and	  the	  Fairness	  of	  Trials’,	  Crim	  LR	  1999,	  p	  261.	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though	   that	   the	   probable	   issue	   of	   Article	   3	   or	   8	   violations	   is	   absorbed	   by	   the	  issue	   raised	   under	   the	   light	   of	   Article	   6.340 	  This	   problem	   in	   discussion	   is	  concentrated	   more	   on	   operations	   where	   special	   investigative	   measures341	  are	  used	   for	   combating	   serious	   crime	   formation	   such	   as	   organised	   crime	   and	  terrorism.	   In	   this	   framework,	  highly	   interesting	   is	   the	  problématique	   related	   to	  the	  commission	  of	   crimes	  provoked	  by	  agents	  provocateurs,	  police	  undercover	  agents,	  who	   have	   slipped	   in	   the	  world	   of	   crime342.	   The	   Court	   has	   dealt	  widely	  with	   that	   issue,	   following	   perhaps	   the	   similar	   tendency	   of	   the	   common	   law	  tradition.	   In	   addition,	   in	   the	   same	   context	   of	   illegally	   obtained	   evidence,	   the	  subject	  of	  self-­‐incrimination	  will	  be	  dealt	  with	  and	  the	  associated	  to	  that	  right	  to	  silence.	  Entrapment	   is	   seen	  by	   the	  Court	   as	   a	   violation	  of	  Article	  6§1,	  whereas	  matters	   that	   address	   the	   privilege	   against	   self-­‐incrimination	   and	   the	   right	   to	  silence	  are	  deemed	  to	  stem	  from	  the	  presumption	  of	   innocence	  and	  are	  placed	  under	  Article	  6§2.	  	  In	  principle,	   the	  ECHR	  does	  not	  cut	  off	   the	  use	  of	  special	   investigative	  methods	  for	  the	  detection	  of	  extremely	  dangerous	  forms	  of	  criminal	  behaviour.	  According	  to	  ECtHR	  though,	  the	  public	  interest	  of	  combating	  such	  behaviours	  is	  not	  enough	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  the	  use	  of	  evidence	  collected	  by	  means	  of	  entrapment.343	  The	  general	  requirement	  of	  impartiality,	  as	  established	  in	  Article	  6,	  applies	  to	  every	  criminal	  process.	  It	  is	  not	  possible	  that	  these	  requirements	  are	  sacrificed	  for	  the	  sake	   of	   any	   expediency,	   no	   matter	   which	   is	   the	   type	   of	   the	   criminal	   offence	  brought	  in	  a	  court	  of	  law.	  	  In	   any	   case,	   the	   public	   interest	   of	   combating	   serious	   types	   of	   crime	   is	   not	  sufficient	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  the	  use	  of	  evidence	  gathered	  after	  a	  provocation	  by	  the	   police.	   The	   latter	   happens	   when	   the	   parties	   involved	   –whether	   they	   are	  members	  of	  the	  security	  forces	  or	  civilians	  that	  act	  following	  orders–	  do	  not	  limit	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  340	  PG	  and	  JH	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  44787/98,	  25	  Sep	  2001,	  §§	  59-­‐60,	  Schenk	  v.	  Switzerland,	  12	  July	  1988,	  Series	  A	  no.	  140,	  (1991)	  13	  EHRR	  242,	  §	  53.	  341	  See	  S	  Seabrooke	  /	  J	  Sprack,	  Criminal	  Evidence	  &	  Procedure:	  The	  Essential	  Framework,	  (Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  1996),	  p	  157.	  342	  JD	  Heydon,	  ‘The	  Problems	  of	  Entrapment’,	  Cambridge	  Law	  Journal	  1973,	  pp	  268-­‐269.	  343	  Entrapment	  by	   the	  police	  was	  recognised	  as	  a	  reason	  of	  excuse	   for	   the	  accused	   first	   time	   in	  1932	  in	  the	  U.S.A.	  It	  was	  the	  case	  of	  Sorrells	  v.	  United	  States,	  287	  U.S.	  435	  (1932).	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themselves	   in	   a	   role	   substantively	   passive;344	  they	   do	   not	   just	   investigate	   a	  criminal	   activity,	   but	   they	   further	   persuade	   the	   potential	   accused345	  in	   such	   a	  way,	   that	   finally	   instigate346 	  the	   commission	   of	   a	   crime,	   that	   wouldn’t	   be	  otherwise	   committed;	   in	   other	   words,	   their	   act	   of	   provoking	   aims	   at	   criminal	  indictment.347	  	  	  4.4.1.1.	  Entrapment	  occurrences	  	  	  The	  case	  of	  Teixeira	  de	  Castro	  v.	  Portugal	  constitutes	  the	  very	  first	  milestone	  on	  the	   Court’s	   views	   about	   police	   incitement.	   In	   that	   crucial	   case	   undercover	  policemen	  approached	  the	  applicant	  saying	  that	  they	  wished	  to	  buy	  20	  grams	  of	  heroin	   for	  200,000	  escudos	  (PTE).	  They	  produced	  a	  roll	  of	  banknotes	   from	  the	  Bank	  of	  Portugal	  for	  that	  purpose,	  although	  their	  real	  plan	  was	  to	  arrest	  him.348	  The	   ECtHR	   held	   that	   the	   police	   agents	   exceeded	   the	   necessary	   measure	   of	  performing	   their	   duties,	   as	   the	   applicant	   had	   never	   been	   a	   suspect	   before	   the	  commission	   of	   the	   crime.	   Furthermore,	   the	   whole	   operation	   hadn’t	   been	   put	  under	  the	  monitoring	  of	  a	  judicial	  body	  which	  led	  to	  his	  deprivation	  of	  the	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial.	  The	  ECtHR	  held	  in	  that	  case	  that	  Teixeira	  de	  Castro	  was	  a	  victim	  of	  police	   incitement,	   a	   fact	   that	   had	   as	   a	   consequence	   the	   unfair	   character	   of	   the	  whole	  trial.349	  	  In	  particular,	   the	  Court	   accepted	   for	   the	   first	   time	   that	  nevertheless	   the	  use	  of	  undercover	   agents	   in	   combating	   serious	   crimes	   (here	   drug	   trafficking)	   is	   not	  prohibited350,	   the	  right	  to	  a	   fair	  procedure	  has	  such	  an	   important	  role	  that	   it	   is	  not	   allowed	   to	   be	   sacrificed	   in	   favour	   of	   expediency.	   The	   standards	   of	   trial	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  344	  See	  on	  that	  as	  a	  test	  of	  admissibility,	  A	  Ashworth,	  ‘Re-­‐drawing	  the	  boundaries	  of	  Entrapment’,	  
Crim	  LR	  2002,	  pp	  161,	  165.	  345	  About	  his	  or	  her	  diminished	  culpability	  as	  victim	  of	  entrapment	  see	  R	  Park,	  ‘The	  Entrapment	  Controversy’	  (1976)	  60	  Minessota	  Law	  Review,	  pp	  163,	  240.	  346	  R.	  Munday,	  Evidence	  (Oxford,	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  p	  49,	  1.53.	  347	  Teixeira	  de	  Castro	  v.	  Portugal,	  9	  June	  1998,	  Reports	  1998-­‐IV,	  1451,	  (1999)	  28	  EHRR	  101,	  §	  38.	  348	  Ibid.,	  §	  10.	  349	  On	  the	  adverse	  effect	  on	  fairness	  of	  the	  proceedings,	  see	  also	  S.	  Nash	  /	  A.	  L.-­‐T.	  Choo,	   ‘What’s	  the	  matter	  with	  Section	  78?’,	  Crim	  LR	  1999,	  929,	  Ι	  Dennis,	  The	  Law	  of	  Evidence,	  (Sweet	  &	  Maxwell,	  1999),	  p	  252.	  350	  See	  also	  A	  Ashworth,	   ‘Should	  the	  Police	  be	  Allowed	  to	  Use	  Deceptive	  Practices?’	   (1998)	  114	  
LQR	  108.	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according	  to	  Article	  6	  ECHR	  are	  valid	   in	  any	  trial	  about	  any	  crime,	  even	  for	  the	  most	   complex	   one.	   In	   addition,	   the	   public	   interest	   cannot	   justify	   the	   use	   of	  evidence	  that	  is	  product	  of	  incitement.	  Contrary	  to	  the	  case	  of	  Lüdi,351	  where	  the	  undercover	  acting	  policemen	  performed	  their	  duties	  within	  the	  limits	  allowed,352	  as	  they	  were	  under	  oath	  before	  a	  judge	  who	  was	  informed	  of	  their	  task,	  the	  Court	  held	   that	   in	   Teixeira	   de	   Castro	   the	   police	   exceeded	   those	   limits	   for	   several	  reasons.353	  	  Firstly,	   the	   police	   officers	   didn’t	   act	   within	   the	   frame	   of	   a	   police	   operation	  ordered	   and	   monitored	   by	   a	   judge,	   fact	   that	   questions	   the	   level	   of	   legality	   in	  police	   activity.	   Secondly,	   the	   state	   authorities	   didn’t	   have	   reasons	   to	   suspect	  Teixeira	  for	  drug	  trafficking,	  since	  he	  did	  not	  have	  any	  (recorded)	  criminal	  past	  and	  no	  criminal	  procedure	  had	  ever	  commenced	  against	  him.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  he	  was	   a	   stranger	   to	   the	   police,	  who	   approached	   him	   via	   the	   agents.	   Thirdly,	   the	  applicant	   didn’t	   possess	   any	   drug	   substance	   at	   home,	   but	   another	   person	  provided	   him	   only	   the	   amount	   pre-­‐ordered	   by	   the	   agents,	   confining	   his	  behaviour	  to	  what	  the	  police	  asked	  from	  him.	  Fourthly,	  there	  was	  no	  evidentiary	  element	   supporting	   the	   argument	   that	   the	   applicant	   was	   omnimodo	   facturus	  (predisposed)	  about	  drug	  crimes.	  Furthermore,	  the	  two	  policemen	  didn’t	  confine	  themselves	  in	  examining	  Teixeira’s	  activity	  in	  a	  passive	  way,	  but	  they	  influenced	  him	   in	   such	   a	   way	   that	   they	   provoked	   the	   commission	   of	   the	   crime.	   Lastly,	  Teixeira’s	  conviction	  was	  substantially	  based	  on	  the	  witness	  testimonies	  of	  these	  two	  police	  officers.	  In	  view	  of	  all	  the	  above,	  the	  Court	  concluded	  that	  the	  actions	  of	   the	   two	   agents	   exceeded	   the	   limit	   of	   the	   undercover	   acting	   agents,	   as	   they	  incited	   the	   offence,	   which	   there	   was	   no	   indication	   that	   would	   have	   occurred	  without	   their	   interference.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   Teixeira	   was	   deprived	   of	   a	   fair	  trial.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  351	  Lüdi	  v.	  Switzerland,	  no.	  12433/86,	  15	  June	  1992,	  Series	  A	  no.	  238,	  (1993)	  13	  EHRR	  173.	  352	  See	  also	  A.L.-­‐T.	  Choo,	  Abuse	  of	  Process	  and	  Judicial	  Stays	  of	  Criminal	  Proceedings,	  1993,	  pp.	  148,	  179.	  353	  K.	  Krauss,	  V-­‐Leute	  im	  Strafprozess	  und	  die	  Europaeische	  Menschenrechtskonvention,	   (Freiburg	  im	  Breisgau,	  Ed.	  Iuscrim,	  1999)	  p	  74.	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According	   to	   ECtHR,	   in	   every	   case	   that	   the	   accused	   claims	   to	   be	   prompted	   to	  commit	   a	   crime	   on	   the	   provocation	   of	   the	   police,	   the	   national	   courts	   should	  examine	  that	  claim	  with	  every	  caution.	  That	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  in	  effect	  especially	  in	  cases	  where	  there	  is	  no	  relevant	  legal	  frame	  that	  regulates	  the	  intervention	  of	  policemen	   or	   sufficient	   guarantees	   that	   respect	   the	   rights	   of	   the	   defence.354	  Hence,	   in	   cases	   where	   the	   elements	   brought	   before	   the	   Court	   by	   the	   law	  enforcement	  agencies	  do	  not	  allow	  it	  to	  come	  to	  a	  conclusion	  about	  the	  existence	  or	   not	   of	   incitement,	   the	   Court	   proceeds	   to	   further	   examination	   of	   the	   case;	  namely	   the	   necessary	   examination	   of	   the	   procedure	   by	   which	   the	   defence	   of	  incitement	  was	  dealt	  with	  by	  national	  authorities.	  In	  this	  manner,	  the	  Court	  can	  ascertain	   whether	   or	   not	   the	   applicant’s	   rights	   were	   respected,	   especially	   the	  right	  to	  an	  adversarial	  trial	  and	  the	  equality	  of	  arms.	  All	  these	  views	  of	  the	  Court	  were	  about	  to	  be	  further	  honed	  in	  the	  near	  future.	  	  After	  Teixeira	  de	  Castro,	  there	  were	  more	  to	  follow,	  like	  the	  case	  of	  Edwards	  and	  
Lewis.355	  The	   peculiarity	   of	   this	   case	   was	   that	   subject	   of	   the	   trial	   was	   not	   the	  question	   whether	   the	   applicants	   were	   victims	   of	   entrapment	   or	   not.	   Their	  objection	  was	  that	  the	  national	  courts	  didn’t	  give	  them	  the	  opportunity	  to	  raise	  the	   related	   defence.	   In	   particular,	   although	   the	   applicants	   claimed	   before	   the	  English	   courts	   that	   they	   were	   victims	   of	   police	   incitement,	   the	   prosecution	  authority	   denied	   disclosing	   evidence	   that	   would	   prove	   the	   relevance	   of	   the	  defence	   due	   to	   reasons	   of	   public	   interest.	   That	   piece	   of	   evidence	   had	   been	  subjected	  to	  a	  procedure	  ‘ex	  parte’,	  without	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  accused	  or	  their	  attorneys.	   During	   that	   procedure	   the	   English	   judge	   had	   held	   that	   there	   was	  nothing	  that	  could	  speak	  in	  favour	  of	  incitement.	  Contrary	  to	  this	  statement,	  the	  ECtHR	   ruled	   that	   the	   principles	   of	   equality	   of	   arms	   and	   of	   adversarial	  proceedings	  had	  not	  been	  respected.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  violation	  of	  Article	  6§1	  was	  accepted.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  354	  Khudobin	  v.	  Russia,	  no.	  59696/2000,	  26	  Oct	  2006,	  §§133-­‐135.	  355	  Edwards	  and	  Lewis	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  nos.	   39647/98	   and	   40461/98,	   22	   July	   2003.	   At	   first,	  there	  was	   a	  decree	  by	   the	  Fourth	   Section	  of	   the	  ECtHR	  on	   the	  22nd	   of	   July	  2003.	   Following	   an	  application	  of	  the	  UK	  Government	  though,	  the	  case	  was	  forwarded	  to	  a	  plenary	  session.	  
 113 
A	  little	  more	  than	  a	  year	  later	  the	  Court	  dealt	  with	  the	  case	  of	  Vanyan.	  A	  female	  civilian	   contacted	   the	   applicant	   asking	   him	   to	   buy	   heroin	   on	   her	   behalf.	  Apparently,	   the	   woman	   wasn’t	   acting	   on	   her	   own	   behalf	   but	   she	   was	   put	   by	  police	   authorities	   to	   perform	   this	   role,	   as	   there	   was	   information	   that	   the	  applicant	   had	   been	   involved	   in	   drug	   trafficking.	   Consequently,	   she	   agreed	   to	  participate	  in	  a	  ‘test	  purchase’,	  which	  is	  a	  special	  investigative	  action,	  introduced	  by	  the	  Russian	  law.356	  	  Also	   in	   this	   case,	   the	   Court	   held	   that	   the	   applicant	   was	   victim	   of	   police	  entrapment.	   Applying	   the	   criteria	   that	   were	   first	   set	   in	   Teixeira	   de	   Castro	   the	  Court	  accepted	  that	  there	  was	  no	  evidence	  implying	  that	  the	  police	  had	  serious	  reasons	  to	  suspect	  the	  applicant	  for	  drug	  dealing	  before	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  undercover	  civilian.	  Indeed,	  the	  simple	  argument	  made	  by	  the	  police	  in	  trial,	  that	  they	   had	   had	   information	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   applicant’s	   involvement	   in	   drug	  dealing	   cannot	   be	   taken	   into	   consideration.	   The	   police	   did	   not	   confine	  themselves	   to	   a	  passive	  way	  of	   investigating	   the	   criminal	   activity.	  No	  evidence	  proved	   that	   the	   crime	   would	   have	   been	   committed	   if	   the	   intervention	   of	   the	  agent	   didn’t	   take	   place.	   As	   a	   consequence,	   the	   police	   provoked	   the	   crimes	   in	  discussion	   (joint	   participation	   in	   the	   procurement	   and	   storage	   of	   drugs)	   and	  therefore	  their	  operation	  and	  the	  use	  of	  evidence	  obtained	  by	  it	  in	  the	  following	  trial	  undermined	  the	  fair	  character	  of	  the	  latter.357	  	  More	  recently	  a	  case	  similar	  to	  Vanyan	  occupied	  the	  Court.	  That	  was	  the	  case	  of	  
Khudobin.	   Though	   the	  Russian	   court	   this	   time	   expressed	  before	   the	  ECtHR	   the	  opinion	   that	   the	  applicant’s	   rights	  had	  not	  been	  violated,	   ‘they	   indicated	   that	  a	  “test	  buy”,	  or,	   in	  the	  domestic	  terms,	  an	  “operative	  experiment”	  (оперативный	  
эксперимент)	   was	   an	   appropriate	   method	   of	   fighting	   crime;	   the	   evidence	  obtained	   in	   such	   “experiments”	   was	   admissible	   under	   Russian	   law	   and	   could	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  356	  Operational-­‐Search	   Activities	   Act	   of	   1995.	   That	   particular	   special	   investigative	   action	   is	  organised	  by	   the	  police.	  As	   the	   text	  of	   the	   judgement	  states	   in	  paragraph	  35:	   ‘In	  particular,	   the	  police	  may	  carry	  out	  a	  “test	  purchase”	  (проверочная	  закупка)	  where,	   inter	  alia,	  a	  criminal	  case	  has	   been	   opened	   or	   information	   concerning	   the	   preparation	   or	   commission	   of	   an	   offence	   has	  become	   known	   to	   the	   police	   and	   the	   available	   data	   are	   insufficient	   for	   bringing	   criminal	  proceedings	  (section	  7)’.	  357	  Vanyan	  v.	  Russia,	  no.	  53203/99,	  15	  Dec	  2005,	  §	  49.	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lead	  to	  conviction	  of	  the	  offender.	  They	  also	  stated	  that	  “the	  question	  as	  to	  what	  particular	   information	  concerning	   [the	  applicant’s]	   illegal	   actions	  with	  narcotic	  drugs	  had	  been	  at	  the	  disposal	  [of	  the	  police	  before	  conducting	  the	  test	  buy]	  was	  not	   an	   element	   of	   evidence	   in	   the	   present	   criminal	   case”.	   The	   test	   buy	   was	  carried	   out	   on	   a	   lawful	   basis	   and	   the	   evidence	   obtained	   thereby	   was	   duly	  included	  in	  the	  materials	  of	  the	  case	  file’.358	  	  	  The	  Court’s	  response	  to	  that	  was	  that	  domestic	   law	  shouldn’t	  accept	   the	  use	  of	  evidence	   that	   is	   the	   fruit	  of	  police	  entrapment,	  because	   in	   that	  case	   it	  does	  not	  comply	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  fair	  trial.359	  Following	  this,	  the	  Court	  observed	  that	  the	  case	  appeared	  to	  have	  prima	  facie	  many	  elements	  that	  spoke	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  interpretation	   of	   incitement.	   The	   applicant	   prior	   to	   his	   arrest	   had	   not	   had	   a	  criminal	   record.	  The	   information	   that	  he	  previously	  had	  been	   involved	   in	  drug	  dealing	  had	  its	  origins	  from	  only	  one	  source.	  The	  applicant	  had	  not	  profited	  from	  the	  dealing	  discussed.	  All	  these	  factors	  indicate	  that	  the	  applicant	  was	  not	  a	  drug	  dealer	  known	  to	  the	  police.	  Nonetheless,	   it	  seems	  that	  the	  police	  operation	  had	  targeted,	  not	  personally	  the	  applicant,	  but	  whoever	  would	  agree	  to	  provide	  the	  undercover	  civilian	  agent	  with	  heroin.360	  	  Furthermore,	  the	  Court	  stated	  that	  in	  the	  present	  case	  the	  police	  action	  had	  been	  authorised	   with	   a	   simple	   administrative	   decision	   by	   the	   same	   body	   that	   later	  executed	  it.	  The	  text	  of	  that	  decision	  reads	  little	  about	  the	  reasons	  and	  the	  goals	  of	  that	  ‘test	  buy’.	  Moreover,	  the	  whole	  operation	  was	  not	  subjected	  to	  any	  kind	  of	  judicial	  or	  other	  monitoring.	  Besides,	  the	  Strasbourg	  Court	  marked	  that	  only	  the	  undercover	  agent	  testified	  as	  a	  witness	  before	  the	  Russian	  court,	  but	  not	  the	  two	  policemen	  that	  participated	  in	  the	  ‘test	  buy’,	  even	  though	  there	  was	  an	  opposite	  request	  on	  that	  by	  the	  defence.	  Even	  more,	  the	  Court	  regards	  as	  impressive	  the	  fact	   that	   the	  applicant	  himself	  was	  absent	  during	  these	  proceedings,	  and	  hence	  not	   heard	   on	   the	   subject	   of	   incitement.	   Consequently,	   the	   Court	   held	   that	  although	   the	   national	   court	   had	   reasons	   to	   suspect	   that	   incitement	   had	   taken	  place,	  it	  didn’t	  analyse	  the	  factual	  and	  legal	  elements,	  which	  would	  have	  assisted	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  358	  Khudobin	  v.	  Russia,	  no.	  59696/2000,	  26	  Oct	  2006,	  §	  126.	  359	  Ibid.,	  §	  133.	  360	  Ibid.,	  §	  134.	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to	   the	   discrimination	   between	   entrapment	   and	   a	   lawful	   form	   of	   investigative	  activity.	   As	   a	   result	   the	   whole	   criminal	   process	   that	   led	   to	   the	   applicant’s	  conviction	  was	  not	  fair.	  	  Finally,	  it	  should	  be	  pointed	  out	  that,	  whilst	  the	  ECtHR	  in	  Vanyan	  and	  Teixeira	  de	  
Castro	   had	   accepted	   that	   the	   applicant	   was	   the	   victim	   of	   police	   entrapment	  resulting	   the	   deprivation	   of	   fair	   character	   of	   the	   trial,	   in	  Khudobin	   case	   it	  was	  more	   hesitant	   to	   do	   so.	   Hence,	   the	   conviction	   of	   Russia	   was	   not	   due	   to	   the	  confirmation	   of	   entrapment	   but	   the	   unsatisfactory	   examination	   of	   the	   relative	  argument	  by	  the	  domestic	  courts.	  	  In	   V	   the	   applicant	   received	   successive	   phone	   calls	   by	   a	   civilian	   asking	   him	  whether	   he	   had	   cannabis	   in	   his	   possession.	   After	   the	   applicant’s	   necessary	  actions	  in	  order	  to	  find	  the	  drugs,	  the	  police	  arrested	  him.	  Later,	  it	  was	  revealed	  that	  the	  civilian	  who	  had	  called	  for	  the	  deal	  was	  in	  police	  custody	  and	  set	  free	  as	  a	  reward	  of	  his	  services	  to	  the	  police.	  Then,	  the	  applicant	  held	  before	  the	  Finnish	  courts	   that	   he	   had	   been	   the	   victim	   of	   entrapment.	   For	   the	   reason	   of	  strengthening	   his	   argument,	   he	   asked	   from	   the	   police	   information	   about	   the	  phone	   calls	   made	   from	   and	   received	   to	   his	   mobile	   phone	   within	   the	   crucial	  timeframe.	   The	   police	   not	   only	   denied	   the	   information	   but	   also	   applied	   to	   the	  local	  court	  for	  permission	  not	  to	  disclose	  the	  material.	  After	  being	  convicted,	  the	  applicant	  asked	  from	  the	  court	  of	  appeal	  to	  order	  the	  delivery	  by	  the	  police	  of	  a	  list	   with	   the	   phone	   calls	   of	   his	   mobile	   phone.	   Finally,	   another	   administrative	  body	  held	  that	  the	  applicant	  had	  the	  right	  to	  access	  that	  information	  and	  ordered	  the	  delivery.	  In	  spite	  of	  that	  positive	  progress,	  the	  court	  of	  appeal	  published	  its	  judgement	   and	   confirmed	   the	   applicant’s	   conviction	   without	   taking	   into	  consideration	   the	   above	   mentioned	   evidence,	   the	   disclosure	   of	   which	   the	  accused	  had	  once	  again	  requested.	  	  Here,	  the	  Court	  repeated	  the	  general	  principles	  in	  relation	  to	  police	  entrapment	  set	  out	  in	  Teixeira	  de	  Castro.	  Actually	  in	  that	  particular	  one	  commented	  that	  the	  police	   intervention	   didn’t	   take	   place	   within	   the	   structure	   of	   an	   ordered	   and	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monitored	   operation	   by	   a	   public	   prosecutor.361	  Besides,	   the	   police	   was	   not	  suspecting	   that	   the	   applicant	  was	   a	   drug	   trafficker.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   he	  was	   a	  complete	   stranger	   to	   the	   policemen,	   who	   had	   contacted	   him	   through	   the	  intermediary.	   Moreover,	   the	   drugs	   weren’t	   found	   in	   the	   residence	   of	   the	  applicant.	  He	  obtained	  them	  from	  a	  third	  person	  and	  also	  a	  quantity	  greater	  than	  that	  demanded	  by	  the	  undercover	  agent	  was	  not	  found.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  there	  were	  serious	  doubts	  as	  to	  whether	  the	  applicant	  was	  predisposed	  to	  commit	  the	  offence.	  Lastly,	  although	  it	  was	  a	  fact	  that	  the	  applicant	  confessed	  that	  previously	  the	  same	  year	  had	  committed	  other	  narcotics	  offences,	  there	  was	  nothing	  at	  all	  linking	   him	   to	   the	   crime	   brought	   under	   trial.	   With	   respect	   to	   the	   alleged	  entrapment	   the	   Court	   stated	   that	   it	  wasn’t	   possible	   for	   it	   to	   diagnose	   to	  what	  extent	   the	   applicant	   was	   victim	   of	   incitement,	   which	   violates	   Article	   6	   of	   the	  Convention.	   That	   happened,	   because	   the	   conclusions,	   to	   which	   the	   national	  courts	  had	  come	   in	   relation	   to	   the	  absence	  of	   a	   causal	   link	  between	   the	  phone	  calls	  of	  the	  agent	  provocateur	  and	  the	  crime	  committed,	  were	  not	  so	  arbitrary	  or	  so	  manifestly	  wrong	  in	  order	  not	  to	  be	  considered.	  	  Following	   that,	   the	   other	   alleged	   unfairness	   was	   examined.	   The	   Court,	   in	   that	  framework,	   proceeded	   to	   the	   examination	   of	   the	   procedure,	   in	   the	   context	   of	  which	  was	  assessed	  the	  defence	  of	  entrapment	  by	  the	  Finnish	  courts.	  Disclosure	  of	  evidence	  is	  included	  in	  the	  right	  to	  an	  adversarial	  trial,362	  and	  thus	  is	  directly	  linked	   to	   the	   right	   of	  Article	   6§1	  of	   ECHR.363	  Despite	   that	   fact,	   this	   right	   is	   not	  absolute.364	  There	  are	  circumstances	  in	  which	  there	  may	  be	  a	  need	  that	  evidence	  is	  not	  disclosed	  to	  the	  defence	  so	  that	  fundamental	  rights	  of	  a	  third	  person	  may	  be	  protected	  or	  an	  important	  public	  interest	  be	  guarded,	  according	  to	  the	  Court.	  Despite	   this	   acknowledgement,	   there	   was	   not	   such	   a	   reason	   in	   the	   case	   in	  question,	  as	  it	  was	  held	  by	  the	  Court.	  In	  particular,	  the	  police	  had	  withheld	  that	  the	  agent	  cooperated	  with	  them	  was	  in	  custody	  by	  the	  time	  he	  gave	  the	  order	  to	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  Apr	  2007,	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  Brandstetter	  v.	  Austria,	  28	  Aug	  1991,	  Series	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  211,	  (1993)	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  66-­‐67.	  363	  Jasper	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	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  (2000)	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   26	  Mar	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  EHRR	  213,	   §	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  Van	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  and	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the	   applicant.	   In	   addition,	   the	   police	   was	   negative	   to	   the	   applicant’s	   question	  about	  the	  extent	  of	  their	  interference	  in	  the	  case.	  	  	  Hence,	   the	   defence	   wasn’t	   informed	   properly	   and	   was	   prohibited	   from	  submitting	   or	   presenting	   arguments	   and	   thus	   participating	   in	   the	   decision	  making	  process.	   In	   that	  way,	   the	  police	  deprived	  the	  applicant	  of	   the	  ability	   ‘to	  verify	   his	   assumptions	   and	   to	   prove	   their	   correctness’.365	  The	  Court	   notes	   also	  that	  the	  material	  concealed	  was	  relevant	  to	  a	  factual	   issue	  highly	   important	  for	  the	  defence	  of	  entrapment.	  Moreover,	  the	  procedure	  before	  the	  Finnish	  court	  of	  appeal	   did	   not	   remedy	   the	   above	   defects,	   as	   the	   applicant	   received	   the	  information	  asked	  after	  the	  lapse	  of	  the	  time-­‐limit	  of	  appealing.	  As	  a	  result,	   the	  procedure	   led	   to	   the	   judicial	  decree	  didn’t	   come	  up	   to	   the	   standards	  of	   its	   fair	  character	  according	  to	  the	  Court.	  As	  it	  was	  impossible	  for	  the	  defence	  to	  support	  the	   argument	   of	   entrapment	   in	   time,	   the	   Article	   6	   of	   the	   Convention	   was	  apparently	  violated.	  	  Additionally,	   the	   Court	   in	   an	   extent	   session	   affirmed	   the	   above	   opinions	   in	  
Ramanauskas.	  The	  applicant,	  a	  former	  prosecutor,	  was	  approached	  by	  someone	  who	   had	   been	   working	   as	   an	   undercover	   agent	   of	   a	   special	   unit	   combating	  corruption	   based	   at	   the	   ministry	   of	   internal	   affairs.	   The	   agent	   offered	   the	  applicant	  3,000	  dollars	  so	  that	   the	   latter	  would	  help	   for	  the	  acquittal	  of	  a	   third	  person.	  Although	  the	  applicant	  denied	  the	  money	  at	  first,	  after	  a	  lot	  of	  pressure	  he	   accepted	   part	   of	   that	   and	   he	   was	   accused	   afterwards	   with	   the	   charges	   of	  bribery.	  Even	  the	  national	  Supreme	  Court	  affirmed	  the	  guilt	  of	  the	  accused,	  as	  the	  evidence	  was	  sufficient	  and	  he	  has	  also	  pleaded	  guilty.	  Therefore,	  as	  long	  as	  his	  guilt	   had	   been	   proved,	   the	   issue	   of	   whether	   there	   had	   been	   any	   external	  influence	  or	  intervention	  to	  his	  volition	  was	  unimportant.	  	  The	  ECtHR,	   after	   rejecting	   the	   related	   arguments	   of	   the	   government,	   held	   that	  the	   national	   authorities	   cannot	   be	   relieved	   of	   their	   responsibilities	   for	   the	  actions	   of	   the	   police	   just	   by	   invoking	   that	   they	   negotiated	   the	   bribe	   with	   the	  applicant	   ‘on	   their	   own	   private	   initiative’.	   Besides,	   there	   were	   no	   personal	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reasons	  or	  motive	   for	   the	  undercover	   agent	   to	   approach	   the	  applicant	  without	  informing	  his	  superiors	  about	  it.	  On	  the	  contrary,	  the	  national	  authorities	  should	  have	  taken	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  undercover	  investigative	  action,	  which	  at	  its	  first	   level	   took	  place	   in	   the	  absence	  of	  any	   legal	   framework	  or	  monitoring	  by	  a	  judicial	   authority.	   Moreover,	   by	   authorising	   later	   the	   actions	   of	   the	   agent,	   the	  national	   authorities	   legitimised	   ex	   post	   facto	   the	   first	   level	   of	   the	   undercover	  activity.	  Furthermore,	   the	  activity	   in	  question	  exceeded	  the	  necessary	  measure,	  as	   there	  wasn’t	   any	  piece	  of	   evidence	   that	   the	  applicant	  had	  committed	  before	  any	  other	  blameworthy	  action,	  especially	  related	  to	  corruption.	  All	  the	  meetings	  took	  place	  after	  the	  agent’s	  initiative	  and	  the	  applicant	  was	  subjected	  to	  ‘blatant	  prompting’	  although	  there	  was	  no	  objective	  evidence	  to	  suggest	  that	  he	  had	  been	  intending	   to	   engage	   in	   such	   activity.366	  In	   addition,	   the	   national	   courts	   didn’t	  examine	  the	  raised	  by	  the	  applicant	   issue	  of	   incitement.	   In	  relation	  to	  what	  the	  national	  Supreme	  Court	  had	  ruled,	  the	  Court	  held	  that	  a	  confession	  to	  an	  offence	  committed	  as	  a	  result	  of	  incitement	  cannot	  eradicate	  either	  the	  incitement	  or	  its	  effects.367	  In	  view	  of	  all	  the	  above,	  it	  concluded	  that	  the	  undercover	  actions	  had	  resulted	  in	  the	  prompting	  of	  the	  applicant	  to	  commit	  the	  crime	  and	  consequently	  he	  was	  deprived	  of	  his	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial	  from	  the	  beginning	  of	  the	  proceedings.	  
	  
	  4.4.1.2.	  Where	  no	  entrapment	  occurred	  	  	  In	  a	  number	  of	  cases	  though,	  the	  ECtHR	  ended	  up	  in	  an	  opposite	  judgement.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  see	  some	  of	  them	  briefly,	  as	  they	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  the	  way	  that	  the	  Court	   in	  Strasbourg	  deals	  with	   the	  argument	  of	   entrapment.	   In	  Sequeira,	   it	  was	   held	   that	   no	   entrapment	   had	   occurred,	   since	   the	   civilians	   in	   cooperation	  with	  the	  authorities	  had	  been	  doing	  so	  at	  a	  time	  after	  the	  applicant	  approached	  them	   for	   the	   reason	   of	   organising	   together	   the	   transportation	   of	   a	   load	   of	  cocaine.	  In	  addition	  to	  that,	  their	  actions	  were	  under	  the	  monitoring	  of	  the	  police,	  which	   had	   had	   sufficient	   reasons	   to	   suspect	   the	   applicant.	   Moreover,	   the	  prosecution	  authorities	  had	  been	  also	  informed	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  activities	  of	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  366	  Ramanauskas	  v.	  Lithuania,	  no.	  74420/01,	  5	  Feb	  2008,	  §	  67.	  367	  Ibid.,	  §	  72.	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secret	  agents.	  Under	  the	  light	  of	  these	  facts,	   the	  Court	  decided	  that	  there	  was	  a	  clear	  difference	  between	  the	  present	  case	  and	  Teixeira	  de	  Castro	  and	  the	  civilians	  mentioned	  above	  could	  not	  be	  characterised	  as	  agents	  provocateurs.	  	  Also,	   in	   Eurofinacom 368 	  the	   Court	   declared	   inadmissible	   the	   application	  submitted	   (Article	   35§3	   ECHR)	   as	   incompatible	   with	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	  Convention.	  In	  particular,	  the	  applicant	  (a	  firm)	  was	  convicted	  for	  pimping.	  The	  firm	   provided	   telematic	   services,	   accessed	   by	   Minitel	   devices,	   resembling	   in	  operation	   to	   an	   e-­‐mail	   address	   with	   inboxes,	   messages	   and	   nicknames.	   The	  French	   prosecution	   authorities	   suspected	   that	   these	   services	   were	   used	   by	  prostitutes	   to	   contact	   potential	   clients.	   Hence,	   they	   ordered	   a	   preliminary	  investigation.	   In	   that	  context	  police	  officers	  were	   logged	  on	   to	   that	   service	  and	  using	   provoking	   female	   nicknames	   they	   were	   sending	   messages	   to	   particular	  recipients	  asking	  them	  about	  prices	  and	  other	  terms	  of	  the	  services	  offered.	  After	  receiving	  answers	  with	  information	  related	  to	  their	  queries,	  penal	  prosecutions	  brought	   against	   the	   firm	   and	   its	   representative	   that	   led	   to	   their	   conviction	   for	  pimping.	   The	   Court	   rejected	   the	   argument	   of	   entrapment,	   accepting	   that	   the	  French	  authorities	  had	  had	  concrete	  reasons	   (announcements	   to	   the	  press	  and	  elements	   from	  previous	   investigations)	   to	   suspect	   the	   firm,	   a	   long	   time	  before	  the	   officers	   had	   sent	   their	   messages.	   Furthermore,	   the	   policemen	  were	   acting	  within	  the	  frame	  of	  a	  preliminary	  research	  that	  was	  ordered	  and	  monitored	  by	  the	   prosecution.	   Last,	   the	   conviction	   of	   the	   applicant	   was	   not	   based	   on	   the	  answers	  received	  by	  the	  policemen,	  but	  on	  evidence	  collected	  (curricula	  vitae	  of	  prostitutes	  available	   in	  the	  system	  and	  their	  testimonies).	  Even	  if	   it	   is	  true	  that	  the	  policemen	  provoked	  the	  offers	  made	  to	  them	  via	  the	  telematic	  messages,	   in	  no	  way	  had	  they	  caused	  the	  circumstances	  that	  led	  to	  the	  applicant’s	  conviction	  for	   pimping.	   Those	   circumstances	   had	   a	   constant	   character	   and	   were	   created	  solely	  by	  the	  applicant	  firm	  itself.	  	  As	  last	  example	  of	  the	  present	  issue,	  it	  will	  be	  discussed	  here	  the	  judgment	  of	  the	  Court	  in	  Ünel.	   In	  this	  case,	  the	  applicant,	  general	  director	  of	  civil	  aviation	  at	  the	  Turkish	   ministry	   of	   transportation,	   demanded	   from	   the	   owner	   of	   an	   aviation	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  368	  Eurofinacom	  v.	  France	  (dec.),	  no.	  58753/00,	  ECHR	  2004-­‐VII.	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firm	  an	  amount	  of	  money,	  so	  that	  he	  gave	  to	  his	  firm	  a	  licence	  permitting	  flights.	  The	  owner	  paid	  the	  money	  and	  obtained	  the	  licence,	  but	  by	  the	  expiration	  date	  the	   applicant	   asked	   for	   more	   money	   in	   order	   to	   issue	   a	   new	   one.	   Then	   the	  businessman	  informed	  the	  ministry	  of	   transportation	  about	  the	   incident	  and	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  minister	  and	  two	  more	  civil	  servants,	  he	  made	  a	  phone	  call	  to	  the	  director,	  who	  repeated	  that	  ‘without	  money,	  there	  is	  no	  licence’.369	  The	  same	  night,	   the	   businessman	   accused	   the	   applicant	   to	   the	   police	   and	   prosecution	  authorities	   while	   an	   operation	  with	   his	   participation	  was	   planned.	   During	   the	  operation,	   the	  applicant	  was	  arrested	   red-­‐handed	  while	  he	  was	   receiving	   from	  the	  businessman	  banknotes	  registered	  beforehand	  by	  the	  police.	  In	  addition,	  the	  scene	  was	  recorded	  by	  a	  hidden	  camera.	  Finally,	  the	  applicant	  was	  convicted	  for	  corruption	  and	  the	  businessman	  was	  also	  convicted	  for	  the	  same	  crime	  (with	  a	  minor	  penalty).	  	  	  The	   Court	   rejected	   the	   argument	   of	   the	   applicant	   that	   he	   was	   a	   victim	   of	  conspiracy	  set	  up	  by	   the	  police.	  As	   the	  Court	  states,	   the	  operation	  of	  his	  arrest	  was	  ensuing	   from	  an	  accusation	  submitted	  by	   the	  businessman.	  The	   latter	  had	  informed	  the	  prosecution	  office	  about	  the	  applicant’s	  behaviour.	  Parallel	  to	  that,	  he	   had	   also	   confessed	   bribing	   the	   applicant,	   a	   reason	   that	   led	   to	   his	   own	  conviction.	   Consequently,	   the	   businessman	   could	   not	   be	   regarded	   as	   agent	  





	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  369	  ‘Sans	  argent,	  pas	  d’autorisation’,	  see	  Ünel	  v.	  Turkey,	  no.	  35686/02,	  27	  May	  2008,	  §	  6.	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4.4.1.3.	  Lawful	  undercover	  police	  activity	  	  	  Derived	  from	  the	  above	  presentation	  of	  the	  case	   law,	   it	   is	  apparent	  that	  for	  the	  chartering	  of	  a	  lawful	  undercover	  police	  activity	  the	  Court	  relies	  mainly	  on	  some	  certain	  criteria:	  	  	   (a) First	   of	   all,	   the	   undercover	   operation	   should	   be	   limited	   to	   occasions	  linked	  to	  serious	  crimes,	  such	  as	  terrorism	  and	  organised	  crime.	  (b) There	   should	   be	   a	   minimum	   solid	   ground	   of	   suspicion370 	  about	   the	  commission	  of	  the	  crime	  before	  the	  operation.371	  	  (c) The	   police	   operation	   should	   be	   ordered	   and	   monitored372	  by	   a	   judicial	  body.	  (d) The	   operative	   agents	   should	   have	   a	   passive	   role	   as	   opposes	   to	   the	  predisposition373	  of	   the	   suspect,	  who	  performs	   the	   leading	   role	   towards	  the	  criminal	  activity.	  	  In	  the	  frame	  of	  examination	  of	  the	  last	  element,	  the	  crucial	  point	  is	  if	  there	  was	  evidence	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   commission	  of	   the	   crime	  without	   the	   intervention	  of	  police.	   Important	   in	  particular	   for	   the	   confirmation	  of	  predisposition	  are	   some	  more	  specific	  parameters.	  For	  instance,	  had	  the	  suspect	  himself	  or	  herself	  taken	  the	   initiative	   for	  the	  commitment	  of	   the	  action	  or	  the	   initiative	  belonged	  to	  the	  police	  instruments?	  As	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  drugs	  confiscated,	  for	  crimes	  related	  to	  drugs,	   were	   more	   drug	   substances	   found	   in	   his/her	   possession	   than	   those	  related	  to	  the	  police	  operation?	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  370	  The	   Court	   tends	   to	   examine	   whether	   the	   police	   had	   reasons	   to	   suspect	   the	   arrested	   or	  oppositely	  he	  or	  she	  was	  a	  stranger	  to	  them.	  Another	  point	  worthy	  to	  be	  examined	  is	  the	  criminal	  record	  of	   the	   suspect.	  Here,	   questions	   as	   the	   following	  matter:	  Was	  his	   or	   her	   criminal	   record	  clear	   before	   the	   police	   operation?	   Furthermore,	   had	   any	   judicial	   search	   begun	   against	   the	  suspect?	  371	  See	  Case	  Comment	  on	  Queen’s	  Bench	  Division	  (Divisional	  Court):	  Lord	  Bingham	  of	  Cornhill	  CJ	  and	  Harrison	  J:	  November	  15,	  1999	  by	  DJB,	  Crim	  LR	  2000,	  pp	  175-­‐177.	  See	  also	  G	  Dworkin,	  ‘The	  serpent	  beguiled	  me	  and	   I	  did	  eat:	  Entrapment	  and	   the	  creation	  of	   crime’,	  Law	  and	  Philosophy,	  1985,	  pp	  32-­‐33.	  372	  By	  any	  means	  recorded	  so	   that	   it	   is	  not	  unverified,	   see	  G	  Robertson,	   ‘Entrapment	  Evidence:	  Manna	  from	  Heaven,	  or	  Fruit	  of	  the	  Poisoned	  Tree?’,	  Crim	  LR	  1994,	  pp	  809,	  811.	  373	  The	  criterion	  of	  predisposition	  that	  the	  ECtHR	  uses	  to	  distinguish	  the	  lawful	  from	  the	  unlawful	  undercover	  police	  activity	  stems	  from	  the	  U.S.A.	  case	  law.	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Finally,	   it	   is	   also	   examined	  whether	   the	   provoked	  made	   profit	   from	   the	  whole	  operation	   or	   not.	   Besides,	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   criterion	   of	   the	   predisposition	   the	  following	  should	  become	  clear:	  according	  to	  the	  Court’s	  case	  law,	  it	  is	  essential,	  whether	  or	  not	  the	  accused	  was	  predisposed	  to	  commit	  the	  particular	  crime	  that	  was	  committed	   in	   the	   frame	  of	   the	  police	  operation.	   In	   the	  case	  of	  Vanyan,	   the	  argument	  of	  entrapment	  was	  accepted,	  although	  the	  applicant	  was	  convicted	  for	  having	   drugs	   in	   his	   possession	   for	   other	   reasons	   unrelated	   to	   entrapment.	  Moreover,	   in	   the	   case	   of	   V	   the	   issue	   of	   entrapment	   concentrated	   on	   the	  possession	   of	   the	   amount	   of	   drugs	   ordered	   by	   the	   undercover	   agent,	   although	  the	  applicant	  was	  convicted	  for	  previous	  petty	  drug	  crimes.	  Therefore,	  it	  is	  under	  examination,	  whether	  or	  not,	  despite	  all	  the	  other	  crimes,	  there	  is	  something	  that	  links	  the	  volition	  of	  the	  accused	  with	  the	  particular	  deviant	  behaviour	  that	  took	  place	  in	  the	  frame	  of	  the	  police	  operation.	  	  	  
	  
4.4.2.	  Self-­‐entrapment	  	  4.4.2.1.	  The	  privilege	  against	  self-­‐incrimination	  	  	  The	  privilege	   against	   self-­‐incrimination	   is	  not	   expressed	  verbally	   in	   the	   text	   of	  the	   Convention	   but	   is	   strongly	   linked	   with	   the	   presumption	   of	   innocence	   and	  evidence	  matters.374	  It	  is	  also	  closely	  associated	  with	  the	  right	  to	  silence	  and	  for	  this	  reason	  many	  issues	  here	  will	  be	  discussed	  with	  regard	  to	  both,	  as	  the	  Court	  has	   dealt	   with	   them	   in	   extent.375 	  ‘The	   right	   not	   to	   incriminate	   oneself,	   in	  particular,	   presupposes	   that	   the	   prosecution	   in	   a	   criminal	   case	   seek	   to	   prove	  their	   case	   against	   the	   accused	   without	   resort	   to	   evidence	   obtained	   through	  methods	  of	  coercion	  or	  oppression	  in	  defiance	  of	  the	  will	  of	  the	  accused.	  In	  this	  sense	   the	   right	   is	   closely	   linked	   to	   the	   presumption	   of	   innocence	   contained	   in	  Article	   6§2	   of	   the	   Convention’.376	  Judge	   Martens,	   in	   his	   dissenting	   opinion	   in	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  E	  Moglen,	   ‘Taking	  the	  Fifth:	  Reconsidering	  the	  Origins	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Privilege	  against	  Self-­‐incrimination’,	  Mich	  LR	  92	  (1994)	  1086.	  375	  See	  S	  Trechsel,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Criminal	  Proceedings,	  p	  340-­‐359.	  376	  Saunders	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	   no.	  19187/91,	  17	  Dec	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐VI,	   2044,	   (1997)	  23	  EHRR	  313,	  §	  68.	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Saunders	   joined	   by	   Judge	   Kuris,	   defines	   the	   privilege	   as	   ‘the	   right	   not	   to	   be	  obliged	   to	   produce	   evidence	   against	   oneself’.377	  As	   explained	   by	   the	   Court	   in	  
Funke	  and	  JB	  the	  privilege	  also	  protects	  against	  pressure	  to	  produce	  documents.	  	  	  	  4.4.2.2.	  Character	  of	  the	  privilege	  	  
	  There	   is	   also	   a	   discussion	   of	   whether	   the	   privilege	   is	   of	   absolute	   or	   relative	  character.	  The	  Commission	   in	  Saunders	  held	   that	   ‘it	   cannot	  be	  compatible	  with	  the	   spirit	   of	   the	   Convention	   that	   varying	   degrees	   of	   fairness	   apply	   to	   different	  categories	  of	  accused	  in	  criminal	  trials.	  The	  right	  of	  silence,	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  may	  be	  contained	  in	  the	  guarantees	  of	  Article	  6,	  must	  apply	  as	  equally	  to	  alleged	  company	  fraudsters	  as	  to	  those	  accused	  of	  other	  types	  of	  fraud,	  rape,	  murder	  or	  terrorist	  offences.	  Further,	  there	  can	  be	  no	  legitimate	  aim	  in	  depriving	  someone	  of	   the	   guarantees	   necessary	   in	   securing	   a	   fair	   trial’.378	  That	   absolute	   view	  was	  clearly	   illustrated	  in	  Saunders.	  The	  applicant	  was	  a	  director	  and	  chief	  executive	  of	  Guinness	  PLC	  and	  he	  was	   suspected	  as	  acting	  unlawfully	  during	  a	   take-­‐over	  bid.	  Firstly,	  an	  investigation	  was	  held	  by	  inspectors	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	   for	   Trade	   and	   Industry.	   Following	   to	   that,	   criminal	   proceedings	  commenced	  in	  which	  the	  transcripts	  and	  documents	  obtained	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  inspectors’	   interviews	  were	   passed	   on	   to	   the	   police.	   The	   Government	   claimed	  that	   only	   submissions	   which	   are	   incriminating	   can	   fall	   within	   the	   privilege	  against	   self-­‐incrimination.	   However,	   exculpatory	   answers	   or	   other	   which,	   are	  consistent	  with	  or	  would	  serve	  to	  confirm	  the	  defence	  of	  an	  accused	  cannot	  be	  properly	  characterised	  as	  self-­‐incriminating.379	  	  On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   Court	   held	   that	   the	   principle	   of	  nemo	   tenetur	   se	   ipsum	  
prodere	   vel	   accusare	   cannot	   logically	   be	   confined	   to	   those	   statements	   of	  admission	   of	   wrongdoing	   or	   to	   remarks	   which	   are	   directly	   incriminating.380	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  377	  Ibid.,	  dissenting	  opinion	  of	  Judge	  Martens	  joined	  by	  Judge	  Kuris,	  §	  4.	  378	  Saunders	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  Commission	  Report,	  §	  71.	  379	  Saunders	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	   no.	  19187/91,	  17	  Dec	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐VI,	   2044,	   (1997)	  23	  EHRR	  313,	  §	  62.	  380	  SH	  Naismith,	  ‘Self-­‐Incrimination:	  Fairness	  or	  Freedom?’	  EHRLR	  (1997)	  229.	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‘Testimony	  obtained	  under	  compulsion	  which	  appears	  on	  its	  face	  to	  be	  of	  a	  non-­‐incriminating	   nature	   –such	   as	   exculpatory	   remarks	   or	   mere	   information	   on	  questions	  of	   fact–	  may	   later	  be	  deployed	   in	   criminal	  proceedings	   in	   support	  of	  the	   prosecution	   case,	   for	   example	   to	   contradict	   or	   cast	   doubt	   upon	   other	  statements	   of	   the	   accused	   or	   evidence	   given	   by	   him	   during	   the	   trial	   or	   to	  otherwise	   undermine	   his	   credibility’.	   When	   this	   credibility	   is	   subject	   to	  assessment	  by	  a	  jury,	  such	  testimony	  may	  be	  proved	  destructive	  for	  the	  accused.	  Consequently,	   what	   is	   crucial	   is	   the	   use	   to	   which	   evidence	   obtained	   under	  compulsion	   is	  put	   in	   the	  course	  of	   the	  criminal	   trial.381	  The	  use	  of	   the	  evidence	  collected	   in	   the	   first,	   non-­‐criminal	   investigation	   aiming	   at	   incriminating	   the	  applicant	  was	  sufficient	  for	  the	  Court	  to	  find	  a	  violation	  in	  the	  instant	  case.	  	  	  In	  Saunders,	  another	  aspect	  of	  the	  absolute	  character	  of	  the	  privilege	  is	  evident.	  The	  Court	  did	  not	  agree	  with	  the	  Government’s	  argument	  that	  the	  complexity	  of	  corporate	  crime,	  such	  as	  fraud,	  the	  vital	  public	  interest	  in	  the	  inquiry	  of	  serious	  crimes	  and	  the	  punishment	  of	  the	  perpetrators	  could	  excuse	  such	  a	  departure	  as	  that	  which	  occurred	  in	  the	  present	  case	  from	  one	  of	  the	  standard	  principles	  of	  a	  fair	   procedure.	   Like	   the	   Commission,	   it	   pointed	   out	   that	   the	   general	  requirements	   of	   fairness	   contained	   in	  Article	  6,	   including	   the	   right	   against	   self	  incrimination,	   apply	   to	   criminal	   proceedings	   with	   respect	   to	   every	   type	   of	  criminal	   offences,	   without	   exceptions,	   from	   the	   simplest	   to	   the	   most	   knotty.	  Furthermore,	   the	   public	   interest	   cannot	   be	   conjured	   to	   legitimate	   the	   use	   of	  answers	  compulsorily	  obtained	  in	  a	  non-­‐judicial	  investigation	  to	  incriminate	  the	  accused	  during	  the	  proceedings	  at	  trial.382	  	  In	  John	  Murray	  however,	  the	  rationale	  seems	  to	  change.	  In	  this	  case,	  the	  applicant	  was	  arrested	  by	  the	  police	  in	  a	  house	  where	  an	  IRA	  hostage	  was	  held.	  The	  Court	  pointed	  out:	   ‘What	   is	   at	   stake	   in	   the	  present	   case	   is	  whether	   these	   immunities	  are	  absolute	   in	  the	  sense	  that	  the	  exercise	  by	  an	  accused	  of	  the	  right	  to	  silence	  cannot	   under	   any	   circumstances	   be	   used	   against	   him	   at	   trial	   or,	   alternatively,	  whether	  informing	  him	  in	  advance	  that,	  under	  certain	  conditions,	  his	  silence	  may	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  Saunders	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	   no.	  19187/91,	  17	  Dec	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐VI,	   2044,	   (1997)	  23	  EHRR	  313,	  	  §	  71.	  382	  Ibid.,	  §	  74;	  see	  also	  Bykov	  v.	  Russia,	  no.	  4378/02,	  10	  Mar	  2009,	  §	  93.	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be	   so	   used,	   is	   always	   to	   be	   regarded	   as	   “improper	   compulsion”383.	   The	   Court	  made	  clear	  that	  it	  was	  not	  congenial	  with	  the	  immunities	  under	  consideration	  to	  base	  a	  conviction	  solely	  or	  mainly	  on	  the	  silence	  of	  the	  accused	  or	  on	  refusal	  to	  answer	   questions	   or	   to	   contribute	   to	   giving	   evidence.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	  Court	  deemed	  it	  equally	  obvious	  that	  these	  requirements	  cannot	  and	  should	  not	  prevent	   the	   authorities	   to	  make	   inferences	   from	   the	   silence	   of	   the	   accused,	   in	  situations	  which	  clearly	  call	   for	  an	  explanation	  from	  him.	  As	  a	  consequence	  the	  character	  of	  the	  right	  at	  issue	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  be	  absolute,	  as	  there	  is	  space	  for	  limitations.	   It	   should	   be	   added	   though,	   that	   the	   Court	  was	   reluctant	   to	   draw	   a	  line	  between	  the	  absolute	  character	  accepted	  in	  other	  cases	  and	  John	  Murray.384	  	  	  
	  4.4.2.3.	  Rationale	  of	  the	  privilege	  
	  The	  Court	  has	  asserted	  that	  ‘the	  right	  to	  silence	  and	  the	  right	  not	  to	  incriminate	  oneself	  are	  generally	  recognised	  international	  standards	  which	  lie	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  fair	  procedure	  under	  Article	  6’.385	  This	  statement	  means	  that	  any	  procedure	   that	   does	   not	   respect	   the	   privilege	   is	   not	   fair.386	  Apart	   from	   the	  domestic	  provisions	  about	  it,	  the	  privilege	  against	  self-­‐incrimination	  is	  included	  in	  international	  texts	  that	  justify	  the	  Court’s	  opinion.387	  In	  addition,	  the	  rationale	  of	  both	  rights	   ‘lies,	   inter	  alia,	   in	   the	  protection	  of	   the	  accused	  against	   improper	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   Murray	   is	   the	   first	   case	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   legislation	   that	   permits	   the	   authorities	   to	   draw	  conclusions	  from	  the	  silence	  of	  the	  suspect.	  384	  John	  Murray	   v.	  United	   Kingdom,	   no.	   18731/91,	   8	   Feb	   1996,	   Reports	   1996-­‐I,	   30,	   (1996)	   22	  EHRR	  29,	  §§	  46-­‐47.	  385	  Saunders	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	   no.	  19187/91,	  17	  Dec	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐VI,	   2044,	   (1997)	  23	  EHRR	  313,	  §	  68;	  see	  also	  Allan	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  48539/99	  ECHR	  2002-­‐IX	  (2003)	  36	  EHRR	  12,	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  (2001)	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  Germany,	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  100;	  JB	  v.	  Switzerland,	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   ECHR	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   Murray	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	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  EHRR	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  Ireland,	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Serves	  v.	  France,	  no.	  20225/92,	  20	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  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐VI,	  2159,	  (1999)	  28	  EHRR	  265,	  §	  46.	  386	  S	  Trechsel,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Criminal	  Proceedings,	  p	  347.	  387	  For	   example:	   ‘In	   the	   determination	   of	   any	   criminal	   charge	   against	   him,	   everyone	   shall	   be	  entitled	  to	  the	  following	  minimum	  guarantees,	  in	  full	  equality:	  (g)	  Not	  to	  be	  compelled	  to	  testify	  against	  himself	  or	  to	  confess	  guilt’	  (International	  Covenant	  on	  Civil	  and	  Political	  Rights,	  Article	  14	  §	  3g).	   See	   also:	   American	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights,	   Article	   8	   §§	  2	   (g)	   and	   3:	   ‘During	   the	  proceedings,	  every	  person	  is	  entitled,	  with	  full	  equality,	  to	  the	  following	  minimum	  guarantees:	  g.	  the	  right	  not	  to	  be	  compelled	  to	  be	  a	  witness	  against	  himself	  or	  to	  plead	  guilty;	  3.	  A	  confession	  of	  guilt	  by	  the	  accused	  shall	  be	  valid	  only	  if	  it	  is	  made	  without	  coercion	  of	  any	  kind’.	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compulsion	   by	   the	   authorities	   thereby	   contributing	   to	   the	   avoidance	   of	  miscarriages	  of	  justice	  and	  to	  the	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  aims	  of	  Article	  6’.388	  	  Furthermore,	  there	  is	  also	  another	  aspect:	  ‘the	  right	  not	  to	  incriminate	  oneself	  is	  primarily	   concerned,	   with	   respecting	   the	   will	   of	   an	   accused	   person	   to	   remain	  silent’.389	  Here,	  the	  link	  is	  clear	  with	  both	  rights	  of	  Article	  3	  and	  8	  of	  ECHR.	  As	  far	  as	  Article	  3	   is	  concerned,	  one	  might	  say	   that	   it	   is	  degrading	   to	  be	   forced	   to	  act	  against	  one’s	  own	  interests,	  but	  the	  degree	  that	  the	  Court	  requires	  for	  a	  violation	  of	  Article	  3	  probably	  won’t	  be	  reached.390	  Indeed,	  it	  has	  been	  considered	  that	  the	  probable	  issue	  of	  Article	  3	  or	  8	  violations	  is	  absorbed	  by	  the	  issue	  raised	  under	  the	  light	  of	  Article	  6391.	  It	  is	  time	  to	  look	  closer	  into	  the	  right	  to	  silence	  and	  come	  upon	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  issues	  concerning	  the	  privilege	  and	  the	  former.	  	  	  	  4.4.2.4.	  Conceptual	  links	  to	  the	  right	  to	  silence	  	  	  The	  right	  to	  silence	  and	  the	  privilege	  against	  self-­‐incrimination	  are	  not	  one	  and	  the	   same	   thing.	   The	   right	   to	   silence	   is	   narrower	   than	   the	   privilege,	   since	   it	   is	  confined	   in	   acoustic	   communication	   only;	   it	   is	   the	   right	   not	   to	   speak.	   On	   the	  other	   hand,	   it	   is	   broader	   than	   the	   privilege	   against	   self-­‐incrimination	   as	   it	  protects	   against	   the	   pressure	   to	  make	   statements	   not	   only	   detrimental	   to	   the	  person	  involved,	  but	  any	  declarations	  at	  all.	  All	   in	  all,	   the	  two	  guarantees	  could	  be	  shown	  as	  two	  circles	  that	  intersect	  with	  each	  other.	  	  The	  right	  to	  silence	  has	  also	  been	  linked	  with	  the	  freedom	  of	  expression392.	  In	  K,	  the	  applicant	  was	  accused	  of	  having	  bought	  and	  possessing	  drugs	  from	  a	  couple	  that	  had	  been	  already	  prosecuted	  and	  charged	  with	  drug	  dealing.	  The	  applicant	  pleaded	  not	  guilty	  but	  he	  was	  summoned	  as	  a	  witness	  in	  the	  proceedings	  against	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  388	  Saunders	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	   no.	  19187/91,	  17	  Dec	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐VI,	   2044,	   (1997)	  23	  EHRR	  313,	  §	  68.	  389	  Ibid.,	  §	  69.	  390	  See	  on	  that	  Tyrer	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  25	  Apr	  1978,	  Series	  A	  no.	  26,	  (1979-­‐80)	  2	  EHRR	  1,	  §	  30.	  	  391	  PG	  and	  JH	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  44787/98,	  25	  Sep	  2001,	  §§	  59-­‐60;	  Schenk	  v.	  Switzerland,	  12	  July	  1988,	  Series	  A	  no.	  140,	  (1991)	  13	  EHRR	  242,	  §	  53.	  392	  K	  v.	  Austria,	  no.	  16002/90,	  2	  June	  1993.	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the	  couple	  in	  order	  to	  give	  evidence.	  In	  a	  situation	  like	  that	  his	  testimony	  could	  serve	   as	   a	   confession	  and	   thus	  be	   incompatible	  with	   the	   right	   to	   remain	   silent	  and	   the	   privilege	   against	   self-­‐incrimination.	   The	   problem	   here	   was	   that	   the	  applicant	  couldn’t	  claim	  any	  right	  based	  on	  Article	  6,	  since	  he	  wasn’t	  the	  accused.	  The	   Commission	   applied	   Article	   10393	  stating	   that:	   ‘the	   right	   to	   freedom	   of	  expression	  by	  implication	  also	  guarantees	  a	  “negative	  right”	  not	  to	  be	  compelled	  to	  express	  oneself,	  i.e.	  to	  remain	  silent’394.	  However,	  just	  as	  the	  positive	  right,	  this	  negative	  right	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  interferences,	  provided	  that	  they	  are	  prescribed	  by	   law,	   that	   they	   pursue	   one	   of	   the	   aims	   set	   out	   in	   Article	   10§2	   and	   can	   be	  considered	   necessary	   in	   a	   democratic	   society.	   ‘In	   this	   context	   the	   Commission	  has	  first	  noted	  that	  the	  principle	  of	  protection	  against	  self-­‐incrimination	  is,	   like	  the	  principle	  of	  presumption	  of	  innocence,	  one	  of	  the	  most	  fundamental	  aspects	  of	  the	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  trial’.395	  
	  
	  4.4.2.5.	  Sphere	  of	  protection	  	  
	  The	  right	  to	  silence	  protects	  the	  individual	  not	  only	  against	  immediate	  physical	  pressure	  like	  torture,	  but	  also	  against	  the	  use	  of	  deception	  such	  as	  entrapment.	  That	  was	  the	  subject	  of	  the	  case	  of	  Allan.	  The	  applicant	  participated	  in	  a	  robbery	  during	  which	  a	  murder	  occurred.	  The	  police	   suspected	  him	  as	   the	  perpetrator,	  although	  he	  decided	  to	  remain	  silent.	  In	  order	  to	  obtain	  evidence	  against	  him,	  the	  police	   decided	   to	   set	   technical	   means	   of	   acoustical	   recording	   in	   his	   cell	   and	  reception	   of	   the	   prison	   he	   was	   held.	   All	   that	   clearly	   violated	   Article	   8	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  393	  Freedom	  of	  expression:	   ‘1.	  Everyone	  has	   the	  right	   to	   freedom	  of	  expression.	  This	  right	  shall	  include	   freedom	   to	   hold	   opinions	   and	   to	   receive	   and	   impart	   information	   and	   ideas	   without	  interference	  by	  public	  authority	  and	  regardless	  of	  frontiers.	  This	  Article	  shall	  not	  prevent	  States	  from	  requiring	  the	  licensing	  of	  broadcasting,	  television	  or	  cinema	  enterprises.	  –	  2.	  The	  exercise	  of	  these	   freedoms,	   since	   it	   carries	   with	   it	   duties	   and	   responsibilities,	   may	   be	   subject	   to	   such	  formalities,	  conditions,	  restrictions	  or	  penalties	  as	  are	  prescribed	  by	  law	  and	  are	  necessary	  in	  a	  democratic	  society,	   in	  the	  interests	  of	  national	  security,	  territorial	   integrity	  or	  public	  safety,	   for	  the	  prevention	  of	  disorder	  or	  crime,	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  health	  or	  morals,	   for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	   reputation	   or	   rights	   of	   others,	   for	   preventing	   the	   disclosure	   of	   information	   received	   in	  confidence,	  or	  for	  maintaining	  the	  authority	  and	  impartiality	  of	  the	  judiciary’	  (Article	  10	  ECHR).	  394	  K	  v.	  Austria,	  Commission	  Report,	  §	  45.	  395	  Ibid.,	  §	  49.	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Convention,396	  but	  couldn’t	  constitute	  a	  breach	  of	  Article	  6.	  However,	  the	  police	  also	  put	  an	  informer	  whom	  trained	  to	  succeed	  in	  what	  the	  technical	  means	  might	  not.	  The	  Court	  held	  that	  ‘while	  the	  right	  to	  silence	  and	  the	  privilege	  against	  self-­‐incrimination	  are	  primarily	  designed	  to	  protect	  against	  improper	  compulsion	  by	  the	   authorities	   and	   the	   obtaining	   of	   evidence	   through	  methods	   of	   coercion	   or	  oppression	   in	   defiance	   of	   the	  will	   of	   the	   accused,	   the	   scope	   of	   the	   right	   is	   not	  confined	   to	   cases	   where	   duress	   has	   been	   brought	   to	   bear	   on	   the	   accused	   or	  where	   the	  will	   of	   the	   accused	   has	   been	   directly	   overborne	   in	   some	  way’.	   The	  right	  to	  silence	  lies	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  notion	  of	  fairness	  and	  serves	  in	  principle	  to	  protect	   the	   freedom	  of	   a	   person	   suspected	  by	   the	  police	   to	   choose	  whether	   to	  speak	   or	   to	   remain	   silent	   when	   confronted	   with	   law	   enforcement	   authorities.	  The	   freedom	   to	   choose	   which	   behaviour	   to	   follow	   is	   to	   a	   great	   extent	  undermined	   if	   the	   authorities	   use	   subterfuge	   to	   elicit,	   from	   the	   suspect,	  confessions	   or	   other	   statements	   of	   an	   incriminatory	   nature,	   which	   they	   were	  unable	   to	   obtain	   during	   such	   questioning	   because	   the	   suspect	   had	   elected	   to	  remain	   silent.	   The	   violation	   extends	   to	   the	   point	   where	   confessions	   or	  statements	   thereby	   obtained	   are	   adduced	   in	   evidence	   at	   trial.397	  The	   Court	  continues	   quoting	   the	   Canadian	   Supreme	   Court	  with	   regard	   to	   the	   role	   of	   the	  agent	  who	  acts	   to	  subvert	   the	  right	   to	  silence	  and	  his	  or	  her	  relation	   to	  a	  state	  authority.	   The	   rationale	   is	   a	   bit	   similar	   to	   the	   indicators	   accepted	   for	  entrapment.398	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  396	  Allan	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  48539/99	  ECHR	  2002-­‐IX	  (2003)	  36	  EHRR	  12,	  §§	  34-­‐36;	  see	  also	  
Khan	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  35394/97,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐V,	  275,	  (2001)	  31	  EHRR	  35,	  §§	  26-­‐28.	  397	  Ibid.,	  §	  50.	  398	  Ibid.,	   §	   51:	   ‘The	  Canadian	  Supreme	  Court	   expressed	   the	   view	   that,	  where	   the	   informer	  who	  allegedly	  acted	  to	  subvert	  the	  right	  to	  silence	  of	  the	  accused	  was	  not	  obviously	  a	  State	  agent,	  the	  analysis	   should	   focus	   on	   both	   the	   relationship	   between	   the	   informer	   and	   the	   State	   and	   the	  relationship	  between	  the	  informer	  and	  the	  accused:	  the	  right	  to	  silence	  would	  only	  be	  infringed	  where	   the	   informer	   was	   acting	   as	   an	   agent	   of	   the	   State	   at	   the	   time	   the	   accused	   made	   the	  statement	   and	   where	   it	   was	   the	   informer	   who	   caused	   the	   accused	   to	   make	   the	   statement.	  Whether	   an	   informer	  was	   to	  be	   regarded	   as	   a	   State	   agent	  depended	  on	  whether	   the	   exchange	  between	  the	  accused	  and	  the	   informer	  would	  have	  taken	  place,	  and	   in	  the	   form	  and	  manner	   in	  which	  it	  did,	  but	  for	  the	  intervention	  of	  the	  authorities.	  Whether	  the	  evidence	  in	  question	  was	  to	  be	   regarded	   as	   having	   been	   elicited	   by	   the	   informer	   depended	   on	   whether	   the	   conversation	  between	  him	  and	  the	  accused	  was	  the	  functional	  equivalent	  of	  an	  interrogation,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  relationship	  between	  the	  informer	  and	  the	  accused’.	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However,	   the	   leading	  case	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  right	   to	  remain	  silent	   is	  Funke.399	  Funke	  was	  believed	  to	  have	  bank	  accounts	  abroad	  and	  he	  was	  questioned	  about	  that	   by	   customs	  officers	   in	   France.	   Funke	  denied	   cooperating	   and	   the	   customs	  authorities	   summoned	  him	  before	   the	   Strasbourg	   police	   court	   seeking	   to	   have	  him	  sentenced	  to	  a	  fine	  and	  a	  further	  penalty	  of	  50	  French	  francs	  a	  day	  until	  such	  time	  as	  he	  produced	   the	  bank	  statements	  he	  was	  asked	   for;	   they	  also	  made	  an	  application	   to	  have	  him	   committed	   to	  prison.400	  He	   then	   claimed	   a	   violation	  of	  the	   privilege.	   Although	   the	   Commission	   found	   no	   breach,	   the	   Court	   decided	  oppositely.	  The	  Court	  noted	  that	  the	  customs	  secured	  the	  applicant’s	  conviction	  in	   order	   to	   obtain	   various	   documents	   in	   the	   existence	   of	  which	   they	   believed,	  even	  though	  they	  were	  not	  sure	  of	  that	  fact.	  Since	  they	  could	  not	  procure	  them	  by	  any	  other	  way,	  they	  tried	  to	  constrain	  the	  applicant	  himself	  to	  provide	  them	  with	  the	  evidence	  of	  crimes	  he	  had	  allegedly	  committed.	  Any	  special	  features	  of	  customs	   law	   cannot	   reassert	   any	   misconduct	   like	   this	   of	   the	   right	   of	   anyone	  ‘charged	  with	  a	  criminal	  offence’,	  within	  the	  autonomous	  meaning	  of	  this	  phrase	  in	  Article	  6,	  to	  remain	  silent	  and	  not	  to	  contribute	  to	  his	  own	  incrimination.401	  	  	  It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  expressions	  used	  by	  the	  Court	  in	  Funke	  could	  be	  characterised	  as	   wide,	   absolute	   and	   leaving	   no	   room	   for	   a	   balancing	   exercise	   at	   all.402	  The	  reality	   though	   is	   different,	   since	   the	   privilege	   covers	   only	   assistance	   of	   the	  suspect	   which	   could	   not	   be	   substituted	   by	   employing	   direct	   force.	   That	   was	  clarified	  in	  Saunders,	  where	  it	  was	  held	  that	  the	  privilege	  ‘does	  not	  extend	  to	  the	  use	  in	  criminal	  proceedings	  of	  material	  which	  may	  be	  obtained	  from	  the	  accused	  through	  the	  use	  of	  compulsory	  powers	  but	  which	  has	  an	  existence	  independent	  of	   the	  will	  of	   the	   suspect	   such	  as,	   inter	  alia,	   documents	  acquired	  pursuant	   to	  a	  warrant,	   breath,	   blood	   and	  urine	   samples	   and	  bodily	   tissue	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  DNA	   testing’. 403 	  Furthermore,	   the	   right	   to	   remain	   silent	   doesn’t	   cover	   a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  399	  AS	  Butler,	   ‘Funke	  v.	  France	  and	  the	  Right	  Against	  Self-­‐Incrimination:	  A	  Critical	  Analysis’	  CLF	  11	  (2000)	  461.	  400	  Funke	  v.	  France,	  no.	  10828/84,	  25	  Feb	  1993,	  Series	  A	  no.	  256-­‐A,	  (1993)	  16	  EHRR	  297,	  §	  11.	  401	  Ibid.,	  §	  44;	  see	  also	  JB	  v.	  Switzerland,	  no.	  31827/96,	  3	  May	  2001,	  ECHR	  2001-­‐III,	  435.	  402	  See	   e.g.	   Judge	  Martens’	   dissenting	   opinion	   in	  Saunders	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	   no.	   19187/91,	   17	  Dec	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐VI,	  2044,	  (1997)	  23	  EHRR	  313,	  §	  11.	  403	  Saunders	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	   no.	  19187/91,	  17	  Dec	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐VI,	   2044,	   (1997)	  23	  EHRR	  313,	  §	  69.	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hypothetical	   right	   to	   remain	   anonymous	   or	   conceal	   one’s	   identity.404	  Hence,	   a	  person	  can	  be	  at	  any	  time	  lawfully	  compelled	  to	  reveal	  his	  or	  her	  identity.	  	  	  Apart	   from	   the	   refusal	   of	   the	   accused	   to	   speak	   which	   should	   be	   treated	   with	  respect	  by	  the	  courts,	  there	  is	  also	  his	  or	  hers	  statements	  taken	  while	  they	  were	  under	   pressure	   which	   the	   courts	   should	   not	   count	   during	   the	   evaluation	   of	  evidence.	  This	   safeguard	   is	  well	   established	  by	   the	  Convention	  against	  Torture	  and	  Other	  Cruel,	   Inhuman	  or	  Degrading	  Treatment	  or	  Punishment:	   ‘Each	  State	  Party	  shall	  ensure	  that	  any	  statement	  which	  is	  established	  to	  have	  been	  made	  as	  a	   result	  of	   torture	   shall	  not	  be	   invoked	  as	   evidence	   in	  any	  proceedings,	   except	  against	  a	  person	  accused	  of	  torture	  as	  evidence	  that	  the	  statement	  was	  made’.405	  	  	  4.4.2.6.	  Drawn	  inferences	  from	  silence	  	  
	  Despite	   these	   safeguards,	   there	   is	   also	   a	   psychological	   element	   that	   cannot	   be	  assessed	  and	  refers	  to	  the	  impact	  that	  the	  evidence	  has	  in	  the	  mind	  of	  a	  judge.406	  In	  practice,	  what	  is	  of	  utter	  importance	  is	  that	  nothing	  based	  on	  the	  silence	  of	  the	  accused	  or	  on	  a	   testimony	  under	  pressure	  will	  be	  depicted	   in	   the	   reasoning	  of	  the	  judgement	  at	  stake.	  	  In	   John	  Murray	   though,	  this	  principle	  was	  almost	  bended,	  as	  shown	  before.	  The	  legislation	  adopted	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  at	  that	  time	  was	  aiming	  at	  combating	  terrorism	   in	   Northern	   Ireland.407	  The	   applicant	   who	   was	   arrested	   in	   a	   house	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  404	  See	  also	  the	  Convention	  Relative	  to	  the	  Treatment	  of	  Prisoners	  of	  War:	  ‘Every	  prisoner	  of	  war,	  when	  questioned	  on	  the	  subject,	  is	  bound	  to	  give	  only	  his	  surname,	  first	  names	  and	  rank,	  date	  of	  birth,	  and	  army,	  regimental,	  personal	  or	  serial	  number,	  or	  failing	  this,	  equivalent	  information.	  If	  he	   wilfully	   infringes	   this	   rule,	   he	   may	   render	   himself	   liable	   to	   a	   restriction	   of	   the	   privileges	  accorded	  to	  his	  rank	  or	  status.	  No	  physical	  or	  mental	  torture,	  nor	  any	  other	  form	  of	  coercion,	  may	  be	  inflicted	  on	  prisoners	  of	  war	  to	  secure	  from	  them	  information	  of	  any	  kind	  whatever.	  Prisoners	  of	  war	  who	  refuse	  to	  answer	  may	  not	  be	  threatened,	   insulted,	  or	  exposed	  to	  any	  unpleasant	  or	  disadvantageous	  treatment	  of	  any	  kind’.	  (Article	  17	  §§	  1-­‐2,	  4).	  405 	  Convention	   against	   Torture	   and	   Other	   Cruel,	   Inhuman	   or	   Degrading	   Treatment	   or	  Punishment,	  1984,	  Article	  15.	  See	  also	  the	  ACHR,	  Article	  8	  §	  3.	  406	  S	  Trechsel,	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Criminal	  Proceedings,	  p	  356.	  407	  John	  Murray	   v.	  United	   Kingdom,	   no.	   18731/91,	   8	   Feb	   1996,	   Reports	   1996-­‐I,	   30,	   (1996)	   22	  EHRR	   29,	   §	  27:	   ‘Circumstances	   in	   which	   inferences	   may	   be	   drawn	   from	   accused’s	   failure	   to	  mention	  particular	  facts	  when	  questioned,	  charged,	  etc.	  –	  (1)	  Where,	  in	  any	  proceedings	  against	  a	  person	  for	  an	  offence,	  evidence	  is	  given	  that	  the	  accused	  –	  (a)	  at	  any	  time	  before	  he	  was	  charged	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where	  a	  person	  was	  held	  as	  prisoner	  by	  the	  IRA,408	  was	  informed	  about	  his	  right	  to	  remain	  silent409	  and	  exercised	  it	  during	  both	  investigation	  and	  trial	  phases.	  In	  spite	  of	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  remained	  silent	  though,	  he	  was	  convicted.410	  	  	  Additionally,	  Amnesty	  International	  participating	  in	  the	  proceedings	  stated	  that	  ‘permitting	  adverse	  inferences	  to	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  silence	  of	  the	  accused	  was	  an	   effective	  means	   of	   compulsion	  which	   shifted	   the	   burden	   of	   proof	   from	   the	  prosecution	   to	   the	   accused	   and	   was	   inconsistent	   with	   the	   right	   not	   to	   be	  compelled	  to	  testify	  against	  oneself	  or	  to	  confess	  guilt	  because	  the	  accused	  is	  left	  with	   no	   reasonable	   choice	   between	   silence	   –which	  will	   be	   taken	   as	   testimony	  against	  oneself–	  and	  testifying’.411	  	  Although	   the	   Court	   admitted,	   that	   there	   is	   ‘a	   certain	   level	   of	   indirect	  compulsion’,412	  when	   the	   accused	   is	   told	   that	   inferences	  may	   be	   drawn	   by	   his	  silence,	   it	   agreed	   finally	   with	   the	   Commission,	   finding	   no	   violation	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  with	  the	  offence,	  on	  being	  questioned	  by	  a	  constable	  trying	  to	  discover	  whether	  or	  by	  whom	  the	  offence	   had	   been	   committed,	   failed	   to	   mention	   any	   fact	   relied	   on	   in	   his	   defence	   in	   those	  proceedings;	  or	  –	  (b)	  on	  being	  charged	  with	   the	  offence	  or	  officially	   informed	  that	  he	  might	  be	  prosecuted	  for	  it,	  failed	  to	  mention	  any	  such	  fact,	  being	  a	  fact	  which	  in	  the	  circumstances	  existing	  at	   the	   time	   the	   accused	   could	   reasonably	  have	  been	   expected	   to	  mention	  when	   so	  questioned,	  charged	   or	   informed,	   as	   the	   case	   may	   be,	   paragraph	   (2)	   applies.	   –	   (2)	   Where	   this	   paragraph	  applies	  –	  (a)	  the	  court,	  in	  determining	  whether	  to	  commit	  the	  accused	  for	  trial	  or	  whether	  there	  is	  a	  case	  to	  answer,	  –	  (b)	  ...	  –	  (c)	  the	  court	  or	  jury,	  in	  determining	  whether	  the	  accused	  is	  guilty	  of	  the	  offence	  charged,	  may	  –	  (i)	  draw	  such	  inferences	  from	  the	  failure	  as	  appear	  proper;	  –	  (ii)	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  such	  inferences	  treat	  the	  failure	  as,	  or	  as	  capable	  of	  amounting	  to,	  corroboration	  of	  any	  evidence	  given	  against	  the	  accused	  in	  relation	  to	  which	  the	  failure	  is	  material.	  –	  (3)	  Subject	  to	  any	  directions	  by	  the	  court,	  evidence	  tending	  to	  establish	  the	  failure	  may	  be	  given	  before	  or	  after	  evidence	  tending	  to	  establish	  the	  fact	  which	  the	  accused	  is	  alleged	  to	  have	  failed	  to	  mention.	  –	  ...’.	  Article	  3	  of	  the	  Criminal	  Evidence	  (Northern	  Ireland)	  Order	  1988.	  408	  About	  potential	  exploitation	  of	   the	  right	  by	   terrorist	   individuals,	   see	  M	  Zander,	   ‘Abolition	  of	  the	   Right	   to	   Silence,	   1972-­‐1974’	   in	   D	   Morgan	   and	   G	   Stephenson	   (eds.),	   Suspicion	   &	   Silence	  (Blackstone,	  1994).	  409	  Ibid.,	  §	  11:	  ‘You	  do	  not	  have	  to	  say	  anything	  unless	  you	  wish	  to	  do	  so	  but	  I	  must	  warn	  you	  that	  if	  you	  fail	  to	  mention	  any	  fact	  which	  you	  rely	  on	  in	  your	  defence	  in	  court,	  your	  failure	  to	  take	  this	  opportunity	   to	  mention	   it	  may	  be	   treated	   in	  court	  as	   supporting	  any	  relevant	  evidence	  against	  you.	  If	  you	  do	  wish	  to	  say	  anything,	  what	  you	  say	  may	  be	  given	  in	  evidence’.	  410	  Interesting	   is	   the	  statement	  of	   the	   judge	  who	  mentioned:	   ‘I	  am	   further	  satisfied	   that	   it	   is	  an	  irresistible	  inference	  that	  while	  he	  was	  in	  the	  house	  [the	  applicant]	  was	  in	  contact	  with	  the	  men	  holding	   L.	   captive	   and	   that	   he	   knew	   that	   L.	  was	   being	   held	   a	   captive.	   I	   also	   draw	   very	   strong	  inferences	  against	   [the	  applicant]	  under	  Article	  6	  of	   the	  1988	  Order	  by	   reason	  of	  his	   failure	   to	  give	  an	  account	  of	  his	  presence	   in	   the	  house	  when	  cautioned	  by	   the	  police	  on	   the	  evening	  of	  7	  January	   1990	   under	   Article	   6,	   and	   I	   also	   draw	   very	   strong	   inferences	   against	   [the	   applicant]	  under	  Article	  4	  of	   the	  1988	  Order	  by	  reason	  of	  his	   refusal	   to	  give	  evidence	   in	  his	  own	  defence	  when	  called	  upon	  by	  the	  Court	  to	  do	  so’.	  Ibid.,	  §	  25.	  411	  Ibid.,	  §	  42.	  412	  Ibid.,	  §	  50.	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Convention.	   Furthermore,	   the	   Court	   reaffirmed	   that	   the	   accused	   is	   protected	  against	  improper	  compulsion,	  stating	  that	  it	  is	  not	  in	  its	  role	  to	  examine	  whether,	  in	  general,	   the	  making	  of	   inferences	  under	  the	  scheme	  included	  in	  the	  Order	  of	  the	  domestic	   law	  is	   incompatible	  or	  not	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  fair	  hearing	  under	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  ECHR.413	  	  Focusing	  on	  the	  particular	  case,	  it	  held	  that	  ‘what	  is	  at	  stake	  in	  the	  present	  case	  is	  whether	   these	   immunities	   are	   absolute	   in	   the	   sense	   that	   the	   exercise	   by	   an	  accused	  of	  the	  right	  to	  silence	  cannot	  under	  any	  circumstances	  be	  used	  against	  him	   at	   trial	   or,	   alternatively,	   whether	   informing	   him	   in	   advance	   that,	   under	  certain	   conditions,	   his	   silence	   may	   be	   so	   used,	   is	   always	   to	   be	   regarded	   as	  “improper	  compulsion”.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  is	  self-­‐evident	  that	  it	  is	  incompatible	  with	  the	  immunities	  under	  consideration	  to	  base	  a	  conviction	  solely	  or	  mainly	  on	  the	   accused’s	   silence	   or	   on	   a	   refusal	   to	   answer	   questions	   or	   to	   give	   evidence	  himself.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   the	   Court	   deems	   it	   equally	   obvious	   that	   these	  immunities	   cannot	   and	   should	   not	   prevent	   that	   the	   accused’s	   silence,	   in	  situations	  which	  clearly	  call	  for	  an	  explanation	  from	  him,	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  assessing	  the	  persuasiveness	  of	  the	  evidence	  adduced	  by	  the	  prosecution’.414	  	  Following	  to	   that,	   ‘the	  question	   in	  each	  particular	  case	   is	  whether	  the	  evidence	  adduced	   by	   the	   prosecution	   is	   sufficiently	   strong	   to	   require	   an	   answer.	   The	  national	   court	   cannot	   conclude	   that	   the	   accused	   is	   guilty	   merely	   because	   he	  chooses	  to	  remain	  silent.	  It	  is	  only	  if	  the	  evidence	  against	  the	  accused	  “calls”	  for	  an	  explanation	  which	  the	  accused	  ought	  to	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  give	  that	  a	  failure	  to	  give	  any	  explanation	  “may	  as	  a	  matter	  of	  common	  sense	  allow	  the	  drawing	  of	  an	   inference	   that	   there	   is	   no	   explanation	   and	   that	   the	   accused	   is	   guilty”.	  Conversely	  if	  the	  case	  presented	  by	  the	  prosecution	  had	  so	  little	  evidential	  value	  that	  it	  called	  for	  no	  answer,	  a	  failure	  to	  provide	  one	  could	  not	  justify	  an	  inference	  of	   guilt.	   In	   sum,	   it	   is	   only	   common-­‐sense	   inferences	  which	   the	   judge	   considers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  413	  Ibid.,	  §	  44.	  414	  Ibid.,	  §§	  46-­‐47.	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proper,	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  evidence	  against	  the	  accused,	  that	  can	  be	  drawn	  under	  the	  Order’.415	  	  All	   in	   all,	   the	   Court	   didn’t	   find	   that	   the	   compulsion	   upon	   the	   applicant	   was	  decisive.	  It	  relied	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  other	  safeguards	  were	  present,	  as	  the	  warning	  by	   the	   police	   with	   regard	   to	   the	   applicant’s	   rights	   and	   the	   reasons	   of	   the	  conviction	   which	   couldn’t	   have	   and	   hadn’t	   been	   solely	   based	   on	   the	   non-­‐cooperation	  of	  the	  applicant.	  As	  long	  as	  the	  silence	  itself	  is	  concerned,	  the	  Court	  found	  that	  this	  specific	  one	  logically	  could	  not	  have	  prevented	  one	  from	  drawing	  inferences	  against	  the	  applicant.	  The	  fact	  of	  his	  presence	  in	  the	  house	  was	  a	  piece	  of	   evidence	   compelling	   for	   an	   explanation;	   for	   a	   defence	   which	   was	   not	  expressed	  or	  exercised.416	  	  After	  John	  Murray,	  the	  Court	  came	  to	  an	  opposite	  conclusion	  (finding	  a	  violation)	  in	   two	   cases	   involving	   again	  United	  Kingdom.	   In	  Condron,	   the	   applicants	  were	  convicted	   of	   drug	   offences.	   They	   had	   remained	   silent	   during	   investigation	   and	  submitted	  a	  statement	  during	  trial	  that	  explained	  their	  behaviour.	  Their	  solicitor	  had	  advised	  them	  so,	  because	  he	  hadn’t	  been	  sure	  about	  their	  capacity	  to	  follow	  questions	  during	  investigation.	  Despite	  that,	  the	  judge	  proposed	  to	  the	  jury	  that	  they	  could	   freely	  rely	  on	   the	  silence	  of	   the	  applicants	  during	   investigation.	  The	  Court	  found	  a	  violation	  as	  it	  did	  in	  the	  case	  of	  Beckles.	  In	  Telfner,	  the	  applicant’s	  car	   was	   involved	   in	   an	   accident	   and	   the	   owner	   was	   convicted,	   since	   his	  whereabouts	  were	  unknown	  on	  the	  date	  of	  the	  accident	  and	  he	  was	  the	  one	  who	  usually	  used	  the	  vehicle.	   In	  addition,	  he	  refused	  to	  make	  any	  statement,	  as	  also	  his	  relatives	  did,	  as	  they	  had	  the	  right	  to	  do	  so.	  Here,	  the	  Court	  found	  a	  violation	  of	  Article	  6§2	  since	  contrary	  to	  John	  Murray,	  the	  evidence	  was	  not	  ‘such	  that	  the	  only	  common-­‐sense	  inference	  to	  be	  drawn	  from	  the	  accused’s	  silence	  is	  that	  he	  had	  no	  answer	  to	  the	  case	  against	  him’.417	  Finally,	  the	  Court	  found	  a	  violation	  of	  Article	  6	  §§	  1	  and	  2	  in	  two	  Irish	  cases,	  as	  ‘the	  “degree	  of	  compulsion”	  imposed	  on	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  415	  Ibid.,	  §	  51.	  416	  See	   also	  Averill	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	   36408/97,	   6	   June	   2000,	   ECHR	   2000-­‐VI,	   203,	   (2001)	   31	  EHRR	  36,	  a	  case	  of	  murder,	  in	  which	  the	  Court	  came	  to	  the	  same	  conclusions.	  417	  Telfner	  v.	  Austria,	  no.	  33501/96,	  20	  Mar	  2001,	  (2002)	  34	  EHRR	  7,	  §	  17.	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the	  applicants	  by	  the	  application	  of	  section	  52	  of	  the	  1939	  Act418	  with	  a	  view	  to	  compelling	  them	  to	  provide	  information	  relating	  to	  charges	  against	  them	  under	  that	   Act	   in	   effect	   destroyed	   the	   very	   essence	   of	   their	   privilege	   against	   self-­‐incrimination	  and	  their	  right	  to	  remain	  silent’.419	  	  Concluding,	  the	  privilege	  against	  self-­‐incrimination420	  and	  the	  right	  to	  silence	  lie	  indeed	   at	   the	   heart	   of	   fairness.	  Nonetheless,	   they	   are	   rights	   set	   in	   a	   particular	  context,	  that	  of	  criminal	  proceedings.	  They	  do	  not	  operate	  in	  a	  vacuum;	  neither	  the	  rights	  nor	   the	  concept	  of	   fairness.421	  The	  dicta	  in	   John	  Murray	   speak	   less	  of	  limitations	  of	  these	  provisions	  and	  more	  in	  favour	  of	  a	  coherent	  interpretation	  of	  them	  within	  a	  system	  that	  bears	  heavily	  the	  mark	  of	  evidence	  law.	  That	  is	  why	  in	  crimes	  where	   the	  perpetrator	   is	  caught	  red-­‐handed	  and	  thus	  embodies	  himself	  material	   evidence	   with	   obvious	   reading,	   he	   is	   compelled	   under	   these	  circumstances	  by	  common	  sense	  to	  participate	  actively	  in	  the	  flow	  of	  evidence.	  	  	  
4.5.	  Towards	  some	  principles	  of	  a	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept	  
	  The	   reluctance	  of	   the	  Court	   to	   form	  concrete	   and	   clear	  principles	   about	   issues	  falling	  into	  the	  core	  of	  the	  essence	  of	  fairness	  or	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  is	  obvious.	   It	   limits	   itself	   to	   the	  necessities	  of	   the	  case	  under	  consideration	  at	   the	  time.422	  Nevertheless,	   it	   does	   have	   a	   valuable	   view	   on	   matters	   such	   as	   the	  principle	   of	   adversarial	   proceedings	   and	   the	   demand	   for	   reasoned	   judgments.	  Beside	   those,	   there	   are	   even	   more	   brilliant	   opinions	   expressed	   on	   illegally	  obtained	   evidence,	   whether	   it	   is	   entrapment	   or	   the	   privilege	   against	   self-­‐incrimination	  and	  right	  to	  silence.	  The	  Court’s	  role	  does	  not	  allow	  it	  to	  be	  more	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   (2001)	  33	  EHRR	  12,	   §	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Quinn	  v.	  Ireland,	  no.	  36887/97,	  21	  Dec	  2000,	  §	  56.	  420	  I	   Dennis,	   ‘Instumental	   Protection,	   Human	   Right	   or	   Functional	   Necessity?	   Reassessing	   the	  Privilege	  against	  Self-­‐incrimination’	  CLJ	  54(2)	  (1995)	  342.	  421	  MC	   Bassiouni,	   ‘Human	   Rights	   in	   the	   Administration	   of	   Justice:	   Identifying	   International	  Procedural	  Protection	  and	  Equivalent	  Protections	  in	  National	  Constitutions’	  Duke	  J	  Comp	  &	  Int’l	  L	  3	  (1993)	  235.	  422	  L	  Loucaides,	  ‘Questions	  of	  Fair	  Trial	  Under	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights’,	  HRLR	  3	  (2003)	  27.	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decisive,	  as	  it	  respects	  exaggeratedly	  the	  national	  courts	  and	  domestic	  law,	  but	  it	  could	  have	  been	  more	  coherent	  on	  its	  judgments.	  	  	  The	  legal	  inheritance	  of	  a	  cohesive	  system	  on	  fairness	  in	  Europe	  is	  nonetheless	  a	  fact	   illustrated	   in	   the	   text	   of	   the	   Convention.423	  The	   lack	   of	   coherence	   in	   the	  Court’s	  case	  law	  cannot	  overshadow	  it.	  Besides,	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  Court	  misses	  only	  a	  holistic	  approach	  targeted	  to	  the	  interdependence	  of	  procedure,	  evidence	  and	  fairness	  –that	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  text	  of	  the	  Convention	  and	  the	  scholarship	  of	  criminal	   procedure–	   and	   not	   right	   judgments	   on	   crucial	   matters	   as	   were	  presented	  above	  in	  the	  application	  of	  Article	  6.	  	  	  However,	  there	  are	  principles	  to	  be	  drawn	  on	  every	  evidence	  related	  issue	  in	  the	  core	  of	  fairness.	  It	  is	  indeed	  unambiguous	  the	  fact	  that	  evidence	  should	  be	  tried	  in	   an	   adversarial	   manner,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   equal	   opportunities	   of	   the	  parties	   should	   be	   protected	   during	   the	   whole	   duration	   of	   the	   proceedings.	  Furthermore,	  it	  is	  essential	  for	  the	  efficient	  exercise	  of	  defence	  rights	  that	  every	  decision	   by	   any	   authority	   involved	   in	   the	   criminal	   proceedings	   be	   reasoned;	  hence	   open	   to	   scrutiny	   regarding	   the	   evidence	   taken	   into	   account	   for	   its	  formation.	  Finally,	  although	  the	  Court	  uses	  several	  indicators	  to	  describe	  a	  lawful	  undercover	  police	  activity,	  it	  is	  possible	  –as	  shown	  above–	  to	  construct	  by	  them	  adhesive	  principles	  on	  entrapment	  and	  agents	  provocateurs	   that	  are	  conclusive	  for	   the	  quality	   of	   the	   evidence	  produced.	  The	   same	  was	   also	   argued	   about	   the	  presumption	   of	   innocence	   and	   can	   further	   be	   employed	   in	   the	   difficulties	   and	  technicalities	  of	  the	  privilege	  not	  to	  incriminate	  oneself	  and	  the	  right	  to	  silence,	  as	  exemplified.	  	  A	  concept	  of	  evidential	  fairness	  originates	  from	  the	  links	  between	  evidence	  law,	  criminal	  procedural	  law	  and	  the	  notion	  of	  fairness.	  The	  thread	  that	  leads	  to	  the	  conceiving	   of	   a	   concept	   on	   evidential	   fairness,	   commenced	   from	   the	   scholarly	  endurable	   relation	   and	   communication	   between	   criminal	   procedure,	   criminal	  evidence	  and	  fairness.	  The	  latter	  can	  also	  be	  approached	  as	  a	  product	  of	  a	  united	  European	  legal	  culture,	  as	  it	  was	  further	  honed	  in	  the	  text	  of	  ECHR	  and	  the	  case	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  423	  FG	  Jakobs,	  ‘The	  Right	  to	  a	  Fair	  Trial	  in	  European	  Law’,	  EHRLR	  (1999)	  141.	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law	   that	   applies	   it.	   Although,	   every	   aspect	   of	   Article	   6	   on	   fair	   trial	   is	   evidence	  relevant,	   there	   are	   four	   fundamental	   elements	   that	   are	   placed	   at	   the	   heart	   of	  evidence	   law.	   These	   are:	   adversarial	   proceedings	   (adversarialism),	   the	  presumption	   of	   innocence,	   reasoned	   judgment	   and	   illegally	   obtained	   evidence.	  The	  whole	  Article	  constitutes	  the	  normative	  environment	  of	  evidential	  fairness,	  but	   these	   four	   elements	   point	   the	   way	   to	   the	   principles	   that	   formulate	   its	  content.	  	  	  An	  acceptable	  model	  for	  these	  should	  include	  propositions	  on	  evidence	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  confronted,	   presumption	   of	   innocence	   serving	   as	   modus	   judicandi,	   decisions	  open,	   transparent	   and	   examinable	   and	   finally	   a	   kind	   of	   overarching	   liberal	  maxim.	  After	  the	  analysis	  of	  the	  case	  law,	  let	  us	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  to	  them.	  	  	  	  
4.6.	  The	  principles	  of	  a	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept	  
	  
4.6.1.	  Evidence	  face	  to	  face	  confronted:	  triangular	  amended	  adversarialism	  
	  The	   Court,	   as	   shown	   extensively	   above,	   has	   acknowledged	   and	   declared	   the	  absolute	   character	   of	   the	   right	   to	   adversarial	   proceedings	   in	   the	   criminal	   trial,	  fact	  that	  situates	  it	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  fairness.	  Both	  prosecution	  and	  defence	   should	   share	   the	   same	   chances	   in	   challenging	   evidence.424	  This	   is	   a	  statement	  that	  the	  Court	  has	  extended	  also	  in	  cases	  when	  an	  independent	  expert	  testifies	   and	   relates	   to	   evidence	   that	   inevitably	   will	   influence	   the	   court’s	  decision. 425 	  The	   requirement	   of	   adversarial	   proceedings	   demands	   that	   the	  parties	  should	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  challenge	  any	  piece	  of	  evidence	  related	  to	  the	  case!426	  It	  doesn’t	  matter	  if	  it	  is	  known	  or	  ignored	  by	  the	  other	  party.	  The	  balance	  between	   the	   parties	   is	   a	   principle	   served	   by	   the	   equality	   of	   arms	   doctrine.	  Adversarialism	   refers	   to	   evidence.	   It	   is	   a	   fair	  manner	  of	   evidence	  organisation,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  424	  For	  example,	  Brandstetter	  v.	  Austria,	  28	  Aug	  1991,	  Series	  A	  no.	  211,	  (1993)	  15	  EHRR	  379,	  §	  67.	  425	  See	  e.g.	  Göç	  v.	  Turkey,	  no.	  36590/97,	  ECHR	  2002-­‐V,	  133,	  §	  34.	  426	  See	   e.g.	  Mantovanelli	   v	   France,	   §	   33;	   Nideröst-­‐Huber	   v.	   Switzerland,	   18	   Feb	   1997,	   Reports	  1997-­‐I,	   101	   (1998)	   25	   EHRR	   709,	   §	   42	   and	   also	   Krcmar	   and	   others	   v.	   Czech	   Republic,	   no.	  35376/97,	  3	  Mar	  2000,	  (2001)	  31	  EHRR	  41,	  §	  42.	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presentation	   and	   evaluation.	   This	   goes	   with	   no	   exception	   of	   any	   evidential	  material;	   irrespective	  of	  whether	  or	  not	   the	  court	   laid	  any	  particular	  emphasis	  on	  it.427	  	  The	  Court	  has	  also	  clarified	  that	  this	  principle	  should	  be	  protected	  by	  the	  courts	  that	  are	  responsible	  for	  preserving	  and	  forwarding	  it	  on	  their	  own	  initiative	  and	  without	   leaving	   this	   burden	   to	   the	   parties	   (especially	   the	   defence). 428	  Adversarialism	  includes	  the	  obligation	  of	  disclosing	  evidence,	  although	  the	  latter	  is	  not	  an	  absolute	  and	  is	  subject	  to	  restrictions	  –	  usually	  of	  public	  interest.429	  	  Adversarial	  proceedings	  and	  equal	  opportunities	  (equality	  of	  arms)	  are	  strongly	  linked	   together	  and	  often	  mistaken	   for	  each	  other	  or	  conflated,	   the	  one	   for	   the	  other,	   although	   they	   are	   clearly	   distinct.	   The	   impartiality	   of	   the	   court	   is	  additionally	  another	  element	  that	  forwards	  the	  fine-­‐tuning	  of	  adversarialism.	  For	  the	  principle	  here	  proposed	  all	  three	  elements	  are	  essential.	  	  To	   confront	   evidence	   face	   to	   face	  means	   that	   the	   parties	   should	   participate	   in	  every	   stage	   of	   the	   proceedings	   challenging	   evidence	   in	   or	   before	   trial.	  Confronting,	   challenging	   evidence	   face	   to	   face	   implies	   furthermore	   that	   both	  parties	   stand	   on	   the	   same	   level	   so	   that	   their	   sights	   cross	   with	   each	   other.	  Adversarial	  proceedings	  are	  the	   idyllic	  way	  for	  testing	  evidence	  but	  the	   former	  should	   furthermore	   include	   equality	   of	   arms	   in	   order	   to	   function	   properly.	   In	  addition,	   for	   the	   mechanism	   of	   adversarialism	   to	   produce	   its	   fruit,	   a	   judge	   is	  needed	   that	   can	   be	   deeply	   affected	   by	   this	   procedure.	   This	   is	   managed	   by	  impartiality	   and	   the	   rule	  we	   accepted	   on	   it	   in	   relation	   to	   evidence.	   The	   judge	  should	  face	   the	  evidence	  for	  the	  first	  time	  whenever	  confronted	  to	  it	  so	  that	  he	  can	   benefit	   from	   the	   adversarial	   function	   of	   the	   criminal	   process.	   That	   would	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  427	  Kuopila	  v.	  Finland,	  no.	  27752/95,	  27	  Apr	  2000	  (2001)	  33	  EHRR	  25,	  §	  35.	  428	  Göç	  v.	  Turkey,	  no.	  36590/97,	  ECHR	  2002-­‐V,	  133,	  §	  57;	  See	  e.g.	  Brandstetter	  v.	  Austria,	  28	  Aug	  1991,	  Series	  A	  no.	  211,	  (1993)	  15	  EHRR	  379,	  §	  67.	  429	  The	  non-­‐disclosure	  is	  accepted	  by	  the	  Court	  in	  cases	  where	  the	  evidence	  in	  question	  isn’t	  put	  to	   the	   jury,	   the	   issue	   is	   commented	   by	   the	   defence	   and	   the	   need	   of	   disclosure	   is	   at	   all	   times	  assessed	   by	   the	   judge.	   By	   contrast,	   when	   this	   assessment	   is	   made	   solely	   by	   the	   prosecution,	  which	  does	  not	  lay	  the	  evidence	  before	  the	  trial	  judge	  so	  that	  the	  latter	  can	  decide	  whether	  or	  not	  such	   non-­‐disclosure	   is	   strictly	   necessary,	   there	   is	   a	   breach	   of	   Article	   6.	   The	   duty	   to	   disclose	  evidence	  does	  not	  concern	  only	  the	  prosecution	  but	  also	  the	  court	  itself.	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demand	  that	  since	  evidence	  is	  examined,	  involvement	  in	  both	  investigation	  and	  trial	   is	   by	   all	   means	   unacceptable.	   In	   other	   words,	   any	   decision	   that	   involves	  examination	  of	  evidence	  would	  exclude	   the	  examiner	   from	  participating	   in	  any	  other	  stage	  of	  the	  proceedings.	  	  	  
Diagram	  II:	  Conditioned	  Adversarialism	  
	  
	  	  Fair	   evidence	   in	   criminal	   procedure	   would	   speak	   in	   favour	   of	   an	   adversarial	  manner	  of	  organisation,	  presentation	  and	  evaluation	  of	  it.	  This	  includes	  equality	  of	   opportunities	   between	   the	   –naturally	   uneven–	   parties	   of	   criminal	   process.	  Benefited	  from	  the	  adversarial	  light	  shed	  on	  evidence	  is	  the	  judge	  who	  must	  be	  impartial,	  as	  a	  condition	  not	  only	  of	  the	  outcome	  of	  challenging	  evidence	  but	  also	  for	  the	  fine	  tuning	  of	  the	  lens	  of	  the	  parties	  lighting	  that	  evidence.	  	  Closing	  this	  point	  it	  must	  also	  be	  said	  that	  this	  exercise	  should	  apply	  to	  the	  whole	  criminal	  procedure.	  It	  must	  not	  be	  confined	  to	  the	  trial	  stage.	  The	  rationale	  of	  the	  Court’s	   principles	   exceeds	   the	   trial.	   Moreover,	   it	   should	   be	   noted	   that	   the	  investigation	   could	   not	   undermine	   the	   decisive	   character	   of	   the	   trial	   by	   being	  more	   transparent,	   since	   they	   differ	   in	   nature.	   Its	   role	   regarding	   evidence	   is	  completely	  different;	  namely	  a	  decision	  of	  whether	  it	  is	  sufficient	  for	  the	  case	  to	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proceed	  to	  trial.	  It	  never	  involves	  a	  determination	  of	  the	  guilt	  or	  innocence	  of	  the	  accused.	  	  	  	  
4.6.2.	  Evidence	  in	  dubio	  pro	  reo	  handled:	  presumed	  and	  treated	  as	  innocent	  
	  The	   presumption	   of	   innocence	   as	   mentioned	   before	   should	   be	   the	   norm	   that	  conditions	  the	  behaviour	  of	  the	  authorities	  towards	  the	  defendant,	  the	  accused,	  the	  alleged	  perpetrator	  of	  the	  crime.	  Due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  he	  or	  she	  has	  ‘allegedly’	  committed	  the	  crime,	  they	  deserve	  a	  treatment	  as	  if	  they	  were	  innocent	  and	  not	  guilty.	   The	  presumption	   of	   innocence	   in	   order	   not	   to	   be	   an	   arbitrary	   principle	  should	  also	  apply	  to	  evidence.	  	  
	  The	   Strasbourg	   Court	   repeatedly	   holds	   opinions	   against	   courts	   or	   judges	   that	  start	  dealing	  with	  a	  case	  with	  the	  conviction	  or	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  accused	  committed	  the	  act	  with	  which	  he	  is	  charged.430	  Here,	  one	  can	  see	  clearly	  a	  point	  where	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  and	  the	  right	  to	  an	  impartial	  tribunal	  meet.	  	  Apart	   from	   the	   judges,	   the	   experts	   are	   expected	   to	  honour	   the	  presumption	  of	  innocence,	  where	  they	  are	  appointed	  by	  the	  court	  and	  not	  by	  the	  parties.	  431	  The	  application	  of	  the	  Convention	  speaks	  also	  against	  the	  reverse	  burden	  of	  proof.	  432	  In	   addition,	   the	  presumption	  of	   innocence	   is	   strongly	   linked	  with	   the	  privilege	  against	  self-­‐incrimination	  and	  the	  right	  to	  silence.433	  	  	  If	   conditioned	   adversarialism	   as	   described	   above	   is	   the	   way	   to	   a	   fairer	  organisation,	   presentation	   and	   evaluation	   of	   evidence,	   the	   presumption	   of	  innocence	  constitutes	  the	  fair	  manner	  of	  it	  all.	  The	  criminal	  procedure	  is	  already	  heavily	   laden	   with	   tiny	   or	   more	   severe	   pre-­‐penalties	   (the	   rationales	   and	   the	  expediencies	  of	  which	  we	  cannot	  deal	  here	  with)	  in	  order	  to	  carry	  the	  additional	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  430	  X	  v.	  Germany,	  The	  Law.	  431	  Bönisch	  v.	  Austria,	  6	  May	  1985,	  Series	  A	  no.	  92,	  (1987)	  9	  EHRR	  191,	  §	  30.	  432	  With	  the	  exception	  of	  tax	  related	  crimes	  and	  offences	  connected	  with	  road-­‐traffic.	  See	  e.g.	  JP,	  
KR	  and	  GH	  v.	  Austria.	  433	  Heaney	  and	  McGuiness	  v.	  Ireland,	  no.	  34720/97,	  21	  Dec	  2000,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐XII,	  (2001)	  33	  EHRR	  12,	   §	  40;	   Quinn	   v.	   Ireland,	   no.	   36887/97,	   21	   Dec	   2000,	   §	  40;	   Saunders	   v.	  United	   Kingdom,	   no.	  19187/91,	  17	  Dec	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐VI,	  2044,	   (1997)	  23	  EHRR	  313,	   §	  68;	  Shannon	   v.	  United	  
Kingdom,	  no.	  6563/03,	  4	  October	  2005,	  §	  32.	  
 140 
weight	   of	   a	   biased	   attitude	   towards	   evidence	   by	   the	   authorities.	   The	   evidence	  should	  be	  organised	   in	  a	  way	   that	   respects	   the	  presumption.	  The	  premise	   that	  the	  accused	  should	  be	  presumed	  innocent	  is	  an	  empty	  promise	  if	  the	  accused	  is	  not	  consequently	  treated	  as	   innocent	  (regarding	  the	  evidence	  that	  refers	  to	  the	  crime	   and	   not	   the	   various	   necessities	   of	   the	   procedure	   that	   allow	   some	   pre-­‐punishing	  behaviour).	  	  
	  
4.6.3.	  Evidence	  by	  reason	  ruled:	  the	  safeguard	  of	  the	  concept	  
	  The	   Court	   correctly	   holds	   that	   any	   judicial	   decision	   is	   burdened	   with	   the	  obligation	   to	   give	   reasons. 434 	  The	   national	   courts	   must	   provide	   sufficient	  indications	   regarding	   the	   reasoning	   on	  which	   their	   decisions	   are	   based.	   	   ‘It	   is	  only	   by	   giving	   a	   reasoned	   decision	   that	   there	   can	   be	   public	   scrutiny	   of	   the	  administration	  of	  justice’.435	  The	  obligation	  to	  give	  reasons,	  not	  only	  stems	  from	  Article	   6§1,	   but	   also	   finds	   its	   justification	   in	   the	   right	   to	   be	  heard,	   the	   right	   to	  appeal	  and	  the	  general	  principle	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law.436	  	  The	  judicial	  state	  power	  serves	  justice	  and	  facilitates	  law	  as	  its	  core	  instrument.	  It	   is	   also	   often	   said	   that	   the	   judicial	   state	   power	   controls	   the	   other	   two	  (legislative	  and	  administrative)	  as	  the	  one	  that	  can	  distribute	  justice.	  But	  how	  is	  that	  very	  state	  power	  controlled?	  It	  could	  not	  be	  acceptable	  that	  the	  judicial	  state	  power	   is	   just	   ipso	  facto.	   If	   popular	   sovereignty	   exists	   and	   the	   legitimacy	  of	   the	  state	  is	  created	  by	  the	  (true)	  will	  or	  consent	  of	  its	  people,	  who	  are	  the	  source	  of	  all	  political	  power,	   it	  must	  be	  something	  more	  there.	  The	  demand	  of	  the	  ECtHR	  for	  reasoned	  decisions437	  reveals	  the	  answer.	  The	  refuge	  of	  the	  common	  sense	  is	  the	  key	  element	  that	  enables	  the	  people	  to	  control	  the	  actions	  of	  the	  judicial	  state	  power.	   The	   fundamental	   consent	   in	   a	   society	   and	   the	   preservation	   of	   their	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  434	  In	  its	  report	  the	  Commission	  for	  example	  found	  a	  violation	  because	  no	  reasons	  had	  been	  given	  to	  grant	  the	  refusal	  to	  a	  request	  that	  a	  witness	  be	  heard	  in	  Bricmont	  v.	  Belgium,	  §§	  151-­‐153.	  435	  Suominen	  v.	  Finland,	  no.	  37801/97,	  1	  July	  2003,	  §	  37.	  436	  Ibid.	  437	  For	   the	   decisions	   made	   by	   the	   prosecution	   see	   also	   F.W.	   Miller,	   The	   Decision	   to	   Charge	   a	  
Suspect	  with	  a	  Crime,	  1970.	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integrity	   is	   the	   reason	   why	   courts	   should	   give	   reasons	   for	   their	   decisions438	  making	  them	  examinable	  and	  transparent.	  Even	  if	  there	  were	  no	  laws	  to	  impose	  this	  obligation,	  decisions	  with	  a	  reasonable	  exegesis	  should	  exist	  anyway,	  as	  the	  real	  reason	  for	  that	  is	  rather	  meta-­‐normative	  than	  just	  normative.	  However,	  the	  ability	  and	  capacity	  of	   the	  public439	  to	  examine	  the	   judicial	  decisions	   is	  another	  matter,	   but	   the	   essential	   issue	   here	   is	   that	   reasoning	   (logic)	   is	   the	   common	  denominator	  of	  the	  subjugation	  of	  judicial	  state	  power	  to	  popular	  control.	  	  Before	   this	   jurisprudential	   interpretation	  of	   the	  obligation	  of	   the	  courts	   to	  give	  reasons	  for	  their	  decisions,	  there	  is	  a	  place	  of	  a	  more	  select	  rationale	  in	  the	  frame	  of	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  here	  in	  discussion.	  The	  fair	  character	  of	  the	  generation,	  collection,	   organisation,	   presentation	   and	   evaluation	   of	   the	   information	   in	  criminal	   proceedings	   can	   only	   be	   examined	   by	   the	   reasons	   given	   in	   each	  decision.	  That	  is	  why	  it	  is	  absolutely	  imperative	  that	  every	  decision	  coming	  from	  every	  agent	  or	  authority	  be	  accompanied	  by	  its	  reasons.440	  The	  well-­‐functioning	  of	   adversarialism,	   the	   savoir	   vivre	  of	   the	   criminal	  process	   (the	  presumption	  of	  innocence)	  and	  the	  humane	  treatment	  of	  the	  accused	  (see	  right	  below)	  can	  only	  be	  tested	  by	  the	  reasons	  given	  in	  the	  decisions	  made.	  The	  demand	  for	  reasoned	  judgments	  embodies	  the	  ultimate	  safeguard	  for	  a	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept.	  	  	  
4.6.4.	  Evidence	  humanely	  conditioned:	  will	  &	  choice	  fully	  protected	  
	  Although	   the	   ECtHR	   has	   poorly	   dealt,	   in	   an	   open	   manner,	   with	   the	   matter	   of	  compatibility	   between	   the	   collection	   and	   use	   of	   improperly	   obtained	   evidence	  and	  the	  principle	  of	   fair	  trial,	   its	   judgments	  on	  entrapment,	  right	  to	  silence	  and	  privilege	  against	  self-­‐incrimination	  light	  the	  way	  to	  a	  principle	  that	  embodies	  a	  kind	   of	   liberal	   maxim.	   Evidence	   is	   not	   to	   be	   produced	   or	   obtained	   through	  instigation	  of	   crime,	   through	  methods	  of	   coercion	  or	   oppression	   in	  defiance	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  438	  For	  a	  critique	  on	  that	  theory	  see	  R.	  Sartorius,	  The	  Justification	  of	  the	  Judicial	  Decision,	  Ethics,	  Vol.	  78,	  No.	  3	  (1968),	  pp.	  171-­‐187.	  439	  C.	  Beccaria	   (translated	  by	  E.D.	   Ingraham),	  On	  Crimes	  and	  Punishments	   (1764),	  1819,	  chapter	  VII.	  440	  In	  its	  report	  the	  Commission	  for	  example	  found	  a	  violation	  because	  no	  reasons	  had	  been	  given	  to	  grant	  the	  refusal	  to	  a	  request	  that	  a	  witness	  be	  heard	  in	  Bricmont	  v.	  Belgium,	  §§	  151-­‐153.	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the	  will	  of	   the	  accused	  or	  pressure	  to	  make	  statements	  not	  only	  detrimental	   to	  the	  person	  involved,	  but	  any	  declarations	  at	  all.	  The	  intention	  of	  the	  Court	  is	  to	  offer	   the	   accused	   protection	   against	   improper	   compulsion	   by	   the	   authorities	  thereby	   contributing	   to	   the	   avoidance	   of	   miscarriages	   of	   justice	   and	   to	   the	  fulfilment	  of	  the	  aims	  of	  Article	  6.441	  Here	  a	  line	  is	  drawn	  where	  minimum	  state	  intervention	   and	   citizen	   participation	   in	   criminal	   matters	   is	   sought.	   Lawful	  undercover	   police	   actions	   are	   legitimate	   for	   serious	   crimes	   and	   activities	   like	  terrorism,	   whereas	   the	   right	   against	   self-­‐incrimination	   applies	   to	   criminal	  proceedings	  with	  respect	  to	  every	  type	  of	  criminal	  offences,	  without	  exceptions,	  from	  the	  simplest	  to	  the	  most	  knotty.	  	  	  In	  the	  same	  context	  of	  great	  importance	  is	  the	  will	  of	  the	  citizen	  involved	  in	  the	  criminal	   proceedings.	   As	   far	   as	   lawful	   police	   undercover	   activity	   is	   concerned,	  the	  suspect	  should	  rather	  not	  be	  provoked	  to	  commit	  the	  crime	  but	  to	  be	  left	  to	  perform	   the	   leading	   role	   that	   might	   reveal	   his	   predisposition	   towards	   crime.	  Following	  the	  same	  rationale,	   the	  right	  to	  silence	  and	  the	  privilege	  against	  self-­‐incrimination	  are	  designed	  to	  protect	  against	  the	  obtaining	  of	  evidence	  through	  methods	  that	  overbear	  the	  will	  and	  choice	  of	  the	  individuals	  affected.442	  	  The	   collection	   of	   evidence	   in	   violation	   of	   defendant’s	   constitutional	   rights	   in	   a	  state	  will	   also	   appear	   to	   be	   against	   Articles	   3	   and	   8	   of	   ECHR.	   In	   principle,	   the	  ECHR	  does	  not	  cut	  off	  the	  use	  of	  special	  investigative	  methods	  for	  the	  detection	  of	  extremely	  dangerous	  forms	  of	  criminal	  behaviour.	  According	  to	  ECtHR	  though,	  the	  public	  interest	  of	  combating	  such	  behaviours	  is	  not	  enough	  in	  order	  to	  justify	  the	  use	  of	  evidence	  collected	  by	  means	  of	  entrapment.	  The	  general	  requirement	  of	   impartiality,	   as	   established	   in	   Article	   6,	   has	   application	   in	   every	   criminal	  process.	   It	   is	  not	  possible	  that	  these	  requirements	  are	  sacrificed	  for	  the	  sake	  of	  expediency,	   no	   matter	   which	   is	   the	   type	   of	   the	   criminal	   offence	   brought	   in	   a	  court	  of	  law.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  441	  Saunders	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	   no.	  19187/91,	  17	  Dec	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐VI,	   2044,	   (1997)	  23	  EHRR	  313,	  §	  68.	  442	  Allan	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  48539/99	  ECHR	  2002-­‐IX	  (2003)	  36	  EHRR	  12,	  §§	  34-­‐36;	  see	  also	  
Khan	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  35394/97,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐V,	  275,	  (2001)	  31	  EHRR	  35,	  §§	  26-­‐28.	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The	  privilege	  against	  self-­‐incrimination	  although	  is	  not	  expressed	  verbally	  in	  the	  text	  of	  the	  Convention	  is	  strongly	  linked	  with	  the	  presumption	  of	  innocence.	  	  The	  Court	  has	  also	  asserted	  that	  ‘the	  right	  to	  silence	  and	  the	  right	  not	  to	  incriminate	  oneself	  are	  generally	  recognised	  international	  standards	  which	  lie	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  the	   notion	   of	   a	   fair	   procedure	   under	   Article	   6’.443	  Furthermore,	   there	   is	   also	  another	  aspect:	  ‘the	  right	  not	  to	  incriminate	  oneself	  is	  primarily	  concerned,	  with	  respecting	   the	   will	   of	   an	   accused	   person	   to	   remain	   silent’.444	  Here,	   the	   link	   is	  clear	  with	  both	   rights	  of	  Article	  3	  and	  8	  of	  ECHR.	  The	   right	   to	   silence	  has	  also	  been	  linked	  with	  the	  freedom	  of	  expression.445	  	  We	  could	  not	  draw	  a	  picture	  of	  principles	  on	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  by	  omitting	  a	  colourful	   depiction	   of	   humane	   treatment	   of	   the	   accused.	   Even	   if	   Article	   6	  intersects	   with	   other	   articles	   of	   the	   convention	   or	   other	   general	   principles	   of	  human	   rights,	   in	   evidence	   context,	   what	   is	   at	   stake	   and	   the	   utmost	   goal	   of	  evidence	  conditioned	  in	  a	  humane	  way,	  is	  the	  integrity	  of	  human	  will	  and	  choice.	  The	   accused	   is	   not	   an	  object	   of	   the	  proceedings;	   primarily	   is	   a	   subject	   and	  his	  free	   will	   and	   choice	   should	   never	   be	   compromised.	   Fair	   play	   in	   criminal	  proceedings	   allows	   no	   space	   for	   any	   kind	   of	   cheating.	   It	   is	   not	   enough	   for	   the	  authorities	  to	  abstain	  from	  torture	  or	  degrading	  methods	  of	  interrogation	  during	  investigation.	  If	  the	  accused	  is	  an	  adversarial	  pillar	   in	  the	  procedure,	  presumed	  innocent,	  given	  reasons	  for	  any	  decisions	  that	  refer	  to	  him,	  primarily	  should	  be	  a	  human	  being	  with	  fully	  protected	  will	  and	  choice.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  443	  Saunders	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	   no.	  19187/91,	  17	  Dec	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐VI,	   2044,	   (1997)	  23	  EHRR	  313,	  §	  68;	  see	  also	  Allan	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  48539/99	  ECHR	  2002-­‐IX	  (2003)	  36	  EHRR	  12,	  §	  44;	  Heaney	  and	  McGuinness	  v.	  Ireland,	  no.	  34720/97,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐XII,	  (2001)	  33	  EHRR	  12,	  §	  40;	  Jalloh	  v.	  Germany,	  no.	  54810/00,	  11	  July	  2006,	  §	  100;	  JB	  v.	  Switzerland,	  no.	  31827/96,	  3	  May	  2001,	   ECHR	   2001-­‐III,	   435,	   §	   64;	   John	   Murray	   v.	   United	   Kingdom,	   no.	   18731/91,	   8	   Feb	   1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐I,	  30,	  (1996)	  22	  EHRR	  29,	  §	  45;	  Quinn	  v.	  Ireland,	  no.	  36887/97,	  21	  Dec	  2000,	  §	  40;	  
Serves	  v.	  France,	  no.	  20225/92,	  20	  Oct	  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐VI,	  2159,	  (1999)	  28	  EHRR	  265,	  §	  46.	  444	  Saunders	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	   no.	  19187/91,	  17	  Dec	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐VI,	   2044,	   (1997)	  23	  EHRR	  313,	  §	  69.	  445	  K	  v.	  Austria,	  no.	  16002/90,	  2	  June	  1993.	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4.6.5.	  Holistic	  approach	  and	  article	  6	  
	  It	  would	  be	  helpful	   if	  we	  grasped	   the	  concept	  of	  evidential	   fairness	   in	  criminal	  proceedings	   emanating	   from	   Article	   6	   ECHR	   under	   the	   light	   of	   a	   holistic	  approach;	  in	  other	  words	  if	  we	  tried	  to	  approach	  article	  6	  as	  a	  criminal	  evidence	  related	  system.446	  In	  this	  system,	  there	  are	  areas	  that	  relate	  to	  evidence	  stronger	  than	  the	  others,	  with	  paragraph	  2	  dominating	  the	  whole	  article,	  while	  paragraph	  1	   provides	   the	   frame	  of	   the	   process	   and	  paragraph	  3	   some	   examples	   of	   rights	  that	   can	   lead	   to	   the	   production	   of	  more	   normative	   applications	   of	   Article	   6	   in	  favour	  of	   the	  defendant.	  The	   inputs	  of	   the	  system	  are	   the	  cases	   that	  come	  to	   it	  through	   the	  door	  of	   individual	   application,	  while	   the	  outputs	   are	   the	  decisions	  that	  are	  incoherent	  as	  long	  as	  the	  Court	  has	  not	  a	  basic	  concept	  of	  applying	  the	  law	  (Art.	  6)	  in	  criminal	  proceedings.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  446	  See	  diagram	  VI,	  following.	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4.6.6.	  The	  knowledge	  of	  rights	  
	  For	  the	  completeness	  of	  this	  part	  there	  should	  be	  a	  little	  reference,	  a	  quick	  word	  about	  the	  knowledge	  of	  rights	  or	  to	  put	  it	  differently	  on	  how	  we	  could	  know	  that	  a	   concept	   on	   evidential	   fairness	   described	   above	   is	   not	   arbitrary.	   One	   would	  argue	   that	   as	   long	   as	   this	   concept	   is	   based	   on	   reason	   and	   the	   law	   given	   (here	  article	  6	  of	  ECHR)	  there	  is	  no	  room	  for	  arbitrariness.	  Article	  6	  though	  in	  order	  to	  establish	   fairness	   in	   criminal	   proceedings	   takes	   the	   very	   substance	   of	   it	   for	  granted.	  If	  the	  platform	  of	  a	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept	  in	  Europe	  is	  Article	  6,	  which	   is	   the	   platform	   of	   this	   very	   article?	   Apart	   from	   the	   normative	   basis	   of	  fairness	  do	  we	  also	  know	  the	  meta-­‐normative?	  	  The	   answer	   to	   this	   question	   constitutes	   at	   least	   another	   thesis,	   but	   here	   we	  should	  clarify	  the	  following:	  the	  meta-­‐normative	  basis	  of	  fairness	  is	  linked	  with	  the	  question	   ‘where	  do	   rights	   come	   from?’447	  and	   refers	   to	  our	  knowledge	   and	  acceptance	   of	   human	   rights	   as	   one	   of	   the	  most	   fundamental	   structures	   of	   law.	  This	   acceptance	   has	   inevitably	   a	   philosophical	   basis.	   In	   this	   context	   a	   form	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  447	  AM	  Dersowitz,	  Shouting	  Fire:	  Civil	  Liberties	  in	  a	  Turbulent	  Age	  (Little,	  Brown,	  2002)	  Ch	  1.	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majority	   rule448	  for	   normativity	   and	   morality	   seems	   weaker	   than	   a	   religious	  ground.449	  The	   interest	   of	   this	   thesis	   though,	   is	   just	   to	   confirm	   that	   there	   is	  indeed	  pluralism	   in	   choosing	   a	  meta-­‐normative	   basis	   of	   fairness,	  which	   is	   also	  open	  to	  scrutiny	  to	  everyone	  who	  denies	  its	  reasonable	  identity.	  
	  	  






	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  448 	  See	   on	   this	   R	   Dworkin,	   Life's	   Dominion:	   An	   Argument	   About	   Abortion,	   Euthanasia,	   and	  
Individual	  Freedom	  (New	  York:	  Knopf.	  1993).	  	  449	  So	   argues	   J	   Perry,	   Toward	   A	   Theory	   of	   Human	   Rights:	   Religion,	   Law,	   Courts	   (Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2007),	  pp.	  xi,	  21,	  28.	  See	  also	  J	  Rawls,	  Political	  Liberalism	  (Columbia	  University	  Press,	  1993),	  pp.	  212-­‐254.	  
 147 
Applying	  evidential	  fairness	  
	  
5.	  European	  Union	  Law	  and	  a	  concept	  on	  evidential	  fairness	  
	  5.1.	  International	  Law	  	  5.1.1.	   Mutual	   recognition	   traces	   in	   world	   history	   (or	   Law:	   global,	  cosmopolitan	  administration)	  5.1.2.	  Mutual	  recognition	  as	  administrative	  tool	  5.1.3.	  Confidence	  &	  Trust	  5.1.4.	  Mutual	  recognition	  character	  5.1.5.	  Mutual	  recognition	  attributes	  5.1.6.	  From	  global	  to	  regional	  administration	  	  5.2.	  EU	  Law	  5.2.1.	  Mutual	  recognition	  in	  the	  EU:	  a	  paradigm	  of	  governance	  	  5.2.2.	  Starting	  with	  a	  drink	  	  5.2.3.	  Exceptions	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  	  5.2.4.	  From	  Community	  Law	  to	  EU	  Law	  	  5.2.5.	  Minimum	  Standards	  and	  Horizontal	  spread	  5.3.	  European	  Criminal	  Law	  5.3.1.	  Context	  and	  application	  	  5.3.1.1.	  Mutual	  Recognition	  History	  in	  EU	  Criminal	  Law	  (links	  and	  background)	  5.3.1.2.	  The	  qualitative	  difference	  argument	  5.3.1.3.	  The	  harmonisation	  argument	  5.3.2.	  Mutual	  Legal	  Assistance	  5.3.2.1.	  MLA	  history,	  function	  and	  instruments	  5.3.2.2.	  MR	  Added	  Value	  5.3.3.	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant	  aftermath	  5.3.3.1.	  Mutual	  Trust	  –	  Test	  of	  Trust	  5.3.3.2.	  Double	  Criminality	  5.3.3.3.	  Grounds	  for	  Refusal	  5.3.4.	  MR	  Spectrum	  5.4.	  The	  proposition	  of	  fairness	  
 148 
5.5.	  Link	  and	  Historical	  flashback	  –	  Mutual	  Recognition	  instruments	  
	  
	  
Introduction	  	  In	   the	   second	   part,	   the	   interest	   moves	   into	   the	   European	   Union	   and	   the	  evidential	  matters	  within	   its	   Area	   of	   Freedom,	   Security	   and	   Justice.	   Here,	   it	   is	  discussed	  the	  next	  leg	  of	  the	  research	  question,	  i.e.	  how	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  first	  part	  about	  a	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept	  apply	  to	  the	  judicial	  cooperation	  on	  evidence	   matters	   in	   EU	   level.	   In	   the	   first	   part	   of	   this	   thesis	   a	   concept	   of	   fair	  criminal	  evidence	  was	  introduced.	  The	  line	  of	  the	  main	  argument	  commenced	  by	  pointing	   out	   the	   link	   between	   the	  European	  Convention	   on	  Human	  Rights	   and	  the	  European	  Union	  as	  a	  legal	  entity.	  It	  was	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  indeed	  a	  line	  of	  legal	   inheritance	   between	   the	   ECHR	   and	   the	   European	   Union.	   This	   fact	   is	   not	  limited	  in	  the	  formal	  declarations	  of	  the	  EU	  legislation	  on	  the	  respect	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  specifically	  the	  European	  Convention	  in	  them.	  It	  does	  not	  even	  stop	  in	  the	  participation	  of	  all	  EU	  member	  states	  in	  it	  as	  signatories.	  The	  Article	  6	  ECHR	  and	   the	   related	   case-­‐law	   of	   the	   ECtHR	   seem	   to	   have	   produced	   a	   criminal	   law	  ethos	   across	   Europe	   that	   intersects	   with	   different	   traditions	   and	   can	   serve	   as	  common	  denominator	  in	  criminal	  procedural	  matters.	  	  Furthermore,	  it	  was	  held	  that	  Article	  6	  ECHR	  functions	  as	  an	  illustration	  for	  the	  interdependence	  between	  fairness,	  evidence	  law	  and	  criminal	  procedure.	  Article	  6	  of	  ECHR	  can	  also	  serve	  as	  a	   legal	  dogmatic	  platform	  that	  reveals	   the	  relation	  and	   interdependence	   between	   different	   concepts	   of	   law	   such	   as	   fairness,	  criminal	  procedure	  and	  evidence.	  The	  element	  of	  connection	  between	  the	  three	  points	   towards	   the	   significance	   of	   fairness	   as	   key	   to	   criminal	   proceedings	   and	  also	  as	  one	  of	  the	  core	  concepts	  of	  evidence	  law	  alongside	  the	  traditional	  two,	  i.e.	  relevance	  and	  admissibility.	  	  On	   these	   grounds,	   a	   reading	   of	   Article	   6	   ECHR	   related	   to	   evidence	   law	   was	  proposed.	  Article	  6	  ECHR	  can	  be	  actually	  read	  with	  respect	  to	  evidence	  law.	  This	  reading	   links	  all	  paragraphs	  of	  Article	  6	  with	  evidence	   law	  as	   it	   intersects	  with	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fairness	  and	  criminal	  procedure.	  Paragraph	  1	  refers	  mainly	  to	  the	  latter	  whereas	  paragraph	   2	   to	   the	   former.	   Paragraph	   3	   is	   an	   application	   of	   rights	   that	   are	  significant	  to	  evidence	  law	  up	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  relates	  to	  fairness.	  There	  are	  direct	  and	  indirect	  references	  to	  evidence	  that	  enable	  an	  interpretation	  of	  Article	  6	  in	  evidence	  law	  terms.	  	  Based	   on	   this	   reading,	   the	   relevant	   case-­‐law	   of	   the	   Strasbourg	   court	   was	  critically	   analysed.	   Article	   6	   ECHR	   and	   the	   European	   Court’s	   of	   Human	   Rights	  case-­‐law	   constitute	   in	   fact	   a	   factory	   of	   principles	   for	   a	   fair	   criminal	   evidence	  concept.	  The	  reading	  of	  Article	  6	  ECHR	  in	  evidence	  law	  terms	  combined	  with	  the	  ECtHR	  case-­‐law	  on	  evidence	  matters	  lead	  to	  the	  formulation	  of	  some	  directions	  about	   them.	   Four	   of	   them	   stand	   out	   as	   principles	   and	   could	   constitute	   a	   fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept	  in	  Europe.	  This	  includes	  values	  that	  speak	  in	  favour	  of	  evidence	  confronted	  in	  a	   ‘vis-­‐à-­‐vis’	  manner,	  a	  presumption	  of	  innocence	  serving	  as	  modus	  judicandi,	  judicial	  decisions	  that	  are	  open,	  transparent	  and	  examinable	  and	   a	   liberal	   maxim	   seeking	   the	   protection	   of	   human	   dignity	   against	   state	  intervention.	  
	  Moving	   into	   the	   second	   part,	   the	   application	   of	   this	   evidential	   fairness	   to	   the	  European	  Union	  realm	  of	  criminal	  matters	  necessarily	  has	  to	  start	  with	  mutual	  recognition.	   Mutual	   recognition	   is	   the	   main	   means	   and	   rationale	   of	   the	   EU	  legislation	   in	   the	   area	   of	   European	   Criminal	   Law.	   It	   is	   argued	   though	   that	   the	  mutual	  recognition	  principle	  is	  not	  only	  a	  principle	  unknown	  to	  the	  criminal	  law	  traditions	  of	  Europe	  but	  also	  a	  concept	  that	  does	  not	  correspond	  to	  the	  general	  principles	  of	  EU	  Law.450	  Since	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	  is	  the	  illustration	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  fairness	  in	  criminal	  evidence,	  the	  related	  discussion	  cannot	  be	  avoided,	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  the	  fairest	  possible	  way	  of	  managing	  evidence	  in	  a	  united	  Europe.	  	  In	   this	   first	  chapter	  of	   the	  second	  part,	   the	   fair	  character	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  will	  be	  discovered	  in	  its	  placement	  within	  the	  EU	  Law	  structure	  and	  in	  particular	  in	  the	  area	  of	  judicial	  cooperation	  in	  criminal	  matters.	  The	  peculiarity,	  the	  special	  nature	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  as	  a	  mechanism	  of	  cooperation	  will	  be	  discovered	  as	   well	   as	   its	   accordance	   to	   fairness.	   However,	   it	   is	   a	   fact	   that	   the	   nature	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  450	  See	  more	  on	  that	  below	  under	  5.3.1.2-­‐3.	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mutual	  recognition	   in	  criminal	  matters	  within	   the	  EU	   is	  not	  absolute.	   It	  will	  be	  argued	  that	  by	  the	  particular	  adjustments	   that	  a	   fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept	  can	  bring	   to	   it,	  a	  more	  sensitive	  cooperation	  can	  be	   forwarded	   in	   favour	  of	   the	  protection	  of	  the	  European	  citizens.	  	  	  Mutual	   recognition	   will	   be	   the	   starting	   point,	   firstly	   as	   a	   conception	   of	  international	  cooperation,	  secondly	  as	  it	  is	  set	  within	  the	  EU	  Law	  area	  and	  lastly	  as	  it	  has	  become	  part	  and	  parcel	  of	  judicial	  cooperation	  on	  criminal	  matters.	  The	  related	  objections	  and	  arguments	  to	  it	  will	  be	  also	  examined.	  Before	  its	  interplay	  with	  fairness	  is	  proposed,	  it	  is	  crucial	  that	  mutual	  recognition	  can	  be	  presented	  as	   a	   sophisticated	   administrative	   concept	   that	   has	   its	   own	   distinctive	  characteristics.	  It	  is	  this	  very	  nature	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  that	  makes	  fairness	  a	  conception	   that	   can	   elevate	   its	   proper	   function	   in	   the	   sphere	   of	   European	  Criminal	  Law.	  	  	  Following	  that	  there	  will	  be	  some	  paragraphs	  on	  mutual	  legal	  assistance	  and	  the	  added	   value	   of	   MR	   instruments	   brought	   on	   the	   existing	   MLA	   regime.	   Before	  moving	  into	  the	  MR	  legislative	  instruments	  referring	  to	  evidence	  there	  will	  be	  a	  word	   on	   European	   Arrest	  Warrant	   related	   issues,	   as	   it	   was	   a	   first	   big	   test	   of	  applying	  mutual	   recognition	   in	  EU	  criminal	   law.	  Closing	   this	   section,	   there	   is	   a	  historical	   flashback	   on	   mutual	   recognition	   in	   EU	   Criminal	   Law	   and	   a	   short	  presentation	  of	  some	  important	  MR	  instruments	  in	  this	  area.	  	  After	  introducing	  the	  idea	  of	  interaction	  of	  fairness	  and	  mutual	  recognition,	  the	  rest	  of	  the	  thesis	  will	  focus	  on	  this	  proposition	  in	  a	  more	  practical	  level,	  namely	  the	   application	   of	   the	   concept	   of	   fair	   criminal	   evidence	   in	   the	  most	   forwarded	  initiatives	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   in	   criminal	   evidence.	   Therefore,	   the	   last	   two	  chapters	  will	  analyse	  the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  Framework	  Decision	  and	  the	  draft	  for	  a	  new	  Directive	  on	  a	  European	  Investigation	  Order	  respectively.	  The	  sixth	  chapter	  will	  begin	   in	   the	   light	  of	   two	  relatively	  new	   legislative	   initiatives,	  with	   the	   discussion	   about	   Article	   6	   and	   whether	   it	   covers	   also	   transnational	  judicial	  cooperation	  in	  criminal	  matters	  apart	  from	  the	  traditional	  criminal	  trial	  proceedings.	   This	   will	   be	   followed	   by	   reference	   to	   judicial	   cooperation	   as	   the	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platform	   of	   application	   of	   fairness,	   harmonisation	   of	   evidence	   –as	   the	   Lisbon	  Treaty	  provides	  the	  legal	  basis	  for	  it–	  and	  gathering	  and	  admissibility	  distinction	  in	   the	   light	   of	   the	   different	   activities	   of	   the	   issuing	   and	   executing	   states.	   This	  section	   will	   continue	   in	   particular	   with	   the	   European	   Evidence	   Warrant,	   its	  content,	   its	  main	   issues	   and	   the	   procedural	   safeguards	   provisioned	   in	   its	   text.	  Parallel	   to	   that	   the	   principles	   of	   evidential	   fairness	   as	   derived	   from	  ECHR	   and	  ECtHR’s	  case	  law	  will	  be	  applied	  to	  the	  instrument	  pointing	  in	  a	  critical	  way	  its	  strengths	  and	  flaws.	  	  	  In	   the	   last	   chapter	   of	   this	   part	   the	   same	  will	   apply	   to	   the	   new	   initiative	   for	   a	  European	  Investigation	  Order.	  The	  conception	  of	  a	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept	  in	  Europe	  with	  the	  ambition	  to	  be	  applied	  in	  the	  area	  of	   judicial	  cooperation	  in	  criminal	  matters	  of	   the	  European	  Union	  cannot	  by	  any	  means	  offer	  a	  definitive	  solution	   to	   the	   issues	   related	   to	   the	   transnational	   law	   enforcement	   under	   the	  rule	  of	  law	  in	  the	  European	  Union.	  But	  this	  way,	  as	  already	  mentioned,	  although	  thorny,	  is	  worth	  following	  as	  it	  can	  ensure	  a	  substantive	  concept	  of	  freedom	  in	  a	  border-­‐less	  Europe.	  	  








5.1.	  International	  Law	  
	  Mutual	   recognition	  as	  a	   concept	   is	  not	  a	  European	  Union	   idea.	  The	  problem	  of	  recognition	   of	   states	   and	   governments	   as	   Kelsen	   put	   it,451	  is	   older	   than	   the	  realisation	  of	  a	  Europe	  united.	  The	   talk	  about	  mutual	   recognition	  cannot	  avoid	  discussions	   with	   frameworks	   inherent	   to	   global	   administrative	   law,	   policy-­‐making	  and	  political	  theory.	  It	  is	  closely	  linked	  with	  them.	  This	  is	  the	  reason	  why	  the	  line	  of	  argument	  of	  this	  section	  embarks	  on	  cosmopolitan	  administration	  and	  its	  links	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  mutual	  recognition.	  The	  next	  mission	  is	  to	  comprehend	  the	   concepts	   of	   confidence	   and	   trust	   that	   are	   central	   to	   the	   principle	   before	  looking	   into	   its	   very	   features	   that	   are	   pertinent	   to	   the	   matter	   at	   hand.	   The	  approach	  aims	   to	  be	  contextual	  and	   instructive	   for	   the	  subsequent	  steps	  of	   the	  thesis	  on	  mutual	  recognition	  on	  the	  law	  of	  criminal	  evidence	  in	  the	  EU.	  	  
	  
	  
5.1.1.	   Mutual	   recognition	   traces	   in	   world	   history	   (or	   Law:	   global,	  
cosmopolitan	  administration)	  	  ‘Would	  you	  tell	  me,	  please,	  which	  way	  I	  ought	  to	  go	  from	  here?’	  Alice	  said	  to	  the	  Cheshire	  Cat.	   ‘That	  depends	  a	  good	  deal	  on	  where	  you	  want	   to	  get	   to,’	   said	   the	  Cat.452	  The	   legal-­‐political	   entities	   of	   human	   history	   are	   characterised	   by	   their	  own	   evolution	   in	   time;453	  from	   polis454	  to	   empire,	   then	   to	   medieval	   feudalism	  and	   finally	   the	  modern	   state.	  What	   is	  next?	  Where	  do	  we	  go	   from	  here?	   Is	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  451	  Hans	   Kelsen,	   ‘Recognition	   in	   International	   Law:	   Theoretical	   Observations’,	   35	   Am.	   J.	   Int’l	   L.	  (1941)	  605.	  	  452	  Lewis	  Carroll,	  Alice’s	  Adventures	  in	  Wonderland,	  Chapter	  VI,	  1865.	  453	  See	   readings	  on	  classical	   legal	   theory,	  D	  Boucher	  and	  P	  Kelly	   (eds.),	  Political	  Thinkers:	  From	  
Socrates	  to	  the	  Present,	   2002;	   I	  Hampsher-­‐Monk,	  A	  History	  of	  Modern	  Political	  Thought,	   1992;	  L	  Strauss	  &	  J	  Cropsey,	  History	  of	  Political	  Philosophy,	  1987;	  M	  Cohen,	  Political	  Philosophy	  from	  Plato	  
to	  Mao,	   2008	   (2nd	   ed.);	  W	   Ebenstein	  &	   A	   Ebenstein,	  Great	  Political	  Thinkers:	  From	  Plato	   to	   the	  
Present,	   2000	   (6th	   ed.);	   J.	  W.	   Harris,	   Legal	  Philosophies,	   1997	   (2nd	   ed.);	  M	   Forsyth	   &	  M	   Keens-­‐Soper,	   The	   Political	   Classics:	   A	   Guide	   to	   the	   Essential	   Texts	   from	   Plato	   to	   Rousseau,	   1988;	   W	  Morrison,	   Jurisprudence:	   From	   the	   Greeks	   to	   Postmodernism,	   1997;	   B	   Redhead	   (ed.),	   Plato	   to	  
NATO:	  Studies	  in	  Political	  Thought,	  1995.	  454	  Especially	   in	   Aristotle.	   See	   D	   Boucher	   and	   P	   Kelly,	   Political	   Thinkers:	   From	   Socrates	   to	   the	  
Present,	  ch.	  5;	  L	  Strauss	  &	  J	  Cropsey,	  History	  of	  Political	  Philosophy,	  pp	  118-­‐154;	  W	  Ebenstein	  &	  A	  Ebenstein,	  Great	  Political	  Thinkers:	  From	  Plato	  to	  the	  Present,	   pp	  75-­‐84;	  M	  Forsyth	  &	  M	  Keens-­‐Soper,	   The	   Political	   Classics:	   A	   Guide	   to	   the	   Essential	   Texts	   from	   Plato	   to	   Rousseau,	   ch.	   2;	   W	  Morrison,	  Jurisprudence:	  From	  the	  Greeks	  to	  Postmodernism,	  pp	  41-­‐52;	  B	  Redhead,	  Plato	  to	  NATO:	  
Studies	  in	  Political	  Thought,	  ch.	  2.	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modern	   state	   evolving	   into	   a	   new	   form?	   And	   in	   the	   meanwhile	   how	   do	   the	  modern	   sovereign	   states	   relate	   with	   one	   another?	   The	   lines	   from	   Alice’s	  Adventures	   in	  Wonderland	   should	   be	   informative	   in	   the	   thinking	   of	   everyone	  involved	   in	   the	  discussion	  about	   the	  present	  and	   future	  of	   international	   affairs	  and	  law.	  	  	  The	  age	  of	  modernity	  gave	  birth	  to	  the	  sovereign	  state	  overthrowing	  the	  feudal	  system	   and	   putting	   at	   its	   centre	   man,	   the	   drive	   of	   autonomy.	   The	   theistic	  overview	   of	   the	   world	   with	   its	   ecclesiastical	   structures	   and	   hierarchy,	  predominant	  in	  the	  pre-­‐modern	  world	  of	  kings,	  tenants-­‐in-­‐chief,	  knights	  (lords)	  and	   peasants	   were	   rejected	   in	   the	   new	   era	   of	   modernism.	   The	   Protestant	  Reformation	   fed	   to	   Thirty	   Years	   War,	   which	   ended	   with	   the	   Peace	   Treaty	   of	  Westphalia	  and	  the	  birth	  of	  the	  sovereign	  nation	  state.	  The	  origins	  of	  modernity	  were	   depicted	   in	   all	   areas	   of	   human	   experience:	   economics,	   science	   and	  technology,	  religion	  and	  art.	  In	  politics	  and	  law	  navigation	  and	  colonialism	  led	  to	  dilemmas	  such	  as	  that	  of	  modernity	  versus	  tradition;	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  the	   ‘old’	  peoples	  theoretically	  supported	  by	  the	  element	  of	  the	  ‘primitive’	  and	  the	  ‘state	  of	  nature’	   and	   on	   the	   other,	   the	   ‘new’	   worlds	   introducing	   fresh	   statuses	   (cf.	   the	  Mayflower	  Compact).	   In	  this	  scenery	  two	  models	  of	  sovereignty	  are	  competing:	  the	  absolutist	  and	  the	  contractarian,	  expressed	  in	  the	  divine	  rights	  of	  kings	  (the	  French	  ‘Sun	  King’	  –	  Louis	  XIV)	  and	  the	  idea	  of	  shared	  sovereignty	  (English	  Civil	  War	  and	  Glorious	  Revolution).	  	  	  The	   pursuit	   of	   utopia,	   an	   integral	   concept	   to	   the	   decoding	   of	   the	   new	  modern	  world,	   led	   to	   complete	   worldviews	   on	   political-­‐legal	   entities	   that	   in	   different	  ways	   aimed	   at	   perfection.	   Hobbes’s	   Leviathan 455 	  pointed	   to	   enlightened	  monarchy	   with	   the	   purpose	   of	   perfecting	   kings	   and	   princes,	   whereas	   Locke’s	  ideal	   of	   liberal,	   parliamentary	   democracy	   proposed	   the	   perfecting	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  455	  See	  C	  Schmitt,	  The	  Leviathan	  in	  the	  State	  Theory	  of	  Thomas	  Hobbes	  –	  Meaning	  and	  Failure	  of	  a	  
Political	  Symbol	  (trans.	  G.	  D.	  Schwab	  and	  E	  Hilfstein,	  1996),	  1938;	  D	  Boucher	  and	  P	  Kelly,	  Political	  
Thinkers:	   From	  Socrates	   to	   the	  Present,	   ch.	   10;	   I	   Hampsher-­‐Monk,	   A	  History	  of	  Modern	  Political	  
Thought,	   ch.	   3;	   L	   Strauss	   &	   J	   Cropsey,	   History	   of	   Political	   Philosophy,	   pp	   396-­‐420;	   M	   Cohen,	  
Political	  Philosophy	  from	  Plato	  to	  Mao,	  ch.	  3;	  M	  Forsyth	  &	  M	  Keens-­‐Soper,	  The	  Political	  Classics:	  A	  
Guide	   to	   the	  Essential	  Texts	   from	  Plato	   to	  Rousseau,	   ch.	   5;	   B	   Redhead,	  Plato	   to	  NATO:	  Studies	   in	  
Political	  Thought,	  ch.	  7;	  W	  Morrison,	  Jurisprudence:	  From	  the	  Greeks	  to	  Postmodernism,	  pp	  75-­‐102.	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parliaments.456	  Finally,	   Rousseau’s	   focus	   on	   the	   cives	   of	   Sparta	   or	   the	   Roman	  Republic	   spoke	   in	   favour	   of	   perfecting	   citizens.457 	  The	   nature	   of	   individual	  human	  beings,	  which	  according	  to	  Rousseau	  are	  born	  free,	  is	  shared	  also	  in	  that	  sense	   by	   Kant	   in	   his	   own	   concept	   of	   freedom	  which	   is	   crucial	   in	   his	   thinking.	  Kant	   premised	   a	   link	   between	   democracies	   and	   peace.458	  Kant’s	   ideas	   in	   his	  perpetual	  peace459	  draw	  the	  picture	  of	  what	  is	  known	  today	  as	  cosmopolitanism.	  	  Although	  the	  sovereignty	  of	   the	  modern	  state	  emerged	  as	  a	  desired	  good,	  soon	  the	  reality	  of	  wars	  and	  the	  dynamics	  between	  competing	  states	  gave	  birth	  to	  the	  idea	  of	  ius	  cosmopoliticum	  that	  would	  not	  only	  protect	  us	  from	  war	  and	  establish	  peace	   but	   also	   support	   cooperation	   and	   prosperity.460	  For	   the	   need	   of	   the	  development	   of	   an	   international	   law,	   a	   law	   of	   the	   nations	   (ius	   gentium)	   Hugo	  Grotius	   and	   Samuel	   Pufendorf	   had	   already	   spoken.461	  But	   the	   contribution	   of	  Kant	  was	  his	  setting	  forth	  of	  principles	  of	  international	  right	  that	  are	  binding	  on	  all	  human	  beings	  collectively.462	  Cosmopolitanism	  therefore	  is	  founded	  on	  moral	  ideas.463	  However,	   a	   pure	   cosmopolitanism	   cannot	   generate	   the	   full	   range	   of	  obligations	   its	   advocates	   generally	   wish	   to	   ascribe	   to	   it.464	  Something	   more	  utilised	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  same	  principle	  must	  be	  put	  at	  work.	  As	  it	  is	  said,	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  456	  See	  D	  Boucher	  and	  P	  Kelly,	  Political	  Thinkers:	  From	  Socrates	  to	  the	  Present,	  ch.	  11;	  I	  Hampsher-­‐Monk,	   A	   History	   of	   Modern	   Political	   Thought,	   ch.	   2;	   L	   Strauss	   &	   J	   Cropsey,	   History	   of	   Political	  
Philosophy,	   pp	  476-­‐512;	  W	  Ebenstein	  &	  A	  Ebenstein,	  Great	  Political	  Thinkers:	  From	  Plato	  to	  the	  
Present,	  pp	  380-­‐388;	  M	  Cohen,	  Political	  Philosophy	  from	  Plato	  to	  Mao,	  ch.	  4;	  M	  Forsyth	  &	  M	  Keens-­‐Soper,	   The	   Political	   Classics:	   A	   Guide	   to	   the	   Essential	   Texts	   from	   Plato	   to	   Rousseau,	   ch.	   6;	   B	  Redhead,	  Plato	  to	  NATO:	  Studies	  in	  Political	  Thought,	  ch.	  8.	  457	  See	  D	  Boucher	  and	  P	  Kelly,	  Political	  Thinkers:	  From	  Socrates	  to	  the	  Present,	  ch.	  14;	  I	  Hampsher-­‐Monk,	   A	  History	   of	  Modern	   Political	   Thought,	   ch.	   IV;	   L	   Strauss	   &	   J	   Cropsey,	  History	   of	   Political	  
Philosophy,	  pp	  559-­‐580;	  W	  Ebenstein	  &	  A	  Ebenstein,	  pp	  442-­‐451;	  M	  Cohen,	  Political	  Philosophy	  
from	   Plato	   to	   Mao,	   ch.	   5;	   M	   Forsyth	   &	   M	   Keens-­‐Soper,	   The	   Political	   Classics:	   A	   Guide	   to	   the	  
Essential	   Texts	   from	   Plato	   to	   Rousseau,	   ch.	   7;	   B	   Redhead,	   Plato	   to	   NATO:	   Studies	   in	   Political	  
Thought,	  ch.	  9.	  458	  J	   MacMillan,	   ‘Immanuel	   Kant	   and	   the	   democratic	   peace’	   in	   Classical	   Theory	   in	   International	  
Relations	  (ed.	  B	  Jahn),	  2006,	  pp	  52-­‐73	  in	  58.	  	  459	  I	  Kant,	  Zum	  ewigen	  Frieden.	  Ein	  philosophischer	  Entwurf,	  1795.	  460	  See	   A.	  W.	  Wood,	   ‘Kant’s	   Project	   for	   Perpetual	   Peace’	   in	   Cosmopolitics:	   Thinking	  and	  Feeling	  
beyond	   the	  Nation	   (P.	   Cheah,	   B.	   Robbins	   eds.),	   1998,	   pp	   59-­‐76	   and	   especially	   in	   60-­‐61	   where	  Kant’s	  ideas	  are	  combined	  and	  compared	  with	  those	  of	  Rousseau	  and	  Abbé	  de	  Saint-­‐Pierre.	  461	  The	   concept	  was	   also	  known	   in	   the	   ancient	  world.	   See	   also	   I	  Kant,	  Zum	  ewigen	  Frieden:	  Ein	  
philosophischer	   Entwurf.	   Kants	   Gesammelte	   Schriften.	   Ausgabe	   der	   königlich	   preussischen	  
Akademie	  der	  Wissenschaften	  (AK)	  8:341-­‐86	  in	  AK	  8:355.	  	  462	  A.	  Wood,	  ibid.	  in	  61.	  463	  J	  Thompson,	  ‘Community	  Identity	  and	  World	  Citizenship’	  in	  Re-­‐imagining	  Political	  Community	  
–	  Studies	  in	  Cosmopolitan	  Democracy	  (eds.	  D	  Archibugi,	  D	  Held	  &	  M	  Köhler),	  1998,	  pp	  179-­‐197	  in	  191.	  464	  R	  Bellamy	  and	  D	  Castiglione,	   ‘Between	  Cosmopolis	  and	  Community:	  Three	  Models	  of	  Rights	  and	   Democracy	   within	   the	   European	   Union’	   in	   Re-­‐imagining	   Political	   Community	   –	   Studies	   in	  
Cosmopolitan	  Democracy	  (eds.	  D	  Archibugi,	  D	  Held	  &	  M	  Köhler),	  1998,	  pp	  152-­‐178	  in	  163.	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best	  theoretical	  analogy	  to	  Kant’s	  conception	  of	  cosmopolitan	  law	  is	  the	  mutual	  recognition	  approach.465	  	  	  	  
5.1.2.	  Mutual	  recognition	  as	  administrative	  tool	  	  We	  live	   in	  a	  world,	  which	  is	  changing	  due	  to	   ‘processes	  of	  globalization’.466	  Our	  world	   is	   a	   world	   of	   ‘overlapping	   communities	   of	   fate’,	   where	   the	   fate	   of	   one	  country	   and	   that	   of	   another	   are	   more	   entwined	   than	   ever	   before.467	  In	   our	  postmodern	   world,	   ‘mutual	   recognition	   regimes	   are	   at	   the	   core	   of	   the	  sovereignty-­‐globalization	  nexus’.468	  The	  tension	  between	  these	  poles	  is	  explored	  in	   depth	   by	   global	   administrative	   law.	   According	   to	   Kingsbury,	   Krisch	   and	  
Stewart,	   global	   administrative	   law	   comprises	   the	   mechanisms,	   principles,	  practices,	  and	  supporting	  social	  understandings	  that	  promote	  or	  otherwise	  affect	  the	  accountability	  of	  global	  administrative	  bodies,	  in	  particular	  by	  ensuring	  they	  meet	  adequate	  standards	  of	  transparency,	  participation,	  reasoned	  decision,	  and	  legality,	   and	   by	   providing	   effective	   review	   of	   the	   rules	   and	   decisions	   they	  make.469	  	  	  The	   category	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   understood	   in	   its	   purpose,	   function	   and	  expression	  provides	  a	  constructive	  lens	  for	  a	  holistic	  perspective	  of	  the	  scenery	  and	   interplay	   of	   global	   administrative	   law.	   This	   approach,	   however,	   calls	   into	  question	   any	   sharp	   distinction	   between	   national	   and	   international	   laws,	  institutions	   and	   enforcement	   strategies.	   Mutual	   recognition	   comprises	   on	   the	  other	  hand	  intermingled	  laws	  of	  sovereign	  states	  with	  the	  purpose	  of	  composing	  a	  global	  legal	  order.	  In	  fact,	  mutual	  recognition	  may	  indeed	  be	  the	  ‘foremost	  legal	  incarnation’	   of	  what	   Kant	   referred	   to	   as	   ius	   cosmopoliticum	   	   –	   that	   is	   in	   other	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  465	  K	  Nicolaidis	  and	  G	  Shaffer,	   ‘Transnational	  Mutual	  Recognition	  Regimes:	  Governance	  without	  Global	  Government’,	  in	  299.	  466	  D	   Held,	   ‘Democracy	   and	   Globalization’	   in	   Re-­‐imagining	   Political	   Community	   –	   Studies	   in	  
Cosmopolitan	  Democracy	  (eds.	  D	  Archibugi,	  D	  Held	  &	  M	  Köhler),	  1998,	  pp	  11-­‐27	  in	  13.	  467	  Ibid.	  in	  24.	  468	  K	  Nicolaidis	  and	  G	  Shaffer,	   ‘Transnational	  Mutual	  Recognition	  Regimes:	  Governance	  without	  Global	  Government’,	  in	  266.	  469	  B	  Kingsbury,	  N	  Krisch	  and	  RB	  Stewart,	  ‘The	  Emergence	  of	  Global	  Administrative	  Law’	  Law	  and	  
Contemporary	  Problems,	  vol	  68,	  2005,	  pp	  15-­‐61	  in	  17.	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words,	  the	  law	  that	  exists	  between	  domestic	  and	  international	  law,	  the	  law	  that	  defines	   the	   obligations	   of	   a	   state	   regarding	   citizens	   of	   other	   states.470	  Mutual	  recognition	  seems	  prescriptively	  typified	  by	  cosmopolitan	  law	  and	  described	  in	  function	  by	  global	  administrative	  law	  that	  explores	  its	  characteristics	   in	  play.	  If	  that	  is	  the	  case,	  by	  discovering	  these	  aspects	  using	  the	  paradigm	  of	  international	  governance,	   feasible	   conclusions	   can	  be	  made	   for	  EU	   cooperation	   especially	   in	  criminal	  matters.	  In	  this	  context,	  a	  central	  contour	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  will	  be	  approached	  next,	  i.e.	  the	  keynote	  of	  trust.	  	  	  
5.1.3.	  Confidence	  &	  Trust	  	  ‘The	  term	  mutual	  recognition	  can	  be	  broken	  down	  into	  its	  two	  components.	  The	  ‘recognition’	   component	  entails	   recognition	  of	   the	   ‘equivalence’,	   ‘compatibility’,	  or	  (at	   least)	   ‘acceptability’	  of	  a	  counterpart’s	  regulatory	  system.	  The	   ‘mutuality’	  component	   indicates	   that	   the	   reallocation	   of	   authority	   is	   reciprocal	   and	  simultaneous’.471	  Both	   terms	   entail	   and	   presuppose	   trust	   and	   confidence.	   The	  idea	  that	  trust	  is	  essential	  for	  social,	  economic,	  and	  political	  life	  is	  a	  very	  old	  one	  going	  back	  at	  least	  to	  Confucius	  who	  suggested	  that	  trust,	  weapons,	  and	  food	  are	  the	   essentials	   of	   government:	   food,	   because	  well-­‐fed	   citizens	   are	   less	   likely	   to	  make	  trouble,	  trust	  because	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  food,	  citizens	  are	  likely	  to	  believe	  that	   their	   leaders	  are	  working	  on	   the	  problem,	  and	  weapons	   in	  case	  neither	  of	  the	  other	  two	  work’.	   In	  more	  recent	  times,	  Hobbes	  and	  Locke	  also	  wrote	  about	  the	   importance	   of	   trust,	   and	  Adam	  Smith	   pointed	   out	   that,	  without	   it,	   efficient	  economic	   transactions	   are	   impossible.	   Tocqueville	   placed	   trust,	   and	   voluntary	  association	  as	  the	  mechanism	  for	  creating	  it,	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  his	  understanding	  of	  stable	   democracy,	   an	   idea	   passed	   on	   by	   John	   Stuart	   Mill,	   Georg	   Simmel,	  Ferdinand	   Toennies,	   Emile	   Durkheim,	   and	   Max	   Weber	   into	   the	   twentieth	  century.472	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  470	  K	  Nicolaidis	  and	  G	  Shaffer,	   ‘Transnational	  Mutual	  Recognition	  Regimes:	  Governance	  without	  Global	  Government’,	  in	  266.	  471	  Ibid.	  in	  264.	  472	  Kenneth	  Newton,	   ‘Social	   and	   Political	   Trust’	   in	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Political	  Beahavior	   (R.	   J.	  Dalton,	  H.	  D.	  Klingemann,	  eds.),	  2007,	  p	  342.	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Plenty	   has	   been	   written	   on	   trust	   in	   many	   different	   disciplines.473	  In	   a	   social	  context,	  trust	  and	  confidence	  have	  several	  connotations.	  The	  typical	  definition	  of	  trust	  includes	  the	  idea	  of	  confidence	  and	  follows	  the	  general	  intuition	  about	  trust	  containing	   such	   elements	   as:	   the	   willingness	   of	   one	   party	   (trustor)	   to	   be	  vulnerable	   to	   the	   actions	   of	   another	   party	   (trustee);	   reasonable	   expectation	  (confidence)	  of	  the	  trustor	  that	  the	  trustee	  will	  behave	  in	  a	  way	  beneficial	  to	  the	  trustor;	  risk	  of	  harm	  to	  the	  trustor	  if	  the	  trustee	  will	  not	  behave	  accordingly;	  and	  the	  absence	  of	   trustor’s	   enforcement	  or	   control	   over	   actions	  performed	  by	   the	  trustee.474	  There	  have	  been	  several	  attempts	  at	  defining	  the	  differences	  between	  confidence	   and	   trust	   (if	   there	   are	   any)	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   research	   in	   social	  sciences.475	  Some	   would	   argue	   that	   trust	   is	   based	   on	   value	   similarity,	   and	  confidence	  is	  based	  vastly	  on	  past	  performance.476	  In	  addition,	  for	  many	  thinkers	  trust	  is	  considered	  to	  be	  a	  more	  subjective	  value,	  while	  confidence	  is	  understood	  by	  more	  objective	  standards.	  	  	  Solid	   confidence	   and	   trust	   are	   nevertheless	   desirable	   for	   intergovernmental	  transnational	   cooperation	   and	   if	   constant	   between	   sovereign	   polities	   would	  spare	  us	  the	  discussion	  of	  the	   ‘prisoner’s	  dilemma’.477	  In	  a	  more	  technical	   level,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  473	  See,	  e.g.,	  H.	  Garfinkel,	  ‘A	  Conception	  of,	  and	  Experiments	  with	  ‘Trust’	  as	  a	  Condition	  of	  Stable,	  Concerted	  Actions’,	  in	  Motivation	  and	  Social	  Interaction,	  Cognitive	  Determinants	  (ed.	  O.J.	  Harvey),	  1963	   (in	   psychology);	   S.	   Herbert	   Frankel,	  Money:	   Two	   Philosophies:	   The	   Conflict	   of	   Trust	   and	  
Authority,	  1977	  (in	  social	  psychology);	  F.	  Fukuyama,	  Trust:	  The	  Social	  Virtues	  and	  The	  Creation	  of	  
Prosperity,	   1995,	   (in	   political	   science);	   R.D.	   Putnam,	  Bowling	  Alone:	  The	  Collapse	  and	  Revival	  of	  
American	  Community,	  2000,	  (in	  political	  science);	  D.	  Gambetta	  (ed.),	  Trust:	  Making	  and	  Breaking	  
Cooperative	  Relations,	  1988	  (also	  in	  political	  science).	  474	  R.	   C.	   Mayer,	   J.	   H.	   Davis,	   F.	   D.	   Schoorman,	   ‘An	   integrative	   model	   of	   organizational	   trust’,	  
Academy	  of	  Management	  Review,	  1995,	  20	  (3),	  pp	  709-­‐734.	  475	  T.C.	   Earle,	   ‘Trust	   in	   risk	  management:	   A	  model-­‐based	   review	   of	   empirical	   research’	   in	  Risk	  
Analysis,	  vol	  30,	  2010,	  pp	  541-­‐574.	  476	  M	   Siegrist,	   ‘Trust	   and	   Confidence:	   The	   Difficulties	   in	   Distinguishing	   the	   Two	   Concepts	   in	  Research’	  in	  Risk	  Analysis,	  vol	  30,	  2010,	  pp	  1022-­‐1024.	  477	  S	  Kuhn,	   ‘Prisoner’s	  Dilemma’,	  The	  Stanford	  Encyclopedia	  of	  Philosophy	   (Spring	  2009	  Edition),	  (ed.	  E.N.	   Zalta),	  URL	  =	  http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/prisoner-­‐dilemma/.	  ‘Cooperation	   is	   usually	   analysed	   in	   game	   theory	   by	  means	   of	   a	   non-­‐zero-­‐sum	   game	   called	   the	  ‘Prisoner’s	   Dilemma’	   (Axelrod,	   1984).	   The	   two	   players	   in	   the	   game	   can	   choose	   between	   two	  moves,	  either	  ‘cooperate’	  or	  ‘defect’.	  The	  idea	  is	  that	  each	  player	  gains	  when	  both	  cooperate,	  but	  if	   only	  one	  of	   them	  cooperates,	   the	  other	  one,	  who	  defects,	  will	   gain	  more.	   If	  both	  defect,	  both	  lose	  (or	  gain	  very	   little)	  but	  not	  as	  much	  as	  the	   ‘cheated’	  co-­‐operator	  whose	  cooperation	   is	  not	  returned.	  A	  classic	  example	  of	  the	  prisoner’s	  dilemma	  (PD)	  is	  presented	  as	  follows:	  two	  suspects	  are	   arrested	   by	   the	   police.	   The	   police	   have	   insufficient	   evidence	   for	   a	   conviction,	   and,	   having	  separated	   the	   prisoners,	   visit	   each	   of	   them	   to	   offer	   the	   same	   deal.	   If	   one	   testifies	   for	   the	  prosecution	  against	   the	  other	   (defects)	   and	   the	  other	   remains	   silent	   (cooperates),	   the	  defector	  goes	  free	  and	  the	  silent	  accomplice	  receives	  the	  full	  10-­‐year	  sentence.	  If	  both	  remain	  silent,	  both	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global	   governance	   is	   highly	   interested	   in	   building	   more	   solid	   trust	   and	  confidence	   relationships	   between	   states.	   For	   this	   purpose	   the	   adoption	   of	  confidence	  building	  measures	  is	  deemed	  to	  be	  of	  great	  importance.	  It	  is	  true	  that	  the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	   is	  extremely	  demanding	   in	   terms	  of	  mutual	  trust.478	  The	  adoption	  of	   even	   short-­‐term	  measures	  of	   that	  nature	   can	  possibly	  build	   long-­‐term	   trust	   among	   the	   cooperating	   agents.	   On	   a	   regulatory	   level,	  mutual	  recognition	  arrangements	  foster	  regulatory	  coordination	  and	  confidence-­‐building	  as	  opposed	   to	  any	  other	  kind	  of	  system	  or	  approach	   that	   involves	  dry	  unilateral	   recognition	   of	   foreign	   standards	   and	   procedures. 479 	  Mutual	  recognition	   involves	   a	   dynamic	   process	   of	   regulatory	   coordination,	   confidence	  building,	  and	  even	  more	  optimal	  allocation	  of	  administrative	  authority	   in	  order	  to	   attempt	   to	   ensure	   that	   whatever	   standards	   are	   applied	   in	   any	   area	   of	  cooperation	   are	   adequate	   and	   appropriate.480	  Hence,	   the	   ideas	   of	   trust	   and	  confidence	   are	   cardinal	   for	   mutual	   recognition	   and	   prerequisite	   to	   its	   proper	  existence	  and	  function.	  	  	  
5.1.4.	  Mutual	  recognition	  character	  	  In	   this	   section	   will	   be	   discussed	   some	   aspects	   of	   the	   character	   of	   mutual	  recognition	   that	   make	   it	   unique	   as	   a	   government	   tool.	   A	   lot	   of	   things	   could	  qualify	  as	  features	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  and	  indeed	  have	  been	  in	  the	  writings	  of	  many	   scholars	   such	   as	   coordination,481	  tolerance482	  or	   negative	   integration.483	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  prisoners	  are	  sentenced	  to	  only	  six	  months	  in	   jail	   for	  a	  minor	  charge.	   If	  each	  betrays	  the	  other,	  each	  receives	  a	   five-­‐year	  sentence.	  Each	  prisoner	  must	  choose	  to	  betray	  the	  other	  or	  to	  remain	  silent.	  Each	  one	  is	  assured	  that	  the	  other	  would	  not	  know	  about	  the	  betrayal	  before	  the	  end	  of	  the	  investigation.	  How	  should	  the	  prisoners	  act?’	  478	  D	  Majone,	  Regulating	  Europe,	  1996,	  p	  279.	  479	  K	  Nicolaidis	  and	  G	  Shaffer,	   ‘Transnational	  Mutual	  Recognition	  Regimes:	  Governance	  without	  Global	  Government’,	  in	  298.	  480	  Ibid.	  in	  316.	  481	  ‘At	  face	  value,	  mutual	  recognition	  implies	  forgoing	  coordination	  and	  relying	  on	  the	  willingness	  of	  governments	  to	  implement	  law	  of	  other	  states’,	  A	  Benz,	  ‘Combined	  Modes	  of	  Governance	  in	  EU	  Policymaking’	   in	   Innovative	   Governance	   in	   the	   European	   Union	   –	   The	   Politics	   of	   Multilevel	  
Policymaking	  (eds.	  I	  Tömmel,	  A	  Verdun),	  2009,	  pp	  27-­‐44	  in	  34.	  482	  ‘Tolerance	  has	  been	   said	   to	  be	   a	  defining	   feature	  of	  mutual	   recognition’,	  K	  Nicolaidis	   and	  G	  Shaffer,	  ‘Transnational	  Mutual	  Recognition	  Regimes:	  Governance	  without	  Global	  Government’,	  in	  317.	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These	   qualities	   have	   been	   distinguished	   here	   from	   some	   attributes	   of	   mutual	  recognition	  which	  are	  actually	  backwash	  of	  its	  managed	  character	  and	  therefore	  more	  technical	  rather	  than	  inbuilt.	  The	  main	  features	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  that	  demand	  our	  attention	  though	  are	  its	  conditionality	  and	  extraterritoriality.	  	  	  Mutual	  recognition,	  in	  all	   its	  incarnations,	   is	  conditional.484	  As	  Nicolaidis	  puts	  it,	  ‘mutual	  recognition	  regimes	  set	  the	  conditions	  governing	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  validity	   of	   foreign	   laws,	   regulations,	   standards,	   and	   certification	   procedures	  among	  states	  in	  order	  to	  assure	  host	  country	  regulatory	  officials	  and	  citizens	  that	  their	   application	  within	   their	   borders	   is	   ‘compatible’	   with	   their	   own,	   and	   that	  incoming	   products	   and	   services	   are	   safe.	   These	   conditions	   involve	   different	  types	  of	  obligations	  for	  home	  states,	  who	  benefit	  from	  conditional	  recognition	  of	  the	  laws	  and	  regulations	  applicable	  to	  products,	  persons,	  firms	  and	  services,	  and	  host	  states,	  who	  forego	  the	  application	  of	   their	  own	  rules	  to	  products,	  persons,	  firms	   and	   services,	   provided	   that	   the	   agreed	   conditions	   are	  met’.485	  This	   is	   the	  reason	  why	  mutual	  recognition	  is	  always	  a	  managed	  exercise.486	  	  If	   ‘jurisdiction	   speaks	   the	   law’487	  then	   mutual	   recognition	   is	   a	   translating	   or	  interpretative	   instrument	   of	   it,	   since	   recognition	   creates	   extraterritoriality.	   ‘In	  the	   diplomatic	   world,	   this	   happens	   in	   a	   minimalist	   guise	   through	   the	  establishment	   of	   embassies	   as	   extraterritorial	   islands	   of	   home	   country	  sovereignty	  in	  the	  host	  state.	  But	  when	  one	  examines	  states’	  recognition	  of	  what	  the	   others	   do,	   rather	   than	   of	   their	   respective	   existence	   and	   boundaries,	   the	  islands	  of	  extraterritoriality	  are	   larger	  and	  more	  pervasive.	   In	   fact,	   they	  cannot	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  483	  ‘The	   cornerstone	   of	   negative	   integration	   is	   the	   principle	   of	  mutual	   recognition’,	   S	   Lavenex,	  ‘Transgovernmentalism	  in	  the	  Area	  of	  Freedom,	  Security	  and	  Justice’	  in	  Innovative	  Governance	  in	  
the	  European	  Union	  –	  The	  Politics	  of	  Multilevel	  Policymaking	  (eds.	  I	  Tömmel,	  A	  Verdun),	  2009,	  pp	  255-­‐271	  in	  262.	  484	  K	  Nicolaidis	  and	  G	  Shaffer,	   ‘Transnational	  Mutual	  Recognition	  Regimes:	  Governance	  without	  Global	  Government’,	  in	  264.	  485	  Ibid.	  486	  K	   Nicolaidis,	   ‘Globalization	   with	   Human	   Faces:	   Managed	   Mutual	   Recognition	   and	   the	   Free	  Movement	   of	   Professionals’,	   in	  The	  Principle	  of	  Mutual	  Recognition	   in	   the	  European	   Integration	  
Process	   (Fiorella	   Kostoris	   Padoa	   Schioppa	   ed.),	   2004.	   ‘There	   is	   also	   a	   managed	   character	   that	  resides	  with	  mutual	  recognition’,	  ibid.	  in	  287.	  487	  C	  Douzinas,	  ‘Speaking	  Law:	  on	  bare	  theological	  and	  cosmopolitan	  sovereignty’	  in	  International	  
Law	  and	  its	  others	  (ed.	  A	  Orford),	  2006,	  pp	  35-­‐56	  in	  41.	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be	  thought	  of	  as	  islands	  anymore,	  but	  more	  aptly	  as	  rivers	  and	  streams	  flowing	  from	  one	  domestic	  legal	  landscape	  to	  another’.488	  	  	  	  
5.1.5.	  Mutual	  recognition	  attributes	  
	  As	  mentioned	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  mutual	  recognition	  can	  be	  managed.	  This	  managing	   or	   fine-­‐tuning	   of	   its	   functions	   leads	   to	   the	   optimization	   or	  improvement	  of	   the	  desired	  results.	  The	  attributes	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  could	  be	  identified	  within	  the	  scope	  of	  four	  categories	  according	  to	  Nikolaidis:489	  prior	  conditions,	  automaticity,	  scope	  of	  access	  and	  ex-­‐post	  guarantees.	  Transnational	  regulatory	  compatibility	  can	  be	  calibrated	  through	  institutional	  development	  in	  both	   supranational	   and	   transnational	   level.	   These	   four	   categories	   found	   an	  extended	  application	  in	  areas	  of	  market	  such	  as	  products,	  financial	  services	  and	  professions.	  	  These	   attributes	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   observed	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   global	  administrative	  law	  serve	  as	  a	  guiding	  compass	  for	  the	  success	  of	  the	  application	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  in	  any	  area	  of	  cooperation.	  If	  this	  categorisation	  is	  indeed	  a	  meta-­‐theory	  and	  not	  a	  description	  of	  what	  happened	  and	  worked	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  the	  EU	  internal	  market,	  then	  mutual	  recognition	  when	  managed	  appropriately	  can	  be	  applied	  substantially	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  EU	  criminal	  law.	  	  	  	  
5.1.6.	  From	  global	  to	  regional	  administration	  	  
	  Mutual	   recognition	   as	   a	   principle	   is	   a	   category	   in	   many	   ways	   different	   in	  comparison	  with	   the	  classical	   legal	  principles.	  The	  word	   legal	   to	  a	  great	  extent	  carries	  the	  weight	  of	  a	  moral	  category.	  Besides,	  law	  is	  regarded	  widely	  as	  applied	  moral	   philosophy.	   The	   relation	   between	   morality	   and	   law	   is	   close.	   Mutual	  recognition	  is	  a	  tool	  that	  although	  has	  a	  legal	  background	  its	  main	  function	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  488	  K	  Nicolaidis	  and	  G	  Shaffer,	   ‘Transnational	  Mutual	  Recognition	  Regimes:	  Governance	  without	  Global	  Government’,	  in	  267.	  	  489	  Ibid.	  in	  290.	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essence	   is	   technical	   with	   minor	   moral	   colours.490 	  The	   main	   aim	   of	   mutual	  recognition	   is	   to	  promote	  cooperation	  between	   legal	  entities.	  Regulated	  by	   law	  such	   a	   tool	   can	   forward	   the	   particular	   goals	   of	   such	   entities,	   i.e.	   of	   sovereign	  states	   in	   a	   safe	   and	   transparent	   framework.	   Moreover,	   mutual	   recognition’s	  intrinsic	   characteristics	   can	  make	   it	   adaptable	   indeed	   in	   areas	   that	   are	   in	   the	  core	  of	  legal	  thinking	  such	  as	  the	  criminal	  law,	  where	  morality	  has	  a	  significant	  role	  to	  play.	  Thus	  mutual	  recognition	  with	  the	  appropriate	  legal	  framework	  that	  tunes	   its	   functions	   could	   be	   adopted	   in	   completely	   different	   areas	   where	  cooperation	  is	  sought.	  	  That	  is	  also	  true	  for	  the	  European	  Union,	  as	  its	  member	  states	  have	  already	  set	  common	  goals	  and	  share	  common	  cultures	  and	  trends	  even	  in	  legal	  matters	  with	  more	  or	  less	  divergence	  from	  one	  another.	  The	  concept	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  as	  an	   administrative	   tool	   in	   international	   relations	   became	   inevitably	   a	   part	   of	  managing	  cooperation	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  European	  Communities	  and	  the	  European	  Union,	  as	  we	  will	  see	  next.	  	  	  
5.2.	  EU	  Law	  	  The	  Treaty	  of	  Rome	  introduced	  in	  1958	  the	  common	  market.	  The	  main	  aiming	  of	  it	  was	  the	  elimination	  of	  trade	  barriers	  among	  the	  European	  member-­‐states.	  This	  goal	   would	   bring	  more	   economic	   prosperity	   and	   contribute	   to	   ‘an	   ever	   closer	  union	  among	  the	  peoples	  of	  Europe’.491	  The	  internal	  market	  was	  a	  step	  forward	  as	   a	   more	   decisive	   approach	   towards	   the	   same	   aims.	   The	   incarnation	   of	   this	  textually	  has	  been	  the	  European’s	  Commission’s	  White	  Paper	  on	  completing	  the	  internal	  market	  (June	  1985)	  and	  it	  was	  incorporated	  in	  the	  Treaty	  by	  the	  1986	  Single	   European	   Act.492	  The	   internal	   market	   was:	   intended	   to	   create	   ‘an	   area	  without	   internal	   frontiers	   in	   which	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   goods,	   persons,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  490	  Although	  history	  proves	  the	  opposite	  (cf.	  ius	  cosmopoliticum	  in	  5.1.1.)	  491	  European	  Parliament:	  http://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/3_1_0_en.htm.	  492	  Commission	  of	  the	  European	  Communities,	  Completing	  the	  Internal	  Market,	  White	  Paper	  from	  the	  Commission	  to	  the	  European	  Council	  (Milan	  28-­‐29	  June	  1985),	  COM(85)	  310	  final,	  Brussels	  14	  June	  1985.	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services	   and	   capital	   is	   ensured’;	   accompanied	   by	   changes	   in	   the	   Community	  legislative	  system,	  designed	   to	  encourage	  adoption	  of	   the	  measures	  needed	   for	  its	   completion.493	  The	   principle	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   made	   its	   way	   to	   the	  European	  Union	  eventually.494	  It	  was	  not	  the	  first	  medium	  of	  cooperation	  but	  it	  has	   been	   proved	   to	   be	   the	   most	   efficient.	   Next	   we	   will	   concentrate	   on	   how	  mutual	  recognition	  developed	  in	  the	  EU	  area	  leaving	  aside	  for	  the	  moment	  other	  types	  of	  cooperation.	  	  
	  
	  
5.2.1.	  Mutual	  recognition	  in	  the	  EU:	  a	  paradigm	  of	  governance	  	  	  In	   recent	   years,	   the	   governance	   approach	   has	   increasingly	   raised	   attention	  among	   scholars	   of	   policymaking	   in	   the	   European	   Union. 495 	  Despite	   the	  omnipresence	   of	   ‘governance’	   in	   the	   study	   of	   the	   EU,	   governance	   is	   still	  ambiguous	  and	  under-­‐specified	  as	  a	  concept,	   let	  alone	  as	  a	   theory.496	  However,	  the	   principle	   of	  mutual	   recognition,	   a	   paradigm	   of	   governance,	   is	   not	   a	   vague	  concept	   for	   the	   EU.	   It	   has	   been	   tested	   for	   years	   in	   the	   area	   of	   its	   internal	  market497	  and	  also	  forwarded	  in	  judicial	  cooperation	  in	  criminal	  matters.	  	  	  	  
5.2.2.	  Starting	  with	  a	  drink	  	  	  The	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  emerged	  out	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Justice’s	  famous	  
Cassis	  de	  Dijon	  decision.498	  Cassis	  de	  Dijon	  is	  a	  French	   liqueur,	  which	  was	  meant	  to	   be	   imported	   in	   Germany.	   This	   would	   not	   happen	   though	   because	   of	   its	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  493	  Ibid.	  ff	  491-­‐492.	  494	  D-­‐C	   Horng,	   ‘The	   Principle	   of	   Mutual	   Recognition	   –	   The	   European	   Union’s	   Practice	   and	  Development’,	  (1999),	  World	  Competition,	  Kluwer	  Law	  International,	  p	  135.	  495	  I	   Tömmel.	   ‘Models	   of	   Governance	   and	   the	   Institutional	   Structure	   of	   the	   European	  Union’	   in	  
Innovative	   Governance	   in	   the	   European	   Union	   –	   The	   Politics	   of	   Multilevel	   Policymaking	   (eds.	   I	  Tömmel,	  A	  Verdun),	  2009,	  pp	  9-­‐23.	  496	  B	   Kohler-­‐Koch	   and	   B	   Rittberger,	   ‘The	   ‘Governance	   Turn’	   in	   EU	   Studies’,	   Journal	  of	  Common	  
Market	  Studies,	  44,	  annual	  review,	  2006,	  pp	  27-­‐49.	  497	  See	  also	  N	  Bernard,	  ‘Flexibility	  in	  the	  European	  Single	  Market’	  in	  C	  Barnard	  and	  J	  Scott	  (eds.),	  
The	  Law	  of	  the	  Single	  Market	  European	  Market:	  Unpacking	  the	  Premises,	  Hart,	  2002.	  498	  K	   Armstrong,	   ‘Mutual	   Recognition’	   in	   C.	   Barnard	   and	   J.	   Scott	   (eds.),	   The	   Law	   of	   the	   Single	  Market	  European	  Market:	  Unpacking	  the	  Premises	  (Hart,	  2002),	  ch.	  9.	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insufficiency	   in	   alcohol	   percentage.	   This	   refusal	   by	   the	   German	   monopoly	  administration	   raised	   the	   issue	   if	   there	   was	   an	   illegal	   hindrance	   of	   the	   intra-­‐Community	   trade,	   as	   ‘a	   measure	   of	   equivalent	   effect	   to	   quantitative	  restrictions’.499	  The	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice	  regarded	  the	  refusal	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  equivalent	  effect,	  namely	  as	  a	  hindrance	   to	   the	   free	  movement	  of	  goods	  and	  introduced	   for	   the	   future	   the	  mutual	   recognition	   principle.	   Since	   then,	  mutual	  recognition	  is	  developed	  step	  by	  step	  into	  different	  areas	  of	  the	  European	  Union.	  The	   mutual	   recognition	   was	   firstly	   introduced	   in	   the	   internal	   market	   in	   the	  context	  of	  the	  free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  persons,	  services	  and	  capital.500	  It	  is	  also	  applicable	   to	   judicial	  decisions	  and	   judgments	  delivered	   in	  matters	  of	   civil	   and	  commercial	   law.	  With	   the	   evolution	   and	  development	  of	  mutual	   recognition	   in	  these	  areas	  grew	  also	  the	  need	  of	  a	  certain	  degree	  of	  mutual	  trust	  between	  the	  Member	  States,	  which	  is	  considered	  as	  conditio	  sine	  qua	  non	   for	  the	  application	  of	  the	  principle	  in	  those	  fields.	  	  	  	  
5.2.3.	  Exceptions	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  	  
	  It	   should	   also	   be	   mentioned	   that	   there	   are	   exceptions	   to	   the	   rule	   of	   mutual	  recognition	   in	   the	   internal	   market.	   More	   specifically,	   there	   are	   two	   grounds	  justifying	   quantitative	   restrictions	   or	   equivalent	   measures.	   The	   hindering	  measure	  can	  actually	  be	  justified	  on	  grounds	  of:	  public	  morality,	  public	  policy	  or	  public	  security;	  the	  protection	  of	  health	  and	  life	  of	  humans,	  animals	  or	  plants;	  the	  protection	   of	   national	   treasures	   possessing	   artistic,	   historic	   or	   archaeological	  value;	  or	  the	  protection	  of	  industrial	  and	  commercial	  property.	  Such	  prohibitions	  or	  restrictions	  shall	  not,	  however,	  constitute	  a	  means	  of	  arbitrary	  discrimination	  or	   a	   disguised	   restriction	   on	   trade	   between	   Member	   States.501 	  The	   second	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  499	  Forbidden	   by	   Article	   34	   of	   the	   Treaty	   on	   the	   Functioning	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   (OJ	  30.03.2010,	   C	   83/47),	   TFEU,	   formerly	   Article	   28	   of	   the	   Treaty	   establishing	   the	   European	  Community,	   EC	   Treaty.	   The	   last	   consolidated	   version	   of	   the	   Treaty	   establishing	   the	   European	  Community	  has	  been	  established	  in	  OJ	  29.12.2006,	  C	  321	  E/1.	  Formerly	  Article	  28	  EC	  Treaty	  is	  the	   equivalent	   of	   the	   previous	   Article	   30	   of	   the	   Treaty	   establishing	   the	   European	   Economic	  Community	  (Treaty	  of	  Rome),	  25	  March	  1957.	  500	  Article	  26(1)	  TFEU.	  501	  ‘The	   provisions	   of	   Articles	   34	   and	   35	   shall	   not	   preclude	   prohibitions	   or	   restrictions	   on	  imports,	  exports	  or	  goods	  in	  transit	  justified	  on	  grounds	  of’	  […]	  (Article	  36	  TFEU).	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exception	  is	  also	  known	  as	  the	  Cassis	  justification,	  since	  it	  stems	  from	  the	  Cassis	  
de	   Dijon	   case	   itself.	   The	   concept	   of	   ‘measures	   having	   effect	   equivalent	   to	  quantitative	  restrictions	  on	  imports’	  contained	  in	  Article	  30	  of	  the	  EEC	  Treaty	  is	  to	   be	   understood	   to	   mean	   that	   the	   fixing	   of	   a	   minimum	   alcohol	   content	   for	  alcoholic	   beverages	   intended	   for	   human	   consumption	   by	   the	   legislation	   of	   a	  Member	  State	  also	  falls	  within	  the	  prohibition	  laid	  down	  in	  that	  provision	  where	  the	   importation	   of	   alcoholic	   beverages	   lawfully	   produced	   and	   marketed	   in	  another	   Member	   State	   is	   concerned’. 502 	  Obviously,	   the	   mutual	   recognition	  principle	   is	   not	   an	   absolute	   one	   and	   that	   is	   something	   to	   bear	   in	  mind	   as	   the	  thinking	  moves	  from	  community	  to	  EU	  Law.	  	  	  
5.2.4.	  From	  Community	  Law	  to	  EU	  Law	  	  	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  see	  how	  the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  was	  transplanted	  in	  criminal	  law,	  since	  it	  is	  argued	  that	  it	  is	  an	  alien	  idea	  to	  both	  EU	  criminal	  law	  and	  the	  legal	  traditions	  of	  national	  criminal	  legal	  orders.	  Judicial	  cooperation	  in	  criminal	  matters	  within	   the	   EU	   is	   traditionally	   carried	   out	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   the	  request	   model.	   The	   request	   model	   is	   built	   on	   the	   idea	   of	   mutual	   legal	  assistance.503	  The	   mutual	   recognition	   principle	   came	   as	   an	   evolution	   of	   this	  model	  and	  that	  shift	  of	  paradigm	  is	  also	  known	  as	  the	  order	  model.	  On	  the	  way	  from	  Tampere	   to	  Lisbon,	  The	  Hague	  and	  Stockholm	  Programmes	   furthered	   the	  application	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  in	  criminal	  matters.	  It	  is	  also	  true	  that	  mutual	  recognition	   is	   based	   on	   the	   assumption	   of	  mutual	   trust.	   The	   term	   recognition	  itself	  implies	  mutual	  trust504	  as	  we	  have	  already	  seen.	  In	  the	  Hague	  Programme,	  the	  Council	   concluded	   that	  despite	   the	   existence	  of	   some	  mutual	   trust,	   the	   full	  implementation	  of	  mutual	   recognition	  would	  need	  higher	   levels	  of	   it.	  This	  goal	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  502 	  20	   February	   1979,	   Case	   C-­‐120/78,	   Rewe	   Zentral	   AG	   v.	   Bundesmonopolverwaltung	   für	  
Brantwein,	  [1979]	  ECR	  649,	  para.	  8.	  503	  More	  on	  that	  see	  below	  in	  5.3.2.	  504 	  ‘Mutual	   recognition	   of	   final	   decisions	   in	   criminal	   matters’,	   Communication	   from	   the	  Commission,	  COM	  (2000)	  495	  final,	  para	  3.1.	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was	  actually	  pursued	  through	  the	  Hague	  Programme.505	  For	  this	  purpose	  it	  was	  and	   still	   is	   also	   widely	   discussed	   the	   introduction	   of	   common	   minimum	  standards506	  and/or	  elements	  of	  harmonisation.507	  	  	  Although	  the	  mutual	  recognition	  principle	  has	  its	  origins	  in	  the	  internal	  market,	  it	   is	   presumed	   to	   have	   the	   same	   legal	   power	   in	   the	   area	   of	   criminal	   law.	   The	  arguments	  against	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  criminal	  matters	  have	  been	  strong	  and	  severe.	  It	   is	  said	  that	  its	  legal	  basis	  does	  not	  find	  an	  echo	  in	  the	  EU’s	   founding	  treaties.508	  A	  clear	   legal	  basis	   is	  today	  provided	  in	  the	  Lisbon	  Treaty.509	  A	  less	  formalistic	  approach	  on	  the	  matter	  would	  point	  out	  the	   dicta	   of	   the	   European	   Court	   of	   Justice,510 	  which	   actually	   confirms	   the	  connection	   between	   the	   old	   pillars511	  and	   the	   complementary	   role	   of	   the	   third	  pillar512	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  first.513	  In	  a	  genuine	  European	  area	  mutual	  recognition	  facilitates	  the	  prosecution,	  conviction	  and	  sentencing	  of	  criminals	  throughout	  the	  European	  Union	  without	  being	  hampered	  by	  borders	  and	  different	   legal	  orders	  of	  other	  Member	  States.	  Mutual	  recognition	  has	  thus	  to	  be	  regarded	  as	  a	  criminal	  law	  measure	  aimed	  at	  providing	  a	  high	  level	  of	  safety	  for	  European	  citizens	  in	  an	  area	  of	  freedom,	  security	  and	  justice.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  505	  Council,	  ‘The	  Hague	  Programme:	  strengthening	  freedom,	  security	  and	  justice	  in	  the	  European	  Union’,	  OJ	  03.03.2005,	  C	  53/I,	  para	  3.2.	   See	  also	   ‘The	  Hague	  Programme:	  Ten	  priorities	   for	   the	  next	  five	  years’,	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission,	  COM	  (2005)	  184	  final,	  para	  2.3.	  506	  This	   has	   always	   to	   face	   the	   problem	   of	   the	   potential	   ‘lowest	   common	   denominator’	   which	  leads	   to	   the	   opposite	   to	   the	   desirable	   result.	   See	   also	   A.	   Weyembergh,	   ‘The	   Functions	   of	  Approximation	  of	  Penal	  Legislation	  within	  the	  European	  Union’,	  Maastricht	  Journal	  of	  European	  
and	  Comparative	  Criminal	  Law,	  12(2)	  (2005),	  p.	  159.	  507	  More	  on	  the	  development	  of	  MR	  in	  EU	  Criminal	  Law	  below	  in	  5.3.1.1.	  508	  P	   Cullen	   and	  L	  Buono,	   ‘Creating	   an	  Area	   of	   Criminal	   Justice	   in	   the	  EU:	   Putting	  Principles	   in	  Practice’,	  ERA	  Forum	  8	  (2007),	  pp	  169-­‐176	  in	  170.	  509	  Articles	  67(3):	  ‘The	  Union	  shall	  endeavour	  to	  ensure	  a	  high	  level	  of	  security	  through	  measures	  to	   prevent	   and	   combat	   crime,	   racism	   and	   xenophobia,	   and	   through	  measures	   for	   coordination	  and	  cooperation	  between	  police	  and	  judicial	  authorities	  and	  other	  competent	  authorities,	  as	  well	  as	  through	  the	  mutual	  recognition	  of	  judgments	  in	  criminal	  matters	  and,	  if	  necessary,	  through	  the	  approximation	  of	  criminal	  laws’	  and	  82(1)	  TFEU:	  ‘Judicial	  cooperation	  in	  criminal	  matters	  in	  the	  Union	  shall	  be	  based	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  of	   judgments	  and	  judicial	  decisions	  and	  shall	  include	  the	  approximation	  of	  the	  laws	  and	  regulations	  of	  the	  Member	  State	  […]’.	  510	  11	   February	   2003,	   Joined	   Cases	   187/01	   and	   385/01,	   criminal	   proceedings	   against	   Hüseyin	  
Gözütok	  and	  Klaus	  Brügge,	  [2003],	  ECR	  I-­‐1345.	  511	  GJM	  Corstens,	  ‘Criminal	  Law	  in	  the	  First	  Pillar?’,	  European	  Journal	  of	  Crime,	  Criminal	  Law,	  and	  
Criminal	  Justice,	  Vol.	  11/1,	  2003,	  pp	  131-­‐144.	  512	  E	   Baker	   and	   C	  Harding,	   ‘From	  past	   imperfect	   to	   future	   perfect?	   A	   longitudinal	   study	   of	   the	  third	  pillar’,	  2009,	  European	  Law	  Review,	  p	  2.	  513	  M	  Fletcher,	   ‘Some	  developments	  to	  the	  ne	  bis	  in	  idem	  principle	  in	  the	  European	  Union:	  Criminal	  
Proceedings	  against	  Hüseyin	  Gözütok	  and	  Klaus	  Brügge’,	  The	  Modern	  Law	  Review,	  Vol.66,	  2003,	  p	  769-­‐780.	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As	   Ouwerkerk	   sums	   it	   up	   ‘the	   legitimacy	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   in	   criminal	  matters	  under	  the	  previous	  pillar	  regime	  of	  EU	  law	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Articles	  2514	  and	  14	  EC	  Treaty.	  Although	  nowhere	  literally	  referred	  to,	  mutual	  recognition	  in	  the	   former	   Third	   Pillar	   was	   expected	   to	   facilitate	   closer	   cooperation	   between	  judicial	   authorities	   and	   to	   simplify	   the	   approximation	   of	   rules	   on	   substantive	  criminal	   law,	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  Union’s	  task	  as	   laid	  down	  in	  Article	  29	  EU	  Treaty	  (second	  and	  third	  lines).515	  This	  has	  to	  be	  regarded	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  aim	  of	  providing	  citizens	  with	  a	  high	  level	  of	  safety	  (first	  line),	  which	  in	  turn	  should	  serve	  the	  development	  of	   the	  Union	  as	  an	  area	  of	   freedom,	  security	  and	   justice	  (Article	   2	   EU	   Treaty,	   fourth	   line).	   The	   development	   of	   an	   area	   of	   freedom,	  security	   and	   justice	   should	   ensure	   the	   free	  movement	   of	   persons	   (Article	   2	   in	  conjunction	   with	   Article	   14	   EC	   Treaty)	   and	   thus	   improve	   the	   area	   without	  borders,	   to	   which	   the	   Union	   area	   is	   convergent	   (Article	   14	   EC	   Treaty).516	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  514	  Article	  2:	  The	  Union	  shall	  set	   itself	  the	  following	  objectives:	  to	  promote	  economic	  and	  social	  progress	  and	  a	  high	  level	  of	  employment	  and	  to	  achieve	  balanced	  and	  sustainable	  development,	  in	   particular	   through	   the	   creation	   of	   an	   area	   without	   internal	   frontiers,	   through	   the	  strengthening	  of	  economic	  and	  social	  cohesion	  and	  through	  the	  establishment	  of	  economic	  and	  monetary	  union,	  ultimately	  including	  a	  single	  currency	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  this	  Treaty;	  to	  assert	  its	  identity	  on	  the	  international	  scene,	  in	  particular	  through	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	  common	  foreign	  and	  security	  policy	  including	  the	  progressive	  framing	  of	  a	  common	  defence	  policy,	  which	  might	  lead	  to	  a	  common	  defence,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  Article	  17;	  to	  strengthen	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   rights	   and	   interests	   of	   the	   nationals	   of	   its	   Member	   States	  through	  the	  introduction	  of	  a	  citizenship	  of	  the	  Union;	  to	  maintain	  and	  develop	  the	  Union	  as	  an	  area	   of	   freedom,	   security	   and	   justice,	   in	   which	   the	   free	   movement	   of	   persons	   is	   assured	   in	  conjunction	   with	   appropriate	   measures	   with	   respect	   to	   external	   border	   controls,	   asylum,	  immigration	   and	   the	   prevention	   and	   combating	   of	   crime;	   to	   maintain	   in	   full	   the	   acquis	  
communautaire	  and	  build	  on	  it	  with	  a	  view	  to	  considering	  to	  what	  extent	  the	  policies	  and	  forms	  of	   cooperation	   introduced	  by	   this	  Treaty	  may	  need	   to	  be	   revised	  with	   the	   aim	  of	   ensuring	   the	  effectiveness	   of	   the	  mechanisms	   and	   the	   institutions	   of	   the	   Community.	   The	   objectives	   of	   the	  Union	  shall	  be	  achieved	  as	  provided	  in	  this	  Treaty	  and	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  conditions	  and	  the	  timetable	  set	  out	  therein	  while	  respecting	  the	  principle	  of	  subsidiarity	  as	  defined	  in	  Article	  5	  of	  the	  Treaty	  establishing	  the	  European	  Community.	  515	  Article	  29:	  Without	  prejudice	  to	  the	  powers	  of	  the	  European	  Community,	  the	  Union's	  objective	  shall	   be	   to	  provide	   citizens	  with	   a	   high	   level	   of	   safety	  within	   an	   area	   of	   freedom,	   security	   and	  justice	  by	  developing	  common	  action	  among	  the	  Member	  States	  in	  the	  fields	  of	  police	  and	  judicial	  cooperation	  in	  criminal	  matters	  and	  by	  preventing	  and	  combating	  racism	  and	  xenophobia.	  That	  objective	   shall	   be	   achieved	   by	   preventing	   and	   combating	   crime,	   organised	   or	   otherwise,	   in	  particular	   terrorism,	   trafficking	   in	  persons	  and	  offences	  against	   children,	   illicit	  drug	   trafficking	  and	   illicit	   arms	   trafficking,	   corruption	   and	   fraud,	   through:	   closer	   cooperation	   between	   police	  forces,	  customs	  authorities	  and	  other	  competent	  authorities	  in	  the	  Member	  States,	  both	  directly	  and	  through	  the	  European	  Police	  Office	  (Europol),	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  Articles	  30	  and	  32;	  closer	  cooperation	  between	  judicial	  and	  other	  competent	  authorities	  of	  the	  Member	  States	   including	   cooperation	   through	   the	   European	   Judicial	   Cooperation	   Unit	   (‘Eurojust’),	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  Articles	  31	  and	  32;	  approximation,	  where	  necessary,	  of	  rules	  on	  criminal	  matters	  in	  the	  Member	  States,	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  Article	  31(e).	  516	  Article	   14:	   1.	   The	   Council	   shall	   adopt	   joint	   actions.	   Joint	   actions	   shall	   address	   specific	  situations	  where	  operational	  action	  by	  the	  Union	  is	  deemed	  to	  be	  required.	  They	  shall	  lay	  down	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Ultimately,	  mutual	  recognition	  can	  be	  interpreted	  as	  contributing	  to	  the	  general	  goals	  of	   the	  European	  Union’.517	  It	  seems	  therefore	  that	   the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  of	  judicial	  decisions	  in	  criminal	  matters	  has	  been	  an	  integrated	  part	  of	  the	  European	  criminal	  law.	  	  	  	  
5.2.5.	  Minimum	  Standards	  and	  Horizontal	  spread	  
	  Mutual	  recognition	  in	  European	  Union	  Law	  is	  proved	  to	  function	  more	  efficiently	  in	   the	   presence	   of	   some	   harmonised	   elements	   of	   legislation	   better	   known	   as	  minimum	   standards.	   It	   is	   interesting	   to	   see	   how	   the	   development	   of	   certain	  minimum	   standards	   contributed	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   mutual	   trust	   and	  therefore	   to	   the	   stability	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   regimes.	   The	   Brussels	   I	  Regulation	   refers	   in	   its	   preamble	   to	   mutual	   trust	   as	   the	   justification	   for	  automatic	   recognition:	   ‘Mutual	   trust	   in	   the	   administration	   of	   justice	   in	   the	  Community	   justifies	   judgements	   given	   in	   a	   Member	   State	   being	   recognised	  automatically	   without	   the	   need	   for	   any	   procedure	   except	   in	   cases	   of	   dispute’	  (par.	  16	  preamble	  Brussels	   I).	  Furthermore,	   the	  preamble	   to	   the	  Regulation	  on	  insolvency	   proceedings	   indicates	   mutual	   trust	   as	   the	   very	   basis	   of	   mutual	  recognition:	   ‘Recognition	   of	   judgements	   delivered	   by	   the	   court	   of	   the	  Member	  States	  should	  be	  based	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  trust’	  (par.	  22	  preamble	  RIP).	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  their	  objectives,	  scope,	  the	  means	  to	  be	  made	  available	  to	  the	  Union,	  if	  necessary	  their	  duration,	  and	   the	   conditions	   for	   their	   implementation.	   2.	   If	   there	   is	   a	   change	   in	   circumstances	   having	   a	  substantial	  effect	  on	  a	  question	  subject	  to	  joint	  action,	  the	  Council	  shall	  review	  the	  principles	  and	  objectives	  of	  that	  action	  and	  take	  the	  necessary	  decisions.	  As	   long	  as	  the	  Council	  has	  not	  acted,	  the	  joint	  action	  shall	  stand.	  3.	  Joint	  actions	  shall	  commit	  the	  Member	  States	  in	  the	  positions	  they	  adopt	  and	  in	  the	  conduct	  of	  their	  activity.	  4.	  The	  Council	  may	  request	  the	  Commission	  to	  submit	  to	  it	  any	  appropriate	  proposals	  relating	  to	  the	  common	  foreign	  and	  security	  policy	  to	  ensure	  the	  implementation	  of	  a	   joint	  action.	  5.	  Whenever	   there	   is	  any	  plan	   to	  adopt	  a	  national	  position	  or	  take	  national	  action	  pursuant	  to	  a	  joint	  action,	  information	  shall	  be	  provided	  in	  time	  to	  allow,	  if	  necessary,	  for	  prior	  consultations	  within	  the	  Council.	  The	  obligation	  to	  provide	  prior	  information	  shall	  not	  apply	  to	  measures	  which	  are	  merely	  a	  national	  transposition	  of	  Council	  decisions.	  6.	  In	  cases	   of	   imperative	   need	   arising	   from	   changes	   in	   the	   situation	   and	   failing	   a	   Council	   decision,	  Member	   States	  may	   take	   the	   necessary	  measures	   as	   a	  matter	   of	   urgency	   having	   regard	   to	   the	  general	   objectives	   of	   the	   joint	   action.	   The	   Member	   State	   concerned	   shall	   inform	   the	   Council	  immediately	  of	  any	  such	  measures.	  7.	  Should	   there	  be	  any	  major	  difficulties	   in	   implementing	  a	  joint	  action,	  a	  Member	  State	  shall	   refer	   them	  to	   the	  Council	  which	  shall	  discuss	   them	  and	  seek	  appropriate	  solutions.	  Such	  solutions	  shall	  not	  run	  counter	  to	  the	  objectives	  of	  the	  joint	  action	  or	  impair	  its	  effectiveness.	  517	  J	  Ouwerkerk,	  Quid	  Pro	  Quo?	  A	  comparative	  law	  perspective	  on	  the	  mutual	  recognition	  of	  judicial	  
decisions	  in	  criminal	  matters,	  2011,	  p.	  63.	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The	  need	  for	  harmonisation	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  mutual	  recognition	  was	  clearly	  expressed	  in	  the	  Tampere	  Conclusions,	  where	  the	  European	  Council	  invited	  the	  Council	   and	   the	   Commission	   to	   work	   on	   ‘those	   aspects	   of	   procedural	   law	   on	  which	   common	   minimum	   standards	   are	   considered	   necessary	   in	   order	   to	  facilitate	   the	   application	   of	   the	   principle	   of	  mutual	   recognition,	   respecting	   the	  fundamental	  legal	  principles	  of	  Member	  States’.518	  Subsequent	  policy	  documents,	  such	   as	   the	   Hague	   Programme,	   have	   continued	   on	   this	   path519	  and	   under	   the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	  it	  appears	  that	  approximating	  measures	  may	  be	  adopted	  with	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  development	  of	  judicial	  cooperation	  in	  civil	  affairs	  being	  a	  cooperation	  system	  based	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  (Art.	  81	  TFEU).	  	  	  In	   the	   light	   of	   this	   discussion	   and	   the	   success	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   in	   the	  internal	  market	   the	   horizontal	   spread	   of	   the	   principles	   in	   the	   area	   of	   criminal	  law520 	  was	   a	   natural	   consequence.	   The	   minimum	   standards	   approach	   was	  triggered	   here	   all	   the	   more	   due	   to	   the	   special	   characteristics	   of	   criminal	   law	  linked	  to	  human	  rights	  and	  sovereignty	  of	  states.	  	  
	  
5.3.	  European	  Criminal	  Law	  	  The	   transposition	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   regime	   into	   the	   area	   of	   European	  Criminal	   Law	  was	   just	   a	  matter	   of	   time.521	  It	  would	   not	   be	   an	   exaggeration	   to	  state	   that	   applying	   the	   principle	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   has	   been	   the	  motor	   of	  European	   integration	   in	   criminal	   matters	   in	   the	   recent	   past.522	  European	   co-­‐operation	   in	   criminal	  matters	   is	   a	   concept	   that	   existed	   before	   the	   relevant	   EU	  action.	  The	  Council	  of	  Europe	  was	  the	  initiating	  lever	  for	  this	  purpose.523	  Despite	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  518	  Tampere	  Conclusions,	  par.	  37.	  519	  ‘The	   Hague	   Programme:	   Ten	   priorities	   for	   the	   next	   five	   years’,	   Communication	   from	   the	  Commission,	  COM	  (2005)	  184	  final,	  para	  11.	  520	  JW	   Bridge,	   ‘The	   European	   Communities	   and	   the	   Criminal	   Law’,	   The	   Criminal	   Law	   Review,	  1976,	  pp	  88-­‐97.	  521	  I	   Bantekas,	   ‘The	  principle	  of	  Mutual	  Recognition	   in	  EU	  Criminal	  Law’,	   European	   Law	  Review,	  2007,	  p	  365.	  522	  For	  an	  analysis	  on	  the	  history,	  principles	  and	  institutions	  of	  EU	  Criminal	  Law	  see	  V	  Mitsilegas,	  
EU	  Criminal	  Law,	  2009,	  chapter	  1.	  523	  S	  Peers,	   ‘Mutual	  recognition	  and	  Criminal	  Law	  in	  the	  European	  Union:	  Has	  the	  Council	  got	  it	  wrong?’	   Common	   Market	   Law	   Review,	   vol	   41,	   (2004),	   p	   5-­‐6.	   ‘While	   co-­‐operation	   was	   being	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that	   and	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   in	   criminal	   matters	   from	   a	  technical	   EU	   Law	   point	   of	   view,	   there	   is	   a	   great	   debate	   of	   whether	   mutual	  recognition	   can	   be	   transplanted	   at	   all	   in	   realms	   such	   as	   the	   criminal	   law.	   The	  qualitative	  differences	  of	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  the	  criminal	  law,	  of	  the	  world	  of	   trade	   and	   that	   of	   crime	   have	   been	   long	   contested.	   Apart	   from	   the	   obvious	  dissimilarities	   of	   the	   two	   areas524	  is	   there	   any	   common	   ground	   that	   not	   only	  justifies	  but	  also	  compels	  for	  such	  a	  transplant?	  	  	  Mutual	   recognition	   in	   criminal	   matters	   can	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   balancing	   solution	  between	   two	  opposite	   tendencies:	   the	  need	  of	   further	   improvement	   in	   judicial	  co-­‐operation	   in	   criminal	   matters	   and	   the	   need	   of	   reassurance	   of	   skeptical	  Member	  States	  towards	  further	  harmonization	  initiatives,	  i.e.	  the	  Corpus	  Juris.525	  For	   the	   view	   that	   opposes	   harmonization,	  mutual	   recognition	   is	   a	   satisfactory	  solution,	   as	   it	   provides	   results	   in	   the	   field	   of	   judicial	   co-­‐operation	   without	  putting	   at	   stake	   national	   legislations	   that	   need	   to	   rapidly	   change.	   Actually,	  mutual	  recognition	   transfers	   the	   transaction	  cost	  of	  dealing	  with	  heterogeneity	  from	  the	  decision-­‐making	  stage	  to	  the	  implementation	  stage.526	  For	  the	  view	  that	  supports	  integration,	  mutual	  recognition	  is	  also	  a	  plus,	  since	  it	  is	  a	  development	  towards	   the	   ambitious	   goal	   of	   even	   further	   integration.527	  Despite	   that	   and	  although	   the	   principle	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   is	   being	   forwarded,	   enjoying	   a	  broad	   consensus	   in	   the	   agenda	   of	   the	   evolution	   of	   co-­‐operation	   in	   criminal	  matters,	   its	   use	   remains	   controversial.	   In	   particular,	   the	   transplantation	   of	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  forwarded	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  extradition,	  mutual	  assistance,	  transfer	  of	  prisoners,	  enforcement	  of	  sentences,	   transfer	   of	   proceedings	   and	   confiscation	   of	   proceeds	   of	   crime,	   several	   factors	  triggered	  the	  evolution	  of	  EU	  criminal	   law	  which	  for	  many	  years	  was	  seen	  both	  as	  an	  ambition	  and	  necessity	  in	  the	  European	  Union.	  After	  the	  adoption	  of	  the	  Maastricht	  Treaty,	  the	  creation	  of	  an	  area	  of	  freedom,	  security	  and	  justice	  within	  the	  EU	  was	  the	  stepping	  stone	  for	  what	  was	  going	  to	   follow.	   Further	   developments	   led	   to	   the	   adoption	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   in	  criminal	  matters’.	  524	  P-­‐A	   Albrecht	   and	   S	   Braum,	   ‘Deficiencies	   in	   the	   Development	   of	   European	   Criminal	   Law’,	  European	  Law	  Journal,	  Vol.	  5,	  No.	  3,	  September	  1999,	  pp	  293-­‐310.	  525	  See	  JR	  Spencer,	   ‘The	  Corpus	  Juris	  Project	  –Has	  it	  a	  future?’,	  Cambridge	  Yearbook	  of	  European	  
Legal	   Studies,	   vol.	   2,	   1999,	   pp	   355-­‐367.	   And	   also	   JR	   Spencer,	   ‘The	  Corpus	   Juris	   Project	   and	   the	  
Fight	  against	  Budgetary	  Fraud’,	  Cambridge	  Yearbook	  of	  European	  Legal	  Studies,	  vol.	  1,	  1998,	  pp	  77-­‐106.	  526	  I	   Tömmel	   and	   A	   Verdun,	   ‘Innovative	   Governance	   in	   the	   European	   Union’	   in	   Innovative	  
Governance	   in	   the	   European	   Union	   –	   The	   Politics	   of	   Multilevel	   Policymaking	   (eds.	   I	   Tömmel,	   A	  Verdun),	  2009,	  p	  6.	  527	  See	   also	   M	   Delmas-­‐Marty	   and	   JAE	   Vervaele,	   The	   implementation	   of	   the	   Corpus	   Juris	   in	   the	  
Member	  States,	  vol.	  1,	  Antwerp,	  Interentia,	  2000.	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principle	   from	   its	   internal	  market	   framework	   to	   the	   criminal	   law	   sphere	   is	   an	  issue	  highly	  challenged.528	  	  	  
5.3.1.	  Context	  and	  application	  	  
	  But	   why	   and	   how	   was	   mutual	   recognition	   applied	   in	   the	   area	   of	   freedom,	  security	  and	  justice?	  What	  was	  that	  triggered	  its	  application?	  What	  are	  the	  main	  arguments	   against	   this	   application?	   We	   need	   to	   look	   into	   the	   context	   of	   this	  political	   decision	   that	   changed	   the	   way	   of	   judicial	   cooperation	   in	   criminal	  matters	  as	  well	  as	  the	  logic	  behind	  the	  voices	  that	  oppose	  to	  it.529	  	  	  	  5.3.1.1.	  Mutual	  Recognition	  History	  in	  EU	  Criminal	  Law	  (links	  and	  background)	  
	  The	   principle	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   in	   the	   context	   of	   judicial	   cooperation	   in	  criminal	  matters	  is	  a	  fairly	  recent	  development.530	  With	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Amsterdam	  in	  1997,531	  the	  European	  Union	  declared	  the	  aim	  to	  establish	  an	  area	  of	  freedom,	  security	   and	   justice	   for	   its	   citizens.532	  Actually,	   with	   Amsterdam	   ‘justice	   and	  home	   affairs	   cooperation	   was	   replaced	   by	   the	   notion	   of	   creating	   an	   area	   of	  freedom,	  security	  and	  justice’.533	  Following	  to	  that,	   in	  1998	  the	  UK	  Government	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  528	  V	  Mitsilegas,	  EU	  Criminal	  Law	  (Oxford,	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2009),	  p	  117.	  529	  Regarding	   the	   future	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   see	   the	   very	   interesting	   study,	   ‘The	   future	   of	  mutual	  recognition	   in	  the	  European	  Union	  /	  L’avenir	  de	   la	  reconnaissance	  mutuelle	  en	  matière	  pénale	   dans	   l’Union	   européenne’	   edited	   by	   G	   Vernimmen-­‐Van	   Tiggelen,	   L	   Surano	   and	   A	  Weyembergh.	  http://ec.europa.eu/justice/doc_centre/criminal/recognition/doc_criminal_recognition_	  en.htm.	  530	  S	  Peers,	   ‘Mutual	  recognition	  and	  Criminal	  Law	  in	  the	  European	  Union:	  Has	  the	  Council	  got	  it	  wrong?’	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review,	  vol	  41,	  (2004),	  pp	  5-­‐11.	  531	  J	   Monar,	   ‘Justice	   and	   home	   affairs	   in	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Amsterdam:	   reform	   at	   the	   price	   of	  fragmentation’,	  European	  Law	  Review,	  1998,	  vol.	  23,	  pp	  320-­‐335.	  532	  ‘The	   three	   notions	   of	   Freedom,	   Security,	   and	   Justice	   are	   closely	   interlinked.	   Freedom	   loses	  much	  of	  its	  meaning	  if	  it	  can	  not	  be	  enjoyed	  in	  a	  secure	  environment	  and	  with	  the	  full	  backing	  of	  a	   system	  of	   justice	   in	  which	   all	   Union	   citizens	   and	   residents	   can	   have	   confidence.	   These	   three	  inseparable	  concepts	  have	  one	  common	  denominator	  –people–	  and	  one	  can	  not	  be	  achieved	   in	  full	  without	  the	  other	  two’.	  Communication	  from	  the	  Commission,	  Towards	  an	  Area	  of	  Freedom,	  
Security	  and	  Justice,	  Brussels,	  14.07.1998,	  COM	  1998,	  459	  Final,	  p	  1.	  533	  D	   Kostakopoulou,	   ‘The	   Area	   of	   Freedom,	   Security	   and	   Justice	   and	   the	   European	   Union’s	  Constitutional	  Dialogue’	   in	  C	  Bernard	  (ed.),	  The	  Fundamentals	  of	  EU	  Law	  Revisited.	  Assessing	  the	  
Impact	  of	  the	  Constitutional	  Debate,	  Oxford,	  OUP,	  2007,	  p	  170.	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during	  its	  EU	  Presidency534	  promoted	  the	  idea	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  in	  criminal	  matters	  suggesting	  later	  that	  the	  approach	  is	  based	  on	  ‘tolerance	  of	  diversity	  on	  the	   basis	   of	   mutual	   confidence	   and	   trust	   in	   each	   others’	   legal	   systems,	   as	  opposed	  to	  insistence	  of	  uniformity	  for	  its	  own	  sake’.535	  The	  idea	  behind	  the	  UK	  proposal	   was	   built	   on	   a	   similarity	   with	   the	   internal	   market,	   where	   after	   the	  
Cassis	  de	  Dijon	  case,536	  mutual	  recognition	  contributed	  to	  the	  better	   functioning	  of	  the	  market.	  	  	  Shortly	  after	   the	  Amsterdam	  Treaty,	   in	   the	  same	  year,	   the	  European	  Council	  at	  Cardiff	   requested	   the	   Council	   to	   ‘identify	   the	   scope	   for	   greater	   mutual	  recognition	  of	  decisions	  of	  each	  others’	  courts’.537	  This	  way	  a	  new	  dynamic	  to	  the	  cooperation	   between	   the	   Member	   States	   in	   civil	   and	   criminal	   matters	   was	  forwarded.	  In	  the	  Action	  Plan	  of	  the	  Council	  and	  the	  Commission	  on	  how	  best	  to	  implement	   the	   provisions	   of	   the	   Treaty	   of	   Amsterdam	   on	   an	   area	   of	   freedom,	  security	  and	  justice	  is	  read	  the	  provision	  of	  initiation	  of	  ‘a	  process	  with	  a	  view	  to	  facilitating	   mutual	   recognition	   of	   decisions	   and	   enforcement	   of	   judgments	   in	  criminal	  matters’.538	  The	   stress	   on	  mutual	   recognition	  was	   justified	   by	   the	   fact	  that	   experience	   had	   shown	   that	   approximation	   was	   time	   consuming	   and	  sometimes	  difficult	  to	  negotiate.	  Full	  harmonisation	  of	  all	  criminal	  offences	  was	  not	   a	   realistic	   prospect;	   moreover,	   differences	   in	   criminal	   procedures	   would	  continue	  to	  impede	  judicial	  co-­‐operation.	  Member	  States	  would	  continue	  to	  have	  different	   systems	  of	   criminal	   law	   for	   the	   foreseeable	   future.	   Even	   if	   laws	  were	  fully	  aligned,	  lack	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  would	  still	  imply	  the	  need	  to	  check	  facts	  and	   satisfy	   legal	   conditions	  before	   co-­‐operation	   could	  be	  provided.	   In	  order	   to	  remove	  unnecessary	  procedural	  hurdles	  and	  formalities,	  work	  on	  approximation	  must	   be	   accompanied	   by	   progress	   towards	   mutual	   recognition.	   Mutual	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  534	  See	   P	   Ludlow,	   ‘The	   1998	  UK	   Presidency:	   A	   view	   from	  Brussels’,	   Journal	  of	  Common	  Market	  
Studies,	  (1998),	  Vol	  36,	  p	  573-­‐583.	  535	  Mutual	   recognition	   of	   judicial	   decisions	   and	   judgements	   in	   criminal	  matters,	   note	   from	   UK	  Delegation	   to	   K.4	   Committee,	   29.3.99,	   7090/99.	   In	   addition,	   the	   document	   proposed	   that:	  ‘Judicial	   decisions	  which	   could	   in	   principle	   be	   brought	  within	   the	   scope	   of	  mutual	   recognition	  include	   arrest	   warrants,	   summonses	   to	   witnesses	   and	   defendants,	   warrants	   for	   search	   and	  seizure,	  orders	  for	  the	  production	  of	  evidence	  (such	  as	  bank	  records)	  and	  orders	  for	  provisional	  freezing	   of	   assets	   or	   evidence,	   e.g.	   electronic	   evidence,	   especially	   where	   speed	   is	   critical	   to	  preventing	  the	  dissipation	  or	  destruction	  of	  the	  assets	  or	  evidence’.	  536	  Case	  120/78	  Cassis	  de	  Dijon	  [1979]	  ECR	  649.	  537	  Para	  39,	  doc	  SN	  150/1/98	  REV	  1.	  538	  Para	  45(f),	  OJ	  C	  019,	  23.01.1999,	  p	  1-­‐15.	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recognition	  could	  sometimes	  provide	  a	  shorter	  route	  to	  improving	  co-­‐operation,	  without	  fully	  aligning	  legislation.539	  	  	  The	  idea	  was	  discussed	  again	  at	  the	  Tampere	  European	  Council	  in	  October	  1999,	  which	   concluded	   that	  mutual	   recognition	   should	   become	   the	   cornerstone540	  of	  judicial	   cooperation	   in	   both	   civil	   and	   criminal	   matters	   within	   the	   Union.	   At	  Tampere	   the	   European	   Council	   also	   explicitly	   stated	   that	   the	   principle	   should	  apply	  both	   to	   judgments	  and	   to	  other	  decisions	  of	   judicial	   authorities.	   It	   asked	  the	  Council	   and	   the	  Commission	   to	  adopt,	  by	  December	  2000,	  a	  programme	  of	  measures	   to	   implement	   the	   principle	   of	   mutual	   recognition. 541 	  In	   this	  programme	   of	   measures	   to	   implement	   the	   principle	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   of	  decisions	   in	   criminal	   matters	   no	   less	   than	   24	   measures	   overall	   are	   included.	  According	   to	   this	   programme,	   the	   extent	   of	   the	  mutual	   recognition	   exercise	   is	  very	   much	   dependent	   on	   a	   number	   of	   parameters	   which	   determine	   its	  effectiveness.542	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  539	  Mutual	   recognition	   of	   judicial	   decisions	   and	   judgements	   in	   criminal	  matters,	   note	   from	   UK	  Delegation	  to	  K.4	  Committee,	  29.3.99,	  7090/99.	  540 	  See	   also	   the	   Hague	   Programme:	   ‘The	   further	   realisation	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   as	   the	  cornerstone	   of	   judicial	   cooperation	   implies	   the	   development	   of	   equivalent	   standards	   for	  procedural	  rights	  in	  criminal	  proceedings,	  based	  on	  studies	  of	  the	  existing	  level	  of	  safeguards	  in	  Member	  States	  and	  with	  due	  respect	  for	  their	  legal	  traditions’	  (para	  3.3.1).	  541	  Paras	  33	   to	  37.	   In	  particular,	   ‘With	   respect	   to	   criminal	  matters,	   the	  European	  Council	  urges	  Member	  States	  to	  speedily	  ratify	  the	  1995	  and	  1996	  EU	  Conventions	  on	  extradition.	  It	  considers	  that	   the	   formal	   extradition	  procedure	   should	  be	   abolished	   among	   the	  Member	   States	   as	   far	   as	  persons	   are	   concerned	   who	   are	   fleeing	   from	   justice	   after	   having	   been	   finally	   sentenced,	   and	  replaced	  by	  a	  simple	   transfer	  of	  such	  persons,	   in	  compliance	  with	  Article	  6	  TEU.	  Consideration	  should	   also	  be	   given	   to	   fast	   track	   extradition	  procedures,	  without	  prejudice	   to	   the	  principle	  of	  fair	  trial.	  The	  European	  Council	  invites	  the	  Commission	  to	  make	  proposals	  on	  this	  matter	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  Schengen	  Implementing	  Agreement.	  –	  The	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  should	  also	  apply	   to	   pre-­‐trial	   orders,	   in	   particular	   to	   those	   which	   would	   enable	   competent	   authorities	  quickly	   to	   secure	   evidence	   and	   to	   seize	   assets	   which	   are	   easily	   movable;	   evidence	   lawfully	  gathered	   by	   one	   Member	   State’s	   authorities	   should	   be	   admissible	   before	   the	   courts	   of	   other	  Member	   States,	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   standards	   that	   apply	   there’	   (paras	   36-­‐37,	   European	  Council	  Tampere	  European	  Council	  15	  and	  16	  October	  1999	  Presidency	  Conclusions	  1999).	  See	  also	  Programme	   of	   measures	   to	   implement	   the	   principle	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   of	   decisions	   in	  criminal	  matters	  (OJ	  C	  012,	  15.01.2001,	  p	  10-­‐22).	  542	  These	  parameters	  are:	  ‘whether	  the	  envisaged	  measure	  is	  of	  general	  application	  or	  limited	  to	  specific	   offences;	   whether	   fulfilment	   of	   the	   double	   criminality	   requirement	   as	   a	   condition	   for	  recognition	   is	  maintained	  or	  dropped;	  mechanisms	   for	   safeguarding	   the	   rights	  of	   third	  parties,	  victims	   and	   suspects;	   the	   definition	   of	   minimum	   common	   standards	   necessary	   to	   facilitate	  application	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  (for	  instance	  with	  regard	  to	  the	  competence	  of	  the	   courts);	   whether	   enforcement	   of	   the	   decision	   is	   direct	   or	   indirect,	   and	   the	   definition	   and	  scope	   of	   a	   validation	   procedure,	   if	   any;	   determination	   and	   extent	   of	   grounds	   for	   refusing	  recognition,	   where	   those	   grounds	   are	   the	   sovereignty	   or	   other	   essential	   interests	   of	   the	  requested	  State	  or	  relate	   to	   legality;	  whether	  States	  have	   liability	  arrangements	   in	   the	  event	  of	  acquittal’.	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Half	   a	   year	   back,	   in	   July	   2000,	   the	   European	   Commission	   published	   a	  Communication543	  on	   mutual	   recognition	   where	   inter	   alia	   expressed	   the	   view	  that:	   The	   traditional	   system	   of	   co-­‐operation	   ‘is	   not	   only	   slow,	   but	   also	  cumbersome,	   and	   sometimes	   it	   is	   quite	   uncertain	   what	   results	   a	   judge	   or	  prosecutor	  who	  makes	   a	   request	  will	   get.	   Thus,	   borrowing	   from	   concepts	   that	  have	  worked	  very	  well	   in	   the	   creation	  of	   the	  Single	  Market,	   the	   idea	  was	  born	  that	   judicial	   cooperation	   might	   also	   benefit	   from	   the	   concept	   of	   mutual	  recognition,	  which,	  simply	  stated,	  means	  that	  once	  a	  certain	  measure,	  such	  as	  a	  decision	  taken	  by	  a	  judge	  in	  exercising	  his	  or	  her	  official	  powers	  in	  one	  Member	  State,	   has	   been	   taken,	   that	   measure	   –in	   so	   far	   as	   it	   has	   extra-­‐national	  implications–	  would	  automatically	  be	  accepted	   in	  all	  other	  Member	  States,	  and	  have	  the	  same	  or	  at	  least	  similar	  effects	  there’.	  	  	  The	   Commission’s	   2000	   Communication	   illustrated	   a	   certain	   amount	   of	  consensus	  on	  the	  application	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  in	  criminal	  matters,	  although	  the	   overall	   operation	   involves	   a	   lot	   of	   contested	   issues.	   This	   fact	   is	   clearly	  depicted	   on	   the	   process	   of	   implementation	   of	   the	   different	  mutual	   recognition	  instruments,	  which	  will	   occupy	  our	   thoughts	   later	  on.	   It’s	  high	   time	  we	   looked	  into	  a	  couple	  of	  arguments	  that	  speak	  against	  this	  application.	  
	  	  5.3.1.2.	  The	  qualitative	  difference	  argument	  	  An	   argument	   supporting	   that	   view	   is	   of	   a	   qualitative	   nature	   (qualitative	  difference	  argument).544	  The	  world	  of	  trade	  and	  market	  is	  completely	  different	  of	  that	   of	   criminal	   law,	   some	   say,	   where	   combating	   crime	   through	   imposing	  penalties	   is	   the	   main	   goal.	   The	   purpose	   of	   social	   peace	   differs	   from	   that	   of	  efficiency	   in	   transactions	   and	   growth	   of	   economic	   performance.	   In	   the	   latter	  situation,	  the	  regulation	  of	  the	  market	  has	  to	  be	  flexible	  leaving	  to	  the	  individuals	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  543	  Communication	   from	   the	   Commission	   to	   the	   Council	   and	   the	   European	   Parliament,	   Mutual	  Recognition	  of	  Final	  Decisions	  in	  Criminal	  Matters,	  COM	  (2000)	  495	  Final,	  26/07/2000,	  p	  2.	  544	  It	  must	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  relevant	  characteristics	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  described	  above	  by	  a	  global	  governance	  narrative	  come	  before	  its	  application	  in	  the	  internal	  market	  of	  the	  EU	  appears	  to	  defy	  the	  qualitative	  difference	  argument.	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the	  initiation	  of	  things.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  although	  criminal	  law	  has	  a	  selective	  character	  –not	  every	  behaviour	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  criminalised–	  its	  rules	  need	  to	  be	  clear	   since	   they	   impact	   on	   fundamental	   rights	   in	   a	   substantial	  way.	   Trade	   and	  markets	  are	  monitored	  by	  the	  state,	  whereas	  criminal	  law	  is	  at	  the	  centre	  of	  its	  sovereignty;545	  it	  is	  one	  of	  the	  cardinal	  services	  and	  powers	  of	  the	  modern	  state.	  Criminal	  law	  regulates	  the	  vertical	  relation	  between	  the	  state	  and	  the	  individual,	  while	   maintaining	   peace	   for	   society	   in	   a	   horizontal	   level.	   Private	   law	   and	  especially	  commercial	   law	  is	  based	  on	  the	  private	  initiative.	  The	  state	  regulates	  in	   order	   to	   forward	   prosperity	   and	   well-­‐being.	   Consequently,	   EU	   action	   and	  intervention	  in	  these	  two	  different	  fields	  should	  not	  be	  equated,	  because	  of	  their	  very	  nature.	   For	   these	   reasons,	  mutual	   recognition	   is	   regarded	   for	  many	  as	   an	  abnormal	  transplant.	  	  	  	  5.3.1.3.	  The	  harmonisation	  argument	  
	  Furthermore,	   it	   is	   said	   that	   there	   is	   lack	   of	   standards	   that	   stem	   from	   an	   EU	  process,	   as	   it	   would	   be	   the	   case	   in	   harmonisation	   (harmonisation	   argument).	  Indeed,	  many	  see	  in	  that	  the	  reason	  why	  mutual	  recognition	  cannot	  operate	  with	  the	   same	   success	   in	   criminal	  matters	   as	   it	   does	   in	   the	   internal	  market.	   In	   the	  latter	   there	   was	   already	   a	   high-­‐level	   of	   harmonisation	   existing	   situation	   that	  enabled	   mutual	   recognition.	   This	   does	   not	   exist	   in	   criminal	   matters’	   co-­‐operation,	  and	  this	  is	  another	  objection	  on	  the	  application	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  in	   the	   field.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   there	   is	   the	   belief	   that	   sustained	   transnational	  engagement	  among	  different	  actors	   spurred	  by	  mutual	   recognition	  agreements	  can	  also	  facilitate	  an	  ongoing	  adaptation	  and	  possible	  convergence	  of	  regulatory	  procedures	  and	   standards	   through	   increased	  mutual	   familiarity	  ex-­‐post,	   rather	  than	   harmonization	   ex-­‐ante. 546 	  Opposed	   to	   that	   view,	   stands	   the	   practical	  thought	  that	  without	  any	  kind	  of	  standards	  that	  come	  from	  EU	  institutions,	  every	  Member	   State	   is	   open	   to	   the	   legal	   surprises	   of	   the	   national	   fellow	   States.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  545	  C	  Harding,	  ‘Exploring	  the	  intersection	  of	  European	  Law	  and	  National	  Criminal	  Law’,	  European	  
Law	  Review,	  2000,	  25(4),	  pp	  374-­‐390.	  546	  K	  Nicolaidis	  and	  G	  Shaffer,	   ‘Transnational	  Mutual	  Recognition	  Regimes:	  Governance	  without	  Global	  Government’,	  in	  273.	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Additionally,	  there	  is	  an	  obvious	  democratic	  deficit	  in	  agreeing	  in	  the	  procedure	  of	  recognising	  rules	  than	  in	  the	  rules	  themselves;	  their	  substance	  and	  rationale.	  In	   that	   way	   the	   production	   of	   criminal	   law	   is	   being	   transformed	   from	   a	  legislative	   process	   into	   an	   administrative	   one. 547 	  It	   is	   not	   the	   fruit	   of	   a	  parliamentary	   negotiation	   –that	   bears	   the	   legitimacy	   of	   the	   democratic	   vote–,	  but	  rather	  of	  a	  governmental	  decision,	  which	  is	  actually	  extraterritorial.548	  	  
	  There	  has	  been	   indeed	  a	   lot	  of	  discussion	  on	   the	   legitimacy	  of	   transposition	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  in	  the	  area	  of	  criminal	  law	  in	  Europe.	  A	  quick	  word	  should	  be	  given	  on	  the	  phenomenon	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  as	  it	  is	  met	  in	  different	  federal	  states	   in	  the	  world.	  Mutual	  recognition	  in	  criminal	  matters	   is	  a	   fact	   for	  modern	  federalism	   (examples	   of	   this	   are	   Switzerland 549 	  and	   the	   United	   States	   of	  America550)	  and	   that	   serves	  as	  an	  argument	   that	  all	   the	  sceptical	  voices	  on	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  547	  B	  Schünemann,	   ‘Fortschritte	  und	  Fehltritte	   in	  der	  Strafrechtspflege	  der	  EU’,	   in	  Goldtammer’s	  
Archiv	  für	  Strafrecht,	  2004,	  p	  193-­‐209.	  548	  S	  Braum,	  ‘Das	  Prinzip	  der	  gegenseitigen	  Anerkennung’,	  in	  Goldtammer’s	  Archiv	  für	  Strafrecht,	  2005	  pp	  688-­‐692.	  549	  Switzerland	  is	  a	  federation	  of	  26	  cantons	  and	  the	  Bund	  (See	  also	  J	  Ouwerkerk,	  Quid	  Pro	  Quo?	  A	  
comparative	   law	   perspective	   on	   the	  mutual	   recognition	   of	   judicial	   decisions	   in	   criminal	  matters,	  2011,	   p	  129	  et	  seq.).	   In	   Swiss	   cooperative	   federalism	   there	   is	   an	  obligation	   for	   the	   federal	   and	  cantonal	   authorities	   to	   assist	   each	   other	   (‘In	  Strafsachen,	  auf	  die	  dieses	  Gesetz	  oder	  ein	  anderes	  
Bundesgesetz	  Anwendung	  findet,	  sind	  der	  Bund	  und	  die	  Kantone	  gegenseitig	  und	  die	  Kantone	  unter	  
sich	   zur	   Rechtshilfe	   verpflichtet’	   -­‐	   Article	   44	   FC).	   Article	   27	   FCCP	  mentions	   that	   all	   authorities	  (both	   cantonal	   and	   federal),	   judicial	   and	   non-­‐judicial,	   have	   the	   obligation	   to	   facilitate	   the	  authorities	   of	   the	   Bund	   in	   the	   progress	   of	   a	   criminal	   process	   (‘Die	   Behörden	   des	   Bundes,	   der	  
Kantone	  und	  der	  Gemeinden	  leisten	  den	  mit	  der	  Verfolgung	  und	  Beurteilung	  von	  Bundesstrafsachen	  
betrauten	  Behörden	   in	   der	   Erfüllung	   ihrer	   Aufgabe	  Rechtshilfe’).	   Moreover,	   in	   Article	   252	   FCCP	  there	  is	  the	  obligation	  to	  legal	  aid	  of	  every	  cantonal	  authority	  towards	  any	  of	  the	  cantons	  that	  are	  involved	  in	  a	  federal	  criminal	  process	  (prosecution	  and	  trial	  -­‐	  ‘Die	  Behörden	  eines	  Kantons	  haben	  
denjenigen	   der	   anderen	   Kantone	   in	   Bundesstrafsachen	   im	   Verfahren	   und	   beim	   Urteilvollzug	  
Rechtshilfe	   zu	   leisten’).	   Within	   the	   Swiss	   federation,	   mutual	   recognition	   exists	   in	   that:	   every	  decision	  of	  the	  judiciary	  that	  has	  cantonal	  or	  federal	  origin	  is	  totally	  effective	  through	  the	  whole	  Swiss	  legal	  order.	  Judicial	  decisions	  are	  recognized	  everywhere	  in	  the	  territory	  bearing	  the	  same	  legal	   force.	  The	  Swiss	  constitution	  provisions	   indeed	   in	   favour	  of	   the	  cooperation	  of	  all	   judicial	  authorities	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	   the	   criminal	   justice	   system.	  The	   recognition	   is	   the	   rule	   and	   the	  exceptions	   to	   that	   are	   limited	   and	   rare	   (J	   Ouwerkerk,	   Quid	   Pro	   Quo?	   A	   comparative	   law	  
perspective	  on	  the	  mutual	  recognition	  of	  judicial	  decisions	  in	  criminal	  matters,	  2011,	  pp	  168-­‐171).	  550	  50	   states	   and	   the	   federal	  district	  of	  Washington	  D.C.	   constitute	   the	   federation	  of	   the	  United	  States	   of	   America	   (See	   also	   J	   Ouwerkerk,	  Quid	   Pro	   Quo?	   A	   comparative	   law	   perspective	   on	   the	  
mutual	  recognition	  of	  judicial	  decisions	  in	  criminal	  matters,	  2011,	  p	  175-­‐239).	  The	  US	  Constitution	  reads	   that:	   ‘Full	   Faith	   and	   Credit	   shall	   be	   given	   in	   each	   State	   to	   the	   public	   Acts,	   Records,	   and	  judicial	  Proceedings	  of	  every	  other	  State.	  And	  the	  Congress	  may	  by	  general	  Laws	  prescribe	   the	  Manner	  in	  which	  such	  Acts,	  Records	  and	  Proceedings	  shall	  be	  proved,	  and	  the	  Effect	  thereof’	  (US	  Constitution	   Article	   IV,	   Section	   1).	   The	   Full	   Faith	   and	   Credit	   Clause	   was	   expressed	   by	   the	  judiciary	   in	   Milwaukee	   County	   v.	   M.E.	   White	   Co:	   ‘To	   alter	   the	   status	   of	   the	   several	   states	   as	  independent	  foreign	  sovereignties,	  each	  free	  to	  ignore	  obligations	  created	  under	  the	  laws	  or	  by	  judicial	  proceedings	  of	  the	  others,	  and	  to	  make	  them	  integral	  parts	  of	  a	  single	  nation	  throughout	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application	   of	   the	   mechanism	   within	   the	   EU	   need	   to	   take	   seriously	   into	  consideration.	  
	  
	  
5.3.2.	  Mutual	  Legal	  Assistance	  
	  Before	   looking	   briefly	   into	   the	   EAW	   and	   bringing	   everything	   together	   for	   a	  conclusion	   in	   this	   chapter	   considering	   the	   interplay	   of	   evidential	   fairness	   as	   a	  concept	   with	   mutual	   recognition,	   we	   should	   give	   a	   little	   space	   to	   some	   more	  history	   looking	   back	   into	   the	   previous	   system	   of	   cooperation	   in	   EU	   criminal	  matters,	  i.e.	  the	  mutual	  legal	  assistance	  regime.	  	  	  	  5.3.2.1.	  MLA	  history,	  function	  and	  instruments	  
	  Mutual	   legal	  assistance	   is	   still	   the	  norm	  of	   cooperation	  between	  states	  all	  over	  the	  world	  considering	  criminal	  affairs.	  The	  authorities	  (judicial	  and	  police)	  of	  a	  state	   needing	   to	   perform	   legal	   actions	   that	   should	   take	   place	   in	   another	  sovereign	  state	  have	  to	  request	  the	  assistance	  of	  that	  state.	  The	  means	  that	  this	  happens	   is	   normally	   letters	   rogatory.	   That	   is	   why	   the	   model	   of	   mutual	   legal	  assistance	  is	  called	  the	  request	  model.	  
	  This	  model	  is	  called	  the	  request	  model,	  in	  order	  to	  pinpoint	  its	  main	  feature	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  which	  a	  remedy	  upon	  a	  just	  obligation	  might	  be	  demanded	  as	  of	  right,	  irrespective	  of	  the	  state	  of	  origin’(296	   US	   268,	   276-­‐277-­‐1935).	   Nevertheless,	   in	   the	   area	   of	   criminal	   law	   there	   is	   an	  exception	  to	  this	  solid	  principle.	  ‘The	  Courts	  of	  no	  country	  execute	  the	  penal	  laws	  of	  another’,	  is	  the	   actual	  wording	   used	   by	   Chief	   Justice	  Marshall,	   in	  The	  Antelope	   (23	   US	   66,	   123-­‐1825),	  that	  incorporates	   the	   so	   called	   ‘penal	   law	   exception’	   (See	   also	   MW	   Janis,	   The	   Recognition	   and	  Enforcement	  of	  Foreign	  Law:	  The	  Antelope's	  Penal	  Law	  Exception.	  International	  Lawyer,	  Vol	  20,	  p.	  303,	  1986.	  Available	  at	  SSRN:	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1103218).	  The	  different	  states	  of	  the	  USA	   federation	   have	   their	   own	   (different)	   rules	   on	   criminal	   matters,	   both	   substantive	   and	  procedural.	  Although	  there	  have	  been	  attempts	  for	  the	  creation	  of	  a	  common	  platform	  of	  rules,	  there	   is	   considerable	   divergence	   between	   the	   systems	   adopted	   by	   the	   individual	   states	   (J	  Ouwerkerk,	   Quid	   Pro	   Quo?	   A	   comparative	   law	   perspective	   on	   the	  mutual	   recognition	   of	   judicial	  
decisions	   in	  criminal	  matters,	   2011,	   p.	   238-­‐9).	  However,	   there	   is	   constant	   cooperation	  between	  the	  different	  states	  and	  the	  federal	  authorities	  that	  prove	  that	  there	  is	  a	  space	  for	  principles	  such	  as	  the	  mutual	  recognition	  for	  the	  furthering	  of	  finer	  trans-­‐federal	  (or	  transnational	  in	  the	  case	  of	  EU)	  law	  enforcement	  and	  combating	  crime.	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maybe	   deficiency.	   The	   instruments	   based	   on	   mutual	   legal	   assistance,	   may	   be	  regarded	   as	   slow	   and	   inefficient	   given	   the	   fact	   that	   they	   do	   not	   impose	   any	  standard	  forms	  to	  be	  used	  when	  issuing	  a	  request	  for	  obtaining	  evidence	  located	  in	  another	  Member	  State	  or	  any	  fixed	  deadlines	  for	  executing	  the	  request.	  There	  are	  also	   complex	   issues	   relating	   to	   the	   cooperation	  between	   the	  executing	  and	  the	   issuing	   state	  authorities	  and	   to	   the	  principles	   that	  apply	   such	  as	   the	   forum	  
regit	  actum.	  	  
	  Here	   are	   some	   instruments	   based	   on	   the	   principle	   of	   mutual	   legal	   assistance.	  These	  most	   notably	   include	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	  mutual	   assistance	   in	  criminal	   matters, 551 	  supplemented	   by	   the	   Schengen	   Agreement 552 	  and	   the	  Convention	   on	   mutual	   assistance	   in	   criminal	   matters	   and	   its	   Protocol553	  (plus	  rules	   on	   specific	   forms	   of	   mutual	   assistance	   such	   as	   the	   interception	   of	  telecommunications	  or	  the	  use	  of	  videoconferencing).554	  	  	  	  5.3.2.2.	  MR	  Added	  Value	  
	  Instruments	  based	  on	  mutual	  recognition	  may	  also	  be	  regarded	  as	  unsatisfactory	  in	  that	  they	  only	  cover	  specific	  types	  of	  evidence	  and	  that	  they	  provide	  for	  a	  large	  number	  of	  grounds	   for	  refusal	   to	  execute	  the	  order.	  Nevertheless,	   they	  provide	  swifter	   solutions	   and	   smoother	   cooperation	   between	   the	   sovereigns.	   The	   so-­‐called	   order	   model	   in	   the	   EU	   is	   further	   forwarded	   by	   the	   Green	   Paper	   ‘on	  obtaining	  evidence	   in	   criminal	  matters	   from	  one	  Member	  State	   to	  another	  and	  securing	   its	   admissibility’	   and	   the	   Stockholm	   Programme,	   which	   aims	  particularly	   and	   emphatically	   at	   improving	   cooperation	   based	   on	   mutual	  recognition.	   Inefficiencies	   of	   both	   request	   and	   order	  models	   seem	   that	  will	   be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  551	  European	  Convention	  of	  20	  April	  1959	  on	  mutual	  assistance	  in	  criminal	  matters.	  552	  Convention	  of	  19	  June	  1990	  implementing	  the	  Schengen	  Agreement	  of	  14	  June	  1985	  between	  the	  Governments	  of	  the	  States	  of	  the	  Benelux	  Economic	  Union,	  the	  Federal	  Republic	  of	  Germany	  and	  the	  French	  Republic	  on	  the	  gradual	  abolition	  of	  checks	  at	  their	  common	  borders	  (OJ	  L	  239,	  22.9.2000,	  p.	  19).	  553	  Convention	  of	   29	  May	  2000	  on	  mutual	   assistance	   in	   criminal	  matters	  between	   the	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  (OJ	  C	  197,	  12.7.2000,	  p.	  1).	  554	  See	   in	   Commission	   of	   the	   European	   Communities,	   Green	   Paper	   on	   obtaining	   evidence	   in	  criminal	   matters	   from	   one	   Member	   State	   to	   another	   and	   securing	   its	   admissibility,	   Brussels,	  11.11.2009	  COM(2009)	  624	  final,	  pp	  4-­‐5.	  
 178 
addressed	  by	  the	  complete	  replacement	  of	  the	  existing	  legal	  regime	  on	  obtaining	  evidence	   in	   criminal	  matters	   by	   a	   single	   instrument	   based	   on	   the	   principle	   of	  mutual	   recognition	  and	  covering	  all	   types	  of	   evidence	   (cf.	  Draft	  on	  a	  European	  Investigation	  Order).	  
	  
	  
5.3.3.	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant	  aftermath	  
	  Before	  plunging	   into	  a	  historical	   flashback	  (5.5),	  we	  will	  mention	  here	  some	  of	  the	  aspects	  of	  the	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant	  which	  shed	  some	  more	  light	  to	  the	  connection	   between	   mutual	   recognition	   and	   criminal	   matters	   in	   the	   EU.	   The	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant	  is	  the	  first	  example	  of	  experimentation	  with	  the	  issues	  relating	   to	   the	  application	  of	  mutual	   recognition	   in	   criminal	  matters.	  The	  main	  issues	  that	  revolved	  around	  it	  were	  that	  of	  legality	  and	  the	  issue	  of	  automaticity.	  On	  the	  first	  the	  double	  criminality	  requirement	  formed	  the	  core	  of	  the	  matter,	  as	  it	  was	  abolished	  for	  a	  large	  category	  of	  crimes	  and	  for	  the	  rest	  its	  use	  was	  rather	  discretionary	   than	   compulsory.	   The	   issue	   of	   automaticity	   and	   the	   respect	   of	  fundamental	   rights	   painted	   the	   picture	   of	   the	   other	   important	   tension	   in	   the	  EAW.	   These	  matters	   are	   important	   since	   they	   have	   tested	  mutual	   recognition	  and	  proved	  there	  is	  a	  gap	  where	  fairness	  could	  assist	  to	  the	  way	  forward.	  	  The	  added	  value	  of	  mutual	   recognition	  was	  put	   to	   the	   test	   in	  practice	  with	   the	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant.555	  Indeed,	  another	   interesting	  aspect	  that	  could	  shed	  some	  light	  on	  the	  discussion	  is	  the	  degree	  of	  mutual	  trust	  in	  existing	  legislative	  MR	  instruments	  such	  as	  the	  EAW.	  Here	  there	  is	  also	  room	  for	  the	  conversation	  about	   double	   criminality	   and	   grounds	   for	   refusal	   in	   EAW	   as	   a	   test	   of	   trust	  between	  the	  member-­‐states	  within	  the	  EU.	  	  	  The	   purpose	   of	   the	   EAW	   was	   to	   improve	   traditional	   judicial	   cooperation	   by	  limiting	   the	   grounds	   of	   refusal,	   bringing	   judicial	   authorities	   of	   Member	   States	  into	   a	   closer	   cooperation	   in	   order	   to	   achieve	   the	   effective	   enforcement	   of	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  555	  S	  Alegre	  and	  M	  Leaf,	   ‘Mutual	  Recognition	  in	  European	  Judicial	  Cooperation:	  A	  step	  too	  far	  too	  
soon?	  Case	  Study-­‐The	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant’,	  European	  Law	  Journal,	  Vol.10,	  March,	  2004,	  pp	  200-­‐217.	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criminal	  decisions,556	  and	   introducing	  mutual	   trust	  of	   the	  different	   and	  diverse	  criminal	  legal	  systems.557	  	  	  5.3.3.1.	  Mutual	  Trust	  –	  Test	  of	  Trust	  
	  Mutual	   trust 558 	  seems	   to	   be	   a	   vague	   wording	   to	   express	   the	   basis	   of	  understanding	  and	  dialogue	  between	  different	  criminal	  processes	   (legal	  orders	  in	  general)	  that	  it	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  trigger	  cooperation.	  Its	  core	  meaning	  has	  been	  contested	  and	  it	  is	  also	  supported	  that	  it	  is	  just	  an	  empty	  of	  meaning	  word	  used	  by	  the	  politicians	  who	  wish	  to	  push	  the	  EU	  agenda	  further.559	  	  In	  the	  Programme	  of	  measures	  to	  implement	  the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  of	   decisions	   in	   criminal	   matters,	   it	   was	   stated	   that	   ‘Implementation	   of	   the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  of	  decisions	  in	  criminal	  matters	  presupposes	  that	  Member	  States	  have	  trust	   in	  each	  others’	  criminal	   justice	  systems.	  That	  trust	   is	  grounded,	   in	   particular,	   on	   their	   shared	   commitment	   to	   the	   principles	   of	  freedom,	   democracy	   and	   respect	   for	   human	   rights,	   fundamental	   freedoms	   and	  the	  rule	  of	   law’.	  560	  	  Almost	   ten	  years	   later	   in	   the	  Stockholm	  programme,	   it	  was	  acknowledged	   that	   ‘Mutual	   trust	   between	   authorities	   and	   services	   in	   the	  different	   Member	   States	   and	   decision-­‐makers	   is	   the	   basis	   for	   efficient	  cooperation	   in	   this	   area.	   Ensuring	   trust	   and	   finding	   new	   ways	   to	   increase	  reliance	   on,	   and	  mutual	   understanding	   between,	   the	   different	   legal	   systems	   in	  the	  Member	  States	  will	  thus	  be	  one	  of	  the	  main	  challenges	  for	  the	  future’.561	  And	  what	  a	  challenge	  it	  has	  been,	  since	  mutual	  trust	  and	  mutual	  recognition	  do	  not	  go	  hand	  in	  hand	  automatically.	  This	  was	  proved	  in	  practice	  with	  the	  EAW.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  556	  See	  article	  31	  par.	  1	  of	  the	  TEU.	  557	  F	   Geyer,	   ‘The	   European	   Arrest	   Warrant	   in	   Germany	   -­‐	   Constitutional	   Mistrust	   towards	   the	  Concept	  of	  Mutual	  Trust’,	  in	  Guild	  (ed.),	  Constitutional	  Challenges	  to	  the	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant	  (Wolf	  Legal	  Publishers,	  2006),	  pp	  101-­‐124.	  558	  H	   Nilsson,	   ‘Mutual	   Trust	   or	   Mutual	   Mistrust?’,	  Mutual	   Trust	   in	   the	   European	   Criminal	   Area,	  Editions	  De	  L’	  Universite	  De	  Bruxelles,	  2005,	  pp	  29-­‐33.	  559	  S	   Alegre,	   ‘Mutual	   trust	   –	   Lifting	   the	   mask’,	   Mutual	   Trust	   in	   the	   European	   Criminal	   Area,	  Editions	  De	  L’	  Universite	  De	  Bruxelles,	  2005,	  p	  45.	  560	  See	  Programme	  of	  Measures	  to	  implement	  the	  principle	  of	  Mutual	  Recognition	  of	  decisions	  in	  criminal	  Matters.	  OJ	  C	  012,	  15/01/2001.	  561	  European	   Council,	   The	   Stockholm	   Programme	   –	   An	   Open	   and	   Secure	   Europe	   Serving	   and	  Protecting	  Citizens	  (2010/C	  115/01).	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5.3.3.2.	  Double	  Criminality	  
	  Double	   criminality	   issue	   in	   the	   EAW	   became	   a	   constant	   headache	   during	  negotiations.	  Article	  2§2	  of	  the	  EAW	  lists	  a	  catalogue	  of	  32	  crimes	  for	  which	  the	  double	  criminality	  principle	   is	  abolished.562	  According	  to	  the	  double	  criminality	  principle	  nobody	  should	  be	  extradited	  for	  a	  crime	  that	  is	  not	  punishable	  in	  both	  the	   issuing	   and	   the	   executing	   states.	   Nevertheless,	   for	   the	   sake	   of	   faster	  cooperation	  the	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant	  legislative	  initiative	  changed	  that	  with	  regard	  to	  a	  sum	  of	  serious	  criminal	  behaviours.	  This	  triggered	  a	  lot	  of	  discussion	  about	   the	  mutual	   trust	   between	   the	  member	   states	   and	   the	   basis	   upon	  which	  they	  were	   to	  adopt	   this	  provision	   trusting	  each	  other,	   recognizing	  each	  other’s	  judicial	  decisions.563	  	  
	  
	  5.3.3.3.	  Grounds	  for	  Refusal	  	  The	  abolition	  of	  double	  criminality	  principle	  did	  not	  automatically	  mean	  swifter	  and	   smoother	   cooperation.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   it	   generated	   a	   demand	   for	   the	  inclusion	  of	  more	   grounds	   for	   refusal	   of	   execution	  of	   an	  EAW	   in	   the	   final	   text.	  The	   reason	   for	   that	   is	   that	   mutual	   recognition	   does	   not	   happen	   overnight.	   It	  cannot	  be	  a	  product	  of	  wishful	   thinking	  or	  vague	  principles	   that	  do	  not	  mirror	  the	  simultaneous	  convergence	  and	  divergence	  of	  criminal	   law	  systems	   that	   the	  European	   states	   share.	   Mutual	   trust	   is	   needed	   for	   mutual	   recognition	   better	  functioning	  but	  then	  one	  needs	  to	  bare	  in	  mind	  the	  mutual	  recognition	  spectrum	  and	  its	  interplay	  with	  trust.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  562	  ‘The	   following	   offences,	   if	   they	   are	   punishable	   in	   the	   issuing	   Member	   State	   by	   a	   custodial	  sentence	   or	   a	   detention	   order	   for	   a	   maximum	   period	   of	   at	   least	   three	   years	   and	   as	   they	   are	  defined	   by	   the	   law	   of	   the	   issuing	   Member	   State,	   shall,	   under	   the	   terms	   of	   this	   Framework	  Decision	   and	   without	   verification	   of	   the	   double	   criminality	   of	   the	   act,	   give	   rise	   to	   surrender	  pursuant	   to	   a	   European	   arrest	   warrant:’	   [it	   follows	   the	   list	   with	   the	   32	   criminal	   behaviours],	  EAW,	  Art.	  2§2.	  563	  See	   also	   M	   Fichera,	   ‘The	   European	   Arrest	  Warrant	   and	   the	   Sovereign	   State:	   A	   Marriage	   of	  Convenience?’	  European	  Law	  Journal,	  Vol.	  15,	  No.	  1,	  2009,	  pp	  70-­‐97.	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5.3.4.	  MR	  Spectrum	  
	  There	  is	  a	  spectrum	  between	  recognition	  plus	  harmonisation	  and	  the	  impact	  on	  grounds	   for	   refusal	   and	   the	   other	   extreme,	   which	   is	   recognition	   minus	  harmonisation	  (and	  subsequent	  interplay	  with	  grounds	  for	  refusal).	  The	  relation	  of	  this	  spectrum	  with	  mutual	  trust	  among	  member-­‐states	  was	  tested	  during	  the	  EAW	  negotiations	  and	  further	  implementation564	  and	  application.	  	  	  On	  the	  one	  hand	  there	  is	  recognition	  that	  accommodates	  harmonisation.	  In	  other	  words	   mutual	   recognition	   operates	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   some	   harmonized	  aspects	  of	  legislation	  exist.	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  there	  is	  the	  other	  extreme,	  namely	  recognition	  without	   harmonisation.	   That	   of	   course	  has	   certain	   implications	   for	  the	   grounds	   for	   refusal.	   If	   the	   legislator	   wishes	   to	   get	   rid	   of	   the	   grounds	   for	  refusal,	   he	   has	   to	   provide	   legal	   guarantees	   for	   trust,	   i.e.	   harmonisation.	   Full	  harmonisation	   is	   a	   utopia	   the	   way	   the	   EU	   functions	   and	   exists	   today.	   Further	  harmonisation	  takes	  time	  but	  on	  the	  other	  hand	  legislative	  instruments	  that	  call	  on	  such	   fundamental	   ideas	  of	   law	   that	  are	  meant	   to	  be	  common	  and	  shared	   in	  order	  to	  forward	  trust	  and	  cooperation	  is	  an	  attempt	  without	  results.	  	  	  
5.4.	  The	  proposition	  of	  fairness	  
	  The	   attempt	   to	   build	   mutual	   trust	   on	   concepts	   as	   vague	   as	   freedom	   and	  democracy	  instead	  of	  solid	  principles	  makes	  a	  great	  illustration	  of	  distinguishing	  clearly	  between	  politics	  and	  law.565	  Mutual	  recognition	  is	  indeed	  the	  model	  that	  realistically	   constitutes	   the	   present	   and	   the	   future	   of	   cooperation	   in	   criminal	  matters	   within	   the	   EU.	   Today	   the	   fear	   is	   not	   war	   (as	   it	   was	   in	   the	   era	   of	   ius	  
cosmopoliticum)	   but	   transnational	   crime.	   Mutual	   recognition	   has	   produced	  results	  in	  the	  EU	  law	  realm	  and	  that	  also	  happens	  in	  the	  judicial	  cooperation	  in	  criminal	   matters.	   Further	   success	   of	   this	   would	   require	   more	   mutual	   trust	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  564	  JM	  Borgers,	  ‘Implementing	  Framework	  Decisions’,	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review,	  Vol.	  44,	  2007,	  p	  1361.	  565	  V	   Hatzopoulos,	   ‘With	   or	   without	   you...	   Judging	   politically	   in	   the	   field	   of	   Area	   of	   Freedom,	  Security	  and	  Justice’,	  2008,	  European	  Law	  Review,	  p	  1-­‐16.	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between	   member	   states	   that	   would	   make	   the	   cooperation	   easier	   on	   the	   one	  hand,	   but	   also	   safer	   for	   citizens’	   human	   rights	   on	   the	   other.	  Nevertheless,	   that	  cannot	   be	   done	   in	   a	   vacuum.	   Full	   harmonisation	   is	   not	   an	   option	   either.	   Some	  harmonisation	  though,	  based	  not	  on	  common	  rules,	  but	  on	  common	  principles	  is	  possible	  and	  natural,	  since	  these	  principles	  belong	  to	  a	  European	  legal	  heritage	  existing	  for	  years	  via	  ECHR	  and	  Strasbourg’s	  case	  law.	  	  	  Indeed,	  a	  concept	  of	  evidential	  fairness	  as	  proposed	  in	  the	  first	  part	  could	  apply	  here,	   since	  mutual	   recognition	  mechanism	   is	  manageable	   and	  adaptable	   to	   the	  area	   that	   seeks	   to	   facilitate.	   The	   attributes	   of	  mutual	   recognition	   point	   to	   this	  same	   direction.	   Adopting	   the	   four	   principles	   of	   evidential	   fairness	   can	   form	   a	  basis	   for	   further	   mutual	   trust	   and	   swifter,	   smoother,	   safer	   cooperation	   in	  criminal	  matters.	  Before	  looking	  into	  how	  this	  is	  possible	  in	  instruments	  such	  as	  the	   European	   Evidence	   Warrant	   and	   the	   European	   Investigation	   Order,	   here	  follows	  an	  overview	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  instruments	  in	  judicial	  cooperation	  in	  EU	  criminal	  matters.	  	  	  	  
5.5.	  Link	  and	  Historical	  flashback	  –	  Mutual	  Recognition	  instruments	  
	  The	  first	  and	  most	  discussed	  product	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  in	  criminal	  matters	  has	   been	   the	   European	   Arrest	   Warrant.566	  ‘The	   European	   arrest	   warrant	   is	   a	  judicial	   decision	   issued	   by	   a	   Member	   State	   with	   a	   view	   to	   the	   arrest	   and	  surrender	  by	  another	  Member	  State	  of	  a	  requested	  person,	   for	   the	  purposes	  of	  conducting	  a	  criminal	  prosecution	  or	  executing	  a	  custodial	  sentence	  or	  detention	  order.	  Member	  States	  shall	  execute	  any	  European	  arrest	  warrant	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	   principle	   of	   mutual	   recognition’,	   as	   Article	   1	   of	   the	   Framework	   Decision	  states.	  However,	   the	   ‘state	  of	  play	  regarding	   implementation	  of	   the	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant	  on	  1	  January	  2004,	  by	  when	  it	  should	  have	  been	   fully	  applicable,	  was	  not	  satisfying	  as	  only	  8	  of	   the	   then	  15	  Member	  States	  had	  managed	  to	  meet	  the	  deadline.	  The	  remaining	  7	  Member	  States	  took	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  566	  Council	   Framework	   Decision	   of	   13	   June	   2002	   on	   the	   European	   Arrest	   Warrant	   and	   the	  surrender	  procedures	  between	  Member	  States	  (2002/584/JHA),	  OJ	  L190,	  18	  July	  2002,	  p	  1.	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more	   months	   before	   implementing	   it.	   Since	   then,	   all	   27	   Member	   States	   have	  implemented	  the	  EAW	  which	  now’,	  is	  supposed	  to	  be	  working	  satisfactorily.567	  	  The	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant	  was	  only	  the	  starting	  point	  for	  a	  number	  of	  other	  measures	   applying	   the	   principle	   in	   criminal	   matters.	   In	   2003,	   the	   Council	  adopted	  a	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  execution	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  of	  orders	  freezing	  property	  or	  evidence.568	  The	  purpose	  of	  it	  is	  to	  establish	  the	  rules	  under	  which	   a	   Member	   State	   shall	   recognise	   and	   execute	   in	   its	   territory	   a	   freezing	  order	  issued	  by	  a	  judicial	  authority	  of	  another	  Member	  State	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  criminal	   proceedings.569 	  Nevertheless,	   until	   summer	   2010,	   only	   23	   Member	  States	  had	   fully	   implemented	   the	   legislation	  on	   the	  Freezing	  of	  Assets	   that	   is	  5	  years	  after	  the	  deadline	  (2	  August	  2005).	  	  	  Execution	   of	   freezing	   orders	   was	   followed	   by	   the	   adoption	   of	   another	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  application	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  to	  financial	   penalties.570	  In	  Article	  6	   is	   read	  –in	   a	   language	   similar	   to	   the	   freezing	  order	   instrument–	   that	   the	   decisions	   imposing	   financial	   penalties	   should	   be	  executed	  ‘forthwith’	  and	  without	  any	  further	  formality.	  However	  forwarding	  are	  the	  words	  used	  in	  favour	  of	  mutual	  recognition,	  the	  reality	  of	  implementation	  is	  again	  different.	  Only	  2	  Member	  States	  had	  implemented	  the	  Framework	  Decision	  by	   22	  March	   2007,	   date	   on	   which	   the	   application	   of	   the	   Framework	   Decision	  should	  have	  begun.	  By	   the	   start	   of	   summer	  2010	   its	   implementation	  had	  been	  notified	  by	  15	  more	  Member	  States.	  	  	  On	  top	  of	  all	  that,	  in	  November	  2006	  a	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  application	  of	  the	   principle	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   to	   confiscation	   orders	   was	   adopted.571	  Because	   of	   the	   different	   legal	   traditions	   between	   the	   Member	   States	   on	   the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  567	  Note	   of	   the	   Incoming	   Belgian	   Presidency	   to	   the	  Working	   Party	   on	   Cooperation	   in	   Criminal	  Matters	   (COPEN)	   regarding	   follow-­‐up	   of	   the	  Mutual	   Recognition	   Instruments,	   11193/10	   of	   17	  June	  2010.	  568	  OJ	  L196,	  2	  August	  2003,	  p	  45.	  569	  Article	  1.	  570	  OJ	  L76,	  22	  March	  2005,	  p	  16.	  571	  OJ	   L328,	   24	  November	   2006,	   p	   59.	  Mitsilegas	   notes	   interestingly	   that	   ‘all	   three	   Framework	  Decisions	  were	  tabled	  on	  the	  initiative	  of	  Member	  States,	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  their	  powers	  under	  the	  third	  pillar’,	  V	  Mitsilegas,	  EU	  Criminal	  Law	  (Oxford,	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2009),	  p	  122.	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matter,	   this	   legislation	   was	   accompanied	   by	   another	   Framework	   Decision	   on	  Confiscation	   of	   Crime-­‐Related	   Proceeds,	   Instrumentalities	   and	   Property,	   trying	  to	   form	   a	   harmonised	   common	   basis	   regarding	   confiscating	   practices.572	  This	  Framework	   Decision	   couldn’t	   be	   an	   exception	   and	   following	   the	   fate	   of	   the	  previous	   Framework	   Decisions,	   had	   been	   implemented	   by	   11	   Member	   States	  until	  the	  summer	  of	  2010.573	  	  	  Following	   to	   all	   these	   measures,	   there	   are	   a	   number	   of	   other	   instruments	  adopted	  furthering	  the	  concept	  of	  mutual	  recognition,	  but	  according	  to	  the	  note	  of	   the	   incoming	   Belgian	   Presidency,	   it	   is	   more	   than	   likely	   that	   the	   situation	  described	   above	   will	   recur.	   In	   November	   2008	   the	   Council	   adopted	   the	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  application	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  to	  judgments	  and	  probation	  decisions	  with	  a	  view	  to	  the	  supervision	  of	  probation	  measures	   and	   alternative	   sanctions. 574 	  ‘This	   Framework	   Decision	   aims	   at	  facilitating	   the	   social	   rehabilitation	   of	   sentenced	   persons,	   improving	   the	  protection	  of	  victims	  and	  of	  the	  general	  public,	  and	  facilitating	  the	  application	  of	  suitable	  probation	  measures	  and	  alternative	  sanctions,	  in	  case	  of	  offenders	  who	  do	  not	  live	  in	  the	  State	  of	  conviction.	  With	  a	  view	  to	  achieving	  these	  objectives,	  this	   Framework	  Decision	   lays	   down	   rules	   according	   to	  which	   a	  Member	   State,	  other	  than	  the	  Member	  State	  in	  which	  the	  person	  concerned	  has	  been	  sentenced,	  recognises	  judgments	  and,	  where	  applicable,	  probation	  decisions	  and	  supervises	  probation	  measures	  imposed	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  a	  judgment,	  or	  alternative	  sanctions	  contained	   in	   such	   a	   judgment,	   and	   takes	   all	   other	   decisions	   relating	   to	   that	  judgment’.575	  The	  date	  of	  implementation	  for	  this	  legislative	  initiative	  was	  the	  6th	  of	   December	   2011.	   In	   addition,	   on	   the	   same	   date	   the	   Council	   adopted	   the	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  application	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  to	  judgments	   in	   criminal	   matters	   imposing	   custodial	   sentences	   or	   measures	  involving	   deprivation	   of	   liberty	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   their	   enforcement	   in	   the	  European	  Union	  with	  date	  of	  implementation	  the	  5th	  of	  December	  2011.576	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  572	  OJ	  L68,	  15	  March	  2005,	  p	  49.	  573	  Date	  of	  implementation:	  24	  November	  2008.	  574	  Framework	  Decision	   2008/947/JHA	   of	   27	  November	   2008.	   OJ	   L337,	   16	   December	   2008,	   p	  102.	  575	  Article	  1.	  576	  Framework	  Decision	  2008/909/JHA	  of	  27	  November	  2008.	  OJ	  L327,	  5	  December	  2008,	  p	  27.	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  In	  this	  chapter	  the	  focus	  shifted	  from	  conceiving	  evidential	   fairness	  to	  applying	  it;	   from	   the	   realm	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   and	   ECHR	   to	   that	   of	   EU	   and	   EU	  Criminal	  Law	  in	  particular.	  The	  mutual	  recognition	  principle	  was	  our	  main	  focus	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  577	  Framework	  Decision	  2008/978/JHA	  of	  18	  December	  2008	  on	  the	  European	  evidence	  warrant	  for	   the	   purpose	   of	   obtaining	   objects,	   documents	   and	   data	   for	   use	   in	   proceedings	   in	   criminal	  matters.	  OJ	  L350,	  30	  December	  2008,	  p	  72.	  Date	  of	   implementation:	  19	  January	  2011.	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  however	  that	  the	  initiative	  for	  the	  European	  Investigation	  Order	  is	  seen	  as	  a	  proposal	  aiming	  at	  replacing	  this	  Framework	  Decision.	  See	  Note	  of	  the	  Incoming	  Belgian	  Presidency	  to	  the	  Working	  Party	  on	  Cooperation	   in	  Criminal	  Matters	   (COPEN)	  regarding	   follow-­‐up	  of	   the	  Mutual	  Recognition	  Instruments,	  11193/10	  of	  17	  June	  2010,	  p	  4.	  578	  Articles	  1	  &	  5.	  More	  on	  the	  EEW	  in	  the	  next	  chapter.	  579	  Framework	  Decision	  2009/299/JHA	  of	  26	  February	  2009,	  OJ	  L81,	  27	  March	  2009,	  p	  24,	  with	  date	  of	  implementation	  the	  28th	  of	  March	  2011.	  The	  objectives	  of	  this	  Framework	  Decision	  are	  to	  enhance	   the	   procedural	   rights	   of	   persons	   subject	   to	   criminal	   proceedings,	   to	   facilitate	   judicial	  cooperation	   in	   criminal	   matters	   and,	   in	   particular,	   to	   improve	   mutual	   recognition	   of	   judicial	  decisions	  between	  Member	  States	  (Art	  1).	  580	  Framework	  Decision	  2009/829/JHA	  of	  23	  October	  2009,	  OJ	  L294,	  11	  November	  2009,	  p	  20.	  This	   Framework	  Decision	   lays	   down	   rules	   according	   to	  which	   one	  Member	   State	   recognises	   a	  decision	   on	   supervision	   measures	   issued	   in	   another	   Member	   State	   as	   an	   alternative	   to	  provisional	   detention,	   monitors	   the	   supervision	   measures	   imposed	   on	   a	   natural	   person	   and	  surrenders	  the	  person	  concerned	  to	  the	  issuing	  State	  in	  case	  of	  breach	  of	  these	  measures	  (Art	  1).	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  581	  J	   Monar,	   ‘European	   Union	   –	   Justice	   and	   Home	   Affairs;	   a	   Balance	   Sheet	   and	   an	   Agenda	   for	  
Reform’,	   in	  G.	  Edwards	  and	  A.	  Pijpers	  (Eds),	  The	  Politics	  of	  European	  Treaty	  Reform:	  The	  1996	  Intergovernmental	  Conference	  and	  Beyond,	  1997,	  pp	  326-­‐	  339.	  
 187 
6.	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  and	  a	  concept	  on	  evidential	  fairness	  	  6.1.	  6	  ECHR	  	  (transnational	  element	  vs.	  the	  trial)	  	  6.1.1.	  Transnational	  element	  	  6.1.2.	  Traditional	  trial	  	  6.2.	  Judicial	  Cooperation	  in	  Criminal	  Evidence	  6.2.1.	  Harmonisation	  of	  Evidence	  in	  mutual	  recognition	  (cf.	  Lisbon	  Treaty)	  6.2.2.	  Gathering	  &	  Admissibility	  6.3.	  EEW	  6.3.1.	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  Initiative	  6.3.2.	  Relation	  with	  other	  instruments	  6.3.3.	  Legislation	  Overview	  6.3.3.1.	  Preamble	  	  6.3.3.2.	  Scope	  	  6.3.3.3.	  Mutual	  Recognition	  6.3.3.4.	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  Main	  Issues	  –	  Issuing	  Authority	  	  6.3.3.5.	  Proportionality	  	  6.3.3.6.	  Territoriality	  	  6.3.3.7.	  Double	  Criminality	  6.3.3.8.	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  Procedural	  Safeguards	  –	  In	  the	  issuing	  state	  	  6.3.3.9.	  In	  the	  executing	  state	  	  6.3.3.10.	  For	  the	  interested	  parties	  	  6.3.3.11.	  Comments	  on	  legislation	  	  6.3.4.	  In	  the	  light	  of	  fairness	  
	  	  
Introduction	  	  Mutual	   recognition	   in	   its	   different	   incarnations	   takes	   the	   form	   of	   specific	  legislative	  instruments	  or	  draft	  proposals	  that	  seek	  to	  put	  in	  paper	  cooperation	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in	  criminal	  matters.	  Here,	   the	   focus	  will	  be	  on	   the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  and	   the	   draft	   proposal	   on	   a	   European	   Investigation	   Order.	   In	   particular,	   the	  twofold	  question	  that	  was	  set	  for	  mutual	  recognition	  is	  also	  applicable:	  How	  do	  these	  instruments	  seem	  to	  function	  in	  the	  light	  of	  evidential	  fairness?	  How	  could	  they	  be	  functioning	  better?	  Before	  dealing	  with	  the	  EEW,	  we	  should	  briefly	  look	  into	  EU’s	  accession	  in	  the	  ECHR	  and	  the	  harmonisation	  of	  evidence	  as	  these	  are	  interesting	  legislative	  developments	  related	  to	  our	  topic.	  
	  
	  
6.1.	  6	  ECHR	  	  (transnational	  element	  vs.	  the	  trial)	  	  
	  We	  need	  to	  a	  certain	  extent	  to	  engage	  with	  the	  discussion	  on	  article	  6	  ECHR	  and	  in	   particular	  with	   the	   question	   of	  whether	   it	   covers	   also	   transnational	   judicial	  cooperation	   in	   criminal	   matters	   apart	   from	   the	   traditional	   criminal	   trial	  proceedings.	  Before	  dealing	  with	  this	  question	  we	  should	  also	  refer	  to	  the	  issue	  of	  the	  EU	  accession	  in	  the	  ECHR.582	  	  	  The	   Council	   of	   Europe	   and	   the	   European	   Union	   function	   as	   to	   separate	  international	   organizations,	   despite	   the	   commonalities	   and	   the	   similar	  characteristics	  that	  are	  shared	  between	  them.	  The	  European	  Union	  is	  built	  on	  the	  respect	  of	   the	  human	  rights	  protected	  by	   the	  ECHR	  and	   the	  European	  Treaties	  verbally	   express	   that	   fact.	  On	   the	  other	  hand	   the	  ECHR	   is	  part	  of	   the	  domestic	  law	  of	  all	  the	  member	  states	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  which	  are	  signatories	  of	  the	  Convention.	  Although	  the	  two	  organizations	  represent	  separate	  legal	  orders	  with	  Strasbourg	  and	  Luxembourg	  Courts	  signposting	  this,	  in	  principle	  they	  belong	  in	  the	  same	  European	  legal	  heritage.	  	  	  Nevertheless,	  since	  the	  EU	  as	  an	  entity	   is	  not	  a	  party	  to	  the	  ECHR,	   formally	  the	  latter	  does	  not	  apply	   to	  EU	  acts.	  Although	   the	  substantial	   legal	   shared	  heritage	  would	   be	   sufficient	   for	   future	   anomalies,	   the	   political	   decision	   for	   the	   EU	  accession	  to	  the	  ECHR	  proves	  the	  existence	  and	  the	  strength	  of	  this	  heritage.	   It	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  582	  X	  Groussot,	  T	  Lock	  and	  L	  Pech,	  ‘EU	  Accession	  to	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights:	  a	  Legal	   Assessment	   of	   the	   Draft	   Accession	   Agreement	   of	   14th	   October	   2011’,	   Fondation	   Robert	  
Schuman,	  European	  issues,	  no	  218,	  7th	  November	  2011,	  pp	  1-­‐17.	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also	  reveals	  the	  political	  will	  of	  the	  EU	  leaders583	  to	  create	  an	  area	  more	  secure	  for	   the	   citizens	   and	  more	   coherent	   to	   the	   shared	   fundamental	   legal	   principles	  that	   have	   been	   forwarded	   by	   the	   Convention.	   Furthermore,	   the	   present	  discrepancy	  of	   the	   formal	  obligation	  of	   the	  member	  states	   to	  respect	   the	  ECHR	  when	   they	   implement	  EU	   law	  (while	   the	  EU	   itself	  does	  not	  have	  such	  a	   formal	  obligation)	  will	  be	  rectified.	  	  In	  addition	   to	   that,	   the	  strengthening	  of	   the	  human	  rights	  protection	   in	   the	  EU	  will	   be	   greater	   since	   the	   whole	   EU	   law	   system	   will	   be	   open	   to	   the	   external	  control	  of	  another	  organization,	  i.e.	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  (through	  the	  individual	  applications	   door	   to	   the	   ECtHR).	   Moreover,	   the	   European	   citizens	   will	   be	  benefited	  by	  enjoying	  direct	  legal	  protection	  against	  harmful	  EU	  legal	  measures	  in	  the	  same	  way	  they	  do	  now	  vis-­‐à-­‐vis	  individual	  European	  states.584	  	  	  The	  EU	  accession	  to	  the	  ECHR	  reinforces	  the	  argument	  of	  this	  thesis	  in	  favour	  of	  the	  close	  link	  between	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  and	  the	  European	  Union,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  central	  role	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  citizen	  in	  a	  Europe	  that	  faces	  complex	  issues	  such	  as	  the	  transnational	  crime	  combatting.	  The	  direct	  effect	  of	  the	  ECHR	  to	  the	  EU	   criminal	   law	   acts	   will	   cover	   the	   whole	   criminal	   procedure	   as	   this	   is	   the	  intention	  of	  the	  Convention,	  expressed	  clearly	  enough	  in	  the	  Strasbourg’s	  Court	  case	  law.	  But	  this	  is	  the	  pre-­‐trial	  element.	  What	  about	  the	  transnational	  element	  of	  criminal	  procedure?	  	  	  
6.1.1.	  Transnational	  element	  	  
	  Is	   the	  ECHR	  applicable	   to	   the	   transnational	   criminal	  processes	   that	   are	  mainly	  the	  area	  covered	  by	  EU	  Criminal	  law	  legislation?	  The	  answer	  is	  positive	  since	  the	  ECHR	   covers	   the	  whole	   criminal	   procedure.	   The	   place	   of	   its	   conduct	   becomes	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  583	  See	  for	  a	  history	  of	  the	  background	  to	  the	  accession,	  JP	  Jacqué,	  ‘The	  Accession	  of	  the	  European	  Union	   to	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Fundamental	   Freedoms’	   (2011)	   48	  
Common	  Market	  Law	  Review,	  995.	  584	  T	   Lock,	   EU	   Accession	   to	   the	   ECHR:	   Implications	   for	   the	   Judicial	   Review	   in	   Strasbourg	  (Decemebr	  7,	  2010).	  European	  Law	  Review,	  Vol.	  35,	  p.	  777,	  December	  2010.	  Available	  at	  SSRN:	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1736602.	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irrelevant	   after	   the	   formal	   participation	   of	   the	   EU	   in	   the	   Convention	   with	   its	  accession.	  The	  crucial	  question	  is	  not	  the	  ‘if’	  of	  the	  transnational	  element	  but	  the	  ‘how’.	  	  	  The	  protection	  of	  the	  rights	  that	  the	  Convention	  upholds	  becomes	  complex	  due	  to	   the	   transnational	   element.	   Different	   police	   and	   judicial	   authorities	   of	   more	  than	  one	  state	  are	  involved	  in	  the	  procedures	  and	  this	  could	  create	  a	  number	  of	  problems	   related	   to	   the	  gathering	  of	   evidence,	   the	  protection	  of	   rights	   and	   the	  responsibility	  of	   the	   state	  agents.	   It	  becomes	  harder	   to	  distinguish	  between	  all	  the	   separate	   actions	   of	   state	   agents	   as	   they	   contribute	   towards	   the	   aim	   of	  investigation	  or	  prosecution,585	  assign	  responsibility,	  provide	  the	  defendant	  with	  concrete	   rights,	   and	   secure	   propriety	   during	   gathering	   evidence.	   This	   is	   the	  reason	   why	   the	   rationale	   of	   reasoned	   judgments	   should	   penetrate	   the	   whole	  criminal	   procedure.	   Giving	   reasons	   for	   every	   decision	   made	   will	   qualify	   the	  whole	  process	  (pre-­‐trial	  and	  transnational)	  into	  a	  transparent	  set	  of	  actions	  that	  can	  be	  examined.	  Thus	  fair	  gathering	  will	  be	  secured,	  individuals	  will	  be	  armed	  with	  applicable	  rights	  and	  authorities	  can	  be	  held	  accountable.586	  	  
	  
6.1.2.	  Traditional	  trial	  	  
	  These	   problems	   cast	   their	   shadow	   even	   on	   the	   traditional	   trial,	   to	   which	  undoubtedly	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   refers.	   Criminal	  procedures	   in	  Europe	  differ	  and	  recognition	  cannot	  happen	  automatically.	  This	  problem	   relates	   a	   lot	   to	   the	   discussion	   about	   levels	   of	   recognition,	   further	  harmonization	  or	  minimum	  standards	  of	  protection,	  a	  common	  denominator	  of	  rules,	   laws	   or	   principles,	   etc.	   This	   is	   an	   ongoing	   debate	   and,	   no	  matter	   which	  view	  is	  supported,	  the	  problem	  remains	  since	  a	  certain	  extent	  of	  difference	  will	  exist	   at	   all	   circumstances.	   The	   crucial	   question	   is	   if	   the	   national	   court	   dealing	  with	  the	  criminal	  case	  has	  the	  will	  to	  examine	  the	  fairness	  of	  the	  procedure	  as	  a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  585	  AAH	   van	   Hoek	   &	   MJJP	   Luchtman,	   ‘Transnational	   cooperation	   in	   criminal	   matters	   and	   the	  safeguarding	  of	  human	  rights’,	  Utrecht	  Law	  Review,	  Volume	  1,	  Issue	  2	  (December)	  2005,	  p	  14.	  586	  A	  Klip,	  ‘Extraterritorial	  investigations’,	  in	  B.	  Swart	  et	  al.	  (eds.),	  International	  Criminal	  
Law	  in	  the	  Netherlands,	  1997,	  p	  292.	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whole	   looking	   into	   every	   stage	   of	   the	   proceedings.587	  This	   can	   be	   a	   realistic	  prospect	  only	   if	   these	  proceedings	  are	  open	   to	   scrutiny	  via	   reasoned	  decisions	  drafted	  by	  the	  state	  agents	  involved.	  
	  
	  
6.2.	  Judicial	  Cooperation	  in	  Criminal	  Evidence	  	  One	   of	   the	   main	   objectives	   of	   the	   EU	   is	   the	   facilitating	   and	   accelerating	   of	  cooperation	  between	  member	  states	  in	  the	  area	  of	  criminal	  law.	  Although	  there	  are	  obstacles	  due	  to	  the	  differences	  between	  the	  national	  legal	  orders	  and	  their	  criminal	   law	   and	   procedure	   rules,	   the	   aim	   of	   creating	   an	   area	   of	   freedom,	  security	  and	  justice	  points	  the	  way	  forward.	  Towards	  the	  goal	  of	  the	  protection	  of	   the	   citizen	   against	   transnational	   crime	   there	   are	   already	   a	   lot	   of	   legislative	  instruments	  into	  force	  and	  the	  field	  of	  gathering	  and	  admissibility	  of	  evidence	  is	  key	  to	  all	  that.	  	  	  	  
6.2.1.	  Harmonisation	  of	  Evidence	  in	  mutual	  recognition	  (cf.	  Lisbon	  Treaty)	  	  With	   the	  Lisbon	  Treaty	   the	  pillar	  system	  is	  abolished	  and	  the	  EU	  Criminal	  Law	  has	  been	   ‘communitarised’.	  Moreover,	   the	   co-­‐decision	  between	  Parliament	  and	  Council	   is	   an	   innovation	   that	   will	   calm	   a	   bit	   the	   skepticism	   regarding	   the	   so-­‐called	   democratic	   deficit	   of	   the	   old	   third	   pillar.	   Furthermore	   Article	   82§2	  TFEU588	  opens	   new	   possibilities	   in	   relation	   to	   the	   potential	   harmonisation	   of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  587 	  Here	   belongs	   the	   discussion	   about	   the	   non-­‐inquiry	   principle.	   See	   on	   that	   JT	   Parry,	  International	  Extradition,	  the	  Rule	  of	  Non-­‐Inquiry,	  and	  the	  Problem	  of	  Sovereignty	  (February	  11,	  2010).	  Boston	  University	   Law	  Review,	   Vol.	   90.	   p.	   1973,	   2010;	   Lewis	   &	   Clark	   Law	   School	   Legal	  Studies	   Research	   2010-­‐4.	   Available	   at	   SSRN:	   http://ssrn.com/abstract=1508019	   or	  http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1508019.	  588	  ‘To	   the	  extent	  necessary	   to	   facilitate	  mutual	   recognition	  of	   judgments	  and	   judicial	  decisions	  and	   police	   and	   judicial	   cooperation	   in	   criminal	   matters	   having	   a	   cross-­‐border	   dimension,	   the	  European	  Parliament	  and	   the	  Council	  may,	  by	  means	  of	  directives	  adopted	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	  ordinary	   legislative	  procedure,	   establish	  minimum	  rules.	   Such	   rules	   shall	   take	   into	  account	  the	   differences	   between	   the	   legal	   traditions	   and	   systems	   of	   the	   Member	   States.	   They	   shall	  concern:	  (a)mutual	  admissibility	  of	  evidence	  between	  Member	  States;	  (b)the	  rights	  of	  individuals	  in	  criminal	  procedure;	  (c)the	  rights	  of	  victims	  of	  crime;	  (d)any	  other	  specific	  aspects	  of	  criminal	  procedure	  which	  the	  Council	  has	  identified	  in	  advance	  by	  a	  decision;	  for	  the	  adoption	  of	  such	  a	  decision,	   the	   Council	   shall	   act	   unanimously	   after	   obtaining	   the	   consent	   of	   the	   European	  
 192 
elements	  of	  legislation	  that	  refer	  to	  evidence	  matters.	  	  	  
6.2.2.	  Gathering	  &	  Admissibility	  
	  After	  the	  Treaty	  of	  Amsterdam	  there	  have	  been	  several	  declarations	  of	  the	  need	  to	   a	   more	   effective	   gathering	   and	   admissibility	   among	   member	   states.	   The	  Tampere	   Conclusions, 589 	  The	   Programme	   of	   measures	   to	   implement	   the	  principle	   of	   mutual	   recognition590	  of	   decisions	   in	   criminal	   matters,	   the	   Hague	  Programme,591	  the	   Action	   Plan	   implementing	   the	   Hague	   Programme592	  are	   the	  most	  significant	  of	  them.	  	  The	   issue	   of	   gathering	   evidence	   is	   resolved	   through	   two	   different	   types	   of	  mechanisms;	   the	   mutual	   legal	   assistance	   regimes	   and	   the	   mutual	   recognition	  instruments.	   The	   fairness	   of	   the	   procedure	   is	   maintained	   basically	   by	   the	  introduction	  of	  grounds	   for	   refusal	  while	   the	  requested	  or	  executing	  states	  are	  expected	   to	   follow	   the	   procedures	   and	   formalities	   of	   the	   requesting	   or	   issuing	  states	  as	  long	  as	  this	  is	  not	  contrary	  to	  internal	  fundamental	  law.	  	  The	   success	   of	   the	   requests	   or	   orders	   depends	   a	   lot	   on	   the	   already	   existing	  similarities	  of	  the	  legal	  orders	  involved	  in	  any	  given	  case.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  the	   lack	   of	   a	   set	   of	   common	   standards	   by	   the	   existing	  mechanisms.	   Thus,	   the	  legislative	   landscape	   at	   the	   moment	   deals	   with	   the	   issue	   of	   admissibility	   in	   a	  rather	  indirect	  way,	  but	  this	  is	  due	  to	  change	  after	  Lisbon.593	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Parliament.	   Adoption	   of	   the	   minimum	   rules	   referred	   to	   in	   this	   paragraph	   shall	   not	   prevent	  Member	  States	  from	  maintaining	  or	  introducing	  a	  higher	  level	  of	  protection	  for	  individuals’.	  589	  European	  Council	  of	  15-­‐16	  October	  1999,	  Conclusions	  of	  the	  Presidency	  -­‐	  SN	  200/1/99	  REV	  1.	  590	  Programme	   of	   measures	   to	   implement	   the	   principle	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   of	   decisions	   in	  criminal	  matters	  (OJ	  C	  12,	  15.1.2001,	  p.	  10).	  591	  The	  Hague	   Programme:	   strengthening	   freedom,	   security	   and	   justice	   in	   the	   European	  Union	  (OJ	  C	  53,	  3.3.2005,	  p.	  1).	  592	  Council	   and	  Commission	  Action	  Plan	   implementing	   the	  Hague	  Programme	  on	  strengthening	  freedom,	  security	  and	  justice	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  (OJ	  C	  198,	  12.8.2005,	  p.	  1).	  593	  The	  decisive	  problem	  though	  seems	  to	  be	  the	  exclusionary	  rules	  rather	  than	  the	  inclusionary	  rules	  of	  evidence	   that	   refer	   to	   the	  admissibility	  as	   JR	  Spencer	  notes	  correctly	   in	  his	  Provisional	  
Reactions	   on	   the	   Green	   Paper	   on	   obtaining	   evidence	   from	   one	   Member	   State	   to	   another	   and	  




6.3.1.	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  Initiative	  
	  On	   November	   14th	   2003	   the	   Commission	   issued	   a	   proposal	   for	   a	   Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant594	  obtaining	  objects,	  documents	  and	  data	   for	   use	   in	   proceedings	   in	   criminal	   matters,595	  with	   the	   valid	   objective	   of	  simplifying	   and	  accelerating	   the	   gathering	   and	   transfer	  of	   evidence	   in	   criminal	  proceedings	   with	   a	   cross-­‐border	   element.	   In	   addition,	   in	   the	   Declaration	   of	  Combating	   Terrorism596	  the	   Heads	   of	   State	   and	   Government	   of	   the	   Member	  States	  of	   the	  European	  Union,	  and	  the	  acceding	  to	  the	  Union	  States	  agreed	  that	  work	   on	   the	   Framework	  Decision	   on	   a	   European	   Evidence	  Warrant	   should	   be	  taken	   forward.597	  Although	   the	   Framework	   Decision	   deals	   with	   a	   part	   of	   the	  spectrum	   of	   gathering	   evidence,	   it	   was	   regarded	   as	   the	   first	   step	   towards	   the	  goal	   of	   creating	   a	   single	   instrument	   that	   would	   replace	   all	   the	   related	  mutual	  assistance	   initiatives.598	  Thus,	   the	   final	   objective	   starting	   with	   the	   European	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  under	   the	  heading	  of	   “Admissibility	  of	  Evidence”	   the	  Commission	   is	   in	  danger	  of	   looking	  at	   the	  matter	  through	  the	  wrong	  end	  of	  the	  telescope’	  (p	  4).	  594	  For	   an	   informed	   presentation	   of	   the	   historical	   and	   legal	   issues	   see	   among	   others	   S	   Peers,	  
Statewatch	   briefing	   on	   the	   European	   Evidence	  Warrant	   to	   the	   European	   Parliament,	   15	   March	  2004,	  P	  De	  Hert,	  K	  Weis	  and	  N	  Cloosen,	   ‘The	  Framework	  Decision	  of	  18	  December	  2008	  on	  the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  obtaining	  objects,	  documents	  and	  data	  for	  use	  in	  proceedings	  in	  criminal	  matters	  –	  a	  critical	  assessment’,	  New	  Journal	  of	  European	  Criminal	  Law,	  p	  55	  et	  seq.,	   A.	   Ijzerman	   ‘From	   the	  CATS	  portfolio:	   the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant’	   in	  European	  
Evidence	  Warrant	   –	   Transnational	   Judicial	   Inquiries	   in	   the	   EU,	   J.A.E.	   Vervaele	   (ed.),	   Intersentia,	  2005,	  CC	  Murphy,	  ‘The	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant:	  Mutual	  Recognition	  and	  Mutual	  (Dis)Trust?’	  (September	   1,	   2010),	  Crime	  within	   the	  Area	  of	  Freedom,	  Security	  and	   Justice:	  A	  European	  Public	  
Order,	   Eckes,	   Konstadinides,	   eds.,	   Cambridge	   University	   Press,	   2011.	   Available	   at	   SSRN:	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1701956.	  595	  Commission	  proposal	   for	  a	  Council	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  for	  obtaining	  objects,	  documents	  and	  data	  for	  use	  in	  proceedings	  in	  criminal	  matters	  submitted	  under	  a	  covering	  letter	  to	  Mr	  Javier	  Solana,	  Secretary-­‐General/High	  Representative	  (COM(2003)	  688	   final;	   15221/03	   COPEN	   119).	   The	   Commission	   considered	   the	   proposal	   for	   a	   European	  Evidence	   Warrant	   to	   constitute	   a	   further	   development	   of	   the	   Schengen	   acquis.	   This	   view	   is	  contested	  by	  A.	  Ijzerman	  ‘From	  the	  CATS	  portfolio:	  the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant’	  in	  European	  
Evidence	  Warrant	   –	   Transnational	   Judicial	   Inquiries	   in	   the	   EU,	   J.A.E.	   Vervaele	   (ed.),	   Intersentia,	  2005.	  596	  Brussels,	  25	  March	  2004.	  597	  On	  March	  31st	  2004	   the	  European	  Parliament	  with	   regard	   to	  Article	  39(1)	  of	   the	  EU	  Treaty,	  pursuant	   to	   which	   the	   Council	   consulted	   Parliament	   (C5-­‐0609/2003),	   approved	   the	  Commission’s	  proposal	  as	  amended	  (P5_TA-­‐PROV(2004)0243	  A5-­‐0214/2004).	  	  598	  See	   also	   A	   IJzerman,	   ‘From	   the	   CATS	   portfolio:	   The	   European	   Evidence	   Warrant’,	   (2005),	  
European	   Evidence	   Warrant	   –	   Transnational	   Judicial	   Inquiries	   in	   the	   EU,	   JAE	   Vervaele	   (ed.),	  Intersentia.	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Evidence	   Warrant	   is	   bringing	   all	   separate	   instruments	   for	   the	   obtaining	   of	  evidence	  together	  into	  a	  unified	  one.599	  	  	  The	   initiative	   for	   an	   EEW	  was	   closely	   linked	   to	   the	   adoption	   of	   a	   Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  execution	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  of	  orders	  freezing	  property	  or	  evidence.600	  But	  the	  power	  of	  this	  instrument	  is	  apparently	  limited	  since	  it	  deals	  only	  with	  the	   issue	  of	   freezing	  the	  evidence	  needed.	   If	   the	  authority	  that	   issues	  the	   order	   needs	   the	   evidence	   as	   part	   of	   a	   criminal	   process	   in	   a	   national	   court	  then	   this	   Framework	   Decision	   is	   not	   sufficient.	   In	   this	   case	   the	   freezing	   order	  needs	  to	  be	  accompanied	  by	  a	  request	  for	  the	  transferring	  of	  the	  related	  piece	  of	  evidence	  governed	  by	  mutual	  assistance	  rules.	  Thus,	  on	  the	  one	  hand	  there	  is	  the	  ability	   to	   freeze	   evidence	   and	   transfer	   it	   abroad,	   but	   on	   the	   other	   there	   is	   the	  complexity	   of	   combining	   different	   procedures	   following	   different	   rationales,	  namely	  mutual	  recognition	  and	  mutual	  assistance.	  From	  a	  practical	  point	  of	  view	  two	   different	   procedures	   will	   be	   needed	   for	   a	   single	   case:	   the	   freezing	   of	  evidence	   (mutual	   recognition)	   and	   the	   transfer	   of	   it	   (mutual	   assistance);	   that	  seems	   to	   make	   things	   more	   complex	   and	   less	   efficient.601	  It	   was	   becoming	  obvious	   to	   the	  Member	   States	   negotiating	   on	   this	   instrument	   that	   there	   were	  further	   steps	   to	   be	   taken	   so	   that	   evidence	   obtainment	   and	   transfer	   would	  become	   simpler	   and	   quicker.	   This	   is	   how	   the	   idea	   on	   a	   European	   Evidence	  Warrant	  came	  into	  life.	  	  	  
6.3.2.	  Relation	  with	  other	  instruments	  
	  The	   European	   acquis	   on	   evidence	   existed	   before	   the	   European	   Evidence	  Warrant,	  constituted	  mainly	  by	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Mutual	  Assistance	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  599	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Council	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  for	  obtaining	  objects,	  documents	  and	  data	  for	  use	  in	  proceedings	  in	  criminal	  matters,	  COM/2003/0688	  final	  –	  CNS	  2003/0270,	  no	  39.	  600	  Council	  Framework	  Decision	  2003/577/JHA	  of	  22	  July	  2003	  on	  the	  execution	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  of	  orders	  freezing	  property	  or	  evidence,	  OJ	  L196,	  2	  August	  2003,	  p	  45.	  601	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Council	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  for	  obtaining	  objects,	  documents	  and	  data	   for	  use	   in	  proceedings	   in	  criminal	  matters,	  COM/2003/0688	  final,	  2003/0270	  (CNS),	  Brussels,	  14	  November	  2003.	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in	   Criminal	   Matters	   of	   20	   April	   1959,	   the	   1990	   Convention	   implementing	   the	  Schengen	  Agreement	  and	  the	  2000	  European	  Mutual	  Assistance	  Convention.602	  	  	  ‘The	  background	  to	  the	  evidence	  warrant	  proposal	  is	  a	  complex	  set	  of	  treaties	  at	  Council	   of	   Europe	   level,	   supplemented	  by	  pre-­‐existing	  EU	  measures’603.	   Before	  the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  initiative,	  the	  basic	  framework	  for	  cooperation	  with	   regard	   to	   evidence	  was	   provided	  by	   the	  European	  Convention	   on	  mutual	  assistance	  in	  criminal	  matters.604	  It	  sets	  out	  the	  basic	  rules	  for	  the	  gathering	  and	  transfer	   of	   evidence	   in	   criminal	   proceedings	   where	   more	   than	   one	   State	   is	  involved	  and	  provides	  for	  the	  execution	  of	  requests	  for	  mutual	  assistance	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	   law	  of	   the	   requested	  State,605	  and	  also	   some	  grounds	   for	   refusing	   such	   assistance.606	  In	   order	   to	   improve	   cooperation,	   this	  Convention	   was	   supplemented	   with	   two	   additional	   protocols	   of	   1978607	  and	  2001.608	  The	  Council	  of	  Europe	  measures	  have	  been	  modified	  as	  regards	  certain	  terrorist-­‐related	   offences	   by	   the	   1977	   Council	   of	   Europe	   Convention	   on	   the	  suppression	  of	  terrorism.609	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  602	  See	   also	   JR	   Spencer,	   ‘The	   Problems	   of	   Trans-­‐border	   Evidence’	   in	   Cambridge	   Yearbook	   of	  
European	  Legal	  Studies,	  Vol.	  9,	  2006-­‐2007,	  pp	  465-­‐480.	  Spencer	   includes	   fairly	  and	  properly	   in	  the	   EU	   acquis	   seven	   instruments,	   namely:	   The	   European	   Convention	   on	   Mutual	   Assistance	   in	  Criminal	   Matters,	   1959;	   The	   Schengen	   Agreement,	   1985;	   The	   EU	   Mutual	   Legal	   Assistance	  Convention	   of	   2000;	   The	   2001	   Protocol	   to	   the	   2000	   Convention;	   The	   Framework	   Decision	   of	  2003	   on	   Freezing	   Property	   or	   Evidence;	   The	   (then)	  Draft	   Framework	  Decision	   on	   a	   European	  Evidence	  Warrant;	  The	  (then)	  Draft	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  Taking	  Account	  of	  Criminal	  Records	  (p	  467).	  603	  S	  Peers,	  Statewatch	  briefing	  on	  the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  to	  the	  European	  Parliament,	  12	  March	  2004.	  604	  Strasbourg,	  20	  April	  1959.	  605	  Art.	   1§1:	   ‘The	   Contracting	   Parties	   undertake	   to	   afford	   each	   other,	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	  provisions	  of	  this	  Convention,	  the	  widest	  measure	  of	  mutual	  assistance	  in	  proceedings	  in	  respect	  of	   offences	   the	   punishment	   of	  which,	   at	   the	   time	   of	   the	   request	   for	   assistance,	   falls	  within	   the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  judicial	  authorities	  of	  the	  requesting	  Party’.	  606	  The	  method	  used	  to	  apply	  mutual	  legal	  assistance	  is	  the	  letters	  rogatory	  mechanism	  and	  the	  right	  of	  executing	  such	  a	  letter	  for	  search	  or	  seizure	  is	  reserved	  on	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  following	  conditions	  according	  to	  Art.	  5§1:	  the	  offence	  motivating	  the	  letters	  rogatory	  is	  punishable	  under	  both	  the	  law	  of	  the	  requesting	  Party	  and	  the	  law	  of	  the	  requested	  Party;	  the	  offence	  motivating	  the	   letters	   rogatory	   is	   an	   extraditable	   offence	   in	   the	   requested	   country;	   the	   execution	   of	   the	  letters	  rogatory	  is	  consistent	  with	  the	  law	  of	  the	  requested	  Party.	  607	  Additional	   Protocol	   to	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	  Mutual	   Assistance	   in	   Criminal	  Matters,	  Strasbourg,	  17	  March	  1978.	  	  608	  Second	   Additional	   Protocol	   to	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	   Mutual	   Assistance	   in	   Criminal	  Matters,	  Strasbourg,	  8	  November	  2001.	  	  609	  Strasbourg,	  27	  January	  1977.	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In	   the	   European	   Union	   the	   1959	   Convention	   was	   complemented	   by	   the	   1990	  Schengen	  Convention,610	  the	  2000	  Convention	  on	  Mutual	  Assistance	   in	  criminal	  matters611	  and	   its	   2001	   Protocol.612	  But	   neither	   the	   2000	   Convention	   nor	   its	  2001	   Protocol	   had	   been	   into	   force	   before	   the	   appearance	   of	   a	   draft	   for	   a	  European	   Evidence	  Warrant	   by	   the	   Commission	   in	   2003.	   The	   legal	   landscape	  was	  laden	  with	  apparent	  questions	  and	  problems.613	  However,	  since	  efficiency	  in	  transferring	  evidence	  was	  sought,	  the	  obsolete	  mechanisms614	  had	  to	  change.	  As	  the	   Commission	   stated:	   ‘Despite	   the	   improvements	   introduced	   by	   these	  instruments,	  co-­‐operation	  on	  obtaining	  evidence	  is	  nevertheless	  still	  carried	  out	  using	  traditional	  mutual	  assistance	  procedures.	  This	  can	  be	  slow	  and	  inefficient.	  Moreover,	  differences	  in	  national	  laws	  result	  in	  barriers	  to	  co-­‐operation’.615	  	  In	  spite	  of	  all	  these	  developments,	  it	  was	  not	  before	  the	  December	  18th	  of	  2008	  that	   the	  Council	   of	   the	  European	  Union	   adopted	   a	   Framework	  Decision	  on	   the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  obtaining	  objects,	  documents	  and	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  610	  Convention	  of	  19	   June	  1990	   implementing	   the	  Schengen	  Agreement	  of	  14	   June	  1985	  on	   the	  gradual	   abolition	   of	   checks	   at	   the	   common	   border.	   Actually	   part	   of	   the	   Schengen	   Convention	  builds	  upon	  the	  1959	  Convention	  (Articles	  48-­‐53).	  Art.	  51	  reduces	  the	  chances	  of	  reserving	  the	  execution	  of	  a	  letter	  rogatory	  under	  the	  1959	  Convention:	  ‘The	  Contracting	  Parties	  may	  not	  make	  the	  admissibility	  of	  letters	  rogatory	  for	  search	  or	  seizure	  dependent	  on	  conditions	  other	  than	  the	  following:	   (a)	   the	   act	   giving	   rise	   to	   the	   letters	   rogatory	   is	   punishable	   under	   the	   law	   of	   both	  Contracting	   Parties	   by	   a	   penalty	   involving	   deprivation	   of	   liberty	   or	   a	   detention	   order	   of	   a	  maximum	   period	   of	   at	   least	   six	   months,	   or	   is	   punishable	   under	   the	   law	   of	   one	   of	   the	   two	  Contracting	  Parties	  by	  an	  equivalent	  penalty	  and	  under	  the	  law	  of	  the	  other	  Contracting	  Party	  by	  virtue	   of	   being	   an	   infringement	   of	   the	   rules	   of	   law	   which	   is	   being	   prosecuted	   by	   the	  administrative	  authorities,	   and	  where	   the	  decision	  may	  give	   rise	   to	  proceedings	  before	  a	  court	  having	   jurisdiction	   in	   particular	   in	   criminal	   matters;	   (b)	   execution	   of	   the	   letters	   rogatory	   is	  consistent	  with	  the	  law	  of	  the	  requested	  Contracting	  Party’.	  611	  Council	   Act	   of	   29	   May	   2000	   establishing	   in	   accordance	   with	   Article	   34	   of	   the	   Treaty	   on	  European	  Union	  the	  Convention	  on	  Mutual	  Assistance	  in	  Criminal	  Matters	  between	  the	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  OJ	  C197,	  12	  July	  2000,	  p	  1.	  The	  scope	  of	  this	  Convention	  is	  broad	  and	   covers	   all	   types	   of	   evidence.	   Moreover,	   provisions	   for	   mutual	   assistance	   and	   related	  measures	  are	  described	  with	  detail.	  	  612	  Council	  Act	  of	  16	  October	  2001	  establishing,	   in	  accordance	  with	  Article	  34	  of	   the	  Treaty	  on	  European	   Union,	   the	   Protocol	   to	   the	   Convention	   on	   Mutual	   Assistance	   in	   Criminal	   Matters	  between	   the	  Member	  States	  of	   the	  European	  Union,	  OJ	  C	  326,	  21	  November	  2001,	  p	  1	   (also	   in	  force	  in	  2005,	  ratified	  by	  twenty-­‐two	  Member	  States).	  613	  JR	  Spencer	  ‘The	  Problems	  of	  Trans-­‐border	  Evidence	  and	  European	  Initiatives	  to	  Resolve	  them’	  (2007)	  9	  Cambridge	  Yearbook	  of	  European	  Legal	  Studies	  477.	  614	  This	   language	   had	   previously	   been	   used	   by	   the	   Commission	   for	   the	   introduction	   of	   the	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant.	  European	  Commission	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Council	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  
the	   European	   arrest	   warrant	   and	   the	   surrender	   procedures	   between	   the	   Member	   States	  COM(2001)	  522	  final/2	  (Brussels,	  25.9.2001),	  1,	  p	  2.	  615	  European	  Commission	  Proposal	  for	  a	  Council	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	   for	   obtaining	   objects,	   documents	   and	   data	   for	   use	   in	   proceedings	   in	   criminal	  matters	  COM(2003)	  688	  final	  (Brussels,	  14.11.2003),	  1.2/15,	  p	  4.	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data	   for	   use	   in	   proceedings	   in	   criminal	   matters. 616 	  However,	   the	   Hague	  programme	  had	  set	  the	  horizon	  of	  that	  evolution	  by	  the	  end	  of	  2005,	  having	  put	  forward	  the	  need	  of	  application	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  to	  evidence	  (gathering	  and	  admissibility).617	  The	  European	  evidence	  warrant	  aimed	  at	  replacing	  the	  system	  of	  mutual	   assistance	   in	   criminal	  matters	  between	  Member	  States	   for	  obtaining	  objects,	   documents	   and	   data	   for	   use	   in	   criminal	   proceedings.	   After	   the	  negotiations	  though,	  it	  was	  decided	  that	  that	  the	  new	  instrument	  would	  coexist	  with	  the	  existing	  mutual	  assistance	  regime.	  This	  framework	  decision	  establishes	  the	  procedures	  and	  safeguards	  for	  Member	  States,	  whereby	  such	  a	  warrant	  is	  to	  be	  issued	  and	  executed.	  	  	  
6.3.3.	  Legislation	  Overview	  	  6.3.3.1.	  Preamble	  	  	  The	  interest	  of	  a	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept	  in	  intersection	  to	  the	  Framework	  Decision	  starts	  right	  at	  its	  preamble.	  Recital	  7	  states	  that	  ‘the	  EEW	  may	  be	  used	  to	   obtain	   any	   objects,	   documents	   and	   data	   for	   use	   in	   proceedings	   in	   criminal	  matters	  for	  which	  it	  may	  be	  issued’.	  It	  must	  be	  said	  though	  that	  this	  possibility	  of	  use	  should	  respect	  the	  four	  principles	  of	  fair	  evidence	  in	  criminal	  process	  as	  they	  emanate	   from	   the	   realm	  of	   the	  ECHR	  expressed	   in	   the	   text	   and	   applied	  by	   the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights.	  Only	  evidence	  confronted	  in	  the	  modus	  of	  the	  triangular	   amended	   adversarialism,	   consistent	   with	   the	   presumption	   of	  innocence,	  the	  principle	  of	  giving	  reasons	  for	  judicial	  decisions	  and	  the	  maxim	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  616	  Council	   Framework	   Decision	   2008/978/JHA	   on	   the	   European	   evidence	   warrant	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  obtaining	  objects,	  documents	  and	  data	  for	  use	  in	  proceedings	  in	  criminal	  matters.	  OJ	  L350,	  30	  December	  2008,	  pp	  72-­‐92.	  	  617	  European	   Council	   Presidency	   Conclusions	   Annex	   1,	   The	   Hague	   Programme:	   Strengthening	  
Freedom,	  Security	  and	  Justice	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  (Brussels,	  November	  4/5	  2004),	  3.3.1,	  p	  27:	  ‘The	   comprehensive	  programme	  of	  measures	   to	   implement	   the	  principle	   of	  mutual	   recognition	  of	  
judicial	   decisions	   in	   criminal	   matters,	   which	   encompasses	   judicial	   decisions	   in	   all	   phases	   of	  criminal	   procedures	   or	   otherwise	   relevant	   to	   such	   procedures,	   such	   as	   the	   gathering	   and	  
admissibility	   of	   evidence,	   conflicts	   of	   jurisdiction	   and	   the	   ne	   bis	   in	   idem	   principle	   and	   the	  execution	   of	   final	   sentences	   of	   imprisonment	   or	   other	   (alternative)	   sanctions,	   should	   be	  completed	   and	   further	   attention	   should	   be	   given	   to	   additional	   proposals	   in	   that	   context’	  (emphasis	  added).	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humane	   treatment	   towards	   the	   agents	   involved	   should	   embody	   these	   ‘objects,	  documents	  and	  data’.	  	  	  Accordingly,	   recital	   8	   emphasises	   the	   importance	  of	   protection	  of	   fundamental	  rights	   that	   the	  Framework	  Decision	  should	   safeguard.	  Here	   the	  emphasis	   is	  on	  the	   judiciary	   and	   its	   central	   role	   to	   the	   criminal	   proceedings	   that	   guarantees	  fairness.	  For	  this	  to	  happen	  though,	  it	  is	  crucial	  that	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  judge	  is	  impartial	   and	   fresh	   in	   relation	   to	   evidence	   so	   that	   the	   adversarial	   manner	   of	  organisation,	  presentation	  and	  evaluation	  of	  it	  can	  be	  fair	  and	  entirely	  protective	  of	  any	  fundamental	  rights.	  Giving	  reasoned	  decisions	  should	  also	  be	  an	  integral	  part	  of	  this	  process.	  The	  same	  must	  be	  said	  also	  for	  recital	  9.618	  Recitals	  11	  and	  12	   correctly	   illustrate	   the	   need	   of	   evidence	   that	   is	   humanely	   conditioned.	   ‘An	  EEW	   should	   be	   issued	   only	   where	   obtaining	   the	   objects,	   documents	   or	   data	  sought	   is	  necessary	  and	  proportionate	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	   the	  criminal	  or	  other	  proceedings	  concerned’.619	  	  In	   Recital	   27	   the	   focus	   appears	   to	   be	   on	   discrimination	   and	   the	   situation	   ‘of	  prosecuting	  or	  punishing	  a	  person	  on	  account	  of	  his	  or	  her	  sex,	  racial	  or	  ethnic	  origin,	   religion,	   sexual	   orientation,	   nationality,	   language	   or	   political	   opinions’.	  But	   the	   reference	   to	   Article	   6	   of	   the	   Treaty	   of	   the	   European	   Union	   and	   its	  principles	   leaves	  an	  open	  but	   indirect	  and	  subtle	  door	  to	   the	  application	  of	   the	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept	  proposed	  here.	  The	  European	  Union	  is	  founded	  on	  the	  principles	  of	   liberty,	  democracy,	  respect	   for	  human	  rights	  and	   fundamental	  freedoms,	   and	   the	   rule	   of	   law,	   principles	   which	   are	   common	   to	   the	   Member	  States	   (Article	   6§1	   TEU).	   All	   of	   them	   indeed	   are	   members	   of	   the	   Council	   of	  Europe	  and	  therefore	  the	  EU	  respects	  fundamental	  rights,	  as	  guaranteed	  by	  the	  European	   Convention	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Fundamental	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  618	  ‘This	  Framework	  Decision	   is	  adopted	  under	  Article	  31	  of	   the	  Treaty	  and	   therefore	  concerns	  judicial	   cooperation	   within	   the	   context	   of	   that	   provision,	   aiming	   to	   assist	   the	   collection	   of	  evidence	  for	  proceedings	  as	  defined	  in	  Article	  5	  of	  this	  Framework	  Decision.	  Although	  authorities	  
other	  than	  judges,	  courts,	  investigating	  magistrates	  and	  public	  prosecutors	  may	  have	  a	  role	  in	  the	  collection	  of	  such	  evidence	  in	  accordance	  with	  Article	  2(c)(ii),	  this	  Framework	  Decision	  does	  not	  cover	   police,	   customs,	   border	   and	   administrative	   cooperation	   which	   are	   regulated	   by	   other	  provisions	  of	  the	  Treaties’	  (emphasis	  added).	  The	  real	  issue	  here	  is	  also	  the	  conformation	  of	  this	  statement	   with	   the	   concept	   of	   fair	   criminal	   evidence	   supported	   in	   this	   thesis	   rather	   than	   the	  nature	  of	  the	  agent	  that	  personifies	  the	  judicial	  authority	  role.	  	  619	  Recital	  11	  Preamble	  of	  the	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  EEW.	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Freedoms	   signed	   in	   Rome	   on	   4	   November	   1950	   and	   as	   they	   result	   from	   the	  constitutional	  traditions	  common	  to	  the	  Member	  States,	  as	  general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law	  (Article	  6§2	  TEU).	  Nevertheless,	  most	  of	  the	  Contracting	  Parties	  to	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  have	  incorporated	  the	  Convention	  into	   their	   own	   national	   legal	   orders,	   either	   through	   constitutional	   provision,	  statute	  or	  judicial	  decision,	  a	  fact	  that	  the	  EU	  acknowledges	  and	  respects	  as	  part	  of	  the	  national	   identities	  of	   its	  Member	  States	  (Article	  6§3	  TEU).	  Therefore,	  the	  four-­‐folded	  concept	  of	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  can	  be	  relevantly	  applied	  in	  terms	  of	  legislative	  order	  within	  the	  EU	  realm.	  
	  
	  6.3.3.2.	  Scope	  	  	  The	  EEW	  is	  a	  judicial	  decision	  issued	  by	  a	  competent	  authority	  of	  a	  Member	  State	  with	   a	   view	   to	   obtaining	   objects,	   documents	   and	   data	   from	   another	   Member	  State.	  Copying	  the	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant,	  Article	  1	  adds	  further	  that	  the	  EEW	  is	  based	  on	  the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  and	  also	   affirms	   the	   fundamental	   principles	   of	   the	   EU	   legal	   order.	   A	   competent	  issuing	   authority	   for	   an	   EEW	  may	   be	   a	   judge,	   court,	   investigating	   magistrate,	  public	  prosecutor	  or	  other	  judicial	  authority.	  Member	  States	  must	  also	  designate	  the	   competent	   authorities	   for	   recognising	   and	   executing	   the	   EEW.620 	  It	   is	  important	  that	  these	  designated	  competent	  authorities	  are	  known	  to	  the	  parties	  before	   the	   commencement	   of	   any	   process	   of	   an	   EEW	   so	   that	   the	   roles	   of	   the	  parties	   at	   the	   proceedings	   are	   clear	   and	   the	   demands	   for	   a	   calibrated	  adversarialism	   in	   terms	  of	   the	   function	  of	   the	   judiciary	   can	  be	  maintained	  and	  controlled.	  	  Although	   the	   wording	   ‘objects,	   documents	   and	   data’	   allows	   a	   broad	  interpretation	  of	  evidence	  to	  be	  collected	  and	  transferred,	  there	  are	  categories	  of	  evidence	   that	   are	   specifically	   excluded	   from	   this	   procedure.	   The	   executing	  authority	  cannot	  ‘(a)	  conduct	  interviews,	  take	  statements	  or	  initiate	  other	  types	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  620	  Article	  3:	  Designation	  of	  competent	  authorities	  –	  Each	  Member	  State	  shall	  inform	  the	  General	  Secretariat	  of	   the	  Council	  which	  authority	  or	  authorities,	  under	   its	  national	   law,	  are	  competent	  […]	  when	  that	  Member	  State	  is	  the	  issuing	  State	  or	  the	  executing	  State	  (para	  1).	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of	  hearings	  involving	  suspects,	  witnesses,	  experts	  or	  any	  other	  party;621	  (b)	  carry	  out	  bodily	  examinations	  or	  obtain	  bodily	  material	  or	  biometric	  data	  directly	  from	  the	   body	   of	   any	   person,	   including	   DNA	   samples	   or	   fingerprints;	   (c)	   obtain	  information	   in	   real	   time	   such	   as	   through	   the	   interception	   of	   communications,	  covert	   surveillance	   or	   monitoring	   of	   bank	   accounts;	   (d)	   conduct	   analysis	   of	  existing	   objects,	   documents	   or	   data;	   and	   (e)	   obtain	   communications	   data	  retained	  by	  providers	  of	  a	  publicly	  available	  electronic	  communications	  service	  or	   a	   public	   communications	   network’.	   Nevertheless,	   all	   kinds	   of	   excluded	  evidence	  may	  be	  requested	  by	  an	  EEW	  where	  the	  objects,	  documents	  or	  data	  are	  already	  in	  the	  possession	  of	  the	  executing	  authority	  before	  the	  EEW	  is	  issued.	  All	  these	  provisions	   are	  well-­‐justified	   observed	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   a	   fair	   criminal	  evidence	   concept.	   The	   demand	   for	   speedy	   proceedings	   inevitably	   leads	   to	   the	  exclusion	   of	   evidence	   that	   –fairly	   managed–	   would	   require	   equality	   of	  opportunities	   for	   the	  parties	   in	   its	   generation,	   collection	  and	  organisation.	  The	  exception	  of	  Article	  4§4	  can	  be	  consistent	  with	  the	  fairness	  of	  the	  matter	  only	  on	  the	   presumption	   that	   the	   evidence	   already	   in	   the	   possession	   of	   the	   executing	  authority	  before	  the	  issuing	  of	  the	  EEW	  was	  obtained	  according	  to	  the	  principles	  of	  humane	  treatment	  and	  triangular	  adversarialism	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  these	  are	  applicable	  and	  other	  agents	  are	  involved	  and	  concerned.	  	  	  The	   EEW	   may	   be	   issued	   to	   request	   objects,	   documents	   and	   data	   from	   other	  Member	  States	  for	  the	  following	  types	  of	  proceedings:	  (a)	  criminal	  proceedings	  brought	   by	   or	   to	   be	   brought	   before	   a	   judicial	   authority	   for	   criminal	   offences	  under	   the	   national	   law	   of	   the	   issuing	   state;	   (b)	   proceedings	   brought	   by	  administrative	   authorities	   for	   acts	   that	   are	   punishable	   under	   the	   law	   of	   the	  issuing	   state	   where	   the	   decision	   may	   give	   rise	   to	   court	   proceedings;	   (c)	  proceedings	   brought	   by	   judicial	   authorities	   for	   acts	   that	   are	   punishable	   under	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  621	  According	  to	  the	  Commission	   ‘the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	   is	  not	   intended	  to	  be	  used	  to	  initiate	   the	   interviewing	   of	   suspects,	   taking	   statements,	   or	   hearing	   of	   witnesses	   and	   victims.	  These	  require	  special	  consideration.	   In	  particular,	   the	  Commission	  adopted	   in	  February	  2003	  a	  Green	  Paper	  on	  procedural	  safeguards	  for	  suspects	  and	  defendants	  in	  criminal	  proceedings	  in	  the	  European	  Union,	  and	  will	  continue	  work	  during	  2003	  on	  other	  aspects	  of	   taking	  evidence	  from	  suspects,	   defendants,	   victims	   and	   witnesses’.	   European	   Commission	   Proposal	   for	   a	   Council	  
Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  for	  obtaining	  objects,	  documents	  and	  data	  
for	  use	  in	  proceedings	  in	  criminal	  matters	  COM(2003)	  688	  final	  (Brussels,	  14.11.2003),	  1.6/29,	  pp	  7-­‐8.	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the	   law	   of	   the	   issuing	   state	  where	   the	   decision	  may	   give	   rise	   to	   further	   court	  proceedings;	   (d)	   all	   of	   the	   above,	   for	   offences	   for	  which	   the	   issuing	   state	  may	  punish	  or	  hold	  liable	  a	  legal	  person.622	  The	  text	  of	  the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision	  makes	  sure	  that	  every	  proceeding	  with	  a	  scent	  of	  a	  criminal	  aspect	  is	  mentioned.	  There	  should	  be	  no	  doubt	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  proceedings	  for	  which	  an	  EEW	  can	  be	  issued.	  Since	  all	  these	  proceedings	  are	  criminal,	  evidence	  should	  be	  treated	  in	  a	   fair	  manner	   that	  not	  only	   respects	  EU	  citizens	  but	  guarantees	  high	  quality	  of	  evidentiary	  material.	  	  	  	  6.3.3.3.	  Mutual	  Recognition	  
	  It	   is	   worth	   elaborating	   on	   the	   explicit	   mentioning	   of	   the	   principle	   of	   mutual	  recognition	  in	  the	  text	  of	  the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision.623	  The	  EEW	  is	  meant	  to	  be	  recognised	  by	  the	  executing	  authority	  without	  any	  further	  formality.624	  Unless	  there	  is	  a	  decision	  of	  invoking	  a	  ground	  for	  non-­‐recognition,	  non-­‐execution625	  or	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  622	  Article	  5	  –	  Type	  of	  proceedings	  for	  which	  the	  EEW	  may	  be	  issued.	  623	  ‘Member	  States	  shall	  execute	  any	  EEW	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  and	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  provisions	  of	  this	  Framework	  Decision’,	  Art.	  1§2.	  624	  Art	   11§1:	   Recognition	   and	   execution.	   1.	   The	   executing	   authority	   shall	   recognise	   an	   EEW,	  transmitted	  in	  accordance	  with	  Article	  8,	  without	  any	  further	  formality	  being	  required	  and	  shall	  forthwith	  take	  the	  necessary	  measures	   for	   its	  execution	   in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  an	  authority	  of	   the	  executing	   State	  would	   obtain	   the	   objects,	   documents	   or	   data,	   unless	   that	   authority	   decides	   to	  invoke	  one	  of	  the	  grounds	  for	  non-­‐recognition	  or	  non-­‐execution	  provided	  for	  in	  Article	  13	  or	  one	  of	  the	  grounds	  for	  postponement	  provided	  for	  in	  Article	  16.	  625	  Art	   13§1:	  Grounds	   for	  non-­‐recognition	  or	  non-­‐execution.	   1.	  Recognition	  or	   execution	  of	   the	  EEW	  may	  be	  refused	  in	  the	  executing	  State:	  (a)	  if	  its	  execution	  would	  infringe	  the	  ne	  bis	  in	  idem	  principle;	   (b)	   if,	   in	   cases	   referred	   to	   in	  Article	  14(3),	   the	  EEW	   relates	   to	   acts	  which	  would	  not	  constitute	  an	  offence	  under	  the	  law	  of	  the	  executing	  State;	  (c)	  if	  it	  is	  not	  possible	  to	  execute	  the	  EEW	   by	   any	   of	   the	   measures	   available	   to	   the	   executing	   authority	   in	   the	   specific	   case	   in	  accordance	   with	   Article	   11(3);	   (d)	   if	   there	   is	   an	   immunity	   or	   privilege	   under	   the	   law	   of	   the	  executing	  State	  which	  makes	  it	  impossible	  to	  execute	  the	  EEW;	  (e)	  if,	  in	  one	  of	  the	  cases	  referred	  to	   in	   Article	   11(4)	   or	   (5),	   the	   EEW	   has	   not	   been	   validated;	   (f)	   if	   the	   EEW	   relates	   to	   criminal	  offences	  which:	  (i)	  under	  the	  law	  of	  the	  executing	  State	  are	  regarded	  as	  having	  been	  committed	  wholly	  or	  for	  a	  major	  or	  essential	  part	  within	  its	  territory,	  or	  in	  a	  place	  equivalent	  to	  its	  territory;	  or	   (ii)	  were	   committed	   outside	   the	   territory	   of	   the	   issuing	   State,	   and	   the	   law	   of	   the	   executing	  State	  does	  not	  permit	   legal	  proceedings	   to	  be	   taken	   in	  respect	  of	  such	  offences	  where	   they	  are	  committed	   outside	   that	   State’s	   territory;	   (g)	   if,	   in	   a	   specific	   case,	   its	   execution	   would	   harm	  essential	  national	  security	  interests,	   jeopardise	  the	  source	  of	  the	  information	  or	  involve	  the	  use	  of	  classified	  information	  relating	  to	  specific	  intelligence	  activities;	  or	  (h)	  if	  the	  form	  provided	  for	  in	   the	   Annex	   is	   incomplete	   or	   manifestly	   incorrect	   and	   has	   not	   been	   completed	   or	   corrected	  within	  a	  reasonable	  deadline	  set	  by	  the	  executing	  authority.	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postponement,626	  the	   executing	   authority	   shall	   take	   the	   necessary	  measures	   to	  execute	   the	  warrant;	   namely,	   following	   the	   same	  way	   as	   in	   a	   similar	   domestic	  case.	   All	   these	   contribute	   to	   a	   quicker,	   more	   efficient	   and	   standardised	  procedure.	  Moreover,	  the	  form	  of	  the	  EEW	  is	  as	  simple	  as	  possible	  containing	  a	  minimum	   of	   information.627	  Judicial	   authorities	   are	   the	   protagonist	   whereas	  political	   input	   has	   been	   minimized.	   The	   standard	   form	   of	   the	   warrant,	   the	  deadlines	   and	   the	   legal	   remedies	   at	   the	   same	   time	   serve	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  transparency	  of	  the	  EEW.	  All	  these	  elements	  are	  in	  accord	  with	  Article	  6	  ECHR,	  the	   reasonable	   time	   requirement	   and	   the	   independence	   of	   the	   tribunals.	   It	   is	  worth-­‐mentioning	  the	  fact	  that	  in	  the	  form	  of	  the	  EEW	  there	  is	  a	  section	  for	  the	  reasons	  of	   issuing	   the	  EEW	  that	   forward	  transparency	  and	   follow	  the	  principle	  adopted	   in	   the	   first	  part	  of	   the	   thesis	   that	  evidence	  should	  be	   ruled	  by	   reason.	  The	  emphasis	  on	  mutual	  recognition	  reveals	  the	  key	  role	  of	  its	  mechanism	  in	  EU	  criminal	   matters.	   The	   relation	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   to	   the	   criminal	   legal	  thinking	  has	  been	  highly	  contested,628	  but	  more	  decisive	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  this	  thesis	   is	   its	   compliance	   with	   fairness.	   The	   two	   issues	   may	   intersect	   but	   are	  clearly	  distinct.	  	  
	  
	  6.3.3.4.	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  Main	  Issues	  –	  Issuing	  Authority	  	  	  Another	  important	  aspect	  of	  the	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  EEW	  is	  its	  emphasis	  on	  the	   judicial	   control	  over	  any	  piece	  of	  evidence	   involved	   in	   these	  procedures.629	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  626	  Art	  16§§1-­‐2:	  Grounds	  for	  postponement	  of	  recognition	  or	  execution.	  1.	  The	  recognition	  of	  the	  EEW	  may	  be	  postponed	  in	  the	  executing	  State	  where:	  (a)	  the	  form	  provided	  for	  in	  the	  Annex	  is	  incomplete	  or	  manifestly	  incorrect,	  until	  such	  time	  as	  the	  form	  has	  been	  completed	  or	  corrected;	  or	  (b)	  in	  one	  of	  the	  cases	  referred	  to	  in	  Article	  11(4)	  or	  (5),	  the	  EEW	  has	  not	  been	  validated,	  until	  such	  time	  as	  the	  validation	  has	  been	  given.	  2.	  The	  execution	  of	  the	  EEW	  may	  be	  postponed	  in	  the	  executing	   State	   where:	   (a)	   its	   execution	  might	   prejudice	   an	   ongoing	   criminal	   investigation	   or	  prosecution,	   until	   such	   time	   as	   the	   executing	   State	   deems	   reasonable;	   or	   (b)	   the	   objects,	  documents	  or	  data	  concerned	  are	  already	  being	  used	  in	  other	  proceedings	  until	  such	  time	  as	  they	  are	  no	  longer	  required	  for	  this	  purpose.	  627	  Art	  6	  of	   the	  Framework	  Decision	  of	  18	  December	  2008	  on	   the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant.	  See	  also	  Annex	  of	  it.	  628	  C.	  Mylonopoulos,	  ‘EU	  Criminal	  Law	  and	  General	  Principles	  of	  EU	  Law’,	  PoinChr	  3/2010.	  629	  ‘The	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  is	  based	  on	  a	  high	  level	  of	  confidence	  between	  Member	  States.	   In	  order	  to	  promote	  this	  confidence,	   this	  Framework	  Decision	  should	  contain	   important	  safeguards	   to	  protect	   fundamental	   rights.	  The	  EEW	  should	   therefore	  be	   issued	  only	  by	   judges,	  courts,	   investigating	   magistrates,	   public	   prosecutors	   and	   certain	   other	   judicial	   authorities	   as	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Certain	   provisions	   emphasise	   the	   need	   for	   oversight	   by	   an	   actual	   judicial	  authority.	  For	  instance,	  if	  the	  issuing	  authority	  is	  not	  an	  actual	  judicial	  authority,	  then	   the	  executing	  authority	  may	   in	   the	   specific	   case,	   decide	   that	  no	   search	  or	  seizure	  may	   be	   carried	   out	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   the	   execution	   of	   the	   EEW.630	  In	  addition,	   Member	   States	   may	   require	   that	   requests	   for	   a	   warrant	   made	   by	  designated	  judicial	  authorities	  are	  validated	  by	  an	  actual	  judicial	  authority	  in	  the	  issuing	   state	   where	   the	   measures	   necessary	   to	   execute	   the	   warrant	   would	  ordinarily	   require	   actual	   judicial	   authority	   in	   the	   executing	   state. 631 	  The	  definition	   of	   the	   issuing	   authority	   for	   the	   EEW	  was	   one	   of	   the	  most	   discussed	  subjects	   during	   the	   negotiation	   process.	   The	   Commission’s	   proposal	   included	  strictly	  a	   judicial	   authority	   for	   this	   role.632	  This	  decision	   is	  well	   justified	  by	   the	  mutual	  trust	  needed	  to	  be	  established	  between	  the	  Member	  States.	  In	  support	  of	  this	   argument	   was	   also	   the	   report	   of	   the	   LIBE	   Committee	   of	   the	   European	  Parliament	   stating	   that	   it	   is	   indeed	   a	   guarantee	   for	   the	   public	   that	   evidence	  should	  be	  collected	  only	  by	  authorities	  with	  judicial	  status.633	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  defined	  by	  Member	  States	   in	  accordance	  with	   this	  Framework	  Decision’.	  Recital	  8	  Preamble	  of	  the	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  EEW.	  630	  Art.	  11§4:	  If	  the	  issuing	  authority	  is	  not	  a	  judge,	  a	  court,	  an	  investigating	  magistrate	  or	  a	  public	  prosecutor	  and	  the	  EEW	  has	  not	  been	  validated	  by	  one	  of	  those	  authorities	  in	  the	  issuing	  State,	  the	  executing	  authority	  may,	  in	  the	  specific	  case,	  decide	  that	  no	  search	  or	  seizure	  may	  be	  carried	  out	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  execution	  of	  the	  EEW.	  Before	  so	  deciding,	  the	  executing	  authority	  shall	  consult	  the	  competent	  authority	  of	  the	  issuing	  State.	  631	  Art.	  11§5:	  A	  Member	  State	  may,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  adoption	  of	  this	  Framework	  Decision,	  make	  a	  declaration	   or	   subsequent	   notification	   to	   the	  General	   Secretariat	   of	   the	   Council	   requiring	   such	  validation	   in	   all	   cases	   where	   the	   issuing	   authority	   is	   not	   a	   judge,	   a	   court,	   an	   investigating	  magistrate	  or	  a	  public	  prosecutor	  and	  where	  the	  measures	  necessary	  to	  execute	  the	  EEW	  would	  have	   to	   be	   ordered	   or	   supervised	   by	   a	   judge,	   a	   court,	   an	   investigating	  magistrate	   or	   a	   public	  prosecutor	  under	  the	  law	  of	  the	  executing	  State	  in	  a	  similar	  domestic	  case.	  632	  ‘It	   is	   important	   to	   note	   that	   the	   issuing	   authority	  must	   a	   judge,	   investigating	  magistrate	   or	  prosecutor.	   Other	   competent	   authorities	   (including	   police,	   customs	   and	   administrative	  authorities)	  are	  not	  permitted	  to	  issue	  a	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant.	  Such	  authorities	  must	  seek	  the	   decision	   of	   a	   judge,	   investigating	   magistrate	   or	   prosecutor	   in	   order	   to	   have	   a	   European	  Evidence	  Warrant	   issued’.	   (Art	   2	   of	   the	   proposal	   of	   the	   Commission	   for	   a	   Council	   Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  for	  obtaining	  objects,	  documents	  and	  data	  for	  use	  in	  proceedings	  in	  criminal	  matters.	  	  633	  Report	  from	  the	  Committee	  on	  Civil	  Liberties,	  Justice	  and	  Home	  Affairs	  on	  the	  proposal	  for	  a	  Council	   Framework	   Decision	   on	   the	   European	   Evidence	  Warrant	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   obtaining	  objects,	  documents	  and	  data	  for	  use	  in	  proceedings	  in	  criminal	  matters:	  The	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  is	  based	  on	  a	  high	  level	  of	  confidence	  between	  Member	  States.	  In	  order	  to	  promote	  this	   confidence,	   this	   Framework	   Decision	   should	   contain	   important	   safeguards	   to	   protect	  fundamental	   rights.	   The	   EEW	   should	   therefore	   be	   issued	   only	   by	   judges,	   investigating	  magistrates	  and	  public	  prosecutors.	  (Amendment	  1,	  Council	  draft,	  Recital	  8),	  OJ	  C	  15,	  21	  January	  2010,	  p	  100.	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This	   issue	  was	   highly	   contested	   since	   previous	   legislative	   instruments	   such	   as	  the	   1959	   Council	   of	   Europe	   Convention	   on	   Mutual	   Assistance	   had	   left	   the	  contracting	  states	   free	   to	  define	  which	  authorities	  would	  act	  as	   judicial	  agents.	  The	   EEW	  draft	  wording	   on	   the	   other	   hand	  was	   stricter	   on	   this	   point,	   creating	  problems	   to	   countries	   that	   use	   police	   authorities	   to	   perform	   judicial	   roles.	   A	  more	   lenient	   wording	   though,	   would	   not	   be	   acceptable	   from	   other	   member	  states	   that	   would	   prefer	   their	   judiciary	   to	   communicate	   and	   cooperate	   with	  equal	   and	   similar	   authorities.	   The	   Framework	   Decision	   clearly	   depicts	   this	  tension	  in	  Article	  2634	  where	  a	  via	  media	  is	  sought.	  	  	  Of	  greater	  significance	  though	  is	  not	  the	  formalistic	  kind	  of	  approach	  of	  the	  term	  judicial	   authority	   rather	   than	   the	   substantial	   embodiment	   of	   the	   role	   by	   the	  national	   authority	   in	   question.	   According	   to	   the	   principle	   of	   the	   triangular	  amended	  adversarialism	  accepted	  in	  this	  thesis,	  it	  is	  of	  utter	  importance	  that	  the	  party	  that	  plays	  the	  role	  of	  the	  judge	  should	  be	  equipped	  with	  the	  guarantees	  of	  impartiality	  and	  independence.	  The	  judge	  –even	  if	  she	  is	  a	  police	  official–	  needs	  to	   be	   substantially	   covered	   by	   these	   two	   necessary	   qualities	   of	   the	   judiciary	  while	   she	  performs	  her	   function.	   In	   addition,	   the	   judicial	   authorities	   should	  be	  known	   to	   the	   parties	   involved	   so	   that	   the	   proper	   procedural	   control	   can	   be	  achieved	   through	   the	   suitable	   legal	   remedies.	   The	   Article	   3	   of	   the	   Framework	  Decision	  forwards	  this	  rationale.	  The	  designation	  of	  competent	  authorities	  is	  key	  not	  only	   for	  the	  smoother	  cooperation	  between	  the	  member	  states	  but	  also	   for	  fairness	   and	   the	   better	   operating	   of	   the	   triangularly	   amended	   adversarial	  system.	  Last	  but	  not	   least,	   the	   individual	   that	  operates	  as	   the	   judicial	  authority	  should	  be	   replaced	  by	  another	  whenever	  his	  dealing	  with	   evidentiary	  material	  involves	   its	  examination	  and	   the	  participation	  of	   the	   interested	  parties.	  As	   it	   is	  mentioned	   before,	   that	   would	   demand	   that	   since	   evidence	   is	   examined,	  involvement	  for	  the	  agent	  of	  the	  judiciary	  in	  both	  investigation	  and	  trial	  is	  by	  all	  means	  unacceptable.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  634	  Art	  2	  of	  the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision:	   ‘issuing	  authority’	  shall	  mean:	  (i)	  a	   judge,	  a	  court,	  an	  investigating	  magistrate,	  a	  public	  prosecutor;	  or	  (ii)	  any	  other	  judicial	  authority	  as	  defined	  by	  the	  issuing	   State	   and,	   in	   the	   specific	   case,	   acting	   in	   its	   capacity	   as	   an	   investigating	   authority	   in	  criminal	  proceedings	  with	  competence	  to	  order	  the	  obtaining	  of	  evidence	  in	  cross-­‐border	  cases	  in	  accordance	  with	  national	  law.	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6.3.3.5.	  Proportionality	  	  	  Another	  issue	  widely	  discussed	  during	  negotiations	  was	  that	  of	  proportionality.	  The	  conditions	  of	  issuing	  the	  EEW	  were	  made	  by	  the	  Commission’s	  proposal	  in	  order	   to	   establish	   minimum	   precautions	   in	   favour	   of	   rights.635	  Only	   the	   two	  thirds	  of	   this	  proposal	  were	  accepted	  and	  those	   in	  a	  slightly	  different	  way.	  The	  EEW	   is	   issued	   only	   when	   the	   issuing	   authority	   is	   satisfied	   that	   the	   objects,	  documents	   or	   data	   can	   be	   obtained	   under	   the	   law	   of	   the	   issuing	   state	   in	   a	  comparable	  case	  if	  they	  were	  available	  on	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  issuing	  state,	  even	  though	  different	  procedural	  measures	  might	  be	  used.	  Moreover,	  the	  issuing	  state	  must	   ensure	   that	   the	   evidence	   requested	   is	   necessary	   and	   proportionate	   for	  these	  proceedings.636	  	  	  Proportionality	  as	  a	  condition	  of	  issuing	  the	  EEW	  unfolds	  a	  traditional	  concept	  of	  criminal	   procedural	   law	   throughout	   Europe.	   It	   actually	   requires	   that	   the	   law	  enforcement	   measures	   taken	   should	   be	   suitable,	   necessary	   and	   proportionate	  (stricto	   sensu)	   for	   the	   purposes	   for	   which	   are	   demanded.	   Only	   the	   restrictive	  measures	  that	  fit	  to	  the	  success	  of	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  procedure	  are	  regarded	  as	  proportionate.	   Only	   those	   measures	   are	   acceptable	   that	   are	   necessary,	   either	  because	  they	  are	  the	  ones	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  the	  purpose	  of	  the	  criminal	  procedure	  or	  because	  they	  are	  the	  mildest	  available.	  The	  principle	  of	  proportionality	  stricto	  
sensu	   accepts	   only	   the	   coercive	   measures	   the	   weight	   of	   which	   stands	   in	   a	  satisfactory	   –under	   the	   aspect	   of	   human	   rights–	   relation	   in	   proportion	   to	   the	  procedural	  purpose	  aimed	  at.	  	  	  6.3.3.6.	  Territoriality	  	  
	  Territoriality	  is	  a	  ground	  for	  refusal	  in	  the	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant.	  Although	  the	  Commission	  had	  not	  proposed	  such	  a	  clause	  and	  the	  European	  Parliament	  had	  had	  negatively	   expressed	   itself	   on	   the	   subject	   as	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  635	  See	  Proposal	  of	  the	  Commission	  for	  the	  FD	  on	  the	  EEW	  (Art	  6.83).	  636	  Article	  7	  –	  Conditions	  for	  issuing	  the	  EEW.	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such	  a	  provision	  is	  not	  coherent	  with	  the	  idea	  of	  mutual	  recognition,	  the	  Member	  States	  decided	  differently.	  They	  wanted	  to	  be	  able	  to	  refuse	  the	  execution	  of	  an	  evidence	   warrant	   in	   the	   cases	   where	   they	   themselves	   were	   competent	   to	  commence	  criminal	  proceedings.	  The	  content	  of	  the	  territoriality	  clause	  was	  the	  outcome	  of	  long	  negotiations.	  	  According	   to	   the	   Framework	   Decision	   of	   the	   EEW,	   if	   the	   warrant	   relates	   to	  criminal	   offences	   which	   under	   the	   law	   of	   the	   executing	   state	   are	   regarded	   as	  having	   been	   committed	   wholly	   or	   for	   a	   major	   or	   essential	   part	   within	   its	  territory,	  or	  in	  a	  place	  equivalent	  to	  its	  territory,	  the	  EEW	  may	  be	  refused	  to	  be	  recognised	  or	  executed	  in	  the	  executing	  state.	  Furthermore,	  the	  same	  can	  happen	  if	   these	  offences	  were	   committed	  outside	   the	   territory	  of	   the	   issuing	   state	   and	  the	   law	  of	   the	  executing	  state	  does	  not	  permit	   legal	  proceedings	   to	  be	   taken	   in	  respect	  of	  such	  offences	  where	  they	  are	  committed	  outside	  that	  state’s	  territory.	  
	  
	  6.3.3.7.	  Double	  Criminality	  
	  The	   recognition	   or	   execution	   of	   an	  EEW	  may	  only	   be	   subject	   to	   verification	   of	  double	  criminality	  if	  a	  search	  or	  seizure	  is	  required	  for	  its	  execution	  and	  if	   it	   is	  not	  related	  to	  the	  list	  of	  offences	  set	  out	  in	  the	  framework	  decision.637	  This	  was	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  637	  In	  Art	  14§2	  is	  stated	  that:	  ‘If	  it	  is	  necessary	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  search	  or	  seizure	  for	  the	  execution	  of	  the	  EEW,	  the	  following	  offences,	  if	  they	  are	  punishable	  in	  the	  issuing	  State	  by	  a	  custodial	  sentence	  or	  a	  detention	  order	  for	  a	  maximum	  period	  of	  at	  least	  three	  years	  and	  as	  they	  are	  defined	  by	  the	  law	   of	   that	   State,	   shall	   not	   be	   subject	   to	   verification	   of	   double	   criminality	   under	   any	  circumstances:	   participation	   in	   a	   criminal	   organisation,	   terrorism,	   trafficking	   in	   human	  beings,	  sexual	   exploitation	   of	   children	   and	   child	   pornography,	   illicit	   trafficking	   in	   narcotic	   drugs	   and	  psychotropic	   substances,	   illicit	   trafficking	   in	   weapons,	   munitions	   and	   explosives,	   corruption,	  fraud,	   including	   that	   affecting	   the	   financial	   interests	   of	   the	   European	   Communities	   within	   the	  meaning	   of	   the	   Convention	   of	   26	   July	   1995	   on	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   European	   Communities’	  financial	   interests	   [OJ	   C	   316,	   27.11.1995,	   p.	   49],	   laundering	   of	   the	   proceeds	   of	   crime,	  counterfeiting	   currency,	   including	   of	   the	   euro,	   computer-­‐related	   crime,	   environmental	   crime,	  including	   illicit	   trafficking	   in	   endangered	   animal	   species	   and	   in	   endangered	   plant	   species	   and	  varieties,	   facilitation	  of	  unauthorised	  entry	  and	  residence,	  murder,	  grievous	  bodily	   injury,	   illicit	  trade	   in	   human	  organs	   and	   tissue,	   kidnapping,	   illegal	   restraint	   and	  hostage-­‐taking,	   racism	  and	  xenophobia,	  organised	  or	  armed	  robbery,	   illicit	   trafficking	   in	  cultural	  goods,	   including	  antiques	  and	  works	   of	   art,	   swindling,	   racketeering	   and	   extortion,	   counterfeiting	   and	  piracy	   of	   products,	  forgery	  of	  administrative	  documents	  and	  trafficking	  therein,	  forgery	  of	  means	  of	  payment,	  illicit	  trafficking	   in	  hormonal	   substances	  and	  other	  growth	  promoters,	   illicit	   trafficking	   in	  nuclear	  or	  radioactive	  materials,	  trafficking	  in	  stolen	  vehicles,	  rape,	  arson,	  crimes	  within	  the	  jurisdiction	  of	  the	  International	  Criminal	  Court,	  unlawful	  seizure	  of	  aircraft/ships,	  sabotage’.	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the	  outcome	  of	  a	  lot	  of	  negotiations,	  since	  the	  initial	  proposal	  of	  the	  Commission	  referred	  to	  a	  longer	  list	  (39	  instead	  of	  the	  ‘traditional’	  32)	  of	  crimes,	  without	  any	  threshold	   level	   of	   imprisonment,	   suggesting	   also	   a	   sunset	   clause	   that	   required	  that	  only	   for	  a	   five-­‐year	   transitional	  period	  could	  double	  criminality	  stand	  as	  a	  ground	   for	   refusal.	   These	   proposals	   would	   not	   find	   the	   member	   states	  concurring.	   The	   outcome	   was	   the	   upholding	   of	   the	   32	   crimes	   list	   with	   a	  threshold	   level	   of	   imprisonment	   and	   a	   clause	   introducing	   a	   review	   in	   5	   years	  period.638	  	  The	   member	   states	   also	   discussed	   the	   possibility	   of	   drawing	   a	   distinction	  between	   warrants	   that	   include	   coercive	   measures	   in	   order	   to	   be	   executed	  effectively	   and	   those	  which	   do	  not.	   For	   the	   latter	   the	   double	   criminality	   check	  could	   be	   also	   abolished.	   In	   Article	   14§1	   of	   the	   EEW	   Framework	   Decision	   this	  suggestion	   is	   applied:	   The	   recognition	   or	   execution	   of	   the	   EEW	   shall	   not	   be	  subject	  to	  verification	  of	  double	  criminality	  unless	  it	   is	  necessary	  to	  carry	  out	  a	  search	   or	   seizure.	   For	   the	   rest	   of	   the	  warrants	   that	   demand	   search	   or	   seizure	  double	  criminality	  can	  be	  an	  issue	  examined639	  unless	  the	  warrant	  refers	  to	  one	  of	  the	  32	  offences	  of	  the	  list	  and	  this	  offence	  is	  punishable	  in	  the	  issuing	  State	  by	  a	  custodial	  sentence	  or	  a	  detention	  order	  for	  a	  maximum	  period	  of	  at	  least	  three	  years.	  	  The	   list	   of	   the	   32	   offences	   does	   not	   automatically	   guarantees	   that	   there	   are	  common	  definitions	  of	  them	  shared	  by	  the	  member	  states.	  They	  are	  offences	  of	  high	  priority	  in	  the	  EU	  agenda	  of	  combating	  transnational	  crime.	  These	  offences	  are	  actually	  defined	  by	  the	  law	  of	  the	  issuing	  state.	  During	  negotiations	  Germany	  proposed	   different	  ways	   to	   solve	   this	   inconsistency.	   One	   of	   them	  was	   that	   the	  member	   states	   should	   adopt	   crime	   definitions	   that	  would	   be	   valid	   as	  well	   for	  other	  mutual	  recognition	   instruments	  such	  as	  the	  EAW.	  Another	  one	  suggested	  the	   introduction	   of	   definitions	   only	   applicable	   for	   the	   purposes	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  638	  See	  also	  Document	  6142/05	  of	  9/02/2005	  and	  Article	  14§4	  of	  the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision.	  639	  ‘If	  the	  EEW	  is	  not	  related	  to	  any	  of	  the	  offences	  set	  out	  in	  paragraph	  2	  and	  its	  execution	  would	  require	  a	  search	  or	  seizure,	  recognition	  or	  execution	  of	  the	  EEW	  may	  be	  subject	  to	  the	  condition	  of	   double	   criminality’	   (Article	   14§3,	   emphasis	   added,	   note	   that	   the	   wording	   favours	   the	  possibility	  of	  double	  criminality	  check	  without	  making	  an	  enjoining	  rule	  about	  it).	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Framework	   Decision	   of	   the	   European	   Evidence	   Warrant.	   None	   of	   them	   was	  eventually	  accepted	  and	  it	  was	  finally	  agreed	  upon	  that	  Germany	  could	  reserve	  its	  right	  to	  exercise	  a	  double	  criminality	  check	  for	  the	  execution	  of	  an	  evidence	  warrant	   in	   crimes	   relating	   to	   terrorism,	   computer-­‐related	   crime,	   racism	   and	  xenophobia,	  sabotage,	  racketeering	  and	  extortion	  and	  swindling.640	  	  	  6.3.3.8.	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  Procedural	  Safeguards	  –	  In	  the	  issuing	  state	  	  	  The	  provision	  of	  several	  safeguards	  is	  evident	  in	  the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision.	  There	  is	  an	  overlap	  with	  the	  grounds	  of	  refusal	  for	  the	  recognition	  or	  execution	  of	   an	   arrest	   warrant,	   fact	   that	   shows	   the	   link	   between	   the	   two	   mutual	  recognition	  instruments.	  The	  admissibility	  of	  evidence	  in	  a	  criminal	  procedure	  in	  the	  issuing	  state	  is	  the	  rationale	  for	  respect	  for	  formalities	  and	  procedures	  by	  the	  executing	   state	   as	   indicated	   by	   the	   former.641	  ‘The	   executing	   authority	   shall	  comply	  with	   the	   formalities	   and	  procedures	   expressly	   indicated	  by	   the	   issuing	  authority	  unless	  otherwise	  provided	   in	   this	  Framework	  Decision	  and	  provided	  that	   such	   formalities	   and	   procedures	   are	   not	   contrary	   to	   the	   fundamental	  principles	  of	  law	  of	  the	  executing	  State.	  This	  Article	  shall	  not	  create	  an	  obligation	  to	  take	  coercive	  measures’.642	  	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  640	  Declaration	   of	   the	   Federal	   Republic	   of	   Germany	   put	   at	   the	   end	   of	   the	   Framework	  Decision.	  There	   are	   also	   certain	   criteria	   for	   terrorism,	   computer-­‐related	   crime,	   racism	   and	   xenophobia,	  sabotage,	  racketeering	  and	  extortion	  and	  swindling	  indicated	  in	  the	  declaration	  that	  if	  met	  make	  the	  double	  criminality	  verification	  unnecessary.	  	  641	  The	  Framework	  Decision	   for	   the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  seems	  to	  be	  copying	  the	  2000	  Convention	   on	   Mutual	   Assistance	   in	   Criminal	   Matters	   between	   the	   Member	   States	   of	   the	  European	  Union	  (Article	  4§1):	  ‘Where	  mutual	  assistance	  is	  afforded,	  the	  requested	  Member	  State	  shall	  comply	  with	  the	  formalities	  and	  procedures	  expressly	  indicated	  by	  the	  requesting	  Member	  State,	   unless	   otherwise	   provided	   in	   this	   Convention	   and	   provided	   that	   such	   formalities	   and	  procedures	  are	  not	  contrary	  to	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  law	  in	  the	  requested	  Member	  State’.	  642	  Article	  12	  of	  the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  Framework	  Decision.	  Also	  Recital	  14	  of	  the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision:	  It	  should	  be	  possible,	  if	  the	  national	  law	  of	  the	  issuing	  State	  so	  provides	  in	  transposing	  Article	  12,	  for	  the	  issuing	  authority	  to	  ask	  the	  executing	  authority	  to	  follow	  specified	  formalities	  and	  procedures	  in	  respect	  of	  legal	  or	  administrative	  processes	  which	  might	  assist	  in	  making	  the	  evidence	  sought	  admissible	  in	  the	  issuing	  State,	  for	  example	  the	  official	  stamping	  of	  a	  document,	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  representative	  from	  the	  issuing	  State,	  or	  the	  recording	  of	  times	  and	  dates	   to	   create	   a	   chain	   of	   evidence.	   Such	   formalities	   and	   procedures	   should	   not	   encompass	  coercive	  measures.	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Worth	  mentioning	  is	  the	  reference	  to	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  or	  guarantees	  of	   law. 643 	  Which	   are	   these	   fundamental	   principles	   of	   law	   that	   should	   be	  protected?	  This	  is	  a	  rather	  vague	  statement.	  Are	  all	  these	  fundamental	  principles	  constitutional?	  Do	  they	  explicitly	  refer	  to	  human	  rights?	  This	  wording	  leaves	  an	  open	  door	   to	   the	  executing	  authorities	   to	  determine	   freely	  which	  procedure	  or	  formality	   can	   be	   reconciled	  with	   their	   national	   law.	   From	   the	   point	   of	   view	   of	  legal	   certainty	   it	   might	   have	   been	   better	   to	   state	   that	   the	   formalities	   and	  procedures	  cannot	  be	  contrary	  to	  the	  law	  of	  the	  executing	  state,644	  although	  this	  would	  not	  provide	  a	  definite	  solution	  to	  the	  issue.	  	  	  If	  we	  take	  a	  closer	  look	  to	  the	  problem	  here,	  we	  understand	  that	  it	  actually	  refers	  to	   the	   admissibility	   of	   foreign	   evidence.	   Although	   the	   attempt	   of	   the	   EEW	  Framework	   Decision	   to	   tackle	   the	   problem	   points	   to	   the	   right	   direction,	   it	   is	  rather	  vague	  and	  insufficient	  obscuring	  the	  real	  issues.	  The	  Tampere	  conclusions	  had	   made	   a	   clearer	   stating	   of	   this	   problem	   by	   saying	   that:	   ‘Evidence	   lawfully	  gathered	   by	   one	   Member	   State’s	   authorities	   should	   be	   admissible	   before	   the	  courts	   of	   other	   Member	   States,	   taking	   into	   account	   the	   standards	   that	   apply	  there’.645	  Also,	  in	  the	  Green	  Paper	  on	  a	  European	  Prosecutor	  the	  issue	  of	  mutual	  admissibility	   of	   evidence	   is	   supported:	   ‘The	   prior	   condition	   for	   any	   mutual	  admissibility	  of	  evidence	  is	  that	  the	  evidence	  must	  have	  been	  obtained	  lawfully	  in	  the	  Member	  State	  where	  it	  is	  found.	  The	  question	  of	  the	  exclusion	  of	  evidence	  obtained	  contrary	  to	  the	  law	  therefore	  has	  to	  be	  considered.	  The	  law	  that	  must	  be	  respected	  if	  evidence	  is	  not	  to	  be	  excluded	  is	  first	  and	  foremost	  the	  national	  law	  of	  the	  place	  where	  the	  evidence	  is	  situated,	  which	  integrates	  in	  all	  Member	  States	  the	  principles	  of	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  Union	  Treaty,	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  the	  European	  Convention	  for	  the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms.	  It	  would	  include	  certain	  Community	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  643	  As	  named	  in	  Recital	  15	  of	  the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision:	  The	  execution	  of	  an	  EEW	  should,	  to	  the	  widest	  extent	  possible,	  and	  without	  prejudice	  to	  fundamental	  guarantees	  under	  national	  law,	  be	   carried	   out	   in	   accordance	   with	   the	   formalities	   and	   procedures	   expressly	   indicated	   by	   the	  issuing	  State.	  644	  P	   De	   Hert,	   K	  Weis	   and	   N	   Cloosen,	   ‘The	   Framework	   Decision	   of	   18	   December	   2008	   on	   the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  obtaining	  objects,	  documents	  and	  data	  for	  use	  in	  proceedings	  in	  criminal	  matters	  –	  a	  critical	  assessment’,	  New	  Journal	  of	  European	  Criminal	  Law,	  p	  67.	  645	  Tampere	   European	   Council	   15	   and	   16	   October	   1999	   Presidency	   Conclusions	   (B.	   A	   genuine	  European	  Area	  of	  Justice,	  36).	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rules	   such	   as	   those	   governing	   the	   European	   arrest	   warrant	   or	   record	   of	  questioning	  where	  they	  are	  used	  as	  evidence’.646	  	  
	  6.3.3.9.	  In	  the	  executing	  state	  	  
	  The	  first	  procedural	  safeguard	  in	  the	  executing	  state	  is	  implied	  in	  the	  definition	  of	   the	   issuing	   authority	   of	   Article	   2(c).	  When	   the	   EEW	  has	   not	   been	   issued	   or	  validated	   by	   a	   judge,	   court,	   investigating	   magistrate	   or	   public	   prosecutor,	   the	  executing	  authority	  may	  decide	  not	   to	   carry	  out	  a	   search	  or	   seizure	   to	  execute	  the	   warrant.	   However,	   it	   must	   consult	   the	   competent	   authority	   of	   the	   issuing	  state	  before	  taking	  such	  a	  decision.	  Member	  States	  may	  declare	  that	  they	  require	  such	  validation	  when	  the	  executing	  measures	  in	  a	  similar	  domestic	  case	  must	  be	  ordered	   or	   supervised	   by	   a	   judge,	   court,	   investigating	   magistrate	   or	   public	  prosecutor	   under	   its	   law.	   Therefore,	   the	   executing	   state	   can	   verify	   that	   the	  issuing	   authority	   is	   at	   least	   clothed	   with	   the	   privileges	   and	   the	   qualitative	  characteristics	   of	   a	   judicial	   authority.	   That	   is	   also	   of	   great	   importance	   as	  mentioned	  above	  for	  well	  functioning	  of	  triangular	  adversarialism.	  	  	  After	   dealing	   with	   the	   issue	   of	   proportionality	   the	   EEW	   Framework	   Decision	  states	  in	  Article	  7	  that	  ‘the	  objects,	  documents	  or	  data	  can	  be	  obtained	  under	  the	  law	   of	   the	   issuing	   State	   in	   a	   comparable	   case	   if	   they	   were	   available	   on	   the	  territory	  of	   the	   issuing	  State,	  even	  though	  different	  procedural	  measures	  might	  be	   used’.	  With	   this	   clause,	   the	  member	   states	   express	   rightly	   their	   will	   that	   a	  European	  evidence	  warrant	  is	  not	  an	  excuse	  or	  a	  back	  door	  to	  breach	  of	  standard	  procedures	  of	  human	  rights	  in	  the	  executing	  state.	  National	  limitations	  must	  be	  protected.	  The	  Article	  is	  not	  addressing	  the	  issue	  of	  an	  investigative	  action	  that	  it	  is	  permissible	  and	  lawful	  but	  conducted	  with	  the	  use	  of	  different	  measures.	  This	  is	  another	  matter	  tackled	  in	  Article	  12	  as	  mentioned	  above.	  This	  guarantee	  aims	  at	   emphatically	   leaving	   out	   any	   chance	   of	   measures	   that	   can	   lead	   to	   illegally	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  646	  Green	  Paper	  on	  criminal-­‐law	  protection	  of	   the	   financial	   interests	  of	   the	  Community	  and	   the	  establishment	  of	  a	  European	  Prosecutor	  (6.3.4.2.	  Exclusion	  of	  evidence	  unlawfully	  obtained).	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obtained	  evidence	  in	  procedures	  that	  are	  not	  permissible	  in	  the	  executing	  state	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  	  Moreover,	  there	  is	  a	  list	  of	  grounds	  for	  refusal	  explicitly	  enumerated	  in	  the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision.	  The	  executing	  state	  may	  refuse	  to	  recognise	  or	  execute	  the	  EEW	   if:	   (a)	   the	   execution	   breaches	   the	  ne	   bis	   in	   idem	  principle;	   (b)	   in	   certain	  cases	   specified	   in	   the	   framework	   decision,	   the	   act	   is	   not	   an	   offence	   under	   its	  national	  law;	  (c)	  execution	  is	  not	  possible	  by	  any	  of	  the	  measures	  available	  to	  the	  executing	   authority	   in	   the	   specific	   case;	   (d)	   there	   is	   an	   immunity	   or	   privilege	  under	   the	   law	  of	   the	  executing	  state	   that	  makes	   its	  execution	   impossible;	   (e)	   it	  has	   not	   been	   validated	   by	   a	   judge,	   court,	   investigative	   magistrate	   or	   public	  prosecutor	  in	  the	  issuing	  state	  when	  so	  required;	  (f)	  the	  offence	  was	  committed	  on	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  executing	  state	  (‘wholly	  or	  for	  a	  major	  or	  essential	  part’)	  or	  outside	  the	  issuing	  state	  where	  the	  law	  of	  the	  executing	  state	  does	  not	  allow	  for	   legal	   proceedings	   in	   respect	   of	   such	   offences;	   (g)	   it	   would	   harm	   essential	  national	   security	   interests,	   jeopardise	   the	   source	   of	   the	   information	  or	   involve	  the	  use	  of	  classified	  information	  relating	  to	  specific	  intelligence	  activities;	  (h)	  the	  form	   is	   incomplete	   or	   manifestly	   incorrect	   and	   has	   not	   been	   completed	   or	  corrected	   within	   a	   reasonable	   deadline	   set	   by	   the	   executing	   authority.647	  All	  these	  provisions	  are	  moving	  to	  the	  right	  direction.	  	  	  Article	  12	  of	  the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision	  by	  using	  the	  words	  ‘unless	  otherwise	  provided	  in	  this	  Framework	  Decision’	   left	  an	  open	  door	  for	  Article	  11	  referring	  to	   measures	   that	   will	   need	   to	   be	   taken	   for	   the	   execution	   of	   the	   European	  Evidence	  Warrant.648	  If	   a	  warrant	   can	   be	   executed	   only	   by	   the	   use	   of	   coercive	  measures	  that	  are	  not	  known	  to	  the	  executing	  state,	  the	  executing	  authority	  can	  refuse	  the	  execution	  of	  the	  evidence	  warrant.	  Article	  11§1	  states	  the	  principle	  of	  
locus	  regit	  actum,	  since	  it	  is	  the	  executing	  state	  that	  decides	  upon	  the	  use	  or	  not	  of	  coercive	  measures	  and	  their	  compliance	  with	  the	  procedural	  rules	  of	  the	  state	  executing	  the	  warrant.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  647	  Article	  13§1	  (Grounds	  for	  non-­‐recognition	  or	  non-­‐execution).	  648	  Article	  11	  -­‐	  Recognition	  and	  execution.	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This	  Article	   contains	   an	   interesting	   clause	   in	   paragraph	  3	  which	   instructs	   that	  every	  investigative	  action	  known	  in	  the	  executing	  state	  should	  also	  be	  available	  for	  the	  execution	  of	  a	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  and	  this	  is	  also	  applicable	  for	  the	   crimes	   that	   have	   been	   excluded	   from	   the	   double	   criminality	   check.	   Article	  13(c)	  introduces	  a	  ground	  for	  refusal	  whenever	  the	  execution	  of	  a	  warrant	  is	  not	  possible	   by	   any	   of	   the	   measures	   available	   to	   the	   executing	   authority	   in	   the	  specific	  case.	  This	  provision	  combined	  with	  Article	  11§1	  establishes	  an	  indirect	  way	  of	  bringing	  back	  the	  double	  criminality	  principle	  for	  all	  the	  crimes	  that	  have	  been	  excluded	  from	  it	   in	  Article	  14.	  For	  example,	   if	  an	  activity,	  blameworthy	   in	  the	  issuing	  state	  and	  therefore	  a	  crime,	  is	  not	  also	  a	  crime	  in	  the	  executing	  state,	  then	   the	   authorities	   of	   the	   latter	   could	   not	   take	   any	   measures	   against	   it	   and	  therefore	   they	  could	  refuse	   the	  execution	  of	   the	  warrant	  on	   the	  grounds	  of	  Art	  13(c).	  This	  is	  a	  subtle	  way	  reintroducing	  the	  double	  criminality	  check	  and	  giving	  the	  executing	  state	  the	  power	  to	  calibrate	  its	  use	  whenever	  convenient.	  	  Last	  but	  not	  least,	  the	  Framework	  Decision	  in	  Article	  16649	  gives	  the	  opportunity	  to	   the	  executing	  state	   to	  postpone	   the	  execution	  of	   the	  warrant,	  whenever	   this	  may	  jeopardise	  another	   investigation	  or	  any	  of	  the	  related	  evidence	  are	  part	  of	  criminal	   proceedings	   already	   commenced.	   The	   application	   of	   this	   regulation	  should	  not	  be	  practised	  against	   the	  demands	   for	  criminal	  proceedings	  within	  a	  reasonable	  time	  as	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  ECHR	  states.	  	  
	  
	  6.3.3.10.	  For	  the	  interested	  parties	  	  
	  For	  a	  legislative	  instrument	  such	  as	  the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  one	  should	  expect	   a	   whole	   arsenal	   of	   rights	   for	   the	   defence.	   But	   this	   is	   not	   the	   case.	   The	  proposal	   of	   the	   Commission	   on	   the	   EEW	  was	   not	   considerably	   satisfactory	   in	  relation	   to	   human	   rights.650	  Even	   though	   some	   provisions	   were	   made	   there,	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  649	  Article	  16	  -­‐	  Grounds	  for	  postponement	  of	  recognition	  or	  execution.	  	  650	  Article	   12	   of	   the	   Proposal	   of	   the	   Commission	   for	   a	   FD	   on	   the	   EEW,	   Brussels,	   14.11.2003,	  COM(2003)	   688	   final	   2003/0270	   (CNS):	   97.	   This	   Article	   ensures	   that	   the	   European	   Evidence	  Warrant	  will	   be	   executed	   in	   accordance	  with	   the	   following	  minimum	   conditions:	   (a)	   the	   least	  intrusive	  means	  necessary	  should	  be	  used	  to	  obtain	  the	  objects,	  documents	  or	  data;	  (b)	  a	  natural	  person	  should	  not	  be	  required	  to	  produce	  objects,	  documents	  or	  data	  which	  might	  result	  in	  self-­‐
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Article	   12	   of	   the	   Commission’s	   proposal	   was	   not	   preserved	   during	   the	  negotiations.	  The	  member	  states	  saw	  in	  that	  an	  attempt	  of	  establishing	  common	  procedural	   standards	   and	   clearly	   that	   was	   not	   the	   main	   purpose	   of	   the	  Framework	  Decision	  discussed.	  Besides,	  the	  issue	  of	  rights	  was	  thought	  to	  be	  one	  tackled	   by	   national	   law.	   The	   general	   human	   rights	   clause	   of	   Article	   1§3	   was	  regarded	  as	  sufficient.	  At	  the	  time	  there	  was	  also	  a	  draft	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  procedural	  rights.651	  The	  reluctance	  of	  the	  member	  states	  towards	  a	  more	  clear-­‐cut	   solution	   is	   once	  more	   evident,	   since	   on	   the	   one	   hand	   they	   expressed	   that	  procedural	  safeguards	  need	  to	  be	  dealt	  with	  on	  a	  national	  level,	  but	  on	  the	  other	  they	   hid	   behind	   the	   potential	   adoption	   of	   a	   legislative	   instrument	   concerning	  them	  that	  makes	  their	   inclusion	  in	  the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision	  redundant.652	  Nevertheless,	   some	   safeguards	   could	  have	  been	   explicitly	   included	   in	   the	  EEW	  text.	  	  
	  Recital	  27	  of	  the	  Framework	  Decision	  includes	  a	  clause	  against	  discrimination.653	  In	   addition	   Recital	   12	   contains	   a	   clause	   that	   establishes	   part	   of	   the	   classic	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  incrimination;	   and	   (c)	   the	   issuing	   authority	   should	   be	   informed	   immediately	   if	   the	   executing	  authority	   discovers	   that	   the	   warrant	   was	   executed	   in	   a	   manner	   contrary	   to	   the	   law	   of	   the	  executing	  State.	  98.	  The	  following	  additional	  safeguards	  are	  provided	  with	  respect	  to	  search	  and	  seizure:	   (a)	   a	   search	   of	   private	   premises	   should	   not	   start	   at	   night,	   unless	   this	   is	   exceptionally	  necessary	   due	   to	   the	   particular	   circumstances	   of	   the	   case;	   (b)	   a	   person	  whose	   premises	   have	  been	  searched	  should	  be	  entitled	  to	  receive	  written	  notification	  of	  the	  search.	  This	  should	  state,	  as	   a	  minimum,	   the	   reason	   for	   the	   search,	   the	   objects,	   documents	   or	   data	   seized	   and	   the	   legal	  remedies	  available;	  and	  (c)	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  the	  person	  whose	  premises	  are	  being	  searched,	  the	  notification	   of	   the	   search	   should	   be	   provided	   to	   that	   person	   by	   leaving	   the	   notification	   on	   the	  premises	  or	  by	  other	  suitable	  means.	  651	  Cf.	  with	  Recital	  28	  of	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision:	  This	  Framework	  Decision	  does	  not	  prevent	  any	   Member	   State	   from	   applying	   its	   constitutional	   rules	   relating	   to	   due	   process,	   freedom	   of	  association,	  freedom	  of	  the	  press	  and	  freedom	  of	  expression	  in	  other	  media.	  652	  P	   De	   Hert,	   K	  Weis	   and	   N	   Cloosen,	   ‘The	   Framework	   Decision	   of	   18	   December	   2008	   on	   the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  obtaining	  objects,	  documents	  and	  data	  for	  use	  in	  proceedings	  in	  criminal	  matters	  –	  a	  critical	  assessment’,	  New	  Journal	  of	  European	  Criminal	  Law,	  p	  74.	  653	  ‘This	   Framework	   Decision	   respects	   the	   fundamental	   rights	   and	   observes	   the	   principles	  recognised	   by	   Article	   6	   of	   the	   Treaty	   on	   European	   Union	   and	   reflected	   by	   the	   Charter	   of	  Fundamental	   Rights	   of	   the	   European	   Union,	   notably	   Chapter	   VI	   thereof.	   Nothing	   in	   this	  Framework	  Decision	  may	  be	   interpreted	   as	  prohibiting	   refusal	   to	   execute	   an	  EEW	  when	   there	  are	  reasons	  to	  believe,	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  objective	  elements,	  that	  the	  EEW	  has	  been	  issued	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  prosecuting	  or	  punishing	  a	  person	  on	  account	  of	  his	  or	  her	  sex,	  racial	  or	  ethnic	  origin,	  religion,	   sexual	   orientation,	   nationality,	   language	   or	   political	   opinions,	   or	   that	   the	   person’s	  position	   may	   be	   prejudiced	   for	   any	   of	   these	   reasons’.	   Recital	   27	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principle	  of	  proportionality	   lato	  sensu.654	  The	  European	  Parliament	   though	  was	  not	  satisfied	  with	  these	  guarantees.	  The	  LIBE	  Committee	  stood	  in	   favour	  of	   the	  minimum	   standards	   introduction,	   having	   proposed	   an	   amendment	   concerning	  the	  use	  of	  evidence	  and	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  defence.655	  This	  proposition	  received	  the	  same	  support	  as	  the	  Commission’s	  proposal.	  	  	  In	   Article	   18	   of	   the	   EEW	   Framework	   Decision	   there	   is	   the	   provision	   of	   legal	  remedies	   for	   any	   interested	   party	   including	   bona	   fide	   third	   parties.	   Member	  States	  must	  ensure	  that	  all	  interested	  parties	  (including	  bona	  fide	  third	  parties)	  have	   access	   to	   legal	   remedies	   against	   the	   recognition	   and	   execution	   of	   a	  warrant.656	  These	   remedies	   may	   be	   limited	   to	   cases	   where	   coercive	   measures	  are	  used.	  Although	  the	  European	  Parliament	  thought	  that	  these	  remedies	  should	  be	  available	   for	   every	   case,	   independently	  of	   it	   involving	   coercive	  measures	  or	  not,	  this	  remark	  was	  not	  retained	  by	  the	  Council.657	  The	  actions	  are	  to	  be	  brought	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  654	  ‘The	  executing	  authority	  should	  use	  the	  least	  intrusive	  means	  to	  obtain	  the	  objects,	  documents	  or	  data	  sought’.	  Recital	  12	  Preamble	  of	  the	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  EEW.	  655	  Report	  from	  the	  Committee	  on	  Civil	  Liberties,	  Justice	  and	  Home	  Affairs	  on	  the	  proposal	  for	  a	  Council	   Framework	   Decision	   on	   the	   European	   Evidence	  Warrant	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	   obtaining	  objects,	   documents	   and	   data	   for	   use	   in	   proceedings	   in	   criminal	   matters:	   ‘Subsequent	   use	   of	  evidence	  -­‐	  The	  use	  of	  the	  evidence	  acquired	  pursuant	  to	  this	  Framework	  Decision	  shall	  in	  no	  way	  prejudice	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  defence	  in	  subsequent	  criminal	  proceedings.	  These	  rights	  shall	  be	  fully	  respected,	   in	   particular	   as	   regards	   the	   admissibility	   of	   the	   evidence,	   the	   obligation	   to	   disclose	  that	   evidence	   to	   the	   defence	   and	   the	   ability	   of	   the	   defence	   to	   challenge	   that	   evidence’	  (Amendment	  32,	  Council	  draft,	  Article	  17a),	  OJ	  C	  15,	  21	  January	  2010,	  p	  107.	  656	  Article	  18:	  Legal	  remedies.	  1.	  Member	  States	  shall	  put	  in	  place	  the	  necessary	  arrangements	  to	  ensure	   that	  any	   interested	  party,	   including	  bona	   fide	   third	  parties,	  have	   legal	   remedies	  against	  the	   recog-­‐	   nition	   and	   execution	   of	   an	   EEW	   pursuant	   to	   Article	   11,	   in	   order	   to	   preserve	   their	  legitimate	  interests.	  Member	  States	  may	  limit	  the	  legal	  remedies	  provided	  for	  in	  this	  paragraph	  to	   cases	   in	   which	   the	   EEW	   is	   executed	   using	   coercive	   measures.	   The	   action	   shall	   be	   brought	  before	  a	  court	  in	  the	  executing	  State	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  law	  of	  that	  State.	  2.	  The	  substantive	  reasons	  for	  issuing	  the	  EEW,	  including	  whether	  the	  conditions	  established	  in	  Article	  7	  have	  been	  met,	  may	  be	  challenged	  only	  in	  an	  action	  brought	  before	  a	  court	  in	  the	  issuing	  State.	  The	  issuing	  State	   shall	   ensure	   the	   applicability	   of	   legal	   remedies	   which	   are	   available	   in	   a	   comparable	  domestic	   case.	   3.	   Member	   States	   shall	   ensure	   that	   any	   time	   limits	   for	   bringing	   an	   action	  mentioned	   in	   paragraphs	   1	   and	   2	   are	   applied	   in	   a	   way	   that	   guarantees	   the	   possibility	   of	   an	  effective	  legal	  remedy	  for	  interested	  parties.	  4.	  If	  the	  action	  is	  brought	  in	  the	  executing	  State,	  the	  judicial	  authority	  of	  the	  issuing	  State	  shall	  be	  informed	  thereof	  and	  of	  the	  grounds	  of	  the	  action,	  so	  that	  it	  can	  submit	  the	  arguments	  that	  it	  deems	  necessary.	  It	  shall	  be	  informed	  of	  the	  outcome	  of	   the	   action.	   5.	   The	   issuing	   and	   executing	   authorities	   shall	   take	   the	   necessary	   measures	   to	  facilitate	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  right	  to	  bring	  actions	  mentioned	  in	  paragraphs	  1	  and	  2,	  in	  particular	  by	  providing	   interested	  parties	  with	  relevant	  and	  adequate	   information.	  6.	  The	  executing	  State	  may	  suspend	  the	  transfer	  of	  objects,	  documents	  and	  data	  pending	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  legal	  remedy.	  657	  P	   De	   Hert,	   K	  Weis	   and	   N	   Cloosen,	   ‘The	   Framework	   Decision	   of	   18	   December	   2008	   on	   the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  obtaining	  objects,	  documents	  and	  data	  for	  use	  in	  proceedings	  in	  criminal	  matters	  –	  a	  critical	  assessment’,	  New	  Journal	  of	  European	  Criminal	  Law,	  p	  77.	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before	   a	   court	   in	   the	   executing	   state;	   however,	   the	   substantive	   reasons	   for	  issuing	  the	  EEW	  may	  only	  be	  brought	  before	  a	  court	  in	  the	  issuing	  state	  and	  the	  issuing	   state	   shall	   also	   ensure	   the	   applicability	   of	   legal	   remedies	   which	   are	  available	   in	   a	   comparable	   domestic	   case.	   A	   principle	   of	   assimilation	   was	   also	  adopted	   in	   terms	  of	   these	   legal	   remedies,658	  which	  was	  not	  actually	  defined	  by	  the	  member	  states.	  Probably	  its	  concept	  is	  similar	  to	  that	  of	  mutual	  recognition,	  namely	  the	  acceptance	  of	  the	  differences	  between	  national	  legal	  systems	  and	  the	  abidance	  according	  to	  them.	  It	  was	  argued	  though,	  that	  the	  issuing	  state	  should	  come	   up	   with	   special	   proceedings,	   legal	   remedies	   suitable	   to	   the	   European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  issuing	  procedure.	  	  	  There	  was	  also	  a	  lot	  of	  discussion	  about	  the	  availability	  of	  these	  legal	  remedies	  in	  both	   states.	   Should	   the	   substantive	   reasons	   of	   issuing	   a	   warrant	   be	   also	  challengeable	  in	  the	  executing	  state?	  Member	  states	  decided	  negatively	  since	  this	  handling	  would	  appear	  opposite	  to	  the	  whole	  idea	  of	  mutual	  recognition.	  Hence,	  while	   legal	  remedies	  refer	  to	  both	  the	   issuing	  and	  the	  execution	  of	  an	  evidence	  warrant,	  they	  are	  available	  only	  in	  the	  state	  where	  the	  specific	  action	  (issuing	  or	  execution)	  takes	  place.	  If	  an	  interested	  party	  wishes	  to	  challenge	  the	  substantive	  reasons	  of	   issuing	   the	  EEW	   including	   the	   conditions	   established	   in	  Article	  7,	   it	  needs	  to	  do	  that	  in	  the	  issuing	  state.	  These	  legal	  remedies	  are	  not	  available	  in	  the	  executing	  state.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  if	  the	  execution	  of	  a	  warrant	  is	  challenged	  in	  the	  executing	  state	  the	  judicial	  authority	  of	  the	  issuing	  state	  is	  informed	  about	  it	  in	   order	   to	   participate	   in	   the	   proceedings	   by	   submitting	   the	   arguments	   that	  deems	  as	  necessary.	  	  	  It	   is	  highly	   important	   that	   the	  member	  states	  do	  everything	  they	  can	  to	  ensure	  the	  effective	  use	  of	  legal	  remedies	  for	  the	  interested	  and	  bona	  fide	  third	  parties.	  As	   the	  whole	  process	  has	   transnational	  elements	   that	  would	  mean	  appropriate	  time	  limits	  for	  the	  legal	  remedies	  and	  information	  –both	  relevant	  and	  adequate–	  about	   the	   reasons	   of	   both	   issuing	   and	   execution	   of	   an	   evidence	  warrant.	   That	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  658	  ‘Each	  Member	   State	   has	   in	   its	   law	   legal	   remedies	   available	   against	   the	   substantive	   reasons	  underlying	   decisions	   for	   obtaining	   evidence,	   including	   whether	   the	   decision	   is	   necessary	   and	  proportionate,	   although	   those	   remedies	  may	   differ	   between	  Member	   States	   and	  may	   apply	   at	  different	  stages	  of	  proceedings’.	  Recital	  21	  Preamble	  of	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would	  need	  certain	  positive	  measures	  initiated	  by	  the	  national	  courts	  in	  order	  to	  facilitate	  the	  parties	  involved.	  That	  actually	  is	  a	  good	  reminder	  of	  the	  European	  Court’s	   of	   Human	   Rights	   position	   which	   has	   clarified	   that	   this	   principle	   of	  adversarial	  proceedings	  should	  be	  protected	  by	  the	  courts	  which	  are	  responsible	  of	  preserving	  and	  forwarding	  it	  on	  their	  own	  initiative	  and	  without	  leaving	  this	  burden	  to	  the	  parties	  (especially	  the	  defence).659	  	  Moreover,	   the	   suspension	   of	   transferring	   objects,	   documents	   and	   data	   is	   not	  obligatory	  for	  the	  executing	  state.660	  Therefore,	   it	   is	  possible,	  that	  the	  executing	  state	  will	  not	  respect	  the	  time	  limits	  set	  for	  the	  use	  of	  legal	  remedies	  and	  transfer	  the	   evidence.	   This	   solution	   leaves	   open	   the	   possibility	   of	   some	   problematic	  situations	  arising	   like	  when	  a	  piece	  of	  evidence	   is	   transferred	   immediately	  and	  after	   that	   a	   successful	   legal	   remedy	   follows.	   The	   same	   can	   also	   occur	  with	   an	  appeal.	   In	   the	   light	   of	   these,	   one	   should	   argue	   that	   the	   use	   of	   word	   ‘may’	   is	  unhelpful	   in	   the	   text	   of	   the	   EEW	   Framework	   Decision.	   The	   obligation	   of	  paragraph	  3	  of	  Article	  18	  for	  an	  effective	  use	  of	  legal	  remedies	  speaks	  in	  favour	  of	   a	   strictest	   interpretation	   of	   paragraph	   6,	   demanding	   an	   obligation	   by	   the	  executing	  state	  to	  suspend	  the	  transfer	  up	  to	  the	  expiration	  of	  the	  legal	  remedies	  time	  limit.	  From	  a	  practical	  point	  of	  view	  that	  creates	  other	  problems	  that	  point	  to	  the	  assertion	  that	  it	  might	  be	  wiser	  if	  the	  legal	  remedies	  were	  available	  in	  both	  issuing	  and	  executing	  states	  for	  both	  the	  issuing	  and	  the	  execution	  of	  a	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant.	  	  	  	  6.3.3.11.	  Comments	  on	  legislation	  	  	  It	   is	   obvious	   that	   various	   kinds	   of	   problems	  met	   during	   the	   whole	   process	   of	  introducing	  the	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant661	  acted	  as	  a	  compass	  towards	  certain	  amendments	   for	   future	   instruments	   of	   mutual	   recognition,	   such	   as	   the	   EEW.	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  659	  Göç	  v.	  Turkey,	  no.	  36590/97,	  ECHR	  2002-­‐V,	  133,	  §	  57;	  See	  e.g.	  Brandstetter	  v.	  Austria,	  28	  Aug	  1991,	  Series	  A	  no.	  211,	  (1993)	  15	  EHRR	  379,	  §	  67.	  660	  ‘[T]he	  executing	  State	  may	   suspend	  the	  transfer	  of	  objects,	  documents	  and	  data	  pending	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  legal	  remedy’,	  Article	  18§6	  (emphasis	  added).	  661	  See	   also	   F	   Geyer,	   ‘Case	   Note:	   European	   Arrest	   Warrant	   -­‐	   Court	   of	   Justice	   of	   the	   European	  Communities’,	  European	  Constitutional	  Law	  Review,	  vol.	  4,	  2008,	  pp	  149-­‐161.	  
 217 
Probably	   an	   apparent	   example	   of	   that	   situation	   is	   the	   handling	   of	   dual	  criminality,	   the	  verification	  of	  which	   in	   the	  Framework	  Decision	  of	   the	  EEW	   is	  abolished.	   The	   requirement	   of	   double	   criminality,	   partially	   abolished	   by	   the	  European	   Arrest	   Warrant	   (EAW)	   is	   almost	   entirely	   abolished	   here.	   Evidence	  warrants	   requiring	   search	   and	   seizure	   for	   a	   list	   of	   32	   offences	   shall	   not	   be	  subject	  to	  verification	  of	  double	  criminality	  under	  any	  circumstances.662	  The	  use	  of	   the	  strong	  wording	   is	  meant	   to	  operate	  as	  a	   shield	   to	  phenomena	  similar	   to	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  EAW.	  	  	  The	   EEW	   Framework	   Decision	   missed	   the	   view	   of	   the	   deeper	   legal	   issues,	  forwarding	  solutions	  that	  could	  bring	  –in	  their	  view–	  short	  term	  results	  until	  the	  terrain	  of	  negotiations	  is	  more	  prepared	  to	  accept	  radical	  proposals	  for	  a	  mutual	  recognition	   based	   cooperation	   in	   evidence	  matters.	   The	   problem	   is	   that	   these	  solutions	  picked	  up	  are	  not	  solutions	  at	  all,	  since	  they	  undermine	  human	  rights	  as	   well	   as	   mutual	   recognition	   principle	   in	   itself.	   The	   total	   recall	   of	   double	  criminality	  check	  and	  the	  maximum	  standards	  of	  protection	   for	   the	   individuals	  involved	   in	   the	   procedure	   are	   the	   two	   elements	   that	   will	   encourage	   stable	  mutual	   trust.	   These	   elements	   are	   in	   accord	   with	   the	   fairness	   proposed	   in	  evidence	   matters	   and	   qualify	   it	   as	   the	   factor	   that	   can	   fine-­‐tune	   mutual	  recognition	  in	  the	  sphere	  of	  criminal	  law.	  A	  positive	  aspect	  of	  the	  EEW	  which	  is	  an	  optimistic	  note	  in	  the	  whole	  picture	  is	  the	  promotion	  of	  the	  written	  reasoned	  reports	   in	  the	  process	  of	  decision	  making.	  This	   is	  a	  need	  also	  flagged	  up	  by	  the	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept	  acknowledged	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  	  The	  double	  criminality	  check	  is	  considered	  a	  foundation	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  in	  criminal	  matters	  since	  it	  makes	  its	  operation	  reasonable	  and	  substantive.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  maximum	  standards	  of	  protection	  emanate	  from	  the	  core	  values	  that	   emerge	   from	   the	   ECtHR’s	   case	   law.	   These	   standards	   are	   not	   common,	   as	  they	  are	  not	   imposed	  by	  any	  other	   legislative	   instrument,	  but	  are	  shared,	  since	  they	  appear	  more	  or	  less	  in	  the	  legal	  traditions	  of	  the	  member	  states.	  Therefore,	  they	   can	   act	   as	   a	   compass	   for	   the	   embracing	   of	   the	   highest	   denominator	   of	  protection,	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  comparing	  two	  different	  legal	  orders	  while	  issuing	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  662	  Art	  14§2	  (list	  of	  offences	  not	  subject	  to	  double	  criminality	  verification).	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and	  executing	  a	  given	  EEW.	  This	  in	  concreto	  exercise	  can	  be	  the	  next	  step	  in	  the	  pursuit	   of	   adopting	   standards	   that	   the	  member	   states	   share,	   before	   the	   formal	  adoption	  of	  the	  highest	  standards	  that	  a	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept	  implies.	  The	  problem	  is	   that	   the	  member	  states	  do	  not	  move	   in	   this	  direction.	  Far	   from	  that,	   they	   are	   interested	   in	   furthering	   cooperation	   that	   operates	   in	   empty	  declarations	  that	  lack	  the	  legal	  substance	  of	  the	  safeguards	  necessary	  for	  human	  rights.	  The	  proof	  for	  that	  is	  the	  new	  draft	  for	  a	  European	  Investigation	  Order.	  
	  
	  
6.3.4.	  In	  the	  light	  of	  fairness	  
	  Useful	  conclusions	  can	  be	  made	  by	  the	  above	  overview	  analysing	  its	  provisions	  in	  the	  light	  of	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  in	  Europe	  as	  it	  is	  formed	  within	  the	  context	  of	  ECHR	  and	   the	  Council	  of	  Europe.	  The	  evaluation	   that	   follows	   focuses	  on	   the	  four	  principles	  of	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  derived	  from	  ECHR	  in	  the	  first	  part	  and	  the	  critical	  analysis	  is	  presented	  here	  through	  their	  lens.	  	  About	  the	  abolition	  of	  dual	  criminality	  it	  should	  be	  said	  that,	  right	  at	  the	  heart	  of	  evidentiary	  fairness	  lays	  the	  triangularly	  amended	  adversarialism	  that	  demands	  a	   well-­‐functioning	   of	   the	   three-­‐party	   interaction	   between	   the	   judge	   and	   the	  parties	   during	   the	   management	   of	   evidence.	   An	   accused	   who	   can	   not	   know	  exactly	  which	  law	  applies	  in	  which	  forum	  for	  a	  given	  action	  –not	  also	  being	  sure	  if	   this	   is	  punishable	  or	  not–	  can	  not	   join/participate	   in	  an	  equal	  manner	   in	   the	  investigation	   or	   trial	   and	   also	   in	   the	   generation,	   collection,	   organisation,	  presentation	   and	   evaluation	   of	   any	   information	   regarding	   the	   accusation,	   the	  case	  against	  him.	  Adversarial	  proceedings	  in	  their	  core	  are	  severely	  undermined	  this	  way.	  In	  a	  case	  in	  which	  double	  criminality	  is	  banished,	  there	  would	  certainly	  be	  evidence	  confrontation	  with	   the	  accused	  absent	  or	   inadequate	   to	   follow	   the	  speedy	  transnational	  proceedings	  that	  create	  legal	   insecurity.	  The	  same	  applies	  to	  equal	  opportunities	  principle.	   It	  would	  not	  be	  an	  exaggeration	  to	  say	  that	  an	  accused	   in	   a	   situation	   like	   that	   is	   not	   only	   deprived	   of	   his	   right	   to	   equal	  opportunities	  during	  the	  proceedings	  and	  to	  follow	  them	  in	  an	  adversarial	  way	  towards	  evidence,	  but	  he	  also	  might	  miss	  the	  clear	  view	  of	  the	  third	  angle	  of	  the	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triangle	  namely	  the	  judge,	  since	  without	  knowing	  the	  law	  applied	  could	  not	  also	  foresee	   the	   exact	   accusation,	   judgment	   or	   penalty	   against	   him	   and	   therefore	  prepare	  for	  defence.	  	  As	   far	  as	   the	  procedural	  safeguards663	  with	  regard	  to	   the	   interested	  parties	  are	  concerned,	  the	  solution	  –or	  better	  non-­‐solution–	  that	  the	  member	  states	  upheld	  raises	   a	   couple	   of	   interrelated	   issues	   with	   respect	   to	   the	   modified	   version	   of	  adversarial	  proceedings	  presented	   in	   the	   first	  part	  of	   this	   thesis,	   that	  demands	  equal	  opportunities	  for	  the	  parties	  so	  that	  the	  management	  of	  evidence	  provides	  better	   outcomes	   in	   terms	   of	   quality	   and	   foremost	   fairness.	   Human	   rights	   in	  criminal	   matters	   are	   not	   just	   conceived	   in	   a	   negative	   way	   rendering	   passive	  protection	  to	  the	  accused	  person	  involved	  in	  the	  proceedings.	  This	  face	  of	  rights	  aims	  in	  particular	  at	  the	  minimisation	  if	  not	  obliteration	  of	  unwanted	  surprises	  for	  the	  accused	  during	  trial	  and	  pre-­‐trial	  proceedings.	  There	  is	  also	  the	  flip	  side	  of	   it	   that	  enables	  equal	  opportunities	  during	  the	  criminal	  procedure,	  which	  is	  a	  positive	  expression	  of	  rights	  equipping	  and	  strengthening	  the	  defence’s	  armour.	  Only	   by	   holding	   together	   these	   two	   aspects	   one	   can	   actually	   speak	   of	   a	   full	  protection	  to	  every	  citizen	  that	  might	  get	  involved	  in	  criminal	  proceedings.	  	  It	   should	   be	   reminded	   though,	   that	   a	   literal	   equality	   of	   arms	   is	   one	   way	   or	  another	   impossible	   in	   criminal	   proceedings.	   On	   the	   contrary,	   the	   inequality	  between	  prosecution	  authorities	  and	  the	  accused	  is	  a	  typical	  element	  of	  criminal	  process.	  The	  potential	  consequence	  of	  the	  dock	  puts	  automatically	  every	  accused	  person	   in	   a	   disadvantageous	   position.	   The	   attack	   against	   his	   or	   her	  moral	   and	  social	   status	   and	   the	   torment	   experienced	   by	   the	   accused,	   put	   next	   to	   the	  prestige	  of	  a	  state	  authority	  as	  the	  prosecution,	  that	  has	  at	  disposal	  the	  crushing	  power	  of	   state	  mechanisms	  and	   the	  police	   in	  particular,	  draws	   the	  unbalanced	  scenery.	  Nonetheless,	  this	  does	  not	  mean	  there	  must	  not	  be	  made	  utmost	  effort	  so	   that	   the	   ultima	   ratio	   of	   the	   criminal	   process	   (i.e.	   the	   protection	   of	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  663	  See	   also	   C	   Brants,	   ‘Procedural	   safeguards	   in	   the	   European	   Union:	   Too	   little,	   too	   late?’	   in	  
European	   Evidence	   Warrant	   –	   Transnational	   Judicial	   Inquiries	   in	   the	   EU,	   J.A.E.	   Vervaele	   (ed.),	  Intersentia,	  2005,	  p	  103.	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citizen)664	  isn’t	   reduced	   to	  mere	  wishful	   thinking.	  Hence,	   it	   is	  more	  accurate	   to	  speak	  of	  equality	  of	  opportunities	  rather	  than	  of	  equality	  of	  arms.	  	  This	  means	   that	   the	  defence	  does	  not	  only	  need	   the	   full	  protection	  of	   rights	   in	  order	  to	  enjoy	  the	  possibility	  of	  equal	  opportunities,	  but	  also	  their	  unambiguous	  expression	   in	   the	   legislative	   instruments	   dealing	  with	   such	   issues,	   such	   as	   the	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant.	  There	  is	  another	  major	  reason	  why	  it	  is	  so.	  When	  a	  European	  evidence	  warrant	  is	  issued	  there	  are	  two	  additional	  elements	  into	  play	  that	  can	  make	  the	  defence’s	  side	  even	  weaker.	  	  The	   first	   is	   the	   mobilisation	   of	   not	   just	   one	   but	   two	   combating	   crime	   state	  mechanisms.	  The	  cooperation	  that	  can	  be	  achieved	  through	  the	  means	  that	   the	  Framework	  Decision	  furnishes	  is	  not	  a	  simple	  accumulation	  of	  two	  prosecutorial	  judicial	  systems	  versus	  an	  injured	  citizen.	  It	  is	  qualitatively	  something	  different.	  The	  reason	  for	  this	  is	  that	  the	  tools	  that	  the	  issuing	  and	  the	  executing	  authorities	  have	   at	   their	   disposal	   are	   not	   equally	   or	   similarly	   offered	   to	   the	   defence.	   The	  second	  is	  that	  through	  the	  abolition	  of	  double	  criminality	  check	  and	  the	   lack	  of	  upholding	  any	  standards	  of	  protection,	  the	  surprises	  and	  unfair	  situations	  for	  the	  individuals	   involved	  can	  multiply.	  Additionally,	   the	  different	  procedures	  of	   two	  
fora	  in	  cooperation	  that	  are	  not	  sharply	  outlined	  in	  the	  legislative	  text	  darken	  the	  whole	   picture	   making	   legal	   certainty	   rather	   impossible.	   For	   this	   reason	   the	  choice	  of	  the	  member	  states	  to	  leave	  in	  Article	  1§3	  the	  only	  human	  rights	  clause	  in	  the	  main	  body	  of	  the	  Framework	  Decision	  is	  rather	  unfortunate.	  	  
	  Furthermore,	  moving	  the	  discussion	  into	  procedural	  safeguards,	  the	  wording	  of	  Article	   12	   of	   the	   EEW	   Framework	   Decision	   could	   have	   been	   clearer	   and	  therefore	   more	   explicit.	   It	   is	   true	   that	   the	   same	   investigative	   measures	   and	  actions	  are	   conducted	   in	  different	  ways	  among	   the	  member	   states.	   It	   is	   crucial	  therefore	   that	   the	   executing	   authorities	   follow	   the	   formalities	   and	   procedures	  that	   occur	   to	   the	   issuing	   state	   during	   obtaining	   documents,	   evidence	   or	   data.	  This	   could	   solve	   the	   problem	   of	   admissibility	   of	   evidence	   in	   the	   issuing	   state	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  664	  See	   also	   S	   Trechsel,	   ‘Liberty	   and	   Security	   of	   Person’	   in	   RSJ	   MacDonald,	   F	   Matscher	   and	   H	  Petzold	   (eds),	   The	   European	   System	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   Human	   Rights	   (Dordrecht,	   Martinus	  Nijhoff,	  1993).	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making	  partially	  the	  obtained	  evidence	  legal,	  obtained	  in	  a	  lawful	  way.	  The	  total	  legitimacy	  of	   the	  act	  of	   the	  obtainment	   though	  could	  not	  be	  claimed	  unless	   the	  measure	  of	   investigation	   is	   also	   lawful	   for	   the	   executing	   state.	  And	   this	   can	  be	  argued	  for	  two	  reasons.	  First	  of	  all,	  the	  integrity	  of	  the	  legal	  order	  of	  the	  issuing	  state	   would	   be	   wounded	   if	   its	   courts	   accepted	   evidenced	   that	   although	  admissible	  according	  to	  national	  law,	  carried	  the	  label	  of	  inadmissible	  or	  illegally	  obtained	   according	   to	   the	   law	   of	   the	   executing	   state.	   This	   kind	   of	   moral	  mirroring	  of	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  evidence	  cannot	  be	  easily	  bypassed.	  Furthermore,	  the	  executing	  state	  cannot	  comply	  with	  measures	   (procedures	  and	   formalities)	  imposed	  by	  the	  issuing	  state	  so	  that	  the	  evidence	  can	  be	  admissible	  at	  all	  costs	  in	  the	  forum.	  But	  is	  this	  really	  the	  case?	  	  Article	  12	  explicitly	  mentions	  that	  it	  does	  not	  create	  any	  obligation	  of	  taking	  any	  measures	  of	  coercion.	  This	  statement	   is	  really	  helpful	  and	  to	  the	  point.	   It	   is	  the	  safeguard	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  make	  the	  evidence	  obtained	  also	  admissible	  in	  the	  courts	   of	   the	   executing	   the	  warrant	   state,	   if	   a	   similar	   case	  were	   to	   be	   brought	  there	   in	   a	   court	   of	   law.	   This	   is	   really	   important	   because	   it	   establishes	   the	  certainty	   that	   human	   rights	   involved	   will	   be	   protected	   as	   well	   as	   the	   general	  principles	   of	   EU	   law.	   It	   would	   be	   difficult	   to	   happen	   otherwise	   really.	   The	  provision	   of	   Article	   12	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   law	   of	   the	   issuing	   state	   has	   no	   other	  rationale	   than	   the	   maximum	   protection	   of	   the	   citizen.	   However,	   this	   is	   not	  explicitly	   stated	   and	   this	   obscures	   things.	  What	   is	   the	   point	   of	   respecting	   and	  following	   the	   formalities	   and	   procedures	   of	   a	   member	   state	   that	   issues	   an	  evidence	  warrant	   executed	   in	  another	  member	   state	   that	  will	   lawfully	   conduct	  all	   the	   relevant	   criminal	   proceedings?	   It	   is	   actually	   the	   difference	   of	   the	  proceedings	   from	   state	   to	   state.	   But	   could	   it	   really	   be	   that	   the	   respect	   for	   the	  foreign	  standards	  endangers	   the	   investigative	  measures	   from	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	   the	   national	   law	   of	   the	   executing	   state?	   In	   the	   light	   of	   the	   last	   sentence	   of	  Article	   12	   the	   answer	   is	   absolutely	   not!	   That	   makes	   the	   reference	   to	   the	  fundamental	  principles	  of	   law	  of	   the	  executing	  state	  obscure	  and	  obsolete.	   It	   is	  not	  needed.	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This	  is	  obviously	  an	  a	  maiore	  ad	  minus	  argument.	  The	  respect	  of	  formalities	  and	  procedures	   of	   the	   issuing	   state	   come	   to	   add	   to	   the	   already	   lawful	   (for	   the	  executing	  state)	  investigative	  measure	  some	  extra	  safeguards	  that	  will	  make	  this	  action	  also	  lawful	  for	  the	  issuing	  state.	  If	  this	  rule	  does	  not	  create	  any	  obligation	  for	   coercion	   then	   it	   is	   impossible	   to	   see	   how	   a	   provision	   in	   favour	   of	   human	  rights	  can	  actually	  in	  any	  given	  circumstance	  work	  against	  them.	  	  The	  formalities	  that	  are	  to	  be	  followed	  in	  the	  executing	  state	  do	  not	  thoroughly	  solve	   the	   issue	   of	   mutual	   admissibility 665 	  but	   they	   do	   more	   than	   they	  immediately	  appear	  to	  do.	  They	  present	  a	  sound	  answer	  to	  the	  question	  of	  how	  evidence	  obtained	   in	   the	   executing	   state	   can	  be	   admissible	   in	   the	   issuing	   state	  and	   they	   also	   point	   to	   a	   total	   and	   complete	   solution	   of	   the	   whole	   issue.	   The	  unfortunate	   aspect	   of	   all	   this	   is	   that	   Article	   12	   lacks	   internal	   coherence	   and	  actually	  obscures	  things.	  It	  misses	  out	  the	  systematic	  approach	  of	  the	  subject.	  It	  makes	  the	  instrument	  more	  political	  rather	  than	  legal.	  Indeed,	  at	  stake	  here	  are	  the	   rights	  of	   the	   individuals	   involved	   in	  a	   criminal	  process,	   in	  which	  a	  piece	  of	  evidence	  relates	  to	  them.	  The	  way	  the	  article	  is	  set	  seems	  to	  reassure	  more	  the	  states	   participating	   in	   the	   negotiations	   rather	   than	   stating	   clearly	   the	   legal	  issues.	  Even	   from	   that	  point	  of	  view	  here	  at	   stake	   is	  not	   the	  protection	  –if	  one	  could	   speak	   in	   that	   kind	   of	   terms–	   of	   the	   state	   sovereignty.	   The	   a	  maiore	   ad	  
minus	  argument	  and	  the	  deeper	  rationale	  of	  the	  article	  imply	  differently.	  It	  is	  not	  about	  the	  protection	  of	  state	  sovereignty.	  It	  is	  about	  the	  protection	  of	  individual	  freedom;	  of	  a	  meaningful	  European	  citizenship.	  In	  fact,	  even	  this	  concept	  of	  state	  sovereignty	   if	   it	   does	   not	   function	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   people	   is	  empty	  of	  content.	  As	  long	  as	  the	  issues	  that	  relate	  to	  the	  European	  Criminal	  Law	  are	  not	  tackled	  in	  a	  pure	  legal	  manner	  that	  respects	  the	  principles	  of	  the	  different	  systems	  within	  the	  continent,	  phenomena	  of	  legislative	  instruments	  like	  the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision	  will	  continue	  to	  emerge.	  Political	  agendas	  trigger	  legislative	  initiatives	  but	  it	  is	  unfortunate	  to	  see	  the	  latter	  offering	  practical	  solutions	  to	  real	  problems,	  but	  lacking	  the	  legal	  certainty	  needed,	  while	  focusing	  more	  on	  serving	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  665	  The	  problem	  of	  mutual	  admissibility	  was	  not	  addressed	  by	  the	  Commission	  in	  its	  proposal	  for	  the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision.	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as	   political	   platforms	   of	   negotiations	   rather	   than	   coherent	   legal	   systems	   of	  thought.	  	  	  The	   wording	   of	   the	   article	   in	   discussion	   fails	   to	   make	   a	   greater	   step	   into	  something	  profound	  and	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept.	  What	   actually	   Article	   12	   inaugurates	   by	   stating	   that	   the	   procedures	   and	  formalities	   of	   the	   issuing	   state	   shall	   be	   respected	   in	   the	   executing	   state	   is	   the	  maximum	   standards	   of	   protection	   that	   are	   desirable	   for	   a	   fairer	   application	   of	  the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  in	  terms	  of	  evidence	  law.	  If	  an	  investigative	  measure	  of	  search	  for	  example	  has	  fewer	  conditions	  in	  the	  executing	  state	  than	  in	  the	  issuing	  state,	  then	  the	  additional	  conditions	  (procedures	  or	  formalities)	  of	  the	   issuing	   state	   will	   be	   applied.	   That	   will	   not	   have	   any	   effect	   for	   the	   legal	  certainty	   principle	   since	   the	   citizen	   of	   the	   executing	   state	  will	   participate	   in	   a	  process	   that	   is	  more	   favourable	   towards	   him.666	  In	   other	  words,	   any	   surprises	  will	  be	  welcomed.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	   if	  an	   investigative	  measure	  of	  search	  has	  lower	  standards	  of	  protection	  for	  human	  rights	  in	  the	  issuing	  state,	  then	  there	  is	  no	  procedure	  or	  formality	  to	  be	  followed	  in	  the	  executing	  state,	  the	  authorities	  of	  which	  will	  carry	  out	  the	  law	  enforcement	  action	  according	  to	  the	  national	  higher	  standards	  of	  protection.	  The	  issuing	  state	  will	  not	  face	  any	  problem	  of	  admitting	  the	  evidence	  obtained	  in	  any	  criminal	  trial	  or	  procedure	  in	  the	  forum,	  since	  this	  will	  be	  qualitatively	  more	  than	  the	  issuing	  authorities	  would	  have	  expected.	  But	  all	   this	   is	   actually	  a	  very	  practical	   application	  of	   the	  demand	   for	   the	  maximum	  available	  protection	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  accused	  in	  criminal	  proceedings!	  By	  not	  making	   it	   explicitly	   clear,	   the	   EEW	   Framework	   Decision	   missed	   out	   a	   unique	  opportunity	   to	   clear	   up	   the	   fog	   of	   political	   negotiations	   and	   law	   enforcement	  expediencies	  of	  combating	  crime	  at	  all	  costs.	  	  	  Here	   another	   related	   aspect	   needs	   to	   be	   addressed.	   The	   real	   problem	   of	  admissibility	  in	  the	  picture	  drawn	  by	  the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision	  has	  nothing	  to	   do	   with	   the	   legal	   circumstances	   around	   Article	   12.	   A	   greater	   issue	   of	  admissibility	  relates	  to	  the	  evidence	  that	  is	  directly	  available;	  namely	  already	  in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  666	  A	  Smeulers,	  ‘The	  position	  of	  the	  individual	  in	  international	  criminal	  cooperation’,	  in	  European	  
Evidence	  Warrant	   –	   Transnational	   Judicial	   Inquiries	   in	   the	   EU,	   J.A.E.	   Vervaele	   (ed.),	   Intersentia,	  2005,	  p	  79	  et	  seq.,	  especially	  84.	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possession	  by	  the	  executing	  state.	  If	  the	  possibility	  of	  illegally	  obtained	  evidence	  is	   excluded,	  when	   the	   formalities	   or	   procedures	   of	   the	   issuing	   state	   are	   fewer	  than	  those	  of	  the	  executing	  state	  then	  there	  is	  not	  a	  problem.	  But	  in	  the	  opposite	  situation	  where	   the	   standards	  of	  protection	  are	  higher	   in	   the	   issuing	   state	  and	  the	   evidence	   is	   directly	   available	   in	   the	   executing	   state,	   there	   is	   an	   apparent	  problem	   of	   evidence	   available	   but	   possibly	   inadmissible	   in	   the	   forum.	   This	  problem	  is	   left	  unanswered	  by	  the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision,	  which	  only	  deals	  with	  situations	  in	  which	  some	  action	  is	  needed	  for	  the	  execution	  of	  a	  warrant.	  	  Moreover,	   the	   EEW	   Framework	   Decision	   establishes	   an	   obligation	   of	   the	  executing	  authorities	  to	  inform667	  the	  issuing	  state	  whenever	  there	  is	  a	  problem	  with	   the	   compliance	   to	   the	   formalities	   and	   procedures	   that	   the	   law	   of	   issuing	  state	  provisions.	  From	  the	  details	  put	  in	  Article	  17	  one	  can	  see	  that	  the	  rationale	  here	  is	  the	  establishing	  of	  the	  highest	  possible	  cooperation	  and	  communication	  between	  executing	  and	   issuing	  authorities	   so	   that	   the	  evidence	  can	  be	   fair	  and	  admissible.	   Presumption	   of	   innocence	   elevates	   the	   defendant’s	   role	   in	   the	  proceedings	  and	  that	  needs	  to	  inform	  the	  whole	  criminal	  process.	  
	  Reasoned	   judgments	   speak	   in	   favour	   of	   transparent	   processes.	   Imagine	   how	  efficient	  criminal	  trials	  would	  be	  in	  the	  case	  of	  criminal	  processes	  in	  which	  every	  participant	  will	  know	  when,	  how	  and	  why	  a	  decision	  was	  made.	  The	  abolition	  of	  the	   double	   criminality	   clause	   combined	   with	   the	   forwarding	   of	   the	   mutual	  recognition	   principle	   can	   lead	   to	   a	   serious	   damaging	   of	   basic	   principles	   of	   the	  rule	  of	   law	  and	  hence	  of	   the	  general	  principles	  of	  EU	   law.	  Needless	   to	  say,	   this	  will	   certainly	   have	   an	   impact	   on	   fairness	   in	   relation	   to	   evidence.	   The	   same	  problems	  arose	  with	   the	  adoption	  of	   the	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant	  Framework	  Decision.	  Mutual	  recognition	  is	  built	  on	  mutual	  trust	  as	  already	  suggested.	  Since	  harmonisation	  of	  national	  legislations	  is	  still	  something	  far-­‐fetched	  the	  solution	  is	  not	  found	  in	  sweeping	  the	  dirt	  under	  the	  carpet	  by	  forcing	  mutual	  recognition	  where	   there	   is	   lack	  of	   legal	  basis	   respecting	   the	  very	  EU	   legal	  order.	  The	   issue	  raised	  here	  has	  less	  to	  do	  with	  the	  fear	  of	  national	  states	  losing	  their	  sovereignty.	  It	  is	  not	  a	  discourse	  about	  national	  sovereignty	  versus	  EU	  superiority;	  it	  is	  not	  a	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  Decision.	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legal	   orders	   conflict	   question.	   It	   is	   about	   the	   integrity	   of	   a	   sole	   system;	   that	   of	  European	  Union	  Law.	  Foremost	  it	  is	  a	  legal	  issue	  about	  rights	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  European	  citizen	  in	  a	  united	  Europe.	  	  Indeed,	   as	   it	   occurs	   with	   the	   Framework	   Decision	   for	   the	   European	   Arrest	  Warrant	  up	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  its	  rules	  are	  combined	  with	  the	  double	  criminality	  abolition,	  there	  is	  not	  only	  legal	  uncertainty	  that	  is	  created	  and	  the	  protection	  of	  legitimate	  expectations	  that	  is	  injured.	  The	  principle	  nullum	  crimen,	  nulla	  poena	  
sine	  lege	  is	  openly	  violated,	  since,	  when	  a	  warrant	  refers	  to	  an	  offence	  for	  which	  the	   double	   criminality	   verification	   does	   not	   apply,	   the	   executing	   state	   can	  actually	   assist	   to	   the	   punishment	   of	   an	   action	   committed	   in	   its	   territory	   that	  according	   to	   its	   internal	   law	   is	  not	  prohibited!	  Namely,	   an	   imaginative	   suspect	  prosecuted	   by	   an	   issuing	   state	   for	   an	   action	   committed	   in	   the	   territory	   of	   the	  executing	   state	   should	  be	   surrendered,	  whereas	   another	  who	   is	   prosecuted	  by	  the	   judicial	   authorities	   of	   the	   same	   state	   without	   the	   interference	   of	   another	  state	  (issuing	  a	  warrant)	  should	  be	  released.	  In	  this	  way	  the	  principle	  of	  equality	  is	  also	  violated,	  since	  for	  the	  same	  action	  that	  is	  committed	  (legitimately)	  in	  the	  same	  state,	  an	  individual	  will	  be	  punished	  according	  to	  EU	  legislation	  (i.e.	  EAW	  Framework	  Decision)	  and	  another	  one	  will	  be	  set	  free.668	  	  Moreover,	  the	  elements	  of	  an	  offence	  are	  every	  time	  determined	  by	  the	  national	  legislation	   of	   the	   EU	   member	   state	   with	   the	   strictest	   law.	   This	   results	   in	   the	  substantial	  imposition	  of	  the	  severest	  legislation	  of	  a	  member	  state	  to	  all	  others,	  at	   least	   for	   the	   list	   of	   the	   32	   offences	   that	   are	   excluded	   from	   the	   double	  criminality	  principle.	   Consequently,	   the	  outcome	   is	   inequality,	   since	   the	   citizen	  who	  committed	  an	  action	  in	  the	  executing	  state	  and	  is	  arrested	  in	  the	  executing	  state,	  he	  will	  not	  be	  prosecuted,	  whereas	  the	  one	  who	  commits	  the	  same	  action	  in	   the	   issuing	   state	  will	   be	   prosecuted	   and	   the	   executing	   state	   should	   transfer	  him.	  The	   inequality	   can	  be	   also	  more	   striking	   in	   the	   case	  where	   the	   action	   for	  which	  the	  execution	  of	  an	  arrest	  warrant	  is	  requested	  has	  been	  committed	  in	  the	  executing	  state	  and	  the	  issuing	  state	  has	  extended	  its	  criminal	  law	  enforcement	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  668	  See	   also	   C	   Mylonopoulos,	   ‘Internationalisierung	   des	   Strafrechts	   und	   Strafrechtsdogmatik’,	  
ZStW	  2009,	  72.	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powers	  according	  to	  the	  universality	  principle	  or	  universal	  jurisdiction	  (namely	  again	  irrespectively	  of	  whether	  this	  action	  is	  punishable	  according	  to	  the	  law	  of	  the	   land	  where	   the	  action	   is	   committed).	  Therefore,	   for	   the	  avoidance	  of	   these	  
absurda,	   the	   clearer	   framework	   of	   the	   actions/offences	   for	   which	   the	   double	  criminality	  does	  not	  apply	  is	  not	  enough;	  the	  proper	  solution	  is	  the	  recall	  of	  the	  double	   criminality	   check,	   as	   long	   as	   the	   harmonisation	   road	   is	   still	   long	   and	  winding.	  	  	  The	  problems	  unfortunately	  do	  not	  end	  with	  the	  arrest	  warrant.	  The	  principles	  of	  EU	  law	  can	  be	  further	  violated	  with	  respect	  to	   law	  enforcement	  measures	  of	  coercion	  against	  a	  prosecuted	  person	  for	  actions	  that	  are	  not	  punishable	   in	  the	  state	   which	   legally	   assist	   another.669	  In	   addition,	   it	   can	   also	   be	   the	   case	   that	  evidentiary	   material,	   which	   is	   properly	   obtained	   in	   the	   executing	   state	   but	  illegally	  obtained	   for	   the	   forum	  state	  can	  be	  admissible	  as	   legally	  obtained	   in	  a	  criminal	   process.	   These	   examples	   raise	  many	   issues	   not	   only	   in	   relation	   to	   EU	  law	  principles	  but	  also	  as	  regards	  generally	  acceptable	  principles	  of	  criminal	  law	  and	  criminal	  procedure	  in	  the	  European	  states.	  	  All	   these	   can	   create	   phenomena	   that	   are	   hardly	   consistent	   with	   the	   EU	   legal	  order.	   For	   example,	   in	   relation	   to	   an	   action	   committed	   by	   more	   than	   one	  perpetrators,	  it	  could	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  same	  piece	  of	  evidence	  obtained	  with	  the	  same	  investigative	  measure	  for	  all	  the	  perpetrators	  would	  not	  be	  admissible	  for	  the	  perpetrator	  with	  regard	  to	  whom	  it	  was	  obtained	  in	  the	  issuing	  state,	  if	  it	  is	   regarded	   as	   illegally	   obtained	   for	   the	   issuing	   state,	   whereas	   it	   could	   be	  admissible	   for	   another	   perpetrator	  with	   regard	   to	  whom	   it	   was	   obtained	   in	   a	  member	  state,	  where	  the	  obtainment	  is	  regarded	  as	  legal.	  Similarly,	  the	  adoption	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  without	  the	  principle	  of	  double	  criminality	  can	  also	  make	  possible	  the	  imposition	  of	  a	  financial	  penalty	  against	  a	  person	  for	  an	  action	  that	  in	  the	  executing	  state	  is	  not	  punishable,	  while	  the	  same	  also	  applies	  in	  the	  case	  of	  a	  penalty	  of	  the	  like	  against	  a	  legal	  person	  in	  a	  state	  where	  the	  criminal	  liability	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  669	  See	   G	   Triantafyllou,	   International	   Legal	   Assistance	   in	   Criminal	   Evidence,	   2009,	   p	   191	   and	   B	  Schünemann,	  ZRP	  2003,	  p	  189.	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of	   legal	  person	  is	  an	  unknown	  concept.670	  This	  way	  the	  principle	  nullum	  crimen	  
nulla	  poena	  sine	  lege	  is	  violated.	  	  As	   far	   as	   evidential	   fairness	   is	   concerned	   the	   question	   of	   proportionality	   is	  answered	   by	   the	   principle	   of	   humane	   treatment	   and	   consequently	   of	   the	  requirement	  that	  evidence	  should	  be	  conditioned	  in	  a	  humane	  way.	  Although	  the	  ECtHR	   has	   not	   dealt	   in	   an	   open	   manner	   with	   the	   admissibility	   of	   improperly	  obtained	   evidence	   its	   judgments	   on	   entrapment,	   right	   to	   silence	   and	   privilege	  against	   self-­‐incrimination	   light	   the	  way	   to	   a	   principle	   that	   embodies	   a	   kind	   of	  liberal	   maxim.	   The	   intention	   of	   the	   ECtHR	   is	   to	   offer	   the	   accused	   protection	  against	   improper	   compulsion	   by	   the	   authorities	   thereby	   contributing	   to	   the	  avoidance	  of	  miscarriages	  of	   justice	  and	   to	   the	   fulfilment	  of	   the	  aims	  of	  Article	  6.671 	  Here	   a	   line	   is	   drawn	   where	   minimum	   state	   intervention	   and	   citizen	  participation	  in	  criminal	  matters	  is	  sought.	  	  	  The	   issuing	   state	   should	   seek	   the	   objects,	   documents	   or	   data	   that	   respect	   the	  minimum	   state	   intervention	   principle.	   Any	   expediency	   should	   be	   left	   out	   in	  favour	  of	  fairness.	  It	  is	  not	  just	  that	  the	  measures	  against	  any	  person	  involved	  in	  a	  criminal	  process	  should	  be	  proportionate	  to	  the	  purpose,	  but	  they	  also	  should	  respect	  the	  will	  of	  the	  individual.	  This	  is	  the	  aim	  of	  the	  call	  to	  evidence	  humanely	  conditioned.	   It	   aims	  at	  preserving	   the	   role	  of	   the	  accused	  as	  an	  active	  agent	  of	  every	  action	  towards	  evidence.	  It	  is	  only	  by	  this,	  that	  the	  accused	  is	  qualified	  as	  a	  subject	   of	   the	   proceedings	   participating	   in	   a	   way	   that	   qualifies	   the	   triangular	  adversarial	   examination	   of	   evidence	   and	   thus	   adds	   to	   the	   quality	   of	   the	  evidentiary	  material.	  	  	  For	  practical	  reasons,	   the	  condition	  of	  proportionality	   is	  not	  added	  as	  a	  reason	  for	  non-­‐execution	  or	  non-­‐recognition.	  It	  is	  the	  responsibility	  of	  the	  issuing	  state	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  670	  This	  is	  the	  case	  in	  the	  Council	  Framework	  Decision	  2005/214/JHA	  of	  24	  February	  2005	  on	  the	  application	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  to	  financial	  penalties,	  Article	  9§3:	   ‘A	  financial	  penalty	   imposed	   on	   a	   legal	   person	   shall	   be	   enforced	   even	   if	   the	   executing	   State	   does	   not	  recognise	  the	  principle	  of	  criminal	  liability	  of	  legal	  persons’.	  See	  also	  M	  Kaiafa-­‐Gbandi	  ZIS	  2006,	  530.	  671	  Saunders	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	   no.	  19187/91,	  17	  Dec	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐VI,	   2044,	   (1997)	  23	  EHRR	  313,	  §	  68.	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to	   ensure	   that	   the	   conditions	   of	   Article	   7	   are	   fulfilled.672	  It	   would	   be	   highly	  impractical	  for	  the	  executing	  state	  to	  seek	  extra	  information	  in	  order	  to	  examine	  the	  issue	  of	  proportionality	  in	  the	  state	  of	  issuing	  the	  warrant.673	  	  In	   addition,	   however	   inconsistent	   this	   concept	  of	   territoriality	  with	   the	   idea	  of	  mutual	   recognition	   seems	   to	  be,	   it	   is	   actually	  not	   at	   all.	  With	   this	   clause,	   some	  would	  say	  that	  the	  member	  states	  express	  their	  reluctance	  to	  trust	  one	  another	  and	   banish	   any	   territoriality	   ground	   of	   refusal.	   A	   consistent	   view	   of	   judicial	  cooperation	   in	   criminal	   matters	   though,	   and	   also	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   and	  fairness	   would	   require	   such	   a	   clause.	   The	   ultima	   ratio	   of	   transnational	   law	  enforcement	  is	   indeed	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  citizen.	  European	  citizens	  are	  to	  be	  protected	  from	  law	  enforcement	  and	  apparently	  crime	  itself.	  For	  this	  to	  happen,	  mutual	   recognition	   should	   be	   built	   on	   substantial	   mutual	   trust,	   not	   on	   some	  political	   expediency	   forwarding	   an	   agenda	   that	   has	   not	   legal	   solid	   basis.	  Transnational	   crime	   cannot	   be	   stopped	   by	   transnational	   law	   enforcement	   or	  judicial	  decisions	  that	  move	  freely	   in	  a	  borderless	  Europe	  without	  standards	   in	  favour	   of	   the	   citizens.	   Mutual	   recognition	   does	   not	   happen	   in	   a	   vacuum	   of	  legislation	   but	   in	   a	   system	   where	   the	   principle	   of	   the	   rule	   of	   law	   practically	  exists.	  	  	  For	  an	   imaginative	  European	  citizen	  A1	  who	   is	   suspect	   for	  a	  crime	  A2,	   it	   is	   far	  more	  better	  to	  be	  prosecuted	  in	  a	  forum	  A3,	  where	  actually	  ‘a	  major	  or	  essential	  part	  of	  the	  offence	  was	  committed’	  rather	  than	  in	  B3,	  another	  forum	  state,	  which	  demands	   the	  execution	  of	   an	  EEW	  against	  her.	  This	   clause	  does	  not	   reveal	   the	  hesitancy	   of	   the	   member	   states	   towards	   European	   integration,	   but	   it	   is	   a	  measure	   in	   favour	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   more	   concretely	   of	   the	   rights	   of	   the	  defendant.	  Article	  13§1f	  of	  the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision	  is	   in	  accordance	  with	  the	   ECHR	   and	   the	   Article	   6	   provisions	   for	   a	   fair	   trial.	   Anyone	   charged	   with	   a	  criminal	  offence	  has	  the	  right	  not	  to	  be	  taken	  by	  surprise.	  This	   is	  supported	  by	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  Documents	  11965/2/05	  of	  7/10/2005.	  See	  also	  Recital	  11	  of	  the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision:	  […]	  The	  responsibility	  for	  ensuring	  compliance	  with	  these	  conditions	  should	  lie	  with	  the	  issuing	  authority.	   The	   grounds	   for	   non-­‐recognition	   or	   non-­‐execution	   should	   therefore	   not	   cover	   these	  matters.	  673	  Documents	  11965/05	  of	  7/9/2005.	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the	  jurisprudential	  and	  judicial	  elaboration	  of	  Article	  6	  both	  paragraphs	  1	  and	  3.	  By	  any	  means,	  the	  accused	  must	  not	  be	  surprised	  by	  the	  accusation	  which	  should	  be	  known	  to	  them	  beforehand	  and	  in	  time	  that	  is	  sufficient	  so	  that	  can	  be	  met.674	  	  Thus,	  the	  cooperation	  between	  the	  member	  states	  should	  always	  encourage	  the	  maximisation	   of	   protection	   for	   the	   citizen	   rather	   than	   the	  minimisation	   of	   her	  rights.	  If	  an	  offence	  can	  be	  dealt	  with	  judicially	  in	  the	  territory	  which	  it	  has	  been	  committed	  this	  is	  the	  preferable	  forum	  for	  the	  related	  criminal	  proceedings	  to	  be	  held.	  The	  second	  provision	  of	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision	  Article	  13§1f	  aims	  at	  the	  same	  goal,	   i.e.	   the	  protection	  of	   the	  citizen	  by	  prohibiting	  surprises	  against	   the	  accused.	  	  	  	  From	  the	  point	  of	  view	  of	  evidential	  fairness,	  this	  whole	  issue	  seems	  to	  include	  a	  further	  imperative,	  namely	  that	  wherever	  a	  criminal	  process	  starts	  for	  an	  offence	  the	   accused	  must	   be	   informed	   and	   participate	   in	   any	   procedure	   that	   involves	  related	   evidentiary	   material	   in	   order	   to	   confront	   it	   in	   every	   stage	   of	   the	  proceedings	  challenging	  it	   in	  or	  before	  trial.	  This	  is	   in	  line	  with	  the	  principle	  of	  humane	  treatment	  that	  enables	  the	  accused	  to	  be	  an	  equally	  treated	  participant	  in	  the	  proceedings.	  	  Moreover	  as	  far	  as	  double	  criminality	  is	  concerned,	  the	  recognition	  of	  minimum	  standards,	  common	  for	  every	  member	  state	   in	  the	  EU,	  as	   it	  has	  been	  proposed,	  leads	   rather	   to	   the	   opposite	   to	   the	   desired	   result,	   that	   is	   supposedly,	   the	  guarantee	   of	   common	   procedural	   safeguards	   for	   all	   citizens	   living	   within	   the	  European	   Union. 675 	  What	   actually	   occurs	   with	   the	   adoption	   of	   minimum	  standards	   is	   a	   standardisation	   of	   human	   rights	   the	   common	   denominator	   of	  which	  is	  considerably	  low.	  Every	  legal	  rule	  that	  provisions	  for	  a	  higher	  right	  or	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  674	  Pélissier	  and	  Sassi	  v.	  France,	  no.	  25444/94,	  ECHR	  1999-­‐II,	  279,	  (2000)	  30	  EHRR	  715,	  §§	  50,	  62;	  see	  also	  Chichlian	  and	  Ekindjian	  v.	  France,	  27	  Nov	  1989,	  Series	  A	  no.	  162-­‐B,	  (1991)	  13	  EHRR	  553,	  
Gea	  Catalàn	  v.	  Spain,	  10	  Feb	  1995,	  Series	  A	  no.	  309,	  (1995)	  20	  EHRR	  266;	  Dallos	  v.	  Hungary,	  no.	  29082/95,	  ECHR	  2001-­‐II,	  189,	   (2003)	  37	  EHRR	  22;	  Sadak	  and	  others	  v.	  Turkey,	  nos.	  29900/96,	  29901/96,	   29902/96,	   29903/96,	   ECHR	   2001-­‐VIII,	   267,	   (2003)	   36	   EHRR	   26;	   Sipavicius	   v.	  
Lithuania,	  no.	  49093/99,	  21	  Feb	  2002.	  The	  same	  spirit	  of	  no	  surprises	  for	  the	  accused	  breathes	  in	  the	  text	  in	  the	  establishment	  of	  other	  principles	  such	  as	  this	  of	  orality.	  	  675	  See	  also	  M.	  Kaiafa-­‐Gbandi,	  ZIS	  2006,	  532,	  H.	  Satzger,	  Die	  Europäisierung	  des	  Strafrechts,	  2001,	  p.	   153,	   B.	   Schünemann,	   ZRP	   2003,	   p.	   187,	   G.	   Triantafyllou,	   International	   Legal	   Assistance	   in	  
Criminal	  Evidence,	  2009,	  p	  109.	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level	   of	   protection	   is	   easily	   neglected	   and	   bypassed.	   Consequently,	   a	   measure	  that	  aims	  at	  being	  a	  safeguard	  for	  human	  rights	  is	  actually	  the	  highway	  for	  their	  deep	  violation.	  	  This	  is	  a	  reciprocating	  movement	  from	  a	  maximised	  and	  welcome	  protection	  of	  human	   rights	   to	   a	  minimised	   sum	   of	   standards	   that	   create	   an	   illusion	   of	   legal	  trust,	   recognition	   and	   harmony.	   Instead	   of	   creating	   a	   clause	   for	   the	   highest	  protection	   of	   the	   citizen,	   minimum	   common	   standards	   achieve	   the	   lowest	  protection	   of	   EU	   citizens,	   drawing	   a	   line	   of	   a	   low	   common	   rights-­‐based	  denominator.	   In	  addition,	   the	  principle	  of	  equality	   is	  also	  wounded,	  since	  same	  cases	   are	   judged	   in	   different	  ways	   producing	   different	   rulings.	   Thus,	   the	   same	  citizen,	   if	   her	   action	   has	   an	   international	   element,	   can	   possibly	   be	   deprived	   of	  guarantees	  that	  her	  state	  recognises	  and	  provides,	  while	  if	  the	  action	  is	  limited	  to	  a	  national	  level,	  she	  enjoys	  all	  the	  stricter	  and	  solider	  safeguards	  of	  the	  law	  of	  the	  member	   state.	   For	   the	   same	   reason,	   the	   principle	   of	   legitimate	   expectations	   is	  also	  violated.	  Legal	  certainty	  suffers	  as	  well,	  inasmuch	  as	  the	  conclusions	  on	  the	  conditions	   existing	   for	   the	   imposition	   of	   a	   criminal	   penalty	   or	   a	   coercive	   law	  enforcement	   measure	   are	   not	   the	   product	   of	   the	   rules	   of	   the	   forum	   state.	  Additionally,	  the	  application	  of	  a	  higher	  protection	  of	  human	  rights	  is	  inconstant,	  being	   depended	   on	   the	   random	   circumstance	   of	   whether	   the	   action	   has	   an	  international	  or	  European	  element	  in	  it	  or	  not.	  The	  result	  of	  all	  these	  is	  that	  any	  investigative	  measure	   of	   coercion	   can	  not	   be	   foreseen.	   In	   this	  way,	   there	   is	   an	  immersion	  of	  an	   intolerable	   indirect	   interference	  and	  alteration	  of	   the	  criminal	  procedural	  systems	  of	  the	  member	  states	  and	  indeed	  not	  towards	  the	  direction	  of	   strengthening	   the	   protection	   of	   individual	   rights	   but	   towards	   that	   of	   their	  weakening.	  Consequently,	  there	  is	  an	  indirect	  abuse	  of	  right	  and	  an	  unjustifiable	  intervention	  to	  the	  internal	  affairs	  of	  another	  state.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  make	  clear	  again	  that	  mutual	  recognition	  in	  criminal	  matters	  is	  not	  at	  all	   a	  dangerous	  concept.	  On	   the	  other	  hand	   is	   completely	  desirable.	   It	   is	  not	  only	  needed	  but	  also	  essentially	  useful.	  However,	  it	  is	  absolutely	  crucial	  that	  operates	  first	  of	  all	  within	  the	  frame	  of	  EU	  law	  principles	  and	  on	  the	  top	  of	  that	  according	   to	   fairness	   as	   it	   is	   supported	   here	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   evidence	   law	   in	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criminal	   proceedings.	   For	   this	   reason,	   since	   the	   harmonisation	   of	   the	   rules	   on	  criminal	  evidence	  and	  on	  other	  areas	  of	   criminal	   law	  and	  procedure	   is	   lacking,	  the	  only	  coherent	  solution	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  is	  the	  recognition	  of	  the	  highest	   possible	   degree	   of	   protection	   derived	   from	   the	   conflict	   of	   law	   in	  question.676	  It	  is	  also	  worth	  mentioning	  that	  the	  ECJ	  itself	  has	  acknowledged	  that	  the	   principle	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   can	   be	   bent	   in	   favour	   of	   human	   rights	   of	  significant	  importance.677	  	  Last	  but	  not	  least,	  a	  quick	  note	  should	  also	  be	  made	  on	  fairness	  alone.	  Although	  a	  practice	  that	  violates	  general	  principles	  of	  EU	   law	  is	  highly	  unlikely	  that	  would	  not	  also	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  higher	  standard	  of	  a	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept,	  this	  approach	  contributes	  an	  added	  lighting	  to	  the	  issue	  discussed.	  The	  abolition	  of	  double	   criminality	   check	   indirectly	  violates	  Article	  6,	   since	   it	  diminishes	   the	  role	  of	  the	  accused	  in	  the	  proceedings.	  It	  is	  not	  only	  the	  element	  of	  surprise	  that	  increases	   proportionately	   to	   the	   legal	   uncertainty	   of	   EU	   law,	   but	   also	   the	  practical	  incapability	  of	  the	  accused	  to	  participate	  actively	  and	  as	  an	  equal	  to	  the	  prosecution	   party	   in	   the	   proceedings	   that	   is	   produced	   by	   it.	   The	   violation	   of	  rights	   referring	   to	   the	   so-­‐called	   environment	   of	   a	   concept	   of	   fair	   criminal	  evidence	  that	  include	  both	  paragraphs	  1	  and	  3	  of	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  ECHR	  should	  be	  consider	   certain.	   Minimum	   state	   intervention	   requires	   a	   high	   standard	   of	  individual	  rights.	  
	  In	   addition,	   the	  only	   jarring	  note	   into	   the	  provision	   concerning	   the	  procedural	  safeguards	  in	  the	  executing	  state	  is	  that	  it	  is	  not	  obligatory.	  The	  validation	  can	  be	  asked	  only	  if	  it	  is	  backed	  up	  by	  a	  declaration	  of	  a	  member	  state	  that	  it	  wants	  it.	  Consequently,	   the	   effectiveness	   of	   this	   guarantee	   lies	  with	   the	  member	   states’	  sensitivity	   upon	   the	  matter.	   This	   little	   detail	   shows	   the	   lack	   of	   the	   negotiating	  parties	   to	   recognise	   the	   importance	   of	   such	   a	   clause	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   fair	  character	   of	   the	   evidence	   gathered.	   It	   also	   reveals	   once	   more	   that	   the	  construction	   of	   EU	   legal	   instruments	   in	   the	   realm	   of	   criminal	   law	   resembles	  more	   to	   a	   political	   terrain	   where	   different	   tensions	   need	   to	   be	   satisfied	   to	   a	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  676	  See	  also	  G.	  Triantafyllou,	  International	  Legal	  Assistance	  in	  Criminal	  Evidence,	  2009,	  p	  112.	  677	  See	   C-­‐368/1995,	   Judgment	   of	   26.06.1997,	   Vereinigte	   Familiapress	   Zeitungsverlag,	   1997,	   I-­‐3689.	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certain	  extent.	  The	  legal	   logic	   is	  not	  coherent	  too	  resembling	  respectively	  to	  an	  act	  of	  mental	  acrobatics.	  
	  
	  

























	  In	   this	   last	   chapter	  we	   look	   into	   the	  most	   forwarded	   attempt	   of	   the	   European	  Union	  on	  criminal	  evidence.	  The	  European	   Investigation	  Order	  will	   replace	   the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant	  adopted	  in	  2008.	  This	  section	  will	  close	  with	  some	  final	   observations	   on	   fairness	   and	   mutual	   recognition	   proposing	   the	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incorporation	  of	  the	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept	   in	  the	  EU	  related	  legislative	  initiatives.	  
	  	  
	  
7.1.	  European	  Investigation	  Order	  Initiative	  	  
	  In	  April	  2009,	  there	  was	  a	  further	  development	  with	  regard	  to	  criminal	  evidence	  in	   the	   EU.	   An	   initiative	   on	   a	   new	   Directive	   towards	   a	   European	   Investigation	  Order	  was	  proposed.	  This	  progress	  aims	  at	  improving	  the	  existing	  landscape	  on	  gathering	  and	   transferring	  evidence	  between	   the	  Member	  States.	  The	  proposal	  for	  a	  European	  Investigation	  Order	  would	  bring	  a	  number	  of	  changes	  in	  relation	  to	  evidence	  matters	  in	  European	  Criminal	  Law.678	  	  	  According	  to	  the	  proposal,	  the	  initiative	  aims	  to	  replace	  the	  existing	  legal	  regime	  on	  obtaining	  evidence	  in	  criminal	  matters	  with	  a	  single	  instrument	  based	  on	  the	  principle	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   and	   covering	   most	   types	   of	   investigative	  measures.	  The	  objective	  of	  the	  initiative	  is	  in	  line	  with	  the	  Stockholm	  Programme	  which	   states	   that	   the	   setting	   up	   of	   a	   comprehensive	   system	   for	   obtaining	  evidence	   in	   cases	   with	   a	   cross-­‐border	   dimension,	   based	   on	   the	   principle	   of	  mutual	   recognition,	   should	   be	   further	   pursued.679	  It	   is	   also	  mentioned	   that	   the	  general	   provisions	   apply	   the	   typical	   characteristics	   of	   mutual	   recognition	  instruments,	   such	   as	   the	   use	   of	   an	   order	   (the	   EIO)	   instead	   of	   a	   request	   for	  assistance,	   direct	   contact	   between	   the	   judicial	   authorities,	   standard	   forms	   for	  issuing	  the	  EIO,	  fixed	  deadlines	  for	  its	  execution,	  abolition	  of	  dual	  criminality	  and	  a	   limited	   number	   of	   grounds	   for	   refusal.	   Many	   of	   the	   general	   provisions	   are	  similar	   to	   the	   corresponding	   provisions	   in	   the	   Framework	   Decision	   on	   the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant.	  The	  specific	  provisions	  contain	  more	  detailed	  rules	  on	   the	   procedure	   for	   conducting	   the	   investigative	   measures	   concerned.	   They	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  678	  See	   S	   Peers,	   Statewatch	   analysis	   -­‐	   The	   proposed	   European	   Investigation	   Order:	   Assault	   on	  
human	  rights	  and	  national	  sovereignty,	  May	  2010.	  679	  Commission	   comments	   on	   proposed	   European	   Investigation	   Order:	   ‘On	   the	   initiative,	   the	  Commission	  comments	  that	  it	  represents	  added	  value	  compared	  to	  the	  existing	  legal	  regime	  on	  obtaining	   evidence	   from	   another	   Member	   State,	   notably	   because:	   It	   replaces	   this	   fragmented	  regime	  with	  a	  single	  instrument	  covering	  almost	  all	  types	  of	  investigative	  measures.	  It	  introduces	  standard	  forms	  for	  issuing	  the	  EIO	  and	  fixed	  deadlines	  for	  its	  execution.	  It	  abolishes	  verification	  of	  dual	  criminality	  and	  limits	  the	  grounds	  for	  refusal’.	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also	   introduce	   additional	   grounds	   for	   refusal	   allowing	   the	   executing	   State	   to	  deny	  execution	  in	  certain	  cases.	  Furthermore,	  many	  of	  the	  specific	  provisions	  are	  similar	   to	   the	   corresponding	   provisions	   in	   the	   existing	   mutual	   assistance	  instruments.	  	  
	  
7.2.	  Relation	  with	  other	  instruments	  
	  The	   EIO	   draft	   comes	   last	   in	   the	   line	   of	   previous	   legal	   instruments	   discussed	  briefly	   above,	   namely	   the	   Mutual	   Assistance	   Convention	   (Council	   of	   Europe,	  1959)	  with	  its	  two	  protocols	  (1978,	  2001),	  the	  Schengen	  Agreement	  (1985),	  the	  Mutual	   Legal	   Assistance	   Convention	   (European	  Union,	   2000)	  with	   its	   protocol	  (2001),	  the	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  Freezing	  Property	  or	  Evidence	  (2003)	  and	  of	  course	   the	   Framework	   Decision	   on	   a	   European	   Evidence	   Warrant	   (2008).	   In	  contrast	  with	  the	  EEW	  the	  EIO	  will	  replace	  the	  existing	  mechanisms	  and	  will	  not	  co-­‐exist	  with	  them	  in	  a	  complementary	  way.	  
	  
	  
7.3.	  Textual	  history	  
	  Before	   looking	   into	   the	   substantial	   part	   of	   the	  new	  Directive	  we	   should	   clarify	  some	   things	  on	   the	  different	   texts	   that	  were	  put	   forward	   for	   this	   initiative.	  We	  should	  draw	  a	  distinction	  between	  the	  Commission	  proposal	  and	  the	  proposal	  of	  the	  member-­‐states.	   The	  Belgian	  presidency	   ambitions	   gave	  birth	   to	   a	   proposal	  that	   several	   member-­‐states	   decided	   together	   to	   present.	   There	   are	   different	  papers	   that	   negotiate	   the	   introduction	   of	   a	   European	   Investigation	   Order.	   In	  them	  one	  can	  see	  the	  points	  of	  tension	  during	  the	  discussion	  between	  member-­‐states.680	  Here	  the	  analysis	  follows	  this	  progression	  and	  interaction	  and	  uses	  as	  final	  basis	   the	   text	   agreed	  as	  general	   approach	  by	   the	  Council	  of	   the	  European	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  680	  Council	  of	  the	  European	  Union,	  Initiative	  of	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Belgium,	  the	  Republic	  of	  Bulgaria,	  the	  Republic	  of	  Estonia,	  the	  Kingdom	  of	  Spain,	  the	  Republic	  of	  Austria,	   the	  Republic	  of	  Slovenia	  and	   the	   Kingdom	   of	   Sweden	   for	   a	   Directive	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   of	   the	   Council	  regarding	   the	   European	   Investigation	   Order	   in	   criminal	   matters,	   31.03,	   17.03,	   29.03,	   16.09,	  19.09,	  21.09,	  07.10,	  08.11,	  21.12.2011,	  29.02.12.	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Union.	   This	   is	   the	   Council’s	   agreed	   position	   before	   entering	   first	   reading	  ‘trilogue’	  with	  the	  European	  Parliament.681	  	  	  	  
7.4.	  Legislation	  overview	  
	  
7.4.1.	  Scope	  	  	  The	  definition	  of	  the	  European	  Investigation	  Order	  (EIO)	  follows	  the	  pattern	  of	  the	  wording	  in	  the	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  EEW.682	  As	  far	  as	  the	  related	  rest	  definitions	   and	   types	   of	   procedure	   for	   which	   the	   EIO	   can	   be	   issued	   are	  concerned,	  these	  are	  accordingly	  the	  same	  with	  the	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  EEW.	  The	  scope	  of	  the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision	  was	  different	  though.	  It	  applied	  only	  to	   ‘objects,	  documents	  or	  data’,	  which	  already	  existed,683	  leaving	  out	  other	  more	  sensitive	  categories	  of	  evidence.684	  Oppositely,	   the	  new	  EIO,	  as	  put	   in	   the	  first	   draft,	  would	   cover	   any	   investigative	  measure685	  with	   the	   exception	   of:	   (a)	  the	  setting	  up	  of	  a	  Joint	  Investigation	  Team	  and	  the	  gathering	  of	  evidence	  within	  a	  Joint	  Investigation	  Team	  as	  provided	  in	  Article	  13	  of	  the	  Convention	  of	  29	  May	  2000	   and	   in	   Framework	   Decision	   2002/465/JHA;	   (b)	   Interception	   and	  immediate	   transmission	  of	   telecommunications	  referred	  to	   in	  Articles	  18§1a	  of	  the	   Convention	   of	   29	   May	   2000;	   and	   (c)	   Interception	   of	   telecommunications	  referred	   to	   in	  Article	  18§1b	  of	   the	  Convention	  of	   29	  May	  2000	   insofar	   as	   they	  relate	  to	  situations	  referred	  to	  in	  Article	  18§2a	  and	  c	  and	  Article	  20	  of	  the	  same	  convention.686	  In	  the	  original	  draft,	  the	  EIO	  would	  not	  have	  applied	  to	  setting	  up	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  681	  2010/0817	  (COD)	  21.12.2001.	  682	  ‘The	   European	   Investigation	  Order	   (EIO)	   shall	   be	   a	   judicial	   decision	   issued	   by	   a	   competent	  authority	   of	   a	   Member	   State	   (the	   issuing	   State)	   in	   order	   to	   have	   one	   or	   several	   specific	  investigative	  measure(s)	  carried	  out	  in	  another	  Member	  State	  (the	  executing	  State)	  with	  a	  view	  to	   gathering	   evidence’	   (Art	   1,	   Initiative	   for	   a	   Directive	   of	   the	   European	   Parliament	   and	   of	   the	  Council	  regarding	  the	  European	  Investigation	  Order	  in	  criminal	  matters).	  683	  Namely	   objects,	   documents	   or	   data	   that	   are	   already	   in	   the	   possession	   of	   the	   executing	  authority	  before	  the	  EEW	  is	  issued	  (Art	  4§4,	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  EEW).	  684	  Art	  4§2,	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  EEW.	  685	  It	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  concept	  of	  ‘investigative	  measure’	  is	  not	  defined,	  so	  it	  might	  also	  be	  questioned	  whether	  many	  other	  types	  of	  investigative	  processes	  are	  covered	  by	  the	  Directive	  or	  not.	  686	  Art	  3	  of	  the	  Initiative	  for	  a	  Directive	  of	  the	  European	  Parliament	  and	  of	  the	  Council	  regarding	  the	  European	  Investigation	  Order	  in	  criminal	  matters.	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joint	   investigation	   teams	   or	   to	   certain	   forms	   of	   interception	   of	  telecommunications.	  In	  the	  latest	  draft	  though,	  the	  EIO	  will	  apply	  to	  all	  forms	  of	  interception	   of	   telecommunications,	   and	   the	   exclusion	   of	   joint	   investigation	  teams	  is	  also	  qualified.687	  The	  detailed	  rules	  concerning	  telecom	  interception	  in	  the	   proposal	   will	   presumably	   be	   amended,	   but	   these	   rules	   have	   yet	   to	   be	  discussed.	  Obviously	  serious	  questions	  arise	  about	  ensuring	  the	  compatibility	  of	  the	  interception	  of	  telecommunications	  with	  human	  rights	  obligations.	  	  	  Since	   the	   term	   ‘investigative	   measure’	   is	   not	   defined	   or	   broken	   down	   to	  categories	  it	  is	  hard	  to	  tell	  which	  types	  of	  measures	  will	  be	  finally	  included	  in	  the	  Directive.688	  It	  might	  be	  the	  case	  that	  the	  new	  Directive	  aims	  at	  being	  as	  inclusive	  as	  possible	  in	  terms	  of	  investigative	  measures	  adopted.	  This	  presumption	  though	  is	   not	   free	   of	   problems	   that	   shadow	   the	   clarity	   of	   the	   new	   legal	   regime.	   An	  example	   of	   that	   is	   the	  measure	   of	   cross-­‐border	   surveillance	   by	   police	   officers	  which	  is	  excluded	  in	  the	  preamble	  of	  the	  proposal	  of	  the	  EIO,	  but	   included	  as	  a	  covert	  investigation	  in	  the	  2000	  EU	  Convention.689	  Whether	  this	  measure	  will	  be	  included	   or	   not	   in	   the	   upcoming	   Directive	   is	   an	   issue	   to	   be	   seen	   only	   in	   the	  future,	  since	  the	  present	  legal	  basis	  seems	  puzzling.	  	  	  The	  answer	  to	  that	  puzzle	  will	  also	  have	  collateral	  consequences.	  That	  is	  because	  the	  2000	  EU	  Convention	  which	  covers	  that	  particular	  measure	  acknowledges	  to	  the	  requested	  Member	  State	  grounds	  to	  refuse	  such	  covert	  operations	  on	  its	  soil.	  The	  spirit	  of	  the	  proposed	  Directive	  though	  is	  quite	  different.	  Another	  question	  was	  whether	  the	  proposed	  Directive	  would	  apply	  to	  obtaining	  criminal	  records,	  regardless	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   there	   is	   already	   existing	   EU	   legislation	   on	   that.	   In	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  687 	  The	   delegations	   have	   agreed	   that	   the	   Directive	   covers	   all	   forms	   of	   interception	   of	  telecommunications	   and	   specific	   provisions	  will	   be	   introduced.	   However,	   a	   couple	   of	  member	  states	   expressed	   some	   concern	   that	   the	   insertion	   of	   these	   specific	   types	   of	   interception	  would	  needlessly	   complicate	   the	   debates	   and	   another	   member	   state	   entered	   a	   scrutiny	   reservation	  (5591/11,	  Brussels,	  31	  January	  2011).	  	  688	  It	  was	  decided	  that	  the	  text	  already	  clearly	  indicates	  that	  the	  requested	  investigative	  measure	  should	   be	   specified,	   although	   there	   was	   a	   proposal	   of	   using	   the	   wording	   ‘one	   or	   several	  specifically	  mentioned	  investigative	  measure(s)’.	  689	  Article	  14	  (Covert	  investigations).	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principle	   it	   seems	   that	   eventually	   the	   Directive	   possibly	   applies	   to	   obtaining	  criminal	  records,	  despite	  the	  existence	  of	  separate	  EU	  rules	  in	  this	  area.690	  	  	  
	  
7.4.2.	  Innovations	  	  	  The	  Directive	  for	  a	  European	  Investigation	  Order	  is	  created	  to	  cover	  issues	  that	  the	  EEW	  did	  not.	  This	  does	  not	  apply	  only	  to	  the	  types	  of	  investigation	  measures	  included	  in	  the	  Directive,	  but	  also	  to	  the	  nature	  of	  operation.	   In	  Article	  27§1	  of	  the	  proposal	  of	  the	  EIO	  it	  is	  mentioned	  that	  ‘the	  EIO	  is	  issued	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  executing	   a	   measure,	   including	   the	   one	   referred	   to	   in	   Article	   25	   and	   26	   [the	  monitoring	   of	   banking	   transactions	   and	   controlled	   deliveries],	   implying	  gathering	   of	   evidence	   in	   real	   time,	   continuously	   and	   over	   a	   certain	   period	   of	  time’.	  This	   specific	  wording	   referring	   to	   the	   issue	  of	   time	   (investigation	   in	   real	  time	  and	  over	  a	  certain	  period	  of	  time)	  without	  naming	  a	  concrete	  investigation	  measure	  implies	  that	  it	  might	  be	  an	  open	  door	  in	  the	  new	  Directive	  for	  additional	  measures	  that	  are	  not	  mentioned	  explicitly.	  	  
	  In	  addition,	  as	  mentioned	  above,	  it	  was	  not	  clear	  in	  the	  first	  draft	  whether	  or	  not	  all	   kinds	   of	   interception	   of	   telecommunications	   are	   outside	   the	   scope	   of	   the	  Directive.	  Moreover,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  the	  EU	  and	  Council	  of	  Europe	  mutual	  assistance	  legislative	  instruments	  have	  application	  to	  matters	  that	  hardly	  can	  be	  considered	   as	   ‘investigative	   measures’.	   Such	   an	   example	   is	   the	   restitution	   of	  property	   (Article	   8	   of	   the	   2000	   EU	   Convention)	   and	   also	   issues	  mentioned	   in	  Article	  49	  of	  the	  Schengen	  Convention:	  	  (b)	   proceedings	   for	   claims	   for	   damages	   arising	   from	   wrongful	   prosecution	   or	  conviction;	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  690	  The	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision	  also	  did	  not	  apply	  to	  obtaining	  criminal	  records	  (Article	  4§3),	  as	   this	   issue	   was	   subject	   to	   a	   separate	   EU	   measure	   which	   built	   upon	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	  Convention	  and	  its	  Protocols	  (subsequent	  EU	  measures	  on	  this	  specific	  subject	  have	  since	  been	  adopted	   in	   2009)	   and	   other	   relevant	   instruments.	   Exchange	   of	   information	   on	   criminal	  convictions	  extracted	  from	  the	  criminal	  record	  is	  carried	  out	  basically	  in	  accordance	  with	  Council	  Decision	  2005/876/JHA	  of	   21	  November	   2005	  on	   the	   exchange	   of	   information	   extracted	   from	  the	  criminal	  record	  (OJ	  L	  322,	  9.12.2005,	  p.	  33).	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(c)	  clemency	  proceedings;	  	  (d)	  civil	  actions	  joined	  to	  criminal	  proceedings,	  as	  long	  as	  the	  criminal	  court	  has	  not	  yet	  taken	  a	  final	  decision	  in	  the	  criminal	  proceedings;	  (e)	  in	  the	  service	  of	  judicial	  documents	  relating	  to	  the	  enforcement	  of	  a	  sentence	  or	   a	   preventive	  measure,	   the	   imposition	   of	   a	   fine	   or	   the	   payment	   of	   costs	   for	  proceedings;	  (f)	   in	   respect	   of	  measures	   relating	   to	   the	   deferral	   of	   delivery	   or	   suspension	   of	  enforcement	  of	  a	  sentence	  or	  a	  preventive	  measure,	  to	  conditional	  release	  or	  to	  a	  stay	  or	  interruption	  of	  enforcement	  of	  a	  sentence	  or	  a	  preventive	  measure.	  	  It	   is	   a	   logical	   presumption	   that	   the	   above	   mentioned	   measures	   will	   not	   be	  replaced	  by	  the	  new	  Directive	  on	  the	  EIO,	  but	  Article	  29§1	   is	  not	  very	  clear	  on	  that.	   In	   light	   of	   this,	   it	   is	   not	   clear	   whether	   the	   conditions	   to	   exclude	   the	  application	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   Convention	   on	  mutual	   assistance	   (Article	  26§4	   of	   the	   Convention)	   are	   in	   fact	   met:	   ‘Where,	   as	   between	   two	   or	   more	  Contracting	   Parties,	   mutual	   assistance	   in	   criminal	   matters	   is	   practised	   on	   the	  basis	   of	   uniform	   legislation	   or	   of	   a	   special	   system	  providing	   for	   the	   reciprocal	  application	  in	  their	  respective	  territories	  of	  measures	  of	  mutual	  assistance,	  these	  Parties	   shall,	   notwithstanding	   the	   provisions	   of	   this	   Convention,	   be	   free	   to	  regulate	  their	  mutual	  relations	   in	  this	   field	  exclusively	   in	  accordance	  with	  such	  legislation	   or	   system.	   Contracting	   Parties	   which,	   in	   accordance	   with	   this	  paragraph,	   exclude	   as	   between	   themselves	   the	   application	   of	   this	   Convention	  shall	  notify	  the	  Secretary	  General	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  accordingly’.	  	  It	   is	   also	   worth	   mentioning	   that	   the	   matter	   of	   video-­‐conferences	   is	   treated	  differently	  by	  the	  new	  EIO	  compared	  to	  past	  legislation.	  The	  2000	  EU	  Convention	  on	   mutual	   assistance	   on	   criminal	   matters	   in	   Article	   10	   (Hearing	   by	   video-­‐conference)	   states	   that	   Member	   States	   may	   at	   their	   discretion	   also	   apply	   the	  provisions	   of	   this	   Article,	   where	   appropriate	   and	   with	   the	   agreement	   of	   their	  competent	   judicial	   authorities,	   to	   hearings	   by	   video-­‐conference	   involving	   an	  accused	  person.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	  decision	   to	  hold	   the	  videoconference,	   and	   the	  manner	   in	   which	   the	   videoconference	   shall	   be	   carried	   out,	   shall	   be	   subject	   to	  agreement	   between	   the	   Member	   States	   concerned,	   in	   accordance	   with	   their	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national	   law	   and	   relevant	   international	   instruments,	   including	   the	   1950	  European	   Convention	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Fundamental	  Freedoms.691	  This	  clear	  reference	   to	  human	  rights	   is	  not	  mentioned	  to	   the	  new	  proposed	  Article	  21	  of	   the	  EIO.	  The	  Commission	  comments	  on	   that	   flagging	  up	  the	  importance	  of	  ensuring	  the	  principle	  of	  fair	  trial	  and	  equality	  of	  arms.692	  	  Additionally,	   Article	   26	   of	   the	   EIO	   proposal	   referring	   to	   controlled	   deliveries	  does	   not	   put	   into	   detail	   specific	   rules693	  for	   this	   investigative	   measure.	   The	  Commission	   correctly	   comments	   on	   that	   holding	   that	   the	   matter	   needs	   to	   be	  further	  examined.	  Last	  but	  not	  least,	  it	  seems	  that	  certain	  restrictions	  regarding	  bank	   information	   will	   be	   dropped	   as	   well	   (Articles	   23-­‐25	   of	   the	   new	   EIO	  proposal).694	  These	  restrictions	  are	  chartered	   in	   the	  2001	  Protocol	   to	   the	  2000	  Convention	  on	  mutual	  assistance.	  According	  to	  the	  Protocol,	  Member	  States	  may	  make	  the	  execution	  of	  a	  request	   for	   information	  on	  bank	  accounts	  and	  banking	  transactions	   dependent	   on	   the	   same	   conditions	   as	   they	   apply	   with	   respect	   to	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  691	  Art	  10§9	  of	   the	  2000	  EU	  Convention:	   ‘Member	  States	  may	  at	   their	  discretion	  also	  apply	   the	  provisions	  of	  this	  Article,	  where	  appropriate	  and	  with	  the	  agreement	  of	  their	  competent	  judicial	  authorities,	   to	   hearings	   by	   videoconference	   involving	   an	   accused	   person.	   In	   this	   case,	   the	  decision	   to	   hold	   the	   videoconference,	   and	   the	   manner	   in	   which	   the	   videoconference	   shall	   be	  carried	  out,	  shall	  be	  subject	  to	  agreement	  between	  the	  Member	  States	  concerned,	  in	  accordance	  with	   their	   national	   law	   and	   relevant	   international	   instruments,	   including	   the	   1950	   European	  Convention	   for	   the	   Protection	   of	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Fundamental	   Freedoms’.	   Furthermore:	  ‘Hearings	   shall	   only	   be	   carried	   out	  with	   the	   consent	   of	   the	   accused	   person.	   Such	   rules	   as	  may	  prove	   to	  be	  necessary,	  with	   a	   view	   to	   the	  protection	  of	   the	   rights	   of	   accused	  persons,	   shall	   be	  adopted	  by	  the	  Council	  in	  a	  legally	  binding	  instrument’.	  692	  Commission	   comments	   on	   proposed	   European	   Investigation	   Order:	   The	   Commission	   notes	  that	   no	   thought	   has	   been	   given	   to	   the	   rights	   of	   the	   defence	   in	   this	   Article.	   The	   Commission	  considers	  it	  necessary	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  principle	  of	  a	  fair	  trial	  and	  equality	  of	  arms	  in	  criminal	  proceedings	   is	   fully	   respected	   in	   the	   application	   of	   Article	   21.	   Defence	   lawyers	  must	   have	   the	  possibility	   to	   question	   witnesses	   and	   experts	   during	   the	   hearing	   by	   videoconference	   if	   the	  information	   gathered	   by	   these	   means	   is	   to	   be	   introduced	   into	   the	   criminal	   trial.	   Additional	  requirements	  might	   need	   to	   be	   introduced	   in	   paragraph	   6	   of	   Article	   21	   in	   this	   respect.	   In	   the	  application	  of	  this	  Directive,	  Member	  States	  are	  fully	  bound	  by	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  (see	  Article	  51	  Charter).	  To	  highlight	  this	  legal	  obligation,	  the	  Commission	  considers	  it	  necessary	  to	  add	  the	  words	  ‘(…)	  and	  the	  Charter	  of	  Fundamental	  Rights	  of	  the	  European	  Union’.	  693	  The	   2000	   EU	   Convention	   on	   mutual	   assistance	   in	   criminal	   matters	   is	   more	   detailed	   on	  controlled	  deliveries	   in	   its	  Art	  12:	   ‘1.	  Each	  Member	  State	  shall	  undertake	   to	  ensure	   that,	  at	   the	  request	  of	  another	  Member	  State,	  controlled	  deliveries	  may	  be	  permitted	  on	  its	  territory	  in	  the	  framework	   of	   criminal	   investigations	   into	   extraditable	   offences.	   2.	   The	   decision	   to	   carry	   out	  controlled	  deliveries	   shall	  be	   taken	   in	  each	   individual	   case	  by	   the	  competent	  authorities	  of	   the	  requested	  Member	  State,	  with	  due	  regard	  for	  the	  national	  law	  of	  that	  Member	  State.	  3.	  Controlled	  deliveries	  shall	  take	  place	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  procedures	  of	  the	  requested	  Member	  State.	  The	  right	  to	  act	  and	  to	  direct	  and	  control	  operations	  shall	   lie	  with	  the	  competent	  authorities	  of	  that	  Member	  State’.	  694	  Article	  23:	  Information	  on	  bank	  accounts.	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requests	   for	   search	   and	   seizure.695	  As	   far	   as	   requests	   for	   the	   monitoring	   of	  banking	   transactions	   are	   concerned,	   the	   decision	   to	  monitor	   shall	   be	   taken	   in	  each	   individual	   case	   by	   the	   competent	   authorities	   of	   the	   requested	   Member	  State,	  with	  due	  regard	  for	  the	  national	  law	  of	  that	  Member	  State.696	  	  	  It	  is	  quite	  clear	  that	  the	  intention	  of	  the	  member	  states	  with	  the	  new	  Directive	  on	  a	   European	   Investigation	   Order	   is	   the	   maximisation	   of	   efficacy	   in	   the	   desired	  judicial	   cooperation	   in	   criminal	  matters.	   For	   this	   to	   be	   attained,	   the	   first	   draft	  seemed	   to	   omit	   several	   safeguards	   in	   terms	   of	   human	   rights	   mostly	   by	   not	  making	   clear	   the	   investigative	   measures	   involved	   and	   the	   solution	   to	   the	  overlapping	  of	  legislation	  between	  different	  mutual	  legal	  assistance	  instruments	  and	   the	   new	   EIO	   proposal.	   The	   general	   principle	   of	   legality	   in	   criminal	   law	   is	  harshly	   trampled	   especially	   in	   its	   form	   of	   nullum	   crimen	   nulla	   poena	   sine	   lege	  
certa.	   The	   various	   investigative	   measures	   taken	   against	   citizens	   are	   regarded	  and	  felt	  as	  minor	  sanctions,	  penalties	  before	  the	  end	  of	  a	  criminal	  procedure	  and	  their	   carrying	   out	   must	   be	   clear	   and	   not	   a	   source	   of	   possible	   confusion.	  Especially,	  when	  more	  than	  one	  rules	  apply	  to	  a	  given	  law	  enforcement	  measure	  this	  demand	  becomes	  more	  urgent.	  The	  problem	  with	  a	  violation	  in	  the	  heart	  of	  the	   principle	   of	   legality	   is	   that	   its	   consequences	   run	   throughout	   the	   whole	  criminal	   procedure.	   The	   participants	   cannot	   know	   the	   details	   of	   the	  measures	  taken	  against	  them	  and	  therefore	  prepare	  to	  face	  them.	  The	  rights	  of	  the	  defence	  are	  attacked	  and	   the	  active	  and	   substantive	  participation	  of	   the	  accused	   in	   the	  proceedings	  is	  threatened.	  	  	  Further	  drafting	  of	  the	  new	  EIO	  revealed	  the	  will	  of	  the	  member	  states	  to	  include	  all	   forms	   of	   interception	   of	   telecommunications.	   This	   is	   another	   matter	   that	  certainly	  raises	  a	  lot	  of	   issues	  for	  human	  rights	  as	  these	  investigative	  measures	  can	   directly	   breach	   the	   right	   to	   a	   fair	   trial	   according	   to	   Article	   6	   ECHR.	   Here	  would	  apply	  all	  the	  findings	  of	  the	  first	  part	  related	  to	  the	  humane	  treatment	  of	  the	  individuals	  involved	  and	  subsequently	  the	  evidence.	  It	  is	  not	  the	  inclusion	  of	  these	  special	   investigation	  measures	  in	   itself	  that	  puts	  at	  risk	  the	  right	  to	  a	  fair	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  695	  See	  Art.	  1§5	  and	  2§4	  of	  2001	  Protocol.	  696	  See	  Art.	  3§3.	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trial.	  It	  is	  the	  parallel	  to	  that	  omission	  of	  concrete	  rules	  that	  define	  the	  rights	  of	  the	   people	  who	   find	   themselves	   in	   these	   situations.	  Here	   the	   discussion	   about	  the	   right	   to	   silence	   and	   the	   privilege	   against	   self	   incrimination	   are	   utterly	  relevant.697	  The	   same	   should	   also	   apply	   for	   the	   standards	   of	   ECtHR	   regarding	  illegally	   obtained	   evidence	   and	   entrapment.	   If	   a	   fair	   criminal	   evidence	   concept	  informed	  the	  legal	  thinking	  in	  judicial	  cooperation	  in	  criminal	  matters	  the	  way	  to	  combating	   transnational	   crime	   building	   up	   at	   the	   same	   time	   mutual	   trust	  between	  member	  states	  and	  between	  EU	  regime	  and	   its	   citizens	  would	  be	   less	  controversial.	  	  	  	  
7.4.3.	  European	  Investigation	  Order	  Main	  Issues	  	  	  
	  7.4.3.1.	  Proportionality	  
	  Furthermore,	  certain	   limitations	  existing	   in	  other	   legislative	  actions	  were	   to	  be	  removed	   in	   the	   Directive	   for	   the	   new	   EIO.	   More	   specifically,	   the	   principle	   of	  proportionality	  stricto	  sensu	  as	   it	   is	  expressed	   in	   the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision	  would	  have	  been	  taken	  off	  the	  new	  text.698	  Accordingly,	   it	  seemed	  that	  the	  new	  EIO	  would	  have	  enabled	  prosecutorial	  forum	  shopping,	  as	  it	  would	  not	  include	  a	  clause	   that	   an	   investigation	   order	   would	   be	   issued	   only	   when	   the	   objects,	  documents	  or	  data	  could	  have	  been	  obtained	  under	  the	  law	  of	  the	  issuing	  State	  in	  a	  comparable	  case	  if	  they	  were	  available	  in	  the	  territory	  of	  the	  issuing	  State,	  even	  though	  different	  procedural	  measures	  might	  be	  used.699	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  697	  Besides	  these	  rights	  are	  considered	  as	  generally	  recognised	  international	  standards	  (Saunders	  v.	  United	  Kingdom,	  no.	  19187/91,	  17	  Dec	  1996,	  Reports	  1996-­‐VI,	  2044,	  (1997)	  23	  EHRR	  313,	  §	  68;	   see	   also	  Allan	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	   no.	   48539/99	   ECHR	   2002-­‐IX	   (2003)	   36	   EHRR	   12,	   §	   44;	  
Heaney	  and	  McGuinness	  v.	  Ireland,	  no.	  34720/97,	  ECHR	  2000-­‐XII,	  (2001)	  33	  EHRR	  12,	  §	  40;	  Jalloh	  v.	  Germany,	   no.	   54810/00,	   11	   July	   2006,	   §	  100;	   JB	   v.	   Switzerland,	   no.	   31827/96,	   3	  May	   2001,	  ECHR	   2001-­‐III,	   435,	   §	   64;	   John	  Murray	   v.	  United	  Kingdom,	   no.	   18731/91,	   8	   Feb	   1996,	   Reports	  1996-­‐I,	  30,	  (1996)	  22	  EHRR	  29,	  §	  45;	  Quinn	  v.	  Ireland,	  no.	  36887/97,	  21	  Dec	  2000,	  §	  40;	  Serves	  v.	  
France,	  no.	  20225/92,	  20	  Oct	  1997,	  Reports	  1997-­‐VI,	  2159,	  (1999)	  28	  EHRR	  265,	  §	  46).	  698	  This	   principle	   was	   verbally	   expressed	   in	   Article	   7	   of	   the	   EEW	   Framework	   Decision.	   ‘Each	  Member	  State	  shall	  take	  the	  necessary	  measures	  to	  ensure	  that	  the	  EEW	  is	  issued	  only	  when	  the	  issuing	   authority	   is	   satisfied	   that	   the	   following	   conditions	   have	   been	   met:	   (a)	   obtaining	   the	  objects,	   documents	   or	   data	   sought	   is	   necessary	   and	   proportionate	   for	   the	   purpose	   of	  proceedings’.	  	  699	  See	  Article	  7(b)	  of	  the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision,	  where	  such	  provision	  does	  exist.	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Eventually,	   a	   proportionality	   test	   identical	   to	   the	   EEW	   Framework	   Decision	  would	   be	   inserted	   into	   the	   Directive.	   In	   the	   last	   draft	   a	   new	   article	   5a	   was	  introduced	  with	   the	   title	   ‘Conditions	   for	   issuing	   and	   transmitting	   an	  EIO’.	   This	  article	   instructs	   that	   a	  European	   Investigation	  Order	  may	  be	   issued	  only	  when	  the	   issuing	  authority	   is	  satisfied	   that	  certain	  conditions	  have	  been	  met,	  namely	  that	   the	   issuing	  of	   the	  order	   is	  necessary	  and	  proportionate	   for	   the	  purpose	  of	  the	   type	   of	   the	   proceedings	   covered	   by	   the	   potential	   Directive	   and	   the	  investigative	   measure	   or	   measures	   mentioned	   in	   the	   order	   could	   have	   been	  ordered	  under	  the	  same	  conditions	  in	  a	  similar	  national	  case.	  The	  conditions	  are	  to	  be	  assessed	  by	  the	  issuing	  authority.	  This	  development	  is	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  spirit	  of	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  in	  EU	  criminal	  matters	  as	  it	  constitutes	  a	  well	  established	   guarantee	   in	   favour	   of	   the	   individuals	   participating	   in	   the	  proceedings.	  	  	  This	   issue	   has	   been	   subject	   to	   extensive	   discussions	   during	   the	   Belgian	  Presidency.	   In	   its	   conclusions,	   the	  Council	  meeting	  2-­‐3	  December	  2010,	  agreed	  on	   the	   following	   guiding	   principles	   for	   further	   discussions:	   proportionality	  should	   systematically	   be	   checked	   by	   the	   issuing	   authority;	   the	   executing	  authority	   should	   be	   entitled	   to	   opt	   for	   a	   less	   intrusive	   measure	   than	   the	   one	  indicated	   in	   the	   EIO	   if	   it	   makes	   it	   possible	   to	   achieve	   similar	   results;	  proportionality	   should	   not	   constitute	   a	   general	   ground	   for	   refusal	   for	   the	  executing	   authority	   applicable	   to	   all	   kinds	   of	  measures;	   direct	   communication	  between	  the	  issuing	  and	  executing	  authority	  should	  play	  an	  important	  role.	  	  The	   Belgian	   Presidency	   proposed	   to	   delegations	   an	   approach	   whereby,	   in	  addition	   to	   the	   proportionality	   check	   made	   by	   the	   issuing	   authority	   on	   the	  issuing	  of	  the	  EIO,	  the	  executing	  authority	  would	  have	  the	  possibility	  to	  consult	  with	   the	   issuing	  authority	  on	  the	  relevance	  of	   the	  execution	  of	  an	  EIO	  where	   it	  would	  have	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that,	  in	  the	  specific	  case,	  the	  investigative	  measure	  concerned	   a	   minor	   offence.	   The	   provision	   underlines	   the	   importance	   of	  communication	  between	  the	  competent	  authorities	  of	  the	  issuing	  and	  executing	  States	  in	  order	  to	  assess	  the	  possibility,	  in	  such	  a	  case,	  of	  withdrawal	  of	  the	  EIO.	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This	   new	   Article	   5a	   was	   generally	   supported	   by	   the	   delegations.	   In	   order	   to	  further	   address	   concerns	   expressed	   by	   some	   delegations	   that	   the	   provision	  could	  de	  facto	  provide	  for	  a	  hidden	  ground	  for	  refusal	  the	  following	  new	  recital	  may	   be	   inserted:	   ‘The	   EIO	   should	   be	   chosen	   where	   the	   execution	   of	   an	  investigative	  measure	  seems	  proportionate,	  adequate	  and	  applicable	  to	  the	  case	  in	  hand.	  The	  issuing	  authority	  should	  therefore	  ascertain	  whether	  the	  evidence	  sought	  is	  necessary	  and	  proportionate	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  proceedings,	  whether	  the	   measure	   chosen	   is	   necessary	   and	   proportionate	   for	   the	   gathering	   of	   this	  evidence,	   and	   whether,	   by	   means	   of	   issuing	   the	   EIO,	   another	   MS	   should	   be	  involved	  in	  the	  gathering	  of	  this	  evidence.	  The	  execution	  of	  an	  EIO	  should	  not	  be	  refused	   on	   grounds	   other	   than	   those	   stated	   in	   this	   Directive,	   however	   the	  executing	  authority	   is	  entitled	   to	  opt	   for	  a	   less	   intrusive	  measure	   than	   the	  one	  indicated	  in	  an	  EIO	  if	  it	  makes	  it	  possible	  to	  achieve	  similar	  results’.	  	  	  7.4.3.2.	  Double	  Criminality	  	  	  Similarly,	  the	  dual	  criminality	  as	  a	  ground	  for	  refusal	  was	  also	  removed	  from	  the	  scene.	   The	   EIO	  Directive	   seemed	   to	   follow	   a	   new	  path,	   different	   to	   that	   of	   the	  Framework	   Decisions	   of	   EEW	   and	   freezing	   orders,	   which	   kept	   the	   concept	   of	  dual	   criminality	   with	   the	   exception	   of	   the	   list	   of	   32	   crimes,	   where	   the	  requirement	  was	  abolished.	  Even	  when	  an	  EAW	  is	  at	  stake,	   the	  Member	  States	  have	  the	  possibility	  to	  refuse	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  warrant	  if	  the	  alleged	  act	  is	  not	  on	   the	   list	   of	   32	   crimes	   where	   the	   dual	   criminality	   requirement	   has	   been	  abolished.	   Additionally,	   according	   to	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   Convention, 700	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  700	  Article	  5:	  Any	  Contracting	  Party	  may,	  by	  a	  declaration	  addressed	  to	  the	  Secretary	  General	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  when	  signing	  this	  Convention	  or	  depositing	  its	   instrument	  of	  ratification	  or	  accession,	  reserve	  the	  right	  to	  make	  the	  execution	  of	  letters	  rogatory	  for	  search	  or	  seizure	  of	  property	  dependent	  on	  one	  or	  more	  of	  the	  following	  conditions:	  that	  the	  offence	  motivating	  the	  letters	   rogatory	   is	   punishable	   under	   both	   the	   law	   of	   the	   requesting	   Party	   and	   the	   law	   of	   the	  requested	  Party;	  that	  the	  offence	  motivating	  the	  letters	  rogatory	  is	  an	  extraditable	  offence	  in	  the	  requested	   country;	   that	   execution	   of	   the	   letters	   rogatory	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	   law	   of	   the	  requested	  Party.	  Where	  a	  Contracting	  Party	  makes	  a	  declaration	  in	  accordance	  with	  paragraph	  1	  of	   this	   article,	   any	   other	   Party	  may	   apply	   reciprocity.	   The	   Schengen	   Convention	  modified	   that	  provision	   in	   Article	   51:	   The	   Contracting	   Parties	   may	   not	   make	   the	   admissibility	   of	   letters	  rogatory	   for	   search	   or	   seizure	   dependent	   on	   conditions	   other	   than	   the	   following:	   (a)	   the	   act	  giving	   rise	   to	   the	   letters	   rogatory	   is	  punishable	  under	   the	   law	  of	  both	  Contracting	  Parties	  by	  a	  penalty	  involving	  deprivation	  of	  liberty	  or	  a	  detention	  order	  of	  a	  maximum	  period	  of	  at	  least	  six	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maintaining	  dual	  criminality	  requirements	  is	  left	  to	  the	  discretion	  of	  the	  Member	  States.	  	  	  However,	  there	  were	  discussions	  of	  retaining	  the	  dual	  criminality	  principle	  and	  now	   it	   seems	   that	   there	  would	  be	   the	  possibility	  of	  applying	  a	  dual	   criminality	  test	  in	  relation	  to	  certain	  types	  of	  crime	  (the	  same	  list	  as	  under	  the	  EEW	  –	  except	  a	   special	   safeguard	   for	   Germany	  would	   be	   dropped)	   and	   in	   relation	   to	   certain	  types	  of	  evidence	  gathering	  (but	  not	  as	  regards	  search	  and	  seizure	  generally,	  as	  the	  current	  EU	  and	  Council	  of	  Europe	  rules	  provide).	   It	   is	  evident	   that	   the	  new	  legislative	  initiative	  on	  the	  EIO	  has	  the	  ambition	  of	  raising	  the	  stakes	  as	  far	  as	  the	  unhindered	   cooperation	   between	   law	   enforcement	   powers	   in	   Europe	   are	  concerned.	   A	   new	   type	   of	   bargaining	   appears	   to	   be	   introduced	   in	   which	   the	  negotiations	  are	  hugely	  depicted	   in	   the	   text	  of	   the	  draft	  proposal.	   It	   is	  as	   if	   the	  first	   draft	   had	   absolutely	   no	   guarantees	  with	   respect	   to	   human	   rights	   and	   the	  updated	  version	  of	  it	  just	  some	  safeguards	  but	  not	  enough.	  	  	  All	   in	   all,	   the	   eventual	   introduction	   of	   dual	   criminality	   seems	   to	   differentiate	  from	  its	  previous	  expressions.	  The	  problem	  is	  that	  the	  gradual	  abolition	  of	  dual	  criminality	   is	   intolerable.	   The	   attempt	   of	   its	   total	   abolition	   in	   the	   EIO	   fails	   to	  comprehend	  the	  pertaining	  issues.	  The	  dual	  criminality	  concept	  as	  it	  is	  construed	  in	  the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision	  is	  problematic.	  The	  same	  and	  even	  more	  could	  be	   obviously	   said	   about	   its	   total	   absence	   here.	   This	   is	   regarded	   as	   a	   step	  backwards.	  A	  fair	  criminal	  concept	  in	  Europe	  cannot	  operate	  (at	  the	  moment	  due	  to	   lack	   of	   common	   procedural	   standards)	   without	   a	  mutual	   recognition	  mode	  that	  goes	  hand	  in	  hand	  with	  the	  dual	  criminality	  check	  principle.	  The	  application	  of	   dual	   criminality	   in	   the	   new	   EIO	   seems	   to	   be	   at	   the	   moment	   an	   optional	  scenario.	  In	  addition,	  there	  are	  limitations	  compared	  to	  the	  corresponding	  EEW	  provision	  that	  are	  not	   justified.	  Furthering	  cooperation	   in	  criminal	  matters	  will	  only	   succeed	  when	   it	   is	   based	  on	  mutual	   trust	   supported	  by	   transparent	   rules	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  months,	  or	   is	  punishable	  under	   the	   law	  of	  one	  of	   the	   two	  Contracting	  Parties	  by	  an	  equivalent	  penalty	  and	  under	   the	   law	  of	   the	  other	  Contracting	  Party	  by	  virtue	  of	  being	  an	   infringement	  of	  the	   rules	   of	   law	   which	   is	   being	   prosecuted	   by	   the	   administrative	   authorities,	   and	   where	   the	  decision	  may	  give	  rise	  to	  proceedings	  before	  a	  court	  having	  jurisdiction	  in	  particular	  in	  criminal	  matters;	   (b)	   execution	   of	   the	   letters	   rogatory	   is	   consistent	   with	   the	   law	   of	   the	   requested	  Contracting	  Party.	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that	   advance	   fairness,	   not	   by	   an	   urgent	   political	   agenda	   that	   insults	   the	   very	  essence	  of	  European	  legal	  tradition.	  	  	  7.4.3.3.	  Territoriality	  
	  In	  addition,	   for	   the	   first	   time	   in	  any	  EU	   instrument,	   the	   territoriality	  exception	  will	  not	  be	  included.	  This	  is	  the	  case	  for	  both	  the	  original	  draft	  and	  the	  following	  to	   that,	   amendments.	   The	   territoriality	   clause	   certainly	   construes	   an	   extra	  safeguard	  for	  the	  protection	  of	  the	  citizen	  and	  defence	  rights.	  In	  an	  indirect	  way	  it	   makes	   the	   state	   of	   play	   more	   transparent	   for	   the	   parties	   involved	   in	   the	  proceedings.	   It	   might	   not	   be	   the	   clause	   that	   is	   absolutely	   necessary	   so	   that	   a	  fairer	  evidence	  gathering	  is	  conducted	  in	  Europe,	  but	  it	  is	  true	  that	  it	  is	  helpful.	  Its	  abolition	  shows	  emphatically	  the	  inclination	  of	  the	  member	  states	  to	  reduce	  the	  obstacles	  to	  a	  judicial	  cooperation	  without	  hindrances.	  	  	  
	  7.4.3.4.	  Use	  of	  Personal	  Data	  	  	  Moreover,	  the	  specific	  conditions	  under	  which	  the	  use	  of	  personal	  data	  is	  lawful	  according	   to	   the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision	  do	  not	   appear	   in	   the	  new	  EIO.701	  It	  might	   be	   the	   case	   that	   the	   Framework	  Decision	   on	   personal	   data702	  will	   apply	  here	   or	   the	   2000	   Convention	   on	  mutual	   assistance,703	  but	   nothing	   is	   explicitly	  mentioned	   about	   that.	   On	   the	   top	   of	   that	   the	   alternatives	   that	   the	   executing	  Member	  State	  has	  under	  the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision,	  to	  choose	  the	  measures	  which	  under	  its	  national	  law	  will	  ensure	  the	  provision	  of	  the	  evidence	  sought	  by	  an	   EEW	   and	   to	   decide	   whether	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	   use	   coercive	   measures,	   will	  disappear.704	  Also,	   the	   same	   will	   apply	   to	   the	   validation	   procedure	   that	   the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  701	  Art	  10	  of	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision.	  	  702	  Council	   Framework	   Decision	   2008/977/JHA	   of	   27	   November	   2008	   on	   the	   protection	   of	  personal	  data	  processed	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  police	  and	  judicial	  cooperation	  in	  criminal	  matters	  (OJ	  L	  350,	  30	  December	  2008,	  p	  60-­‐71.	  703	  In	  particular	  Article	  23	  on	  personal	  data	  protection.	  	  704	  Art	  11§2	  of	  the	  EEW	  Framework	  Decision.	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executing	  Member	  State	  was	  entitled	  to	  carry	  out	  if	  the	  issuing	  authority	  is	  not	  a	  judge,	  a	  court,	  an	  investigating	  magistrate	  or	  a	  public	  prosecutor.705	  	  	  Another	   issue	   related	   to	   the	   use	   of	   personal	   data	   is	   data	   protection	   and	  confidentiality.	  The	  confidentiality	  of	  information	  contained	  in	  the	  EIO	  is	  closely	  linked	  with	  the	  application	  of	  a	  data	  protection	  regime	  to	  this	   information.	  The	  member	   states	  made	   explicit	   during	   their	   discussions	   that	   the	   data	   protection	  regime	  set	  out	  by	  the	  Council	  Framework	  Decision	  2008/977/JHA	  is	  applicable	  to	   the	   information	   transferred	   to	   the	   issuing	  Member	   State	   on	   the	   basis	   of	   an	  EIO.	   In	   the	   course	  of	   several	  discussions,	   the	  delegations	  of	   the	  member	   states	  were	  ready	  to	  agree	  on	  an	  additional	  recital	  clarifying	  that	  the	  provisions	  of	  the	  Council	   Framework	   Decision	   2008/977/JHA	   will	   apply	   to	   the	   processing	   of	  personal	  data	  transmitted	   in	  the	   framework	  of	   the	  Directive	  regarding	  the	  EIO.	  This	  recital	  changed	  due	  to	  doubts	  expressed	  by	  delegations	  about	  the	  suggested	  new	   recital	   by	   the	   Presidency.	   The	   new	   recital	   states	   that	   personal	   data	  processed,	   when	   implementing	   the	   EIO	   Directive,	   should	   be	   protected	   in	  accordance	   with	   the	   provisions	   applicable	   to	   the	   protection	   of	   personal	   data	  processed	   in	   the	   framework	   of	   police	   and	   judicial	   cooperation	   in	   criminal	  matters	   and	   with	   relevant	   international	   instruments	   in	   this	   field.	   For	   further	  clarification	   of	   the	   matter	   there	   is	   article	   18	   on	   confidentiality	   where	   a	  paragraph	  2b	  is	  introduced:	  ‘Personal	  data	  shall	  not	  be	  further	  processed,	  in	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  application	  of	  EIO,	  in	  a	  way	  incompatible	  with	  those	  purposes	  laid	  down	  in	  this	  Directive’.	  	  
	  
7.4.4.	  European	  Investigation	  Order	  Procedural	  Safeguards	  	  	  7.4.4.1.	  In	  the	  issuing	  state	  	  	  The	  proposal	   for	   the	  new	  EIO	  both	  under	  Articles	  8	  para	  2706	  (recognition	  and	  execution)	   and	   15707	  (obligation	   to	   inform)	   makes	   provisions	   for	   procedural	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  705	  See	  also	  Art	  11§4.	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safeguards	   in	   the	   issuing	   state.	  The	  draft	   for	   the	  new	  Directive	   restates	  almost	  verbatim	   article	   12	   of	   the	   EEW	   about	   the	   formalities	   to	   be	   followed	   in	   the	  executing	  state.	  However,	  here	  there	  is	  no	  reference	  to	  coercive	  measures	  which	  apparently	  are	  to	  be	  included	  in	  the	  broader	  scope	  of	  the	  European	  Investigation	  Order.	  	  	  The	  obligation	  of	   the	   executing	   authority	   to	   inform	   the	   issuing	   state	   regarding	  matters	   that	  demand	   immediate	  decisions	  corresponds	   to	   the	  principle	   that	  all	  decisions	   should	  be	   transparent	  by	   reasons	   given	   considering	   them,	  which	  are	  put	   in	   paper.	   According	   to	   the	   draft	   of	   the	   EIO,	   the	   executing	   authority	   shall	  inform	  the	  issuing	  authority	  by	  any	  means	  and	  immediately	  if	  the	  decision	  of	  the	  execution	   or	   recognition	   is	   made	   impossible	   due	   to	   incompleteness	   or	  incorrectness	   of	   the	   form	   for	   the	   EIO.	   In	   addition,	   the	   same	   shall	   apply	   if	   the	  executing	  authority,	  in	  the	  course	  of	  the	  execution	  of	  the	  EIO,	  considers	  without	  further	  enquiries	  that	  it	  may	  be	  appropriate	  to	  undertake	  investigative	  measures	  not	  initially	  foreseen,	  or	  which	  could	  not	  be	  specified	  when	  the	  EIO	  was	  issued,	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  the	  issuing	  authority	  to	  take	  further	  action	  in	  the	  specific	  case.	  If	  the	  formalities	  and	  procedures	  referred	  to	  article	  para	  2	  and	  indicated	  by	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  706	  ‘The	  executing	  authority	  shall	  comply	  with	  the	  formalities	  and	  procedures	  expressly	  indicated	  by	   the	   issuing	   authority	   unless	   otherwise	   provided	   in	   this	   Directive	   and	   provided	   that	   such	  formalities	  and	  procedures	  are	  not	  contrary	  to	  the	  fundamental	  principles	  of	  law	  of	  the	  executing	  State’.	  707	  ‘1.	  The	  competent	  authority	  in	  the	  executing	  State	  which	  receives	  the	  EIO	  shall,	  without	  delay	  and	  in	  any	  case	  within	  a	  week	  of	  the	  reception	  of	  an	  EIO,	  acknowledge	  this	  reception	  by	  filling	  in	  and	   sending	   the	   form	   provided	   in	   Annex	   B.	  Where	   a	   central	   authority	   has	   been	   designated	   in	  accordance	  with	  Article	  6(2),	  this	  obligation	  is	  applicable	  both	  to	  the	  central	  authority	  and	  to	  the	  executing	   authority	   which	   receives	   the	   EIO	   via	   the	   central	   authority.	   In	   cases	   referred	   to	   in	  Article	  6(5),	  this	  obligation	  applies	  both	  to	  the	  competent	  authority	  which	  initially	  received	  the	  EIO	  and	  to	  the	  executing	  authority	  to	  which	  the	  EIO	  is	  finally	  transmitted.	  2.	  Without	  prejudice	  to	  Article	  9(2),	   the	  executing	  authority	   shall	   inform	   the	   issuing	  authority:	   (a)	   immediately	  by	  any	  means:	  (i)	  if	   it	   is	  impossible	  for	  the	  executing	  authority	  to	  take	  a	  decision	  on	  the	  recognition	  or	  execution	   due	   to	   the	   fact	   that	   the	   form	   provided	   for	   in	   the	   Annex	   is	   incomplete	   or	  manifestly	  incorrect;	   (ii)	   if	   the	   executing	   authority,	   in	   the	   course	   of	   the	   execution	   of	   the	   EIO,	   considers	  without	   further	   enquiries	   that	   it	  may	   be	   appropriate	   to	   undertake	   investigative	  measures	   not	  initially	  foreseen,	  or	  which	  could	  not	  be	  specified	  when	  the	  EIO	  was	  issued,	  in	  order	  to	  enable	  the	  issuing	   authority	   to	   take	   further	   action	   in	   the	   specific	   case;	   (iii)	   if	   the	   executing	   authority	  establishes	  that,	  in	  the	  specific	  case,	  it	  cannot	  comply	  with	  formalities	  and	  procedures	  expressly	  indicated	   by	   the	   issuing	   authority	   in	   accordance	   with	   Article	   8’.	   Upon	   request	   by	   the	   issuing	  authority,	  the	  information	  shall	  be	  confirmed	  without	  delay	  by	  any	  means	  capable	  of	  producing	  a	  written	  record;	  (b)	  without	  delay	  by	  any	  means	  capable	  of	  producing	  a	  written	  record:	  (i)	  of	  any	  decision	   taken	   in	   accordance	  with	   Article	   10(1);	   (ii)	   of	   the	   postponement	   of	   the	   execution	   or	  recognition	   of	   the	   EIO,	   the	   underlying	   reasons	   and,	   if	   possible,	   the	   expected	   duration	   of	   the	  postponement.	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issuing	  state	  cannot	  be	  complied	  with,	  then	  the	  executing	  authority	  should	  also	  inform	  the	  issuing	  authority	  about	  that.	  The	  importance	  of	  the	  written	  records	  is	  also	  upheld,	  but	  unfortunately	  only	  as	  a	  possibility.	  Upon	  request,	  by	  the	  issuing	  authority,	   the	   information	   shall	   be	   confirmed	   without	   delay	   by	   any	   means	  capable	  of	  producing	  a	  written	  record.	  	  	  Moreover,	   the	   executing	   authority	   should	   inform	   the	   issuing	   authority	  without	  delay	   (by	   any	   means	   capable	   of	   producing	   a	   written	   record)	   of	   any	   decision	  taken	  for	  non-­‐execution	  or	  non-­‐recognition	  and	  also	  of	  the	  postponement	  of	  the	  execution	  or	  recognition	  of	  the	  EIO,	  the	  underlying	  reasons	  and,	   if	  possible,	  the	  expected	  duration	  of	  the	  postponement.	  However	  a	  number	  of	  delegations	  of	  the	  member	  states	  was	  of	   the	  opinion	   that	   the	  provision	  of	   information	  may	  make	  the	   procedure	   cumbersome	   and	   cause	   too	  much	   of	   red	   tape	   for	   the	   executing	  authorities.	   These	   member	   states	   consequently	   proposed	   that	   the	   scope	   of	  information	   to	   be	   provided	   might	   be	   reduced.	   However,	   the	   opinion	   that	  prevailed	  was	   that	   all	   the	   information	  which	   is	   provisioned	   to	   be	   given	  would	  logically	  be	  provided	  by	   the	  executing	  authority	   in	  order	   to	   effectively	   execute	  the	  EIO.708	  	  
	  
	  7.4.4.2.	  In	  the	  executing	  state	  	  
	  As	   far	   as	   the	   grounds	   for	   non-­‐recognition	   or	   non-­‐execution	   of	   an	   EIO,	   the	  proposal	   states:	   1.	   Recognition	   or	   execution	   of	   the	   EIO	  may	   be	   refused	   in	   the	  executing	  State:	  –	  a)	   if	   there	  is	  an	  immunity	  or	  a	  privilege	  under	  the	   law	  of	  the	  executing	  State	  which	  makes	  it	  impossible	  to	  execute	  the	  EIO;	  –	  b)	  if,	  in	  a	  specific	  case,	   its	   execution	  would	  harm	  essential	   national	   security	   interests,	   jeopardise	  the	  source	  of	  the	  information	  or	  involve	  the	  use	  of	  classified	  information	  relating	  to	  specific	  intelligence	  activities;	  –	  c)	  if,	  in	  the	  cases	  mentioned	  in	  Article	  9	  (1)(a)	  and	   (b),	   there	   is	   no	   other	   investigative	   measure	   available	   which	   will	   make	   it	  possible	   to	   achieve	   a	   similar	   result;	   or	   d)	   if	   the	   EIO	   has	   been	   issued	   in	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  708	  The	  Presidency	  however	   invited	   the	  delegations	   to	  submit	   further	  suggestions	   they	  deemed	  appropriate	  in	  respect	  of	  this	  provision.	  
 250 
proceedings	   referred	   to	   in	  Article	  4	   (b)	  and	   (c)	  and	   the	  measure	  would	  not	  be	  authorised	   in	  a	  similar	  national	  case.	  –	  2.	   In	   the	  cases	  referred	   to	   in	  paragraph	  1(b)	   and	   (c),	   before	   deciding	   not	   to	   recognise	   or	   not	   to	   execute	   an	  EIO,	   either	  totally	  or	   in	  part,	   the	  executing	  authority	  shall	  consult	   the	   issuing	  authority,	  by	  any	   appropriate	   means,	   and	   shall,	   where	   appropriate,	   ask	   it	   to	   supply	   any	  necessary	  information	  without	  delay	  (Article	  10).	  	  	  What	  is	  striking	  is	  the	  annihilation	  of	  grounds	  for	  refusal	  that	  traditionally	  used	  to	   be	   in	   the	   arsenal	   of	   a	   Member	   State	   either	   refusing	   a	   request	   for	   mutual	  assistance	   or	   the	   execution	   of	   an	   arrest	   or	   evidence	   warrant.	   The	   greatest	  example	  of	  that,	  is	  the	  abolition	  of	  double	  jeopardy	  as	  a	  basis	  for	  refusal	  (ne	  bis	  in	  
idem	  principle).709	  Ne	   bis	   in	   idem	   is	   a	   concept	   met	   both	   in	   the	   EAW	   and	   EEW	  (plus	   freezing	   orders)	   and	   it	   is	   also	   enclosed	   as	   a	   right	   in	   the	   EU’s	   Charter	   of	  Fundamental	   Rights	   (Article	   50).710	  However,	   there	  would	   now	   be	   an	   optional	  general	  exception	  relating	  to	  double	  jeopardy.	  	  	  The	  updated	  draft	  proposal	  on	  the	  EIO	  includes	  a	  new	  recital	  (12a)	  that	  declares	  that	   the	   principle	   of	   ne	   bis	   in	   idem	   is	   a	   fundamental	   principle	   of	   law	   in	   the	  European	  Union.	  Therefore	  the	  executing	  authority	  should	  be	  entitled	  to	  refuse	  the	  execution	  of	  an	  EIO	  if	  its	  execution	  would	  be	  contrary	  to	  such	  principle.	  Given	  the	   preliminary	   nature	   of	   the	   proceedings	   underlying	   an	   EIO,	   this	   ground	   for	  refusal	   should	   only	   be	   used	   by	   the	   executing	   authority	   when	   it	   is	   firmly	  confirmed	  that	  the	  trial	  of	  the	  person	  concerned	  has	  been	  finally	  disposed	  of	  for	  the	  same	  facts	  and	  under	  the	  conditions	  set	  out	  in	  Article	  54	  of	  the	  Convention	  of	  19	  June	  1990	  implementing	  the	  Schengen	  Agreement.	  Such	  ground	  for	  refusal	  is	  without	   prejudice	   to	   the	   obligation	   of	   the	   executing	   authority	   to	   consult	   the	  issuing	   authority	   in	   accordance	   with	   Council	   Framework	   Decision	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  709	  M	   Fletcher,	   ‘Some	   developments	   to	   the	   ne	   bis	   in	   idem	   principle	   in	   the	   European	   Union:	  Criminal	   Proceedings	   against	  Hüseyin	  Gözütok	   and	  Klaus	  Brügge’,	  The	  Modern	  Law	  Review,	   Vol.	  66,	  2003,	  pp	  769-­‐780.	  710	  Article	   50:	   Right	   not	   to	   be	   tried	   or	   punished	   twice	   in	   criminal	   proceedings	   for	   the	   same	  criminal	  offence.	  No	  one	  shall	  be	  liable	  to	  be	  tried	  or	  punished	  again	  in	  criminal	  proceedings	  for	  an	  offence	  for	  which	  he	  or	  she	  has	  already	  been	  finally	  acquitted	  or	  convicted	  within	  the	  Union	  in	  accordance	  with	  the	  law.	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2009/948/JHA	  of	  30	  November	  2009	  on	  prevention	  and	  settlement	  of	  conflicts	  of	  exercise	  of	  jurisdiction	  in	  criminal	  proceedings.711	  	  	  7.4.4.3.	  For	  the	  interested	  parties	  
	  Moreover,	  the	  proposal	  was	  completely	  vague	  on	  the	  matter	  of	  legal	  remedies.	  It	  seemed	  that	  these	  remedies	  may	  be	  weakened	  compared	  to	  those	  of	  the	  EEW.712	  This	   led	   the	  Commission	   to	   comment	   that	   although	   agrees	   that	   legal	   remedies	  should	  be	  available	  for	  persons	  affected	  by	  an	  EIO,	  consideration	  should	  be	  given	  to	   describing	   these	   remedies	   in	  more	   detail,	   as	   it	  was	   done	   in	   the	   Framework	  Decision	  on	  the	  European	  Evidence	  Warrant.713	  The	  updated	  version	  of	  the	  draft	  proposal	  came	  up	  with	  a	  new	  article	  13.	  	  	  There	   were	   many	   discussions	   regarding	   legal	   remedies.	   The	   discussions	  addressed	  two	  main	  issues.	  The	  first	  of	  them	  addressed	  the	  question	  of	  relation	  of	  the	  legal	  remedies	  provided	  for	  in	  Article	  13	  with	  the	  legal	  remedies	  already	  existing	  under	  national	  law.	  The	  majority	  of	  delegations	  were	  of	  the	  opinion	  that	  the	  directive	  should	  not	  be	  understood	  as	  imposing	  upon	  the	  Member	  States	  any	  obligation	  to	  provide	  more	  legal	  remedies	  than	  what	  is	  available	  in	  respect	  of	  the	  same	  investigative	  measures	  carried	  out	  in	  a	  similar	  national	  case.	  Secondly,	  the	  relationship	  between	  Article	  13	  and	  other	  Articles	  was	  examined	  (deadlines	  for	  recognition	   or	   execution,	   transfer	   of	   evidence,	   grounds	   for	   postponement	   of	  recognition	  or	  execution).	  	  The	  main	  issue	  was	  that	  most	  of	  the	  delegations	  could	  not	  accept	  to	  create	  new	  legal	  remedies	  in	  their	  national	  law	  specific	  to	  the	  issuing	  or	  the	  executing	  of	  an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  711	  OJ	  L	  328,	  15.12.2009,	  p	  42.	  712	  Art	  18	  of	  the	  Framework	  Decision	  on	  EEW.	  	  713	  Furthermore,	   it	   is	  stated	  that	   ‘in	  doing	  so,	  the	  EU	  legislator	  must	  take	  due	  account	  of	  Article	  47(1)	   of	   the	   Charter	   of	   Fundamental	   Rights,	   in	   particular	   in	   so	   far	   as	   the	   right	   to	   an	   effective	  remedy	  under	  the	  Charter	  requires	  access	  to	  a	  court	  (administrative	  bodies	  are	  not	  sufficient)’.	  Commission	  comments	  on	  proposed	  European	  Investigation	  Order.	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EIO.714	  Therefore	  Member	  States	  agreed	  that	  they	  should	  ensure	  the	  applicability	  of	   legal	   remedies	  which	   already	   exist	   in	   their	   national	   law.	   Accordingly	   as	   the	  rules	  on	  legal	  remedies	  concern	  national	  law,	  Article	  13	  does	  not	  define	  the	  time	  limit	  within	  which	  a	  legal	  remedy	  can	  be	  applied	  for,	  and	  the	  suspension	  of	  the	  execution	   is	  also	   to	  be	  defined	  by	   the	  relevant	  national	   law.	  However,	  Member	  States	  should	  take	  the	  necessary	  measures	  to	  facilitate	  the	  exercise	  of	  the	  right	  to	  a	   legal	   remedy	   which	   includes	   the	   obligation	   to	   inform.	   In	   order	   to	   address	  concerns	   voiced	   by	   delegations,	   the	   Presidency	   proposed	   a	   new	   wording	   of	  Article	  13.715	  	  As	  a	  counterbalance	  to	  all	   that,	  Article	  1§3	  of	   the	  proposal	  expresses	  that:	  This	  Directive	   shall	   not	   have	   the	   effect	   of	   modifying	   the	   obligation	   to	   respect	   the	  fundamental	  rights	  and	  fundamental	  legal	  principles	  as	  enshrined	  in	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  Treaty,	  and	  any	  obligations	  incumbent	  on	  judicial	  authorities	  in	  this	  respect	  shall	   remain	   unaffected.	   This	   Directive	   shall	   likewise	   not	   have	   the	   effect	   of	  requiring	   Member	   States	   to	   take	   any	   measures	   in	   contradiction	   of	   its	  constitutional	  rules	  relating	  to	  freedom	  of	  association,	  freedom	  of	  the	  press	  and	  freedom	   of	   expression	   in	   other	   media.	   However,	   such	   general	   and	   wispy	  provisions	   require	   interpretation	   and	   it	   is	   clear	   that	   the	  Court	   of	   Justice	   is	   the	  only	  agent	  that	  can	  resolve	  the	  danger	  of	  vacuum	  of	  rights,	  which	  seems	  to	  have	  appeared.	   There	   is	   a	   need	   for	   more	   precise	   legislation	   so	   that	   detailed	  obligations	  to	  the	  protection	  of	  human	  rights	  can	  be	  undertaken	  by	  the	  Member	  States.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  714	  This	   has	   been	   reflected	   in	   the	   new	   recital	   and	   in	   paragraph	   (2)	   Article	   13:	   ‘The	   persons	  subject	  to	  or	  affected	  by	  the	  proceedings	  for	  which	  the	  EIO	  has	  been	  issued	  should	  have	  the	  right	  to	  challenge	  the	  EIO	  in	  accordance	  with	  procedures	  in	  national	  law.	  This	  right	  does	  not	  entail	  an	  obligation	   for	  Member	   States	   to	   provide	   for	   a	   separate	  mechanism	   or	   complaint	   procedure	   in	  which	  the	  issue	  or	  the	  execution	  of	  an	  EIO	  may	  be	  challenged	  and	  should	  not	  prejudice	  the	  time	  limits	  applicable	  to	  the	  execution	  of	  an	  EIO’.	  715	  See	  also	  the	  proposed	  addition	  to	  the	  recital	  13	  in	  the	  negotiation	  paper	  of	  February	  the	  29th	  2012	  regarding	  the	  availability	  of	  legal	  remedies:	  ‘Although	  the	  situation	  is	  properly	  targeted	  by	  art.	   13.3,	   the	   current	   wording	   of	   Recital	   13	   a	   may	   offer	   the	   false	   impression	   that	   substantial	  matters	  may	   be	   challenged	   at	   the	   level	   of	   the	   executing	   authority.	   The	   consultations	  with	   the	  issuing	  authority	  mentioned	  in	  the	  recital	  should	  be	  complemented	  with	  the	  clear	  indication	  that	  these	  consultations	  are	  but	  a	  way	  to	  convey	  to	   the	   issuing	  authority	   the	  allegations,	  but	  do	  not	  constitute	  a	   remedy	  before	   the	  executing	  authority,	  nor	  a	   substitute	   for	   the	   remedy	   to	  be	   filed	  before	  the	  issuing	  authority’.	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7.5.	  In	  the	  light	  of	  fairness	  
	  Is	   fairness	   as	  described	   in	   this	   thesis	   going	   to	   affect	   any	  of	   the	  decisions	   to	  be	  made	  in	  the	  future	  on	  this	  European	  Investigation	  Order	  initiative?	  What	  are	  the	  things	   that	   should	   the	   negotiators	   hold	   high	   in	   their	   prioritising	   and	   agendas?	  Fortunately,	   the	   progress	   of	   the	   legislative	   drafts	   in	   relation	   to	   human	   rights	  justifies	  optimism.	  	  	  The	  original	  draft	  proposal	   to	   the	  new	  EIO	  was	   rather	   rough	  regarding	  human	  rights.	   Human	   rights	   provisions	   should	   have	   been	   stated	   more	   forcefully	   and	  stronger.	   No	   doubt	   why	   there	   is	   so	   much	   scepticism	   with	   respect	   to	  constitutional	   issues	  when	  negotiations	   produce	   texts	   like	   that.716	  Mutual	   trust	  cannot	  be	  guaranteed	  without	  some	  rules.	  	  	  There	  are	  some	  improvements	  as	  regards	  the	  ne	  bis	  in	  idem	  principle	  and	  that	  of	  proportionality.	   The	   exception	   of	   double	   jeopardy	   is	   provisioned	   as	   optional	  though	  and	  this	  is	  not	  satisfactory.	  It	  should	  have	  been	  mandatory	  otherwise	  this	  improvement	  will	  not	  be	  substantially	  effective.	  There	  are	  other	  changes	  as	  well	  which	   although	   move	   to	   the	   right	   direction,	   do	   not	   go	   far	   enough	   (data	  protection,	  double	  criminality,	  validation	  procedures,	  etc.)	  	  Unfortunately,	  the	  shadow	  that	  threatens	  human	  rights	  and	  state	  self-­‐defining	  is	  still	   imminent	   as	   the	   issue	   of	   proportionality	   remains	   unresolved	   and	   the	  tendency	   towards	   human	   rights	   does	   not	   seem	   to	   change	   drastically.	   The	  simultaneous	   abolition	   of	   principles	   like	   territoriality	   and	   double	   criminality	  raises	  a	  lot	  of	  issues	  with	  respect	  to	  human	  rights,	  breach	  of	  fundamental	  articles	  of	  the	  ECHR	  (in	  which	  the	  EU	  accesses)	  and	  the	  basic	  concepts	  of	  criminal	  law.717	  	  Fairness,	   the	  principle	  of	   fair	   trial	  as	   it	   is	   construed	   in	   the	  ECtHR	  case	   law	   is	  a	  concept	  that	  could	  help	  in	  resolving	  some	  of	  the	  controversies	  mentioned	  above	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  716	  See	   S	   Peers,	   Statewatch	   Analysis	   –	   Update,	   The	   Proposed	   European	   Investigation	   Order,	   24	  November	  2010.	  717	  See	  G	  Kaiser	   and	  H-­‐J	  Albrecht,	  Crime	  and	  Criminal	  Policy	   in	  Europe,	   Freiburg,	   1990,	  pp	  285-­‐292.	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related	  to	  evidence	  matters.	  In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  thesis,	  it	  was	  acknowledged	  that	  transnational	  law	  enforcement	  is	  one	  of	  the	  areas	  that	  currently	  attract	  a	  lot	  of	  attention	  and	  have	  given	  rise	  to	  significant	  controversy	  within	  the	  European	  Union.	   Its	   practical	   importance	   is	   without	   doubt	   great	   both	   for	   prosecution	  authorities	  and	  EU	  citizens.	  The	  approach	  of	   transnational	   law	  enforcement	  on	  the	   basis	   of	   common,	   shared	   fundamental	   procedural	   principles	   must	  concentrate	   on	   the	   protection	   of	   the	   citizen.	   Such	   an	   approach	   will	   focus	   on	  European	   legal	   values	   and	  will	   respond	   to	   a	   convergence	   of	   several	   European	  criminal	   procedural	   laws	   that	   respects	   its	   very	   substance.	   The	   phase	   of	  investigation	  in	  transnational	  law	  enforcement	  in	  the	  EU	  is	  laden	  with	  problems.	  This	  part	  of	  the	  process	  is	  particularly	  significant	  as	  the	  investigation	  is	  normally	  conducted	  in	  more	  than	  one	  state.	  	  	  The	   recent	   mutual	   recognition	   instruments	   initiatives	   show	   the	   will	   of	   the	  European	   Union	   to	   pursue	   a	   more	   substantial	   cooperation	   in	   criminal	   justice	  between	  Member	  States.	  Although	  the	  level	  of	  trust	  between	  them	  is	  expressed	  only	   by	   ambitious	   legislative	   measures,	   which	   the	   implementation	   procedure	  often	  belies,	  there	  are	  reasons	  to	  believe	  that	  the	  mutual	  trust	  will	  grow.	  For	  this	  to	  happen	  and	  not	  prove	  to	  be	  an	  unrealistic	  wishful	  thinking,	  a	  more	  systematic	  approach	   to	   European	   legal	   heritage	   needs	   to	   be	   envisaged.	   The	   general	  principles	  of	  EU	  Law	  further	  honed	  can	  provide	  us	  with	  a	  concept	  of	  evidential	  fairness,	  which	  can	  be	  validly	  utilised	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  judicial	  cooperation	  in	  criminal	  matters.	  	  The	   fair	   criminal	   evidence	   concept	   in	   Europe	   embodying	   principles	   such	   as	  triangular	   adversarial	   proceedings,	   reasoned	   judgments,	   humane	   treatment	   of	  the	   individuals	   involved	   in	   the	   proceedings	   and	   the	   presumption	   of	   innocence	  hand	   in	  hand	  with	   the	  principles	  of	   legality	  paves	   the	  way	   to	  mutual	   trust	   that	  leads	  to	  a	  well	  established	  mutual	  recognition.	  Double	  criminality	  of	  the	  crimes,	  transparency	   in	   the	   proceedings	   and	   protection	   of	   the	   accused	   persons	   is	   the	  threefold	   demand	   for	   a	   fairer	   evidence	   management.	   The	   final	   text	   for	   a	  European	  Investigation	  Order	  should	  take	  into	  account	  these	  needs	  and	  attempt	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to	   put	   them	   in	   words	   for	   a	   judicial	   cooperation	   in	   criminal	   matters	   that	   is	  gradually	  building	  up	  a	  Europe	  characterised	  by	  freedom,	  security	  and	  justice.	  	  
	  
	  
7.6.	  Fairness	  in	  mutual	  recognition	  	  
	  There	  is	   indeed	  space	  of	  a	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept	  in	  mutual	  recognition	  regimes.718	  The	   findings	  of	   this	   thesis	   so	   far	   support	   the	  view	   that	   fairness	   is	  a	  concrete	   moral	   category	   that	   produces	   and	   shapes	   tools	   and	   forms	   of	  cooperation	  such	  as	  mutual	  recognition.	  The	  latter	  as	  such	  a	  mechanism	  belongs	  to	  a	  different	  category	  of	  principles.719	  	  	  	  
7.6.1.	  Boundaries	  in	  transnational	  governance	  and	  the	  issue	  of	  democracy	  	  
	  It	  is	  time	  to	  return	  to	  some	  of	  the	  reflections	  we	  developed	  before	  on	  the	  issue	  of	  democracy.	   Both	   the	   qualitative	   difference	   and	  harmonization	   arguments	   have	  on	   them	   strong	   strings	   attached	   to	   legitimacy.	   Indeed,	   any	   concept,	   idea	   or	  system	  of	  transnational	  governance	  can	  be	  sustainable	  only	  if	  it	  is	  legitimate.720	  Moreover,	  closing	  the	  related	  discourse	  on	  mutual	  recognition,	  one	  should	  pose	  the	   question:	   is	  mutual	   recognition	   a	   remedy	   to	   all	   problems	   of	   transnational	  governance?	  When	  should	   it	   apply	  and	  when	  should	   it	  not?	   Is	  EU	  criminal	   law	  such	   a	   non-­‐applicable	   area?	   The	   answers	   to	   such	   questions	   bring	   the	   line	   of	  thinking	  back	  to	  Carroll’s	  queries	  put	  masterfully	  in	  the	  mouth	  of	  Alice.	  	  	  Mutual	   recognition	   regimes	   can	   also	   require	   that	   all	   actors	   involved	   in	   the	  process	  provide	  reasoned	  decisions.721	  The	  element	  of	  transparency	  is	  essential	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  718	  See	  also	  J	  Chalmers	  and	  F	  Leverick,	   ‘Fair	  Labelling	  in	  Criminal	  Law’,	  The	  Modern	  Law	  Review,	  Vol.	  71,	  No.	  2,	  2008,	  p	  217-­‐246.	  719	  CC	  Murphy,	   ‘The	   European	   Evidence	  Warrant:	   Mutual	   Recognition	   and	  Mutual	   (Dis)Trust?’	  (September	   1,	   2010),	  Crime	  within	   the	  Area	  of	  Freedom,	  Security	  and	   Justice:	  A	  European	  Public	  
Order,	   Eckes,	   Konstadinides,	   eds.,	   Cambridge	   University	   Press,	   2011.	   Available	   at	   SSRN:	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1701956.	  720	  K	  Nicolaidis	  and	  G	  Shaffer,	   ‘Transnational	  Mutual	  Recognition	  Regimes:	  Governance	  without	  Global	  Government’,	  in	  298.	  721	  Ibid.	  in	  302.	  
 256 
for	   legitimacy.	   The	   aim	   of	   transparency,	   reasoned	   justifications,	   and	   judicial	  review	  mechanisms	  is	  to	  empower	  publics	  and	  public	  advocates,	  wherever	  they	  are	   located,	   to	   oversee	   regulators.722	  Giving	   reasoning	   for	   decision-­‐making	   is	   a	  safety	   belt	   for	   transparency	   and	   legitimacy	   indeed.	   But	   is	   this	   enough?	   The	  recognition	  in	  areas	  that	  differ	  like	  the	  internal	  market	  and	  the	  criminal	  law	  raise	  more	  worries.	  	  The	   recognition	   as	   such	   in	   these	   two	   fields	   has	   automatically	   a	   different	  character.	   Mutual	   recognition	   in	   the	   internal	   market	   aims	   at	   recognising	  standards	   and	   controls	   that	   are	   in	   force	   in	   different	   legal	   orders,	   so	   that	   free	  movement	  of	  goods,	  services,	  products	  and	  persons	  operates	  more	  smoothly.723	  Apart	   from	   that	   mutual	   recognition	   in	   the	   internal	   market 724 	  deals	   with	  legislative	   and	   administrative	   authorities.	   The	   recognition	   of	   judicial	   decisions	  which	   is	   part	   of	   the	  mutual	   recognition	   in	   criminal	  matters	   is	   something	   else.	  These	   judicial	   decisions	   have	   a	   great	   impact	   in	   the	   lives	   of	   individuals	   as	   they	  involve	   human	   rights	   restrictions,	   such	   as	   arrests,	   extraditions,	   investigative	  measures,	  orders	  that	  resemble	  to	  penalties.	  There	  is	  here,	  a	  different	  approach	  to	   rights.	   While	   mutual	   recognition	   in	   the	   internal	   market	   enables	   the	   better	  functioning	   of	   rights	   in	   the	   private	   sector	   for	   the	   needs	   of	   the	   market	   itself,	  mutual	  recognition	  in	  criminal	  matters	  is	  seen	  primarily	  as	  a	  restriction	  to	  rights.	  This	  is	  an	  element	  inherent	  in	  criminal	  law.	  But	  at	  the	  same	  time	  it	  is	  the	  reason	  –as	  one	  could	  argue–	  why	   the	   transplantation	  of	   the	  mutual	   recognition	   to	   the	  area	   of	   freedom,	   security	   and	   justice	   cannot	   operate	   automatically	   without	  human	  rights	  taken	  into	  serious	  consideration.	  	  Nevertheless,	   the	   principle	   behind	   mutual	   recognition,	   whether	   it	   is	   in	   the	  internal	  market	  or	  the	  sphere	  of	  criminal	  law	  is	  the	  same,	  namely	  the	  recognition	  of	   national	   standards	   by	   other	   EU	   Member	   States.	   In	   that	   sense,	   recognition	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  722	  Ibid.	  in	  308.	  723	  K	   Armstrong,	   ‘Mutual	   Recognition’,	   in	   C	   Barnard	   and	   J	   Scott,	  The	  Law	  of	   the	   Single	  Market:	  
Unpacking	  the	  Premises,	  Oxford,	  Hart	  Publishing,	  2002,	  p	  225-­‐267.	  724	  M	  Dougan,	   ‘Minimum	  Harmonization	  and	  the	   Internal	  Market’,	  Vol.	  37,	  Common	  Market	  Law	  
Review,	  (2000),	  p	  853.	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creates	   extraterritoriality	   as	   already	   supported.725 	  By	   this	   it	   is	   meant	   that	  national	   standards	   must	   be	   validated	   and	   accepted	   in	   an	   area	   beyond	   the	  borders	  of	  the	  national	  state	  that	  has	  introduced	  them.	  This	  will	  happen	  only	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  mutual	  trust	  with	  a	  minimum	  of	  formality.726	  The	  EU	  Member	  States	  recognising	  these	  standards	  are	  called	  to	  accept	  measures	  that	  are	  substantially	  part	   of	   the	   national	   legislation	   of	   a	   fellow	   Member	   State	   and	   seemingly	   have	  nothing	   to	   do	   with	   legal	   standards	   introduced	   by	   the	   common	   procedures	   of	  European	   Law.	   So	   that	   surprises	   may	   be	   avoided	   the	   development	   of	   certain	  mechanisms	   and	   filters	   that	   will	   stop	   potential	   total	   automaticity	   has	   been	  established.	   That	   fact	   of	   course	   doesn’t	   make	   mutual	   recognition	   in	   criminal	  matters	   easier.	   The	   nature	   of	   criminal	   law	   which	   is	   strongly	   linked	   to	   the	  national	  state	  has	  raised	  issues	  that	  might	  lead	  to	  constitutional	  changes	  both	  in	  EU	  and	  national	  level.	  	  Constitutional	   concerns	   become	   more	   concrete	   as	   the	   instruments	   of	   mutual	  recognition	   in	   criminal	  matters	  have	  been	   adopted	   through	   the	   years.	  A	  major	  issue	  is	  the	  abolition	  or	  not	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  dual	  criminality.	  The	  advocates	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  argue	  that	  the	  whole	  concept	  of	  dual	  criminality	  requirement	  is	  logically	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  very	  idea	  of	  mutual	  recognition.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	   opposite	   view	   finds	   a	   strong	   link	   of	   dual	   criminality	   requirement	  with	   the	  principle	  of	  legality.	  Many	  Member	  States	  enclose	  in	  their	  national	  constitutional	  texts	   the	   nullum	   crimen	   sine	   lege	   principle.	   As	   a	   result	   it	   would	   be	  constitutionally	   unacceptable	   for	   a	   Member	   State	   to	   recognise	   or	   execute	   a	  measure	  with	  a	  penal	  character	  against	  one	  of	  its	  citizens	  for	  a	  crime	  that	  is	  not	  described	  in	  any	  national	  legal	  text.	  	  	  Another	   concern	   of	   the	   same	   nature	   refers	   to	   the	   link	   between	   legality	   and	  legitimacy	   of	   criminal	   law	   at	   national	   and	   EU	   level.	   Mutual	   recognition	  overshadows	  the	  traditional	  concept	  of	  rule	  of	   law	  on	  a	  national	   level.	  Criminal	  law	  which	  is	  close	  to	  the	  core	  of	  the	  idea	  of	  the	  sovereign	  state,	  sets	  out	  the	  rules	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  725	  K	  Nicolaidis	  and	  G	  Shaffer,	   ‘Transnational	  Mutual	  Recognition	  Regimes:	  Governance	  without	  Global	  Government’,	  p	  267.	  726	  V	  Mitsilegas,	  ‘The	  Constitutional	  Implications	  of	  Mutual	  above	  Recognition	  in	  Criminal	  Matters	  in	  the	  European	  Union’,	  Common	  Market	  Law	  Review,	  vol	  43,	  2006,	  pp	  1281-­‐82.	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for	  the	  punishable	  criminal	  behaviour	  of	  the	  individuals	  and	  the	  power	  that	  the	  state	  is	  entitled	  to	  use	  in	  order	  to	  maintain	  peace,	  freedom	  and	  security.	  Criminal	  law	  is	  the	  product	  of	  a	  democratic	  process	  in	  which	  the	  rules	  adopted	  are	  clear	  and	   known.	   Hence,	   legitimacy	   and	   legality	   go	   hand	   in	   hand.	   Contrary	   to	   this	  framework,	  mutual	  recognition	  brings	   into	  the	  scene	  rules	  that	  are	  not	  directly	  the	  object	  of	  a	  democratic	  process.	  	  	  Some	   would	   debate	   that	   the	   situation	   that	   emerges	   is	   far	   from	   secure	   for	  individuals.	  While	  co-­‐operation	  in	  criminal	  matters	  aims	  at	  establishing	  an	  area	  of	   freedom,	   security	   and	   justice,	   the	   danger	   that	   these	   three	   values	   may	   be	  undermined	   is	   imminent,	   as	   many	   would	   reckon.	   It	   is	   true	   that	   the	   criminals	  should	   not	   benefit	   from	   the	   abolition	   of	   borders	   in	   the	   EU	   but	   the	   measures	  taken	  against	  that	  threat	  should	  not	  apply	  at	  the	  expense	  of	  fundamental	  rights	  of	  the	  rest	  of	  European	  citizens.	  Here,	  a	  dangerously	  unbalanced	  legal	  landscape	  is	  drawn.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	   there	   is	   the	   individual	  potentially	  participating	   in	  a	  criminal	   process	   and	   on	   the	   other	   hand	   is	   the	   judiciary	   and	   most	   of	   all	  prosecutorial	   state	  power.	  The	  rights	  of	   the	   first	   seem	  to	  be	  blurred,	  while	   the	  flexibility	  of	  the	  latter	  grows	  in	  efficiency	  and	  swiftness.	  It	  might	  be	  the	  case	  that	  through	  mutual	  recognition	  well	  established	  rights	  for	  the	  prosecuted	  might	  be	  obscured,	   while	   extraterritorial	   law	   enforcement	   can	   expeditiously	   impose	  punitive	  measures.	  	  	  Foremost	   at	   stake	   are	   the	   rights	   of	   the	   individual	   and	  more	   concretely	   of	   the	  suspect,	  prosecuted	  or	  accused	  person.	  The	  issue	  of	  human	  rights	  protection	  is	  a	  matter	   that	   puts	   to	   the	   test	   the	   long	   discussed	  mutual	   trust	   between	  Member	  States.727	  The	   latter	   is	   an	   issue	   highly	   disputed.728	  No	   matter	   how	   much	   trust	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  727	  It	  is	  interesting	  anyhow,	  that	  the	  instruments	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  take	  this	  trust	  for	  granted,	  as	   it	   is	   shown	   from	   the	   recitals	   of	   both	   EAW	   and	   EEW	   (Recital	   8).	   ‘The	   mechanism	   of	   the	  European	   arrest	   warrant	   is	   based	   on	   a	   high	   level	   of	   confidence	   between	   Member	   States.	   Its	  implementation	  may	  be	  suspended	  only	  in	  the	  event	  of	  a	  serious	  and	  persistent	  breach	  by	  one	  of	  the	  Member	   States	   of	   the	   principles	   set	   out	   in	   Article	   6(1)	   of	   the	   Treaty	   on	   European	   Union,	  determined	  by	  the	  Council	  pursuant	  to	  Article	  7(1)	  of	  the	  said	  Treaty	  with	  the	  consequences	  set	  out	   in	  Article	   7(2)	   thereof’	   (Recital	   10,	   EAW).	   And	   also:	   ‘Cooperation	   between	  Member	   States,	  based	   on	   the	   principle	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   and	   immediate	   execution	   of	   judicial	   decisions,	  presupposes	  confidence	  that	  the	  decisions	  to	  be	  recognised	  and	  enforced	  will	  always	  be	  taken	  in	  compliance	  with	   the	   principles	   of	   legality,	   subsidiarity	   and	   proportionality’	   (Recital	   4,	   Council	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exists	   between	   Member	   States,	   there	   is	   certainly	   a	   considerable	   amount	   of	  mistrust	  that	  casts	  its	  shadow	  over	  the	  co-­‐operation	  in	  criminal	  matters	  in	  terms	  of	   mutual	   recognition.	   Human	   rights	   concerns	   are	   one	   of	   the	   categories	   that	  create	  that	  lack	  of	  reliance	  from	  one	  legal	  order	  to	  another.	  The	  individual	  needs	  to	  be	  armed	  with	  clear	  cut	  rights	  and	  therefore	  defended	  against	  an	  all	  powerful	  supranational	  prosecutorial	  regime.	  Many	  of	  these	  concerns	  are	  linked	  to	  other	  –of	   the	   same	   nature	   but	   even–	   broader	   constitutional	   issues.	   The	   national	  constitution	   can	   be	   easily	   left	   aside	   while	   the	   aims	   of	   efficiency	   in	   combating	  crime	   are	   pursued.	   Last	   but	   not	   least,	   in	   all	   that	   there	   is	   an	   implicit	   lack	   of	  confidence	   towards	   the	   unknown	   legal	   systems	   of	   other	   Member	   States.	   The	  sovereignty	  of	  the	  modern	  state	  in	  a	  postmodern	  world	  is	  threatened	  and	  it	  is	  a	  hard	  to	  accept	  threat	  since	  there	  are	  so	  many	  concerns	  related	  to	  human	  rights,	  constitutional	   law	   and	   state	   sovereignty.	   As	   counterbalance	   for	   all	   these	  concerns,	   appear	   a	   series	   of	   safeguards	   in	   the	   legislation	   introducing	   mutual	  recognition	  instruments.	  	  	  It	   is	   evident	   from	   the	   reluctance	  of	   certain	  national	   courts	   that	   there	   is	   strong	  awareness	   of	   all	   these	   problems	   related	   to	   democracy,	   legitimacy	   and	  constitutional	   law.	   An	   example	   comes	   from	   the	   attitude	   of	   BGH	  (Bundesverfassungsgericht)	   towards	   the	   European	   Arrest	   Warrant.	   ‘For	   the	  prosecuted	  person,	  transfer	  to	  another	  Member	  State’s	  legal	  system,	  even	  though	  it	   has	   been	   brought	   closer	   by	   European	   integration,	   not	   only	   means	  discrimination	   under	   procedural	   law,	  which	   can	   consist	   in	   language	   obstacles,	  cultural	   differences	   and	   different	   procedural	   law	   and	   possibilities	   of	   defence.	  Such	  transfer	  ultimately	  ties	  the	  prosecuted	  person	  to	  a	  substantive	  criminal	  law	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  Framework	  Decision	  2003/577/JHA	  of	  22	  July	  2003	  on	  the	  execution	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  of	  orders	  freezing	  property	  or	  evidence).	  728	  An	   example	   that	   contrasts	   the	   confidence	   proclaimed	   in	   the	   recitals	   of	   mutual	   recognition	  instruments	  are	  often	  debates	   in	  national	  parliaments.	  The	  debate	  on	   the	  2003	  Extradition	  Act	  (legislation	  for	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant)	  included	  lively	  oppositions	  and	  comments	  in	  the	  UK.	  David	  Cameron,	  then	  only	  an	  MP	  for	  the	  Conservative	  Party,	  stood	  out	  against	  the	  abolition	  of	  dual	  criminality	  stating:	  ‘To	  put	  the	  matter	  in	  tabloid	  form,	  the	  Minister	  is	  not	  telling	  us	  to	  trust	  the	  current	  Greek,	  Portuguese	  or	  Spanish	  criminal	  justice	  systems.	  Instead,	  he	  is	  saying	  that	  we	  must	  trust	  any	  criminal	  justice	  system	  of	  any	  present	  or	  future	  EU	  country	  not	  as	  it	  is	  today	  but	  as	  it	  may	  be	  decades	  in	  the	  future’	  (Hansard,	  25	  March	  2003,	  col	  197).	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in	   respect	   of	   which	   no	   democratic	   means	   had	   existed	   for	   him	   or	   her	   to	  participate	  in	  its	  creation’.729	  	  
	  
	  
7.6.2.	  Fairness	  in	  Mutual	  Recognition	  revisited	  
	  As	  mentioned	  above,	  many	  would	   argue	   that	   the	  key	   for	   an	   efficient	   and	  well-­‐established	  co-­‐operation	  in	  criminal	  matters	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  is	   a	   certain	   point	   of	   harmonisation	   in	   legislation.	   Although,	   many	   crucial	  differences	   remain	   between	   different	   criminal	   procedural	   systems	   in	   Europe,	  there	  are	  minimum	  standards	  provided	  that	  are	  common	  and	  serve	  as	  a	  platform	  of	   harmonised	   legislation.	   The	   ECHR	   provides	   for	   such	   standards.730	  This	   fact	  however,	  doesn’t	  imply	  that,	  because	  all	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  EU	  are	  signatories	  to	  the	  ECHR	  and	  the	  Union	  itself	  acknowledges	  its	  validity,	  mutual	  trust	  happens	  automatically.	   Different	   judicial	   decisions	   by	   national	   judicial	   authorities	   have	  proven	   the	   controversy	   of	   this	  matter.	   Two	   examples	   are	   Germany	   and	   Czech	  Republic,	  the	  courts	  of	  which	  came	  to	  different	  conclusions	  on	  the	  occasion	  of	  the	  European	  Arrest	  Warrant	  and	  its	  compliance	  with	  the	  national	  constitutions.731	  	  	  The	   German	   Constitutional	   Court	   held	   that	   ‘the	   existence	   of	   an	   all-­‐European	  standard	  of	  human	  rights	  protection	  established	  by	  the	  European	  Convention	  for	  the	   Protection	   of	   Human	   Rights	   and	   Fundamental	   Freedoms	   do	   not,	   however,	  justify	  the	  assumption	  that	  the	  rule-­‐of-­‐law	  structures	  are	  synchronised	  between	  the	  Member	  States	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  as	  regards	  substantive	  law	  and	  that	  a	  corresponding	   examination	   at	   the	   national	   level	   on	   a	   case-­‐by-­‐case	   basis	   is	  therefore	  superfluous’.732	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  Europäischer	  Haftbefehl	  113	  BVerfGE	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  (2005),	  86.	  730	  Articles	  5-­‐7	  (Liberty	  &	  Security,	  Fair	  Trial,	  Retrospectivity).	  731	  CC	  Murphy,	   ‘The	   European	   Evidence	  Warrant:	   Mutual	   Recognition	   and	  Mutual	   (Dis)Trust?’	  (September	   1,	   2010),	  Crime	  within	   the	  Area	  of	  Freedom,	  Security	  and	   Justice:	  A	  European	  Public	  
Order,	   Eckes,	   Konstadinides,	   eds.,	   Cambridge	   University	   Press,	   2011.	   Available	   at	   SSRN:	  http://ssrn.com/abstract=1701956,	  pp	  14-­‐15.	  732	  Europäischer	  Haftbefehl	  113	  BVerfGE	  273	  (2005).	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On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  Czech	  Court	  takes	  the	  opposite	  view:	  ‘The	  contemporary	  standard	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   fundamental	   rights	   within	   the	   European	   Union	  does	   not,	   in	   the	   Constitutional	   Court’s	   view,	   give	   rise	   to	   any	   presumption	   that	  this	   standard	   for	   the	   protection	   of	   fundamental	   rights,	   through	   invoking	   the	  principles	   arising	   therefrom,	   is	   of	   a	   lesser	   quality	   than	   the	   level	   of	   protection	  provided	  in	  the	  Czech	  Republic’.733	  	  Nevertheless,	  a	  European	  criminal	  evidence	  concept,	  as	  was	  examined	  in	  the	  first	  part,	   can	   steadily	   forward	  mutual	   trust	   in	   criminal	  matters.	   The	   ideal	   starting	  point	   for	   the	   attempt	   of	   understanding	   and	   forwarding	   a	   European	   criminal	  evidence	   concept	   on	   the	   grounds	   of	   fairness	   is	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   and	   the	  Court’s	   case	   law.	   The	   main	   reason	   for	   that	   is	   the	   Article	   6	   of	   the	   Convention	  which	  sets	   the	   ‘right	   to	  a	   fair	   trial’	   in	  criminal	  cases.	   In	  addition,	   the	  Council	  of	  Europe	   is	   the	   oldest	   international	   organisation	   working	   towards	   European	  integration	   and	   all	   its	   members	   are	   also	   EU	  member-­‐states.	   Furthermore,	   the	  Treaty	   on	   European	   Union	   (Maastricht	   Treaty)	   proclaims	   the	   respect	   of	  fundamental	  rights	  as	  guaranteed	  in	  the	  ECHR,	  providing	  substantial	  proof	  that	  there	  is	  also	  a	  legislative	  thread	  of	  inheritance	  between	  the	  two	  organisations.734	  As	  commented	  above,	   this	  argument	  may	  be	  enough	   for	  establishing	  minimum	  standards,	  but	  it	   is	  insufficient	  for	  something	  more,	  i.e.	  substantial	  mutual	  trust	  between	  Member	  States.	  The	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  doesn’t	   seem	   to	  be	  sufficient	   in	  itself	  to	  raise	  or	  keep	  high	  the	  standards	  of	  protection.	  The	  mutual	  trust	   that	   the	  principle	  of	  mutual	   recognition	  needs	  as	  a	   fuel	   should	   find	  other	  (but	  not	  necessarily	  different)	  foundations.	  	  Although	  the	  ECHR	  is	  part	  of	  the	  legal	  inheritance	  of	  both	  Member	  States	  and	  the	  EU	  as	  a	  whole	  this	  does	  not	  automatically	  operate	  as	  a	  shield	  for	  the	  protection	  of	   human	   rights.	   Violations	   of	   human	   rights	   and	   individual	   applications	   to	   the	  European	  Court	  of	  human	  rights,	  as	  well	  Member	  State	  convictions	  is	  a	  statistical	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  733	  Judgment	  of	  the	  Czech	  Constitutional	  Court	  3	  May	  2006	  Pl	  Ús	  66/04.	  734	  See	  Article	  F	  para	  2	  of	  Maastricht	  Treaty:	   ‘2.	  The	  Union	   shall	   respect	   fundamental	   rights,	   as	  guaranteed	  by	   the	  European	  Convention	   for	   the	  Protection	  of	  Human	  Rights	   and	  Fundamental	  Freedoms	   signed	   in	   Rome	   on	   4	   November	   1950	   and	   as	   they	   result	   from	   the	   constitutional	  traditions	  common	  to	  the	  Member	  States,	  as	  general	  principles	  of	  Community	  law’.	  	  
 262 
reality,	   steady	   through	   the	   years. 735 	  However,	   the	   systematic	   approach	   of	  ECtHR’s	   case	   law	   in	   relation	   to	   evidence	   law	   can	   raise	   high	   the	   standards	   of	  protection,	   constituting	   a	   basis	   for	   a	   harmonised	   legislation	   that	   exceeds	   the	  usual	   minimum	   standards.	   Whether	   the	   ECHR	   is	   considered	   to	   be	   too	   low	   a	  minimum	  common	  standard	  or	  not,	  additional	  EU	  legislation	  is	  needed	  in	  order	  to	  envisage	  solid	  mutual	  trust.	  This	  could	  happen	  through	  harmonisation	  or	  the	  introduction	   of	   stronger	   minimum	   standards	   in	   criminal	   procedure.	   Both	  solutions	  could	  be	  supported	  by	  common	  evidence	  rules	  referring	  to	  the	  fairness	  of	  criminal	  procedures.	  	  	  	  7.6.2.1.	  Future	  of	  EU	  
	  There	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  fear	  that	  all	  these	  discussions	  and	  plans	  might	  prove	  redundant	  and	   superfluous.	   The	   European	   Bank	   System	   crisis	   and	   the	   Eurozone	   turmoil	  have	   shaken	   the	   world.	   Sceptics	   of	   all	   kinds	   strengthen	   their	   voices	   as	   the	  evidence	  coming	   from	   financial	  markets,	  productivity	  and	  competition	  seem	   to	  prove	   them	   right.	   Further	   unification	   between	  member-­‐states	   appears	   to	   be	   a	  far-­‐fetched	   goal	   nowadays,	   when	   there	   is	   doubt	   on	   the	   existing	   unified	  components	  of	   the	  European	  Union	  enterprise	  and	  a	  big	  shadow	  cast	  upon	  the	  Treaties	  themselves.	  	  	  7.6.2.2.	  Future	  of	  Fairness	  
	  The	  future	  of	  fairness	  within	  this	  entire	  crisis	  seems	  to	  be	  rather	  secured.	  Fear	  is	  most	  of	  times	  a	  bad	  council	  to	  governments	  and	  crime	  combating	  strategies	  but	  the	   fair	   trial	   is	   a	   concept	  well	   established	   and	   a	   given	   that	   it	   is	   desired	   to	   be	  further	  improved	  and	  sustained.	  Demands	  for	  quick	  responses	  to	  crime	  and	  swift	  sanctions	  might	  strengthen	  their	  voice	  particularly	  in	  the	  area	  of	  financial	  crime	  and	  tax	  related	  offences.	  The	  accession	  of	  the	  European	  Union	  as	  a	  whole	  to	  the	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  735	  See	   also	   among	   others	   S	   Greer,	   The	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights:	   Achievements,	  
Problems	  and	  Prospects	  (Cambridge,	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2006).	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European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  proves	  that	  an	  optimistic	  approach	  is	  not	  unrealistic.	  This	  step	  will	   inevitably	  function	  as	  a	  basis	  to	  better	  understanding	  and	   clear	   dialogue	   between	   different	   legal	   systems	   and	   criminal	   processes,	  paving	  the	  way	  to	  substantial	  mutual	  trust	  and	  further	  harmonisation.	  
	  
	  7.6.2.3.	  Future	  hope	  
	  In	  spite	  of	  all	  the	  problems	  and	  concerns	  about	  the	  future	  of	  a	  united	  Europe	  the	  realisation	   of	   this	   concept	   is	   a	   progressing	   phenomenon.	   The	   expressed	  historical	  will	  of	   the	  dominant	  nations	  of	   this	  continent	  after	  World	  War	   II	   is	  a	  united	  front,	  a	  view	  of	  strategically	  great	  importance	  for	  international	  relations	  and	  dynamics	  between	  sovereign	  states.	  	  	  
Conclusions	  
	  In	  the	  first	  part	  of	  this	  thesis,	  it	  was	  argued	  that	  there	  is	  a	  line	  of	  legal	  inheritance	  between	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe.	  On	   the	  basis	  of	   this,	  a	  conception	  of	   fair	  criminal	  evidence	  systematically	  coherent	  with	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  and	  the	  case	  law	  of	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  was	   attempted.	   A	   reading	   of	   Article	   6	  was	   proposed	   that	   illustrated	   its	  constellation	   with	   evidential	   characteristics,	   as	   well	   as	   an	   intra-­‐systemic	  coexistence	  of	  legal	  concepts	  such	  as	  fairness,	  evidence	  and	  criminal	  procedure.	  This	  argument	  brought	  up	  the	  interdependence	  of	   fairness	  and	  evidence	  law	  in	  criminal	  matters	  in	  a	  realm	  such	  as	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	  that	  through	  its	  legal	  tradition	   has	   many	   elements	   to	   add	   to	   the	   discussions	   in	   the	   EU	   on	   judicial	  cooperation	  in	  criminal	  matters.	  	  	  The	  conception	  of	  European	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  came	  down	  to	  principles	  that	  create	  a	  strong	  core	  of	  European	  Criminal	  Law	  and	  Procedure	  maxim.	  This	  is	  not	  qualified	  as	  a	  legal	  tradition	  followed	  by	  all	  member	  states	  of	  the	  EU,	  since	  many	  of	   them	   fall	   short	   of	   it	   up	   to	   a	   certain	   extent.	   At	   the	   same	   time,	   it	   does	   not	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embody	  a	  common	  (low	  or	  high)	  denominator	  of	  standards	  for	  the	  same	  reason	  and	  also	  because	  all	  of	  them	  are	  rooted	  in	  the	  idea	  of	  fairness	  which	  is	  accepted	  by	   all	   member	   states	   in	   both	   a	   substantive	   and	   a	   formalistic	   way.	   The	   latter	  refers	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  all	  member	  states	  are	  signatories	  to	  the	  Convention	  and	  the	  former	   is	   that	   through	   the	   ECtHR’s	   case	   law	   the	   concept	   of	   fairness	   has	   been	  moulded	  within	  their	  national	  legal	  orders.	  	  	  Moving	   from	   conception	   to	   application	   the	   idea	   of	   fairness	   seems	   to	   be	   an	  element	   that	   can	   helpfully	   and	   constructively	   interact	   with	   the	   principle	   of	  mutual	   recognition.	  Mutual	   recognition	   in	   its	  nature	   is	   in	  need	  of	   concepts	   like	  that	   in	   order	   to	   be	   adjusted	   and	   fine-­‐tuned	   for	   the	   particular	   purposes	   of	   its	  application.	  The	  principle	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  constitutes	  an	  inevitable	  start	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  EU	  Criminal	  Law	  as	   it	   is	   the	  dominant	  means	  by	  which	  the	  will	  of	  member	   states	   is	   expressed	   in	   evidence	   matters.	   Both	   its	   validity	   as	   a	   legal	  principle	   and	   its	   transplant	   in	   criminal	   matters	   has	   been	   highly	   contested.	  However,	  it	  is	  a	  principle	  functioning	  in	  federal	  states	  throughout	  the	  world	  and	  also	  produced	  by	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Justice.	  Indeed,	  the	  adoption	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  happened	  in	  a	  way	  that	  it	  is	  cohesive	  with	  the	  production	  of	  other	  EU	  general	  principles	  as	  well	  as	  the	  Union’s	  very	  needs	  and	  evolution.	  	  	  A	  further	  approach	  to	  mutual	  recognition	  as	  an	  administrative	  tool	  showed	  that	  it	  has	  its	  own	  identity	  in	  terms	  of	  attributes	  and	  characteristics.	  Here	  is	  the	  space	  where	  mutual	  recognition	  and	  fairness	  actually	  can	  meet.	  A	  well-­‐construed	  and	  understood	   model	   of	   fair	   criminal	   evidence	   in	   Europe	   could	   serve	   as	   the	  calibrating	   factor	   for	   the	   controversial	   and	   often	   suspicious	   role	   of	   mutual	  recognition	   in	   criminal	  matters.	   It	   is	   evident	   that	  mutual	   recognition	   is	   not	   an	  absolute	  principle	  but	  on	  the	  contrary	  needs	  to	  be	  balanced.	  In	  fact,	  it	  is	  a	  part	  of	  what	   it	  represents:	   this	  genuine	  need	  to	  be	  specifically	  graduated	  to	   its	   field	  of	  operation.	   A	  managed	   form	   of	  mutual	   recognition	   in	   criminal	  matters	   through	  fairness	  is	  therefore	  the	  starting	  point	  of	  application.	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This	   is	   further	   explained	   in	  more	   practical	   terms	   in	   the	   context	   of	   the	   related	  legal	  instruments	  with	  respect	  to	  evidence	  law.	  The	  principle	  of	  dual	  criminality	  is	  fundamental	  both	  for	  mutual	  recognition	  in	  criminal	  evidence	  matters	  and	  the	  realisation	  of	   the	   fair	   criminal	   evidence	  with	   its	  multifaceted	   references.	  Apart	  from	  that	  a	  maximum	  standard	  of	  protection	  needs	  to	  be	  introduced	  so	  that	  the	  accused	  through	  the	  defence	  can	  be	  protected	  and	  contribute	  considerably	  to	  the	  management	  of	  evidence	  in	  every	  stage	  of	  the	  criminal	  process.	  By	  a	  maximum	  standard	  of	  protection	  the	  intention	  of	  avoiding	  the	  pitfall	  of	  the	  lowest	  possible	  common	  denominator	  is	  implied.	  This	  standard	  needs	  to	  satisfy	  the	  principles	  of	  fairness	   in	  evidence	   law	  as	   they	  were	  prescribed	   in	   the	   first	  part.	  All	   in	  all,	   the	  fair	   criminal	   evidence	   demand	   is	   a	   concept	   worth	   pursuing	   in	   the	   EU	   and	  consistent	  with	  the	  European	  legal	  system	  both	  in	  its	  national	  and	  supranational	  aspect.	  Fairness	  is	  a	  key	  principle	  that	  is	  well	  conceived	  in	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe,	  well	   known	   by	   the	   European	   States	   and	   applicable	   in	   judicial	   cooperation	   in	  criminal	  matters	  at	  an	  EU	  level	  with	  regard	  to	  evidence.	  	  A	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept	  in	  Europe	  as	  it	  emanates	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  Council	   of	   Europe	   is	   not	   by	   any	  means	   a	   definitive	   answer	   to	   the	   problems	   of	  transnational	  evidence	  gathering	  and	  admissibility.	  It	  does	  not	  have	  the	  ambition	  of	  providing	  an	  overall	   solution	   to	   judicial	   cooperation	   in	  EU	  criminal	  matters.	  Nevertheless,	   its	   core	   points	   out	   that	   there	   is	   indeed	   a	  minimum	   that	   forms	   a	  European	  tradition	  on	  criminal	  evidence	  matters	  and	  serves	  as	  a	  compass	  for	  the	  future	   whether	   this	   is	   mutual	   recognition	   or	   further	   cooperation.	   The	   EU	  member	   states	  do	  already	  accommodate	   these	  principles.	   Concepts	  of	   law	   that	  are	  already	  known	  need	  to	  be	  identified	  and	  decoded	  into	  those	  principles	  that	  in	  principle	  every	  European	  legal	  order	  follows.	  It	  might	  be	  the	  case	  that	  some	  of	  them	  need	  to	  calibrate	  aspects	  of	  their	  criminal	  processes	  to	  meet	  their	  purpose	  and	  this	  forms	  a	  solider	  platform	  for	  trust	  and	  therefore	  cooperation.	  There	  are	  indeed	   little	   steps	   of	   good	   will	   that	   are	   required	   from	   different	   criminal	  processes	   in	   Europe	   so	   that	   there	   is	   a	   basis	   that	   even	   if	   it	   is	   not	   regarded	   as	  enough	   in	   itself	   for	   trust	  and	  cooperation	  serves	  as	  a	   fundamental	  cornerstone	  for	  the	  future.	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8.	  Conclusions	  
	  The	  threat	  of	  transnational	  crime	  in	  the	  united	  Europe	  creates	  the	  demand	  of	  a	  counter-­‐criminal	   policy	   that	   forwards	   further	   judicial	   cooperation	   in	   criminal	  matters	  within	  the	  European	  Union.	  This	  is	  imperative	  too	  for	  the	  gathering	  and	  admissibility	   of	   evidence.	   Judicial	   authorities	   and	   law	   enforcement	   agencies	  should	   work	   together	   more	   closely	   and	   efficiently	   in	   a	   way	   that	   is	   legally	  coherent	  and	  protective	  of	  the	  European	  citizen.	  	  This	  is	  not	  a	  task	  without	  obstacles	  since	  the	  area	  of	  criminal	  law	  is	  special.	  It	  is	  the	  part	  of	  law	  closest	  to	  the	  core	  of	  state	  sovereignty	  and	  linked	  with	  the	  most	  fundamental	  of	  the	  human	  rights.	  Criminal	  evidence	  as	  part	  of	  the	  criminal	  law	  is	  also	  a	  discipline	  with	  different	  rules	  and	  practices	  among	  the	  different	  European	  legal	  orders,	  systems	  and	  traditions.	  	  The	  only	  place	  where	  a	  constructive	  start	  can	  be	  found	  in	  relation	  to	  a	  European	  consensus	  on	  criminal	   law	  is	   the	  Council	  of	  Europe.	  Every	  member	  state	  of	   the	  European	   Union	   is	   a	   member	   of	   the	   Council	   of	   Europe	   and	   all	   of	   them	   are	  signatories	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights.	  Soon	  the	  accession	  of	  the	   whole	   European	   Union	   in	   the	   Convention	   will	   highlight	   the	   strong	   link	  between	  the	  two	  organisations.	  	  Article	  6	  of	  the	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  is	  a	  legal	  text	  that	  has	  an	  internal	   logic	   illustrating	   the	   interdependence	  of	  different	   concepts	  of	   criminal	  law	   such	   as	   criminal	   procedure,	   criminal	   evidence	   and	   criminal	   trial	   fairness.	  The	   whole	   Article	   can	   be	   interpreted	   through	   the	   lens	   of	   criminal	   evidence	  presenting	   a	   coherent	   concept	   of	   criminal	   evidence	   that	   is	   fair	   and	   affects	   the	  criminal	  procedures	  of	  the	  European	  countries	  that	  have	  implemented	  it	  in	  their	  legislation.	  	  Through	  the	  door	  of	  individual	  applications	  the	  European	  Court	  of	  Human	  Rights	  in	  Strasbourg	  has	  already	  applied	  this	  concept	  in	  a	  subtle	  fashion.	  Although	  the	  Court’s	   purpose	   is	   not	   the	   creation	   of	   a	   common	   European	   criminal	   evidence	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tradition,	  its	  judgments	  are	  further	  honing	  the	  logic	  of	  Article	  6	  and	  formulating	  basic	  principles	  of	  this	  concept	  of	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  in	  Europe.	  	  These	  principles	  emanate	  from	  Article	  6	  paragraph	  1	  and	  2.	  They	  put	  forward	  a	  triangular	  model	  of	  adversarial	  proceedings	  and	  handling	  of	  evidence.	  The	  judge	  is	  impartial.	  The	  prosecution	  and	  the	  defence	  have	  the	  same	  opportunities.	  The	  defence	  is	  regarded	  as	  equal	  during	  the	  proceedings	  having	  the	  same	  position	  as	  the	  prosecution.	  This	  means	  that	  the	  accused	  should	  be	  presumed	  innocent	  and	  armed	  with	  rights.	  Schematically	  this	  triangle	  needs	  to	  be	  equilateral.	  Triangular	  adversarialism,	   reasoned	   judgements,	   presumption	   of	   innocence	   and	   humane	  treatment	  are	  the	  principles	  that	  constitute	  this	  concept	  of	  evidence.	  	  European	   criminal	   law	   can	   apply	   these	   principles	   in	   the	   area	   of	   judicial	  cooperation	  in	  criminal	  matters	  calibrating	  cooperation	  in	  accordance	  with	  a	  fair	  criminal	   evidence	   concept.	   Gathering	   and	   admissibility	   of	   evidence	   is	   a	  matter	  high	  in	  the	  European	  Union	  agenda.	  	  Cooperation	   in	   the	   European	   Union	   is	   synonymous	   with	   mutual	   recognition,	  which	  is	  the	  motor	  of	  it.	  Further	  harmonisation	  can	  also	  benefit	  from	  the	  concept	  of	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  acquiring	  shape	  and	  content.	  Every	  form	  of	  cooperation	  in	  fact	  can	  use	  it,	  since	  it	  builds	  upon	  the	  idea	  of	  mutual	  trust.	  	  The	   intrinsic	   and	   inherent	   characteristics	   of	  mutual	   recognition	   as	   a	  means	   of	  administration	  qualify	  it	  as	  ideal	  for	  furthering	  cooperation	  in	  areas	  such	  as	  this	  of	  European	  criminal	  law	  where	  there	  are	  a	  lot	  of	  differences	  between	  different	  systems.	   These	   differences	   and	   difficulties	   should	   not	   be	   overlooked	   since	   the	  utmost	  purpose	  of	  furthering	  cooperation	  in	  criminal	  matters	  is	  the	  protection	  of	  the	   citizen.	   Combating	   crime	   can	   never	   be	   a	   means	   to	   an	   end	   that	   deprives	  people	  of	  their	  rights.	  	  Mutual	  recognition’s	  managed	  character	  is	  a	  platform	  open	  to	  be	  moulded	  by	  the	  principles	  of	   fair	  criminal	  evidence.	   It	   is	  possible	   for	   this	  administrative	   tool	   to	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absorb	   and	   interpret	   the	   specialness	   of	   criminal	   law	   taking	   into	   account	   state	  sovereignty,	  rule	  of	  law	  and	  human	  rights.	  	  Mutual	   recognition	   has	   been	   tested	   in	   criminal	   cooperation	   in	   other	   contexts	  such	   as	   the	   United	   States	   of	   America	   and	   Switzerland.	   The	   arguments	   that	  support	   the	   view	   that	   mutual	   recognition	   is	   unfitted	   for	   matters	   related	   to	  criminal	   law	   are	   therefore	   reductionistic.	   It	   is	   not	   a	   moral	   category,	   but	   it	  qualifies	   as	   a	   legal	   one	   as	   a	   type	   of	   procedure	   and	   administration	   open	   to	  changes	  by	  moral	  concepts	  that	  sharpen	  its	  functions.	  	  Another	   element	   important	   to	   mutual	   recognition	   is	   mutual	   trust.	   Mutual	  recognition	   legal	   instruments	   such	   as	   the	   European	   Arrest	   Warrant	   in	   its	  negotiation,	  implementation	  and	  application	  tested	  the	  relation	  between	  mutual	  recognition	   and	   mutual	   trust.	   Mutual	   recognition	   cannot	   function	   without	   a	  concrete	  and	  solid	  existence	  of	  some	  substantial	  legally	  realised	  mutual	  trust.	  	  Mutual	  recognition	  in	  European	  Union	  Law	  is	  proved	  to	  function	  more	  efficiently	  in	   the	   presence	   of	   some	   harmonised	   elements	   of	   legislation	   better	   known	   as	  minimum	   standards.	   It	   is	   interesting	   to	   see	   how	   the	   development	   of	   certain	  minimum	   standards	   contributed	   to	   the	   establishment	   of	   mutual	   trust	   and	  therefore	  to	  the	  stability	  of	  mutual	  recognition	  regimes.	  	  The	   forwarding	   of	   mutual	   trust	   is	   also	   the	   aim	   of	   Lisbon	   Treaty	   through	   the	  adoption	   of	   minimum	   common	   rules	   on	   criminal	   law.	   The	   principles	   of	   a	   fair	  criminal	   evidence	   concept	   can	   provide	   mutual	   recognition	   with	   the	   elements	  needed	   so	   that	   it	   can	   function	   better	   in	   European	   criminal	   law.	   It	   can	   thus	  manage	   it.	   These	   principles	   can	   also	   be	   adopted	   as	   minimum	   standards	   to	  increase	  mutual	   trust.	  The	   relevance	  of	   fair	   criminal	   evidence	  principles	   to	   the	  European	   Union	   needs	   for	   more	   cooperation	   are	   also	   highlighted	   by	   the	   EU	  accession	   to	   ECHR	   that	   resolves	   the	   tension	   of	   the	   application	   of	   Article	   6	   in	  transnational	  crime	  and	  pre-­‐trial	  proceedings.	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The	   legal	   instruments	   that	   are	   introduced	   to	   deal	   with	   criminal	   evidence	   in	  Europe	  such	  as	  the	  EEW	  seem	  to	  misunderstand	  the	  systemic	  function	  of	  mutual	  recognition	   and	   its	   legal	   aspect.	   They	   seem	   to	   impose	   measures	   that	   are	  arbitrary	  and	  political,	  aiming	  at	  combating	  crime	  no	  matter	  what	  the	  cost.	  	  	  A	   more	   responsible	   approach	   should	   accommodate	   principles	   that	   are	  
conditiones	  sine	  quibus	  non	   for	   criminal	   law	  categories.	  All	  measures	   should	  be	  put	   forward	   sub	   specie	   civitatis.	   The	   anticipated	   European	   Investigation	   Order	  should	  be	  based	  on	  these	  given	  propositions.	  	  	  Principles	   such	   as	   double	   criminality,	   proportionality	   and	   territoriality	   are	  consistent	  with	  a	   fair	   criminal	   evidence	   concept	  and	  should	  be	   sustained	  since	  they	   produce	   mutual	   trust	   among	   member	   states.	   The	   four	   principles	   of	  triangular	  adversarialism	  give	  more	  light	  and	  shape	  to	  them	  and	  speak	  in	  favour	  of	  their	  necessity.	  	  	  Individual	  rights,	  the	  defence	  arsenal	  should	  also	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  in	  a	  way	  that	  helps	  the	  accused	  to	  participate	  as	  equal	  in	  the	  proceedings.	  This	  means	  that	  should	  not	  be	  regarded	  as	  something	  lower	  than	  the	  prosecution	  (presumption	  of	  innocence	  translated	  in	  certain	  criminal	  procedures)	  or	  of	  the	  same	  value	  but	  without	  the	  same	  powers	  (human	  rights	  given	  and	  reasoned	  judgments	  in	  every	  stage	  of	  the	  trial	  that	  make	  the	  criminal	  process	  transparent).	  	  The	   four	   principles	   emanating	   from	   triangular	   adversarial	   proceedings	  (triangular	   adversarialism,	   reasoned	   judgments,	   presumption	   of	   innocence,	  humane	   treatment	   or	   minimum	   state	   intervention)	   can	   practically	   work	   as	  minimum	   standards	   that	   are	   already	   in	   the	   legal	   DNA	   of	   the	   European	   legal	  orders	   inherited	   from	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights.	   This	   way	  cooperation	   in	   criminal	   matters	   can	   be	   forwarded	   in	   the	   current	   fashion	   of	  mutual	   recognition	   managed	   in	   a	   way	   appropriate	   to	   its	   character	   and	   the	  European	  Union	  needs.	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This	  proposition	  of	  the	  application	  of	  a	  concept	  of	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept	  emanating	   from	   the	   European	   Convention	   on	   Human	   Rights	   in	   the	   European	  Union	   does	   not	   constitute	   an	   absolute	   solution	   to	   the	   complexities	   of	  transnational	  judicial	  cooperation	  in	  criminal	  matters.	  It	  is	  seen	  though	  as	  a	  step	  of	   improvement	   of	   the	   current	   situation	   that	   is	   legally	   responsible	   and	   people	  sensitive;	  in	  a	  word	  fair.	  	  	  Throughout	  the	  analysis	  of	  this	  written	  task	  it	  has	  been	  illustrated	  that:	  	   1. There	   is	  a	   legal	   inheritance	   thread	  between	  ECHR	  and	   the	  EU.	  There	   is	   a	  line	  of	  legal	  inheritance	  between	  the	  ECHR	  and	  the	  European	  Union.	  This	  fact	   is	  not	   limited	   in	   the	   formal	  declarations	  of	   the	  EU	   legislation	  on	  the	  respect	  of	  human	  rights	  and	  specifically	  the	  European	  Convention.	  It	  does	  not	   even	   stop	   in	   the	   participation	   of	   all	   EU	   member	   states	   in	   it	   as	  signatories.	   Article	   6	   ECHR	   and	   the	   related	   case-­‐law	   of	   the	   ECtHR	   have	  produced	  a	  criminal	  law	  ethos	  across	  Europe	  that	  intersects	  with	  different	  traditions	   and	   serves	   as	   common	   denominator	   in	   criminal	   procedural	  matters.	  	  2. Article	   6	   ECHR	   includes	   a	   coherent	   concept	   of	   criminal	   procedural	   law.	  Article	  6	  of	  ECHR	  can	  also	  serve	  as	  a	  legal	  dogmatic	  platform	  that	  reveals	  the	  relation	  and	  interdependence	  between	  different	  concepts	  of	  law	  such	  as	  fairness,	  criminal	  procedure	  and	  evidence.	  This	  element	  of	  connection	  between	   the	   three	   points	   to	   the	   significance	   of	   fairness	   as	   central	   to	  criminal	  proceedings	  and	  also	  as	  one	  of	  the	  core	  concepts	  of	  evidence	  law	  next	  to	  relevance	  and	  admissibility.	  
	   3. Article	  6	  ECHR	  is	  evidence-­‐related.	  Article	  6	  ECHR	  can	  be	  read	  with	  respect	  to	   evidence	   law.	   This	   reading	   links	   all	   paragraphs	   of	   Article	   6	   with	  evidence	   law	   as	   it	   intersects	   with	   fairness	   and	   criminal	   procedure.	  Paragraph	   1	   refers	   mainly	   to	   the	   latter	   whereas	   paragraph	   2	   to	   the	  former.	   Paragraph	   3	   is	   an	   application	   of	   rights	   that	   are	   significant	   to	  evidence	  law	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  relates	  to	  fairness.	  There	  are	  direct	  and	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indirect	   references	   to	   evidence	   that	   enable	   a	   ‘translation’	   of	  Article	  6	   in	  evidence	  law	  terms.	  
	   4. Article	   6	   ECHR	   and	   ECtHR	   case-­‐law	   provide	   principles	   for	   a	   fair	   criminal	  
evidence	   concept.	   The	   reading	   of	   Article	   6	   ECHR	   in	   evidence	   law	   terms	  combined	   with	   the	   ECtHR	   case-­‐law	   on	   evidence	   matters	   lead	   to	   the	  formulation	   of	   directions	   about	   them.	   Four	   of	   them	   stand	   out	   as	  principles	   and	   can	   constitute	   fair	   criminal	   evidence	   in	   Europe.	   This	  includes	  values	  that	  speak	  in	  favour	  of	  evidence	  confronted	  in	  a	  ‘vis-­‐à-­‐vis’	  manner,	   presumption	   of	   innocence	   serving	   as	  modus	   judicandi,	   judicial	  decisions	  open,	  transparent	  and	  examinable	  and	  a	  liberal	  maxim.	  
	   5. Mutual	   Recognition	   has	   a	   manageable	   character.	   Mutual	   recognition,	  which	  is	  the	  principle	  that	  serves	  as	  motor	  for	  matters	  related	  to	  evidence	  law	   in	   judicial	   cooperation	   in	   criminal	   matters	   within	   the	   EU,	   is	   an	  administrative	   regime.	   Its	   closer	   observation	   confirms	   its	   manageable	  character.	   This	   managing	   or	   fine-­‐tuning	   of	   its	   functions	   leads	   to	   the	  optimization	  or	   improvement	  of	   the	  desired	  results.	  This	  actually	   leaves	  an	  open	  door	   for	   improvement	  of	   its	   functions,	  a	  space	  where	  proposed	  methods	  or	  principles	  could	  help	  towards	  the	  goals	  pursued.	  
	   6. Mutual	  Recognition	  can	  be	  managed	  by	  a	  concept	  of	  fair	  criminal	  evidence.	  The	   desired	   managing	   of	   mutual	   recognition	   can	   happen	   through	   the	  application	   of	   a	   fair	   criminal	   evidence	   concept	   as	   it	   was	   derived	   from	  ECHR	   and	   ECtHR	   case-­‐law.	   The	   fact	   that	   these	   principles	   underline	   a	  common	   criminal	   law	   tradition	   without	   imposing	   certain	   measures	   for	  their	   adoption	   serves	   as	   a	   smoother	   transition	   from	   a	   managed-­‐by-­‐fairness	  mutual	  recognition	  to	  further	  harmonisation	  through	  time.	  
	   7. Fair	   criminal	   evidence	   in	   Europe	   equals	   with	   preservation	   of	   basic	  
principles	  of	   law.	   The	   application	   of	   a	   fair	   criminal	   evidence	   concept	   on	  mutual	   recognition	   as	   a	   principle	   and	   as	   it	   is	   incorporated	   in	   legal	  instruments	  (EEW,	  EIO)	  entails	  the	  preserving	  of	  principles	  that	  advance	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fairness,	   i.e.	   the	   principles	   of	   legality,	   proportionality	   and	   of	   double	  criminality	  (as	  a	  conditio	  sine	  qua	  non	  for	  evidence	  law	  issues	  in	  criminal	  matters	   of	   judicial	   cooperation).	   The	   principle	   of	   dual	   criminality	   is	  fundamental	   both	   for	   mutual	   recognition	   in	   criminal	   evidence	   matters	  and	   the	   realisation	   of	   the	   fair	   criminal	   evidence	   with	   its	   multifaceted	  references.	  	  
	   8. Fair	   criminal	  evidence	   in	  Europe	  calls	   for	   the	  establishment	  of	  procedural	  
rights	   for	   all.	   A	   fair	   criminal	   evidence	   concept	   can	   further	   encourage	  mutual	  trust	  in	  EU	  criminal	  evidence	  matters	  through	  the	  constitution	  of	  procedural	  rights	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  it.	  The	  maximum	  protection	  of	  the	  rights	  of	  the	  European	  Citizen	  are	  a	  demand	  for	  translating	  the	  principles	  of	   fair	   criminal	   evidence	   into	   a	   catalogue	   of	   safeguards	   that	   is	   not	  exhaustive	  but	  open	  to	  additions.	  By	  a	  maximum	  standard	  of	  protection	  it	  is	   implied	   the	   intention	   of	   avoiding	   the	   pitfall	   of	   a	   lowest	   possible	  common	  denominator.	  After	  all,	  defendant’s	  rights	  –which	  are	  crucial–	  do	  not	  require	  the	  operation	  of	  a	  harmonised	  international	  procedure.	  
	   9. Fair	   criminal	   evidence	   in	   Europe	   leads	   to	   the	   adoption	   of	   harmonised	  
common	   standards.	   The	   adoption	   of	   common	   standards	   that	   reflect	   the	  fair	  criminal	  evidence	  concept	  emanating	  from	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  Council	  of	  Europe	   is	   a	   normal	   consequence	   of	   a	   mutual	   recognition	   managed	   by	  fairness	  and	  building	  on	  mutual	  trust.	  These	  procedural	  standards	  aim	  at	  the	  transparency	  of	  the	  proceedings,	  which	  at	  the	  same	  time	  are	  formed	  in	   a	   triangular	   way	   that	   respects	   all	   parties	   in	   the	   criminal	   process	  (defendant,	   judge	   and	   prosecutor).	   These	   could	   direct	   towards	   the	  gathering	   of	   evidence	   (where	   the	   forum	  regit	  actum	   rule	   could	   function	  harmoniously	   for	   the	   ‘free	   movement	   of	   evidence’)	   and	   a	   menu	   of	  exclusionary	  (rather	  than	  inclusionary)	  rules.	  
	   10. The	  European	  Investigation	  Order	  should	  mirror	  the	  need	  for	  the	  upholding	  
of	   criminal	   law	   principles,	   individual	   rights	   and	   common	   standards.	   This	  can	   happen	   if	   the	   outcome	   of	   the	   negotiations	   includes	   detailed	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obligations	   for	   the	  protection	  of	  human	  rights	  and	   ‘minimum’	  standards	  for	   search	   and	   seizure	   based	   on	   a	   fair	   criminal	   concept	   platform.	  Moreover	  the	  principles	  of	  territoriality	  and	  double	  criminality	  should	  not	  be	   abolished.	   Finally,	   validation	   procedures,	   data	   protection	   and	  opportunities	  to	  refuse	  gathering	  of	  types	  of	  evidence	  should	  be	  inspired	  by	   standardised	   transparent	   procedures,	   concrete	   evidence-­‐applied	  individual	  procedural	  rights	  in	  an	  adversarial	  context	  as	  described	  in	  the	  thesis	  in	  hand.	  More	  specifically:	  
 11. The	   final	   EIO	   instrument	   should	   clarify	   the	   definition	   of	   the	   ‘investigative	  
measures’	  so	  that	  the	  types	  of	  measures	  are	  known	  and	  specific.	  This	  is	  not	  only	  necessary	  for	  the	  respect	  of	  the	  principle	  of	  legality	  (lex	  certa),	  in	  its	  procedural	  form,	  but	  also	  for	  the	  application	  of	  the	  system	  of	  cooperation	  (MLA	   or	   MR)	   to	   any	   given	   measure,	   its	   legal	   basis	   and	   the	   potential	  provision	  for	  grounds	  for	  refusal.	  
	   12. The	   final	  EIO	   instrument	  should	  preserve	  the	  principles	  of	  proportionality,	  
double	   jeopardy,	   dual	   criminality	   and	   territoriality.	   The	   double	   jeopardy	  and	   proportionality	   exceptions	   should	   not	   be	   optional.	   In	   these	  exceptions	   the	   dual	   criminality	   should	   also	   be	   added	   along	  with	   a	   clear	  requirement	   of	   the	   proportionality	   principle.	   It	   does	   not	   seem	   feasible	  that	   these	   measures	   can	   be	   abolished	   with	   the	   current	   differences	  between	  EU	  members’	  legislations.	  
	   13. The	   final	   EIO	   instrument	   should	   include	   specific	   rules	   conditioning	  
interception	   of	   telecommunications.	  As	   it	   applies	   to	   the	   definition	   of	   the	  types	   of	   investigative	   measures	   included	   in	   the	   EIO,	   interception	   of	  telecommunications	  compatibility	  with	  human	  rights	  should	  be	  checked.	  The	  approach	  that	  will	  be	  followed	  should	  allow	  rights	  to	  the	  individuals	  involved	   in	   these	   procedures	   in	   favour	   of	   their	   information,	   humane	  treatment	   and	   substantial	   defence	   that	   respect	   the	   presumption	   of	  innocence.	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14. The	   final	   EIO	   instrument	   should	   introduce	   measures	   that	   forward	  
transparency	  in	  the	  cooperation	  between	  the	  judicial	  authorities	  of	  member	  
states.	   This	   could	   be	   achieved	   through	   the	   wide	   use	   of	   reports	   that	  present	   the	   legal	   basis	   of	   the	   measure	   taken	   and	   give	   reasons	   for	   the	  operative	  strategy	  adopted	   in	  concreto,	  which	  should	  be	   in	   line	  with	   the	  national	   law	   and	   the	   practical	   circumstances	   of	   the	   case.	   Every	   single	  investigative	  measure	  should	  be	  accompanied	  by	  its	  report	  giving	  reasons	  for	  it.	  	   15. The	   final	   EIO	   instrument	   should	   allow	   the	   adversarial	   nature	   of	   the	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